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The French philosopher Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) was deeply influenced by 
the classical tradition of American philosophy. Marcel’s first essays focused upon the 
philosophy of Josiah Royce (1855-1916). Royce impressed Marcel due to his ability to 
engage in bold, imaginative construction and yet remain “faithful to the empirical 
tradition, which he deepened and enriched….” Marcel was also deeply influenced by 
William Ernest Hocking’s (1873-1966) major work, The Meaning of God in Human 
Experience which, for Marcel, not only reaffirmed the religious dimension of human 
experience but also served as “an advance in the direction of that metaphysical realism 
toward which I resolutely tended.” Lastly, Marcel had a sustained personal and 
philosophical relationship with Henry G. Bugbee Jr. (1915-1999) of the University of 
Montana. Marcel first met Bugbee at Harvard University while delivering the William 
James Lectures in 1961. Willard Van Orman Quine described Bugbee as “the ultimate 
exemplar of the examined life” and Calvin Schrag described him as “the most 
marginalized philosopher in America.” 
Part I consists of a comprehensive examination of Marcel’s philosophy, focusing 
upon the manner in which his thought exhibits a strong sense of “ontological continuity” 
– establishing a fundamental relationship between human being and the transcendent. 
According to Marcel “Finite thought is continually attracted by a beyond which eternally 
escapes it.” Part I will be followed by three sections (Parts II-IV) devoted to the 
relationship between Marcel and the thought of Royce, Hocking, and Bugbee 
respectively. The relationship between Marcel and these philosophers is based largely 
upon their mutual critique of abstract thinking and a shared belief in the presence of a 
decisive connection between human being and the transcendent. The thesis concludes 
with Part V entitled “The Religious Dimension of Experience,” which explores the 
manner in which a select cadre of American philosophers has successfully developed the 
philosophical implications of Marcel’s work. As Marcel indicated, “Perhaps the most 
important task on the plane of speculation is to deepen once again the notion of life itself 
in the light of the highest and most genuine religious thought.” 
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You would not find out the boundaries of the soul, even by traveling along every path: so 
deep a logos does it have. 
 
  Heraclitus 
 
 
A philosopher is a human soul which remembers its own divinity and behaves as 
becomes a god. 
 
  Étienne Gilson 
 
 
There will be no saying, “Look, here it is! or there it is!” For, behold, the kingdom of 
God is within you. 
 
  Luke 17:20-21 
 
 
Truth is simple 
But seldom ever seen.  
Let nothing come between 
Simple man, simple dream. 
 
  John David Souther 
 
 
And then in the desert, when the sun comes up, I couldn't tell where heaven stopped and 
the earth began. 
 
  Forrest Gump 
 
 
I saw a highway of diamonds and nobody on it. 
 
  Bob Dylan 
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Introduction 
 
The Religious Dimension of Experience:  
Gabriel Marcel and American Philosophy 
 
“Perhaps the most important task on the plane of speculation is to deepen once again the notion of 
life itself in the light of the highest and most genuine religious thought.”1 
 
“A kind of magnetic field stretches around my life … one of the poles of this magnetic field was 
and remains, in spite of everything, America.”2 
 
§ 
 
Investigational Context 
 
 The fact that Marcel’s philosophy has largely been relegated to the dustbin of 
philosophy bespeaks a very sad state of affairs. Despite his great popularity in the 60’s 
and 70’s as a “Christian existentialist,” Marcel’s thought currently claims few followers. 
Due to his emphasis on concreteness and his antipathy to abstraction in any form, 
Marcel’s writings are often misread as effeminate, unsophisticated, and lacking in 
philosophical rigor – even by continental standards! Unlike Derrida and other recent 
French writers, Marcel’s thought has failed to attract a subsequent generation of readers. 
 This is unfortunate because Marcel’s thought is rich both in its content and its 
relevance to inter-disciplinary investigations. One aspect of Marcel’s thought that has yet 
to be explored is its relationship to classical American philosophy. The fact that 
American philosophy is driven by an appeal to experience in its rich dimensionality 
allows for an immediate synergy with Marcel’s thought. The purpose of this study is to 
present Marcel’s thought and its relation to three important American philosophers: 
Josiah Royce, William Hocking, and Henry Bugbee. 
                                                 
1 Gabriel Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, trans. M. Harari (London: Harvill Press Ltd., 1954): 19. 
2 Gabriel Marcel, Awakenings, trans. Peter Rogers (Marquette University Press, 2002): 211, 213. 
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 The lines of connection between Marcel and these thinkers are various and rich. 
Few readers of Marcel are aware that the first philosophical position he embraced was 
objective idealism. This idealistic orientation gave Marcel a unique vantage point from 
which to understand and evaluate Royce’s thought.  For this reason, the essays that 
comprise the Royce monograph – perhaps the least known of all Marcel’s writings – 
remain to this day a gold standard in Royce studies. Yet despite the idealistic tenor of his 
work on Royce, Marcel was clearly moving away from his idealistic orientation towards 
what he referred to as “metaphysical realism.” This shift in perspective was a direct result 
of his exposure to Hocking’s The Meaning of God in Human Experience – a monumental 
work emphasizing the primacy of intersubjective relations. Perhaps the closest thing to an 
American equivalent to Gabriel Marcel is Henry Bugbee. Marcel’s important notions of 
ontological exigence and secondary reflection are given concrete testimonial in Bugbee’s 
work, approaching a level of experiential intensity not seen in American thought since 
Edwards and Thoreau. According to Marcel, “Henry Bugbee and I inhabit the same land 
… [a land] illuminated by a light of its own.”3 
§ 
Thematic Orientation 
 
The religious dimension of experience provides an ideal theme around which to 
orient Marcel’s thought in its American context. Experience in its religious 
dimensionality is multivalent, requiring a series of interconnected perspectives for its 
proper disclosure. While any phenomenological description of experience must remain 
                                                 
3 Gabriel Marcel, “Introduction,” to The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form 
(University of Georgia Press, 1999): 18. 
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incomplete, the following themes represent the most integral dimensions of experience in 
its manifestation as religious.  
A Broken World 
 
 The recognition of experience in its religious capacity occurs within the context of 
what Marcel aptly refers to as a “broken world.” In the course of day to day living, our 
primary mode of relating to the world is functional. Marcel characterizes this mode of 
relatedness as “primary reflection” – things are abstracted from their animating context 
and visualized simply through the immediate function they serve within a restricted 
network of efficient causality. Despite their role within a causal chain, things disclosed 
strictly from within a functional context appear fragmented. In religious terms, the 
experience of the pragmatization of human beings and relations is referred to as profane. 
According to Marcel, “what is indeed meaningful, what reveals a spiritual life, is always 
a variation in habits, the breaking of a rhythm which seemed inalterable.”4 Religious 
experience – in its binding capacity as religio – discloses the entire telic context within 
which a thing persists. Since this context is ultimately spiritual – reflecting an animating 
source that is inexplicable in simply materialistic terms – a thing is spiritually disclosed 
when it is revealed on a plane that is other than material. Experience of this kind is 
deemed sacred – reflective of being. From a Marcellian perspective, being reveals a 
surplus that cannot be dissolved or explained away by mathematical-physical explanation 
– “a tension which could only … be resolved in an illumination [that] comes from some 
point much higher than man”.5  As one commentator has insightfully remarked: “the 
vitality of [Marcel’s] work … has to do, I think, with the intuition that the infinite is 
                                                 
4 Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, trans. V. and G. Ringer (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956: 
92. Hereafter referred to as RM. 
5 Awakenings: 109. Marcel will refer to this tension as “the exigience of Being.”  
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reflected in one’s private life.”6    
 Marcel’s view of the world as broken stemmed from witnessing the devastation 
resulting from two world wars – worlds at war are necessarily broken worlds. But a world 
can be broken in ways other than physically. The sense of homelessness that results from 
large displaced populations, bureaucratically administered social policies, and 
overcrowded mega-cities all contribute to a broken, fragmented type of existence. This 
darker side of modernity tends to be explained away callously through such trite phrases 
as “efficient and effective,” and “the law of large numbers” – but Marcel will not tolerate 
any “spirit of abstraction” whose goal is merely to blind us to the horrors inhabiting the 
concrete. The peripatetic nature of Marcel’s thought – sinuous and winding – enabled 
him to experientially grasp these horrors of modern life. Marcel’s appeal to secondary 
reflection in its recuperative capacity – a radical maneuver according to the standards of 
contemporary philosophy – constitutes an attempt to heal this sense of fragmentation by 
reconnecting human existence with its animating source in being: “remaking, thread by 
thread, the spiritual fabric heedlessly torn.”7 The sense of fragmentation that weighs upon 
the human species is the material expression of an infinitely more essential degradation 
having to do with the fact that humanity has been cut off from what Marcel refers to as 
our “ontological roots.” 
 Royce died in 1916, shortly after the beginning of World War I. His philosophical 
corpus reflects an acute sense of the volatile state of world affairs – in fact, the rapid 
deterioration of his health has been attributed to the outbreak of the war. The Roycean 
notion of “prophetic pragmaticism,” as exemplified in his writings on loyalty and 
                                                 
6 Jacques de Bourbon Bussett, “Preface,” in Awakenings: 30. 
7 Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope, trans. E. Craufurd (Harper & Row: 
1962): 100.  
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community, is a direct response to the looming prospect of a world teetering on the brink 
of destruction. 
 A broken world, from a Roycean perspective, is a world that has lost its reverence 
for the relations of life. It is commonly known that Royce grew up in a mining town in 
California during the gold rush era. This experience gave Royce a deep sense of relations, 
both natural and communal. From his earliest writings his objective is to reunite a world 
torn asunder by truncation. Nowhere is this monumental effort at reconstruction more 
evident than in the First Series of his Gifford Lectures entitled The Four Historical 
Conceptions of Being. Realism, Mysticism, and Critical Idealism are doctrinally 
incapable of accounting for the infinite series of relations that constitute the real – they 
simply cannot mend a broken world. In order to reunite the world in terms of the full 
scope of its relationality, one must embrace either a system of Absolute Idealism – as 
depicted in The World and the Individual – or, perpetually engage in the interpretive 
disclosure of the divine Logos à la Apostle Paul – as stated in The Problem of 
Christianity. Royce’s thought underwent definite stages to be sure, but each stage was a 
response to a broken world. 
 Hocking was also profoundly aware of the existence of a broken world – his 
notion of a “coming world civilization” reflects his attempt to reunite humanity through a 
peri-Christian, albeit non-sectarian, approach to solidarity. A world civilization must 
overcome the brokenness and fragmentation of the present – a condition tragically 
exacerbated by what is currently referred to as globalization. For Hocking, the key to 
achieving the unity required for a genuine sense of community lies in disclosing 
experience in its intersubjective integrity – “I” and “Thou” existing as co-knowers of a 
 6
shared world. This sense of sharedness provides the “refractory kernel” of Hocking’s 
metaphysics – the cement needed to repair our sense of brokenness: “[I]t is God from the 
beginning who shares all of our objects and so is the real medium of communication 
between one person and another.8 Religious experience, for Hocking, is realized within 
the foreground of experience, under a “cloud of witness.” 
 Henry Bugbee writes sparingly about the details of a broken world, although he 
does make occasional references to growing up in New York City “within the yearning 
bleakness of solitariness and milling multitudes.9”  Bugbee’s life and work, however, 
provide a compelling testimony as to the importance of the leading an examined life, 
offering a courageous example as to how one might pursue living so as to recover a world 
that is no longer broken. Having been denied tenure at Harvard University for lack of 
scholarly output, Bugbee migrated to Montana – the mountains and river providing 
phenomenological evidence as to the continuous nature of being. Authentic living, in a 
Bugbean sense, recognizes that the real is non-inferentially given and the need to “weigh 
everything by the measure of the silent pressure of things, clarified by the cry of the 
hawks, solidified in the presence of rocks, spelled syllable by syllable by waters of 
manifold voice, and consolidated in the act of taking steps.”10  
A Return to Experience 
 
The traditional empirical conception of experience is inadequate when it comes to 
demonstrating the rich dimensionality of experience. Lockean empiricism simply cannot 
register the syllables made by “waters of manifold voice.” A re-conception of experience 
                                                 
8 From a letter written by Hocking in 1920. Cited in Leroy J. Rouner, Within Human Experience: The 
Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking (Harvard University Press, 1969): 41. 
9 Henry G. Bugbee, “Loneliness, Solitude, and the Twofold Way in which Concern Seems to be Claimed,” 
Humanitas, Nov., 1974: 314 
10 The Inward Morning: 139. 
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is required. Marcel recognized this very early in life when, in the wake of the death of his 
mother, he confided to his aunt that he would “find out” about the nature of the spiritual 
afterlife. As he reflected later – “It would be a mistake to take those childhood words 
lightly, in some ways they determined the course I was to take.”11  
Marcel’s course consisted of traversing experience on multiple levels. 
Parapsychology, music, and drama provide just a few examples of the unconventional 
routes Marcel explored in order to illuminate the vast potential of what experience is 
capable of yielding when examined in depth. In fact, Marcel remains adamant that 
experience resists spatial and ocular representation:  
I am not a spectator who is looking for a world of structures susceptible to being viewed 
clearly and distinctly, but rather I listen to voices and appeals comprising that symphony 
of Being—which is for me, in the final analysis, a supra-rational unity beyond images, 
words, and concepts.12 
 
 Despite his being labeled a dyed in the wool idealist, Royce displays a profound 
appreciation of experience. Perhaps no greater compliment can come from anyone other 
than Marcel: “Royce, with an eclecticism which by no means implies feebleness of 
thought, searched for his solutions wheresoever he found authentic and profound 
intellectual experience, wheresoever he felt a direct contact with that reality in which we 
bathe and outside of which we are nothing.”13 Royce possessed a catholic intellect – the 
poetry of Browning, Eastern mysticism, the latest developments in mathematical logic – 
little escaped his voracious capacity for assimilation. Unlike those who have used the 
tools of logic to narrow the scope of philosophical investigation, Royce stands out as one 
                                                 
11 Gabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity (Harvard University Press, 1963): 25. 
12 Ibid.: 82-83. 
13 Royce’s Metaphysics: xvi.  See also “Author’s Preface to the English Edition,” in Metaphysical Journal, 
trans. B. Wall (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), p. vii: “[B]eing cannot be indicated, it cannot be shown, it 
can only be alluded to…. 
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who was able to appropriate the developments in logic for speculative purposes. Take, for 
example, his creative use of Dedekind’s notion of a “self-representative system.” A self-
representative system is able to capture the Absolute totum simul by virtue of its ability to 
“contain a complete and perfect image or view of itself. Hence it is, in structure, at once 
One, as a single system, and also and endless Kette [i.e. series]….” 14 Royce argued that 
the Absolute – far from being completely other-worldly – was susceptible to concrete 
representation. This characterization of a self-representative system as “One” and 
“endless” at the same time serves as the basis upon which Royce develops the notion of 
an individual as a fulfilled life plan – a unique and complete teleologically-defined 
moment of existence. 
Hocking refers to his brand of empiricism as absolute because experience grasps 
the world as “one stupendous fact.” Despite his training as an engineer, Hocking 
preferred biological explanations over mechanical accounts. Religious experience 
qualifies as religious to the extent that it consists of “in-letting, or osmosis, between the 
human spirit and the living tissue wherein it is eternally carried.”15  This process of 
experiential osmosis is a result of our capacity for feeling – feeling and ideation are 
organically continuous. Through the satisfaction of feeling, ideas are given the capacity 
to stretch and coalesce with their object, allowing for a “perfect continuity between 
prophecy and fulfillment.”16 While he recognizes the valuational capacity of the subject 
to shape our understanding of the real, Hocking remains ultimately a realist by 
                                                 
14 Bruce Kuklick, Josiah Royce: An Intellectual Biography (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1972): 140. 
Royce’s appropriation of Peircean triadic logic in The Problem of Christianity provides another compelling 
example of the speculative use of logic. 
15 William E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (Yale University Press, 1912): 95. 
16 Ibid. 68. See also p. 135: Feeling “constitutes the very tour de force of objectivity.” 
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emphasizing the priority of being. Reality is ultimately spiritual, but “the finite knower 
knows realistically; the being of the object is prior to his own.”17 
Bugbee views experience intuitively as an act of sympathetic engagement that is 
able to penetrate the deep recesses of the world: “When we place our ears close to the 
stream of life we do not hear the ticking of segregated consecutive instants but rather a 
constant hum, a mingling of harmonies interposed by epoch changes in key and 
imperceptible blends.”18 The subject is naturally open to presence. The world does not 
“stand against” us in the form of an object (Gegenstand): “Experience is permeated with 
meaning by invasion.”19 This notion of experience is counter to the traditional conception 
of a passive tabula rasa in which a detached spectator registers images upon the film-like 
membrane of consciousness. A subject undergoes a process of immersion “with complete 
absorption … being comprehended and sustained in a universal situation.”20  Experience 
assumes the character of an interactive, reflexive process – in Dewey’s phrase an “affair 
of affairs” – through which subject and object are so co-constituted that human being and 
knowing are brought to bear most directly on the development of one another. 
Reflexive Capacity of Experience 
The reflexive capacity of experience is a discovery of major importance for each 
of these thinkers. Experience is bi-directional – possessing both centripetal and 
centrifugal axes. Traditional accounts of experience have focused upon its centrifugal 
axis, serving as a source of connection between the subject and the “outside” world. 
However, reflexive experience also exhibits an interior, centripetal axis which is 
                                                 
17 Ibid.: 571. 
18 Henry Bugbee, In Demonstration of the Spirit (1936), p. 22. This is Bugbee’s Princeton undergraduate 
thesis. 
19 The Inward Morning: 41. 
20 Ibid.: 51-52. 
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extremely rich in its disclosive capacity. When the subject is experientially impacted by 
an event, a mental response of some kind occurs – an image, sensation, idea, or thought. 
Qua mental (Geistigheit), these affective responses potentially elevate the subject into the 
realm of spirit (Geist), revealing a vast reservoir of being that exceeds the reach of the 
material. At the spiritual level, life gives birth to something more than itself. When a self 
becomes vivified by an idea – stung by it – a quickening of self-consciousness occurs. 
Through the reflexive act of reflection our ideational capacity is enhanced. This human 
capacity for perpetually increasing the scope of reflexion constitutes the cognitive side of 
mystical experience – a grafting of the flesh onto the spirit. As Emerson said, “Let a man 
fall into his divine circuits, and he is enlarged. Obedience to his genius is the only 
liberating influence.”21 
Marcel’s emphasizes the fecund relationship existing between reflexivity and 
what he refers to as coesse – interactive participation in being. Participation consists of an 
active reception or “inward relaxation” in which the subject becomes de-centered, fused 
with a “fructifying,” ontological dimension which defies any form of articulation from 
within the restricted register of primary reflection. Secondary reflection consists of the 
intra-experiential attempt to trace these intrauterine contours of experience to their 
furthest reaches – a dimension which can only be conceived dynamically: “[This] 
recurring … inevitable spiral character of intellectual motion … is one of the constants of 
my thought.”22 
                                                 
21 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Complete Prose of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. G.T. Bettany (London: Ward 
Lock & Company, 1890): 160. Cf. John 6:63 “It is Spirit that vivifies.” 
22 Gabriel Marcel, “Postface (Epilogue)” in Philosophical Fragments: 1909-1914, ed. L. Blain (University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1965): 127. 
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Royce turns to the reflexive dimension of experience to counter the fragmentation 
resulting from our quotidian tendency to combine narrow thinking and vigorous action. 
Intricate series of relations are truncated. Finite consciousness must become unhinged 
from its functional limitations in order to fulfill its complete realization. For Royce, 
“every single power sends us beyond itself for the interpretation of the meaning of the 
whole.”23 The significance of the “Fourth Conception of Being” – Absolute Idealism – 
lies in its ability to conceptually envision the entire relational expanse that is spread 
before us in the form of the unique life-plan of a human being. If the “upshot” of a 
particular experience consists of the qualitative impact it exhibits within the course of 
one’s life, then the experiential upshot of experience, from a Roycean perspective, 
consists of the apex of meaning derived from an infinite weave of possible relations. This 
ability to articulate the infinite in finite form discloses the divine aspect of human 
existence: “The sun of true Being has risen before our eyes … and we shall enter at last 
the homeland.”24 
Hocking and Bugbee are also attentive to experience in its reflexive depth. What 
is deemed to be merely “subjective feeling” exhibits a universal resonance across the 
experiential spectrum. Hocking once remarked that “man is born in the freedom and unity 
of the Spirit, but everywhere he is in the chains of bodily separation….”25  Through 
traversing the reflexive contours of experience, one is able reestablish one’s primordial 
unity qua spirit: “[T]he kingdom of philosophical truth is within…. A recall to such self-
                                                 
23 Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (Harper Torchbook Edition, 1958): 289. 
24 Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, First Series, The Four Historical Conceptions of Being 
(Macmillan Company, 1899): 342. Hereafter referred to as W&I (FS). 
25 Daniel S. Robinson, Royce and Hocking: American Idealists (Christopher Publishing House, 1968): 160. 
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knowledge … is one of the perennial functions of philosophy.”26 For Bugbee, experience 
exhibits its reflexive capacity in the form of a movement beyond. By returning to the rich 
depths of experience reflectively, we are able to recollect a sense of unity that consists of 
being radically sustained in being with being – “[a] light dawns upon us in the light of 
which we become enlightened in our relationship with [things], as they dawn on us as 
given in that light.”27 The self emerges within this reflexive happening – spirit reveals 
itself perspectivally through limited acts of self disclosure. For both Hocking and 
Bugbee, reflexive experience is a function of a heightened consciousness of the self. As 
Paul stated in 1 Corinthians 6:19 – “You are not your own … your body is a temple of 
the Holy Spirit.”  In Hocking’s terms, “I am in thy great room of thy soul; and I 
experience thy very experience.”28 
The Primacy of Intersubjective Being 
 
 The primacy of intersubjective being constitutes a vital concern for each of these 
thinkers. For modern philosophy beginning with Cartesian dualism, intersubjectivity 
posed an almost insurmountable problem. Husserlian phenomenology, with its primary 
emphasis upon the intentionality of consciousness, was initially seen as offering a 
solution. Husserl conceived cognitive intentions are primary – being is identified with the 
object qua known within the transcendental ego. Intersubjective being becomes, at best, a 
second level, derivate type of intention. For Husserl, intersubjectivity is a thematic 
problem to be phenomenologically overcome as opposed to a fundamental datum existing 
                                                 
26 William E. Hocking, The Self, Its Body and Freedom (Yale University Press, 1928): vii, viii. Hereafter  
referred to as SBF. 
27 Henry Bugbee, “A Point of Co-Articulation in the Life and Thought of Gabriel Marcel,” in Philosophy 
Today, Vol. XIX, Spring, 1975): 65. 
28 The Meaning of God in Human Experience: 266. See also p. 542: “[P]sychical categories are 
complementary to physical categories.” 
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ontologically prior to any attempt to solve it as a problem. Instead of a problem requiring 
a solution, intersubjective being is a given, or Gegebensein, to be embraced. 
 Royce provides an example of the approach to intersubjectivity as a problem by 
viewing intersubjectivity as possible only on the condition of the existence of a “third” – 
either the Absolute, à la World and the Individual, or the set of universal symbols 
through which the Absolute was disclosed, ά la The Problem of Christianity. According 
to Royce, we have no direct empirical knowledge of ourselves or of other minds. As one 
commentator remarked, “For Royce, individuals are like the monads of Leibniz except 
that they are not entirely windowless. They have a skylight to the Absolute…. The line of 
communication between Royce and his neighbor is always indirect.”29 
 Royce’s position was deemed untenable by both Hocking and Marcel. While still 
under Royce’s tutelage at Harvard, Hocking argued for an extended conception of 
empirical knowledge that includes an awareness of oneself as well as another “and so 
admit an element of realism within the ideal totality.”30 Marcel would seize upon this 
fundamental insight of Hocking as well, claiming that this “provocative accent on 
intersubjectivity … challenged Proust’s monadism.”31 Both Marcel and Hocking 
proceeded to emphasize the sheer immediacy of intersubjective being that resides “out 
front” within the foreground of experience. Marcel describes this immediate feeling of 
togetherness as: “We become simply us.”32 According to Hocking, “I can imagine no 
contact more real and thrilling than this.”33  
                                                 
29 Within Human Experience: The Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking: 21. 
30 William E. Hocking, “Preface” to Royce’s Metaphysics: viii. 
31  Awakenings: 72. 
32 Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, trans. B. Wall (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952): 146 
33 The Meaning of God in Human Experience: 266. 
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From his years spent at sea, Bugbee realized that human beings are deeply 
susceptible to existing in communion with others. To use a term of Marcel’s, we are 
disponible. As Kant indicated, our dignity as human beings elevates us to a level 
surpassing that of phenomenal being, allowing the self to exceeding its physical 
boundaries and to participate in the wider dimension of spiritual life. The Gospel 
according to John 3:8 expresses this diffusive aspect of spirit in the statement: “The wind 
bloweth where it listeth.” For Bugbee, our capacity for spirit enables the subject to exist 
intersubjectively by “partak[ing] in thought of the closed circuit of reality in which we 
live and move and have our being.”34 Within this closed circuit, we are invaded from 
within by a spirit which commands our profoundest respect. In the words of Thoreau, 
things speak directly “without metaphor.” 
 
The Quest for Wholeness 
 
 Each of these thinkers views philosophy as an activity of synthetic reconstruction. 
This is not to say that they are simply against analysis per se – analysis is seen as an 
important technique for enabling things to be viewed in their isolated particularity, 
extracted out of the larger context within which they exist. This process of isolating a 
particular from its larger context of associations is referred to as abstraction – from the 
Latin verb abstraho, meaning “to drag away from or remove forcibly.” Abstraction strips 
an object of any characteristics other than those which are conventionally deemed to 
constitute its essential identity. But a thing cannot be reduced to a set of defining 
characteristic – a thing is able to assume an essential character only on the basis of its 
wider associations. This tendency towards abstraction assumes the character of 
                                                 
34 The Inward Morning: 169. 
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viciousness when the qualities that are eliminated through the act of abstraction are 
viewed as a minor form of collateral damage or, worst of all, the recognition that any 
qualities have been eliminated is completely lost. 
An appeal must be made to a sense of the whole in order to protect the complex 
relational character of being from excision under the knife of abstraction – a thousand 
deaths by one cut! Marcel’s approach to reconstructing a sense of the whole is through 
the vehicle of secondary reflection. Whereas primary reflection analyzes data for the 
purpose of analysis and segmentation, secondary reflection is recueillement or 
recuperative – seeking higher unities associated with overall structures, organic wholes 
and intelligible syntheses without which physical being would not be recognizable. 
Marcel was very much influenced by the philosophy of Louis Lavelle who viewed the 
finite self as primordially inscribed within being – “la présence actuelle et inévitable de 
la totalité de ľ etre en chaque point.”35 This sense of being inscribed within being must 
not be conceived in otherworldly terms. As Marcel once remarked, it is a “[r]eturn to the 
here and now, which recover an unparallel dignity and worth.”36 
Royce’s appeal to a sense of the whole is initially adumbrated through his 
emphasis upon the internal meaning of an idea and its whole fulfillment when viewed 
within the context of an infinite series of relations. The significance of an idea is 
completely fulfilled through a process of tracing the infinite series in which it is 
implicated – culminating in the Absolute. At this elevated vantage point, truth and being 
are defined in one stroke: “All finite experience must be regarded as a fragment of a 
                                                 
35 Louis Lavelle, La présence totale (Aubier: Paris, 1934): 12. Translation: The actual and inevitable 
presence of the totality (whole) of being (with)in each point.   
36 Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary, trans. K. Farrer (Peter Smith Publishers, 
1976): 24. 
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whole, whose content is present in the unity of consciousness of one absolute moment.”37 
The later Royce will abandon the notion of a whole conceived totum simul within the 
conspectus of the Absolute’s eternal regard. Adopting a more historical approach, Royce 
came to view the Absolute as revealed developmentally by virtue of its ongoing 
interpretative disclosure through the acts of finite minds sub specie aeternitatis. As a 
result of Its perpetual diversification at the hands of finite interpreters, the Absolute 
becomes a perfectly ordered system over an extended period of time.  
Hocking’s thought is thematically centered upon an understanding of the whole. 
Displaying his prior training as an engineer, Hocking equates “the whole” to a textile 
loom: “In the beginning was, at least, the Loom; and always remains the simple-total 
frame of things….” 38 The loom weaves a fabric that exhibits an intricate texture but, 
once produced, the weave exhibits no visible sign of the loom. For Hocking, the loom’s 
presence is felt as a “non-impulsive background.” An understanding of the whole is not 
derived genetically, it is felt all at once: Reality, in its full infinity and wholeness, is now 
before me and has been so from my conscious beginning.”39 By re-tracing the guiding 
threads contained within the intricate texture of experience, one can recollect a sense of 
“the Loom” – the source of created being. As Hocking expresses this process: “We are 
looking for man and we found God.”40 
Bugbee’s sense of the whole is reflected through his use of the concept of the 
sublime. The sublime is disclosed in those instances in which experience conveys a 
looming sense of the infinite. Being is not susceptible to systematic comprehensiveness – 
                                                 
37 Josiah Royce, The Conception of God (MacMillan Company, 1897): 204. 
38 The Meaning of God in Human Experience: 97. 
39 Ibid.: 96. 
40 The Meaning of God in Human Experience: 301. 
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categories of limitation are simply not applicable: “The mystery of each thing is the 
mystery of all things; and this … is the foundation of the universe: the omnirelevance of 
the experience of something as sacred.”41 Since his days as an undergraduate, Bugbee 
wrestled with the problem as to how to articulate the importance of the sublime as a 
philosophical category. Recognizing the limitations of philosophy narrowly conceived: “I 
am afraid I will have to break the confines of the medium, for images and a full conscious 
life beckon me more than their purified reflection – ideas.”42 Bugbee makes an heroic 
appeal to the splendor of things in their simplicity. By experientially appealing to the 
fundamental vividness of things, we are able to witness the incarnation of meaning at a 
foundational level: 
Not such as this, but this. So long as this is taken as such as … one has not yet 
responded to this. This, indeed only sinks in as we are involved with it at a level 
or depth appreciative of its mystery.43 
 
Being as Creative 
 
 The difficulty of articulating the whole representationally can be overcome 
through the capacity of the human being to exist creatively. Here it is best to begin with 
Royce. Perhaps the most vexing issue with which Royce had to contend during the period 
of The World and the Individual was the problem of how to reconcile the idea of personal 
freedom with the notion of the individual as a completely fulfilled life plan – a plan 
consummated in the Absolute. Much is at stake in whether or not a “total accord” 
between the Absolute and the individual can be realized. This issue would ultimately 
force a shift in Royce’s thought, but his initial solution to the problem involved having 
the individual life plan qualitatively effect the countenance of Absolute being: “[T]his 
                                                 
41 The Inward Morning: 209. 
42 In Demonstration of the Spirit: 5. 
43 The Inward Morning: 225. 
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individual’s experience … when metaphysically viewed is a unique experience, and 
consequently a unique constituent of the Divine life … and therefore metaphysically 
necessary to the fulfillment of God’s own life….”44 In short, if I were otherwise, then so 
too would be God be! 
 Marcel is critical of Royce’s attempt to meld a realistic personalism with an 
idealistic monism: “[Does] this theory not leave us with a ruinous dualism by 
reestablishing on a higher level … the barriers it claimed to have broken down forever … 
[making] individuals proceed from God and … in the end reducing them to being nothing 
but Ideas, no longer Acts, i.e. ends which in the deepest sense create or deposit 
themselves.”45 From Marcel’s perspective, Royce must modify his theory by jettisoning 
the notion of divine omniscience. For those who are familiar with the course of Royce’s 
thought, this modification assumes the form of a shift from a notion of an all-inclusive 
Absolute to a more historically mediated conception. As Marcel’s remarkable conversion 
to Catholicism at the age of 41 exhibited, the relationship between God and a person is 
one of individual to individual and “this act partakes more of faith than of abstract 
thought.”46 
 At this juncture that the Roycean doctrine of loyalty takes center stage. The act of 
participatively engaging in loyal service – praxis – unconstrained by the categorical 
divisions of discursive thought, allows for a more concrete connection between finite and 
infinite being. The act of loyal participation is ontologically significant both in terms of 
the finite moment and the eternal life plan. Without participating within the context of a 
wider community, the finite individual would simply not be at all. If an individual does 
                                                 
44 The Conception of God: 293. 
45 Royce’s Metaphysics: 59. 
46 Ibid.: 73. 
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not belong to a genuine community of some kind, the heart may emit a beat but otherwise 
it is effectively dead: “Individuality is like a ferment. Introduce a germ of it into your 
world … and the universe soon swarms as with yeast, and individuality bubbles out 
everywhere.”47 But what is most important in this context is the fact that the act by which 
a person determines oneself is the very same act by which God is. Human beings are now 
viewed as assuming a greater degree of control over the direction their finite plan takes. 
No longer absorbed within an eternal cycle, human beings creatively serve themselves, 
their community, and God at the same time. The synchronic characterization of eternal 
time as totum simul has now been replaced by a more developmental, diachronic 
conception. The dualism between finite and Absolute consciousness is overcome through 
a relationship of reciprocity – the Absolute is to the extent that I serve it loyally within 
the context of my community. Intersubjective being is no longer mediated through a 
skylight to the Absolute. Royce is attempting to merge metaphysics and ethics in a way 
that will emphasize relations between living beings beneath the wide and sunny heavens 
above – “We need a new heaven and a new earth.”48 
 Marcel’s notion of creativity is built upon his concept of creative fidelity – the 
pons aeternitatis of his thought. Fidelity reveals the supra-temporal identity of the self: 
“the evidence of fixed stars in the heaven of the soul.”49 This identity is not given apriori 
– it must be creatively achieved. Our freedom is achieved during the course of those 
significant acts in which we re-create, or attest to, our being qua spirit: “Through fidelity 
                                                 
47 The Conception of God: 258. Considered outside of its role in an animating community, the individual is 
“otherwise dead and [exhibits the] stubbornly universal categories of merely abstract theory. 
48Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (Macmillan Company, 1909): 9. 
49 Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope: 9. 
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I transcend my becoming and reach my being…. Fidelity creates the self, the self as non-
object.”50 
 From his work with Royce while a student at Harvard, Hocking was convinced 
that all ideas contain an “uncounted infinity.” Through its capacity for framing ideas, the 
self has the ability to extend indefinitely, always able to regain contact in medias res with 
a world of which it is pre-reflectively an integral part. For Hocking, “the real is 
permanent and ancient as well as germinal and creative.”51 The objectivity of nature is 
due to the fact that it exists as an “Other Mind” or a self-in-its-otherness. For this reason, 
nature shines by a reflected light, not by its own.”52 The objectivity of nature provides the 
“irruptive material” that is integral to creation of the human being as it develops 
spiritually. To the extent that the finite self interacts with nature in the latter’s capacity as 
a self-in-otherness, the finite self creatively advances through the infusion of spiritual 
capital. Within the region of Absolute mind “spirits wander as shapes embedded.”53 
 The ontological dimension of human creativity is expressed as early as Bugbee’s 
undergraduate thesis. The “teleological autonomy” of the noumenal self is instantiated 
through a unity of moral purpose. The immense variety of creative attempts to forge 
meaning throughout history is the universal. The activity of creating meaning is “a unique 
and tremendously significant mode of communication rivaling pure conceptualization as 
an interpretation of Reality … for the aesthetic experience can be as intensely and widely 
synthetic as any consciousness of which man is capable.”54 
                                                 
50 Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (Fordham University Press, 1962): 69. 
51 The Meaning of God in Human Experience: 46. 
52 Ibid.: 285. 
53 Ibid.: 298. 
54 In Demonstration of the Spirit: 54. 
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 Bugbee’s empirical approach to metaphysics bespeaks a conception of being that 
is vivified through the rich infusions of sense perception. In order for something to be 
present, it must stand forth with a degree of impact, enabling it to stand out within the 
experiential field. Being may be constant but “through uneven stresses the even plane of 
being [becomes] tilted and faulted to meet the eye.”55 Sense experience must also exhibit 
a sense of poise able to modulate the intensity of impact. Impact and poise are 
complementary moments of our sense of being. 
 This sense of being puts us on the spot: “One is brought to realize one is held 
within the embrace of what is proffered in its being proffered… [We are] sponsored from 
within a depth underlying our own ability to respond.”56 The human capacity to respond 
from a greater source provides the foundation for a non-egotistical version of “self-
respect.” As we attend to our kindred relationship with animating things, we emerge 
together in unison within being. According to Bugbee: “The truly creative deed of man 
seems to be that of which he becomes lucid to himself as a creature of creation. Creation 
can only be understood through participation in it.”57  
Apotheosis of Human Consciousness: Human Being as Spirit 
 
 This sense of mutuality engendered through “reflexive reflection,” between 
human beings, divine being, and the things of nature, has significant ramifications. 
Robert Pollock characterizes this process of moving from a closed world to an infinite 
universe as an all embracing drama: 
                                                 
55 Henry Bugbee, The Sense and Conception of Being, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (University of California 
at Berkeley, 1947): 95. 
56 Henry Bugbee, “Wilderness in America,” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 42, No. 
4 (1974): 619, 620. 
57 The Inward Morning: 222, 223. See also “Thoughts on Creation,” in Essays in Philosophy, eds. Members 
of The Philosophy Department of The Pennsylvania State University (Penn State University Press, 1962), 
p. 135: “We become ourselves—truly ourselves—in willing participation in creation. We cannot conceive 
of creation in terms apart from our participation in it.” 
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But what a drastic alteration in perspective when men can envisage a wide open 
world in which development, spontaneity and novelty are entirely at home! Given this 
new image of the universe, experimentation and creativity are endowed with a new 
dignity, for they have gained a status within nature itself. Now looked on as essential 
aspects of a growing world, they speak with an authority to which [human being] gladly 
responds.58 
  
As the human being responds accordingly to its burgeoning creative potential, a 
major transformation occurs, ontologically speaking, placing a person at the liminal 
boundary between material and spiritual being. At this moment, human being approaches 
its teleological fulfillment as spirit.  
Through a reflexive connection with spirit, one is able to re-establish one’s place 
within the eternal whole. Like Bergson, Marcel believed that “Something appears to 
overflow every part of the body … passing beyond it in space as in time…. The soul … 
being precisely a force which can draw from itself more than it contains, yield more than 
it receives, give more than it has.59 Our capacity for hope provides a concrete example of 
this phenomenon in which material causality is superseded. Unlike desire, where one 
focuses upon the pursuit of a material thing, hope consists of a process whereby the self 
grasps its being in its immediacy, interiorizing itself within the total spiritual economy: “I 
hope in thee for us.”60 To truly exist, for Marcel, is to recognize the need to perpetually 
re-absorbing oneself into the realm of spirit. In Marcellian terms, telepathy allows for the 
traversing of space just as memory allows for the traversing of time.  No longer simply a 
return to the past, an appeal is made to the future as well: “[T]his region where the now 
                                                 
58 Robert C. Pollock, “Process and Experience,” in John Dewey: His Thought and Influence, ed. J. Blewett 
(Fordham University Press, 1961): 165. See infra, where Pollock states: “[T]here has taken place a kind of 
‘nuclear fission’ within the human soul itself.”  
59 Henri Bergson, Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays, trans. H.W. Carr (Henry Holt and Company, 1920): 
38, 39. See also, p. 56: “Put aside, then, artificial reconstructions of thinking; consider thinking itself, you 
will find directions rather than states…. [T]hinking is essentially a continual and continuous change of 
inward direction, incessantly tending to translate itself by changes of outward direction….”  
60 Homo Viator: 60. See also Being and Having, p. 80: “Hope is perhaps the very stuff by which our soul is 
made.” 
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and then tend to merge … could be nothing other than Eternity.”61 According to Richard 
Kroner, “… the present is the meeting point (Schnittpunkt) of time and eternity, the point 
in which time itself arises….”62 
The emergence of finite and infinite being is evident throughout Royce’s thought. 
What the finite self perceives in a fragmented, incomplete manner, the Absolute – 
through its capacity of appreciative apperception – is able to apprehend “both as a 
successive order and as a totality.”63 In order to understand the meter of poetry or the 
composition of a melody, the whole succession must somehow be present at once to 
consciousness. The beginning and the end – although not the same – are synthetically 
linked within one whole succession. 
Levels of experience, integrally linked and teleologically ordered, lead to an 
appreciation of Absolute being. What appears to the stark realist as a world of opaque, 
“fragmentary givens,” now, upon reflection, appears as a universe that is experientially 
integrated – intelligent, albeit not always pellucid to the finite gaze. In World and the 
Individual, Royce conceived this integration speculatively, but his speculative solution to 
the relationship between the one and the many – the finite and the infinite – left many, 
including Royce himself, with a gnawing sense of inadequacy. A more concrete approach 
is necessary. This integration of the finite and the finite is no longer accomplished 
vertically in totum simul under the synoptic gaze of Absolute conspection. Integration is 
now achieved horizontally through interpretive disclosure. The self-representative 
                                                 
61 Mystery of Being: Reflection and Mystery, Volume I (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company: 1960): 194. I 
am reminded of the line form the Lennon-McCartney composition Two of Us: “You and I have memories 
longer than the road that stretches out ahead.” 
62 Richard Kroner, “System und Geschichte bei Hegel,” in Logos XX, 2 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1931), p. 
255. 
63 RM: 80. See infra: “[E]veryday experience, in the apperception of succession, gives us the image, almost 
the pattern, of what eternity may be.” 
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Dedekindian Kette is now dynamically reconfigured as the arrival of a universal 
community “in which the whole order of time, the process of the spirit, is … so 
interpreted that, when viewed in the light of its goal, the whole world is reconciled to its 
own purpose.”64 This is a “living reason” unified and directionally inspired by the Holy 
Spirit – resulting in a kingdom of heaven on earth. 
  Taking his bearings from Peirce, the later Royce viewed the whole as achieved 
through a process of mutual understanding that “is in some fashion spanned by one 
insight which surveys the unity of its meaning … [embodying] the form of a Community 
of Interpretation….”65 The essence of a human being is to be mutually implicated, 
through the power of interpretation, in the progressive odyssey of spirit: “The natural 
world [is] infinite in space and time and … the salvation of man [is] bound up with the 
interpretation of an infinitely rich realm of spiritual life….66 The teleological fulfillment 
of this process of self-interpretation – both human and divine – is a Beloved Community 
consisting of “the kingdom in which all hermeneutic acts receive immediate confirmation 
and seal.”67 This sense of community is achieved through the reconciliation of diverse 
perspectives via interpretive mediation. At this prophetic moment, humankind stands 
within the horizon of a new dawn in which “self-realization and fulfillment pass from the 
sphere of ideality to that of concrete realization.”68 Royce’s later philosophy can be seen 
as an attempt to integrate the essential teachings of Christianity into the life of a people in 
order to enrich spirit.       
                                                 
64 RM: 144.   
65 Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity (Catholic University of America Press, 2001): 318. Hereafter 
referred to as PC. 
66 PC: 402.  
67 Robert S. Corrington, The Community of Interpreters: On the Hermeneutics of Nature and the Bible in 
the American Philosophical Tradition (Mercer University Press, 1987): 24. 
68 John E. Smith, Royce’s Social Infinite: The Community of Interpretation (Liberal Arts Press, 1950), p. 
163. 
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Marcel once referred to Hocking as a companion of eternity. Like his colleague 
Whitehead, Hocking stressed the vector character of feeling – the forward, intentional 
direction feeling assumes as it strives to “meet the total object-over against-me.”69 This 
sense of something greater – the whole – constitutes our spiritual destiny: 
The truth is the healing fact of which we are in search, a fact as simple, as ever-
present, and as easily overlooked as the fact of one’s own existence. It is accessible to 
every man … on the same terms; yet it falls short of being notorious common knowledge 
because of the same single-eyed industriousness of inquiry which loses sight of the 
soul…. It is the truth that the world, like the human self, has its unity in a living purpose. 
It is the truth of the existence of God.70 
 
In order to appreciate the spiritual dimension of Hocking’s thought, it is necessary 
to touch upon his appropriation of “field theory.” The field within which various sub- 
systems are related is not a function of events within any finite system. In other words, 
experience is the great matrix out of which all distinctions arise, but it is itself not wholly 
identical in nature with any of its contents. The mind serves as a vinculum, or link, 
between possible systems and, as such, cannot be a function of events within any one 
nature-system. Naturalism is unable to provide an ultimate description of fact. 
Metaphysical idealism provides the only adequate account of the self – not merely as a 
field of fields, but as a concrete event determining the field of fields: “The self is free 
from the single-series determination of whatever it makes its object.”71 
Unlike the body which is situated within a natural field and subject to the laws of 
space, time, and causality, the mind is endowed with the gift of envisioning multiple 
spaces and a span of time that extends into the past as well as the future. Through the 
powerful reach of the mind, the self has unique ability to be “space-free … [and] time-
                                                 
69 William E. Hocking, Fact, Field and Destiny: Inductive Elements of Metaphysics,” in Review of 
Metaphysics, Vol. 11 (1957-1958): 546. 
70 William E. Hocking, What Man Can Make of Man (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1942): 59.  
71 SBF: 155. 
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free, as the body is not.”72 It is through our ability to com-prehend – “grasping-things-
together” – that holds the key to the potential divinity of the individual soul. This 
potentiality is reflected in the meaning of the phrase “Thy Kingdom come.” Aquinas 
recognized this very fact when he stated that the purpose of the human being was to 
gather, or collect (colligere), finite instances of knowledge so that the great chain of 
being could become universum – turned towards unity. Without this ability to 
synthetically integrate experience at the spiritual level “we might forever pass in review 
our shard bits of knowledge as in some nightmare quiz show….”73 
According to Bugbee, we must “steadfastly bend our minds to the conception of 
being….”74 Such bending does not require engaging in abstract speculation or 
otherworldly mysticism. We must attend to our inclusive situation hic et nunc through an 
intensive analysis of the concrete world. Ultimate features of experience must be elicited 
into view. Bugbee’s point is both simple and profound: We do possess knowledge of fact 
and fact confronts us in its definiteness. But with Descartes and Kant, knowledge has lost 
its “empirical compulsion” – its ontological force of determination. Without any sense of 
empirical compulsion, our knowledge “is simply cast adrift unless we actually moor it to 
its proper mooring, which is supplied by the metaphysical conception of being.”75  
Knowledge makes contact with the real through a direct awareness of presence – 
a presence which is indicative of being. Philosophy must begin, not with technical terms, 
metaphysical abstractions or “second order” levels of discourse – philosophy must begin 
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with a consideration of the things themselves: “Lest the simplicity of being and the 
abstractness of its conception be confused with vacuity or met with indifference, let the 
sense of being reaffirm its significance in human experience.”76 Leaping trout in 
Montana, a chapel bell ringing in Harvard Yard, a kamikaze pilot in the South Pacific – 
all are indices of the intensive panorama of being: “The extensive wholeness of reality is 
founded on an intensive wholeness.”77 
Bugbee focuses attention upon the dynamic tendency of experience: “A thing is as 
much a center of energy as it is a center of qualitative definiteness … a creative advance 
… hylicly singular and related beyond itself.78 The story of Job consists of a case-study 
of experience as tendential – singular and yet related beyond itself – an “aquiescence in 
spirit.” The lesson to be learned from the story of Job is the need to transcend calculative 
explanation and embrace the realization of an absolute source of things. The openness 
exemplified by Job – a mode of comportment that we too can choose to embrace – is the 
key to achieving a kind of grace which has a cleansing effect, recalling us to our senses: 
“Thinking dedicated to essential truth seems consummated only as it is graced … [by] an 
unanticipated precipitation of meaning.”79 Job is able to effectively regain a sense of 
stasis within his life by reinscribing the sheer immediacy of the present – an immediacy 
expressing what was there all along – within a context of the higher unity of spirit. As 
Job realized at the end of his ordeal: “I have spoken about great things which I have not 
understood…. I knew of thee only by report, but now I see with my own eyes. Therefore 
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I melt away….”80 Thought is a foreign medium here. What is perceived at first per 
speculum et in aenigmate is later seen “face to face” – one becomes graced by responding 
to the call of a “non-contingent destiny” which is ours to fulfill:  
Simply it is the vision of things: the things of heaven-and-earth, dramatized in their 
emergent majesty, wonder, and inviolable reserve. But seen in the mode of this, their 
being. And seen as if, for the first time, yet as belonging to a domain, in which dominion 
(not domination) reigns, forever and ever; the dominion of being itself. 81 
 
Consciousness is unique by virtue of the manner in which it is able to synthesize a 
welter of elements within a unified personality. Spirit represents the supreme 
embodiment of both the one and the many, an integrally unified manifold of infinitely 
diverse particulars. Human being qua imago Dei exhibits this selfsame logic of spirit – 
writ small. According to Bugbee, this identity of finite and infinite spirit must serve as 
the basis of any authentic philosophy, balancing the human need to speak – articulating 
the deep logos – with the need to simply and quietly embrace the reticent mystery of 
being: 
Perhaps some things need to be said; and it might even be as well to set out from a 
sustained reticence to speak…. [R]eticence also seems attuned to the quiet of heaven-
and-earth, the unprejudiced silence of things…. [I]t is a measure that makes for 
reflection, and finding out what we make of things, in the course of having to do with 
them. In a mortal life.82 
 
Such a compelling moment of vision, an Augenblick, in which we recognize the 
autochthonous integrity of existence can – like the twinkling of an eye – occur almost at 
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any time. In keeping with Bugbee’s remark, some things do need to be said – proffered in 
a spirit of reticence – while standing here, peering into a glimmer of eternity. 
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Part I 
 
From a Broken World to Circulating Being: The Transcendent Trajectory of 
Marcel’s Thought 
 
§ 
Marcel’s Experiential Basis: Life as Thought 
         “[S]ome circumstances … are situated in a kind of magnetic field  
             that stretches around my life and that gives it meaning.”1 
 
  “[T]he problem I consider essential [is] that of the relationship between philosophical 
research and life.”2 With perhaps the exception of Nietzsche, no philosopher has demonstrated 
such a keen awareness of the relationship between life and thought as Gabriel Marcel. In 
additional to the numerous personal references that populate his many books and essays, Marcel 
published three autobiographical accounts.”3 Before turning to the important connections that 
exist between Marcel’s life and thought, a few caveats are in order. First, Marcel quickly rejected 
the notion of “an illusory synthesis.”  Towards the end of his life he commented that he “never 
wanted, not only to create a system, but even to write a treatise in the philosophical sense of the 
word.”4 For this reason, it would be inappropriate to expect these reflections on Marcel’s life to 
somehow recapitulate, or bring to final closure, the definitive essence of his thought. Second, 
Marcel’s personal recollection of his life’s journey should not be taken in a naïve, quasi-Platonic 
sense as simply an ascending journey from darkness to light. Marcel is quick to report: “[M]y 
                                                 
1 Gabriel Marcel, Awakenings, trans. Peter S. Rogers (Marquette University Press: 2002): 211. Marcel indicates that 
through a type of “radioscopic analysis,” one can trace these lines of connection. See also “Author’s  Preface,” to 
Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, trans. S. Jolin and P. McCormick (Northwestern University Press, 1973): xxxi, where 
Marcel refers to “a magnetic field that opens on to the infinite. The opening, in fact, is the essential thing. But the 
field is crossed by currents.” 
2 Gabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963): 13. 
Hereafter referred to as EBHD. 
3 See Awakenings and “An Autobiographical Essay,” in The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel: Library of Living 
Philosophers Volume XVII, ed. P. Schilpp and L. Hahn (Open Court Publishing Company, 1984): 3-68.  See also 
“An Essay in Autobiography,” in Philosophy of Existentialism, trans. M. Harari (Philosophical Library, 1956): 104-
128.  Again, it should be noted that personal reflections pervade most of Marcel’s philosophical works. 
4 Awakenings: 169. 
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life has been perpetually harrowed by a searching, often and for long stretches undertaken in 
darkness and anguish. Nothing could be more false than to envisage it as a progression towards 
the light.”5 Lastly, Marcel strongly believes that his consistent interweaving of the experiential 
with the philosophical serves as “an irrepressible protestation surfac[ing] from the depths of [his] 
being … that life can be put on a file card.”6 At this juncture of our being resides a surplus that 
cannot be dissolved or explained away by mathematical-physical explanation – “a tension which 
could only … be resolved in an illumination [that] comes from some point much higher than 
man”.7  As one commentator has insightfully stated: “the vitality of [Marcel’s] work … has to 
do, I think, with the intuition that the infinite is reflected in one’s private life.”8    
 In surveying some of the most significant moments in Marcel’s life, two observations 
should be kept in mind. First, one must be extremely careful not to evoke Marcel’s “irrepressible 
protestation” and attempt to analyze the totality of his life into a series of decisive chronological 
events. Instead, the purpose must be to identify those experiential constellations where the 
developmental trajectory of Marcel’s thought intersects his life. These events are referred to as 
“experiential constellations” because they posses a complex multi-dimensionality—exhibiting 
both a personal concreteness and a universality that exceeds the reach of Marcel’s thought by 
connecting to a shared fund of human experience. As Marcel puts the matter: [My life] 
completely transcends the categories of biology … [and] infinitely transcends my possible 
conscious grasp … at any given moment.”9   
 However, the sense of time that will be traversed here is not always linear; experiential 
                                                 
5 An Autobiographical Essay: 3. 
6 Awakenings: 34. See also MB I, p. 189, where Marcel stresses the fact that life cannot be reduced to a cinematically 
as “merely a succession of images.” 
7 Ibid.: 109. Marcel will refer to this tension as “the exigience of Being.”  
8 Jacques de Bourbon Bussett, “Preface,” in Awakenings: 30. 
9 MB I: 167. 
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time is not the time of the clock or the calendar.10 Marcel’s life is punctuated by events which 
cannot be registered in strictly causal terms – events exhibiting both a synchronic and a 
diachronic dimension. Marcel will characterize this continuous juncture of his life and thought as 
a “sinuous road.” Using a geological comparison, he states: 
[W]hat really matters is to point out the successive sedimentations, or layers, as a result of which 
my mental soil has become what it is today…. [This] phase of my research should be considered 
rather as having become a horizon, a beyond in which past and future meet to enter into a 
dimension which is no longer that of life perceived merely as sequence or as the fall of leaves.”11 
 
 These constellations are formulated around the following clusters of events: 1) the death 
of Marcel’s mother when he was 4 years old; 2) his adverse reaction to the barren abstractness of 
the French public school curriculum; 3) an initial flirtation with, and rejection of, idealism; 4) the 
experience working for the Red Cross in WWI; 5) his brief participation in séances as a psychic 
medium; 6) a direct experience of the vast destruction and devastation of WWII; 7) his life-long 
interest in music; and 8) his remarkable conversion to Catholicism in 1948.12 
Death of Mother 
 The death of Marcel’s mother in November of 1893 in a sense marks the very beginning 
of Marcel’s conscious memories: 
 It would surely be better to speak of a certain affective tonality of my first years, those years 
preceding the death of my mother, after two days of illness on the 15th of November 1893…. 
Strange as it may seem I recall absolutely nothing of those two desolate days…. Yet I retain a 
rather definite memory…. I still seem to hear the murmurs of Granny and other members of the 
                                                 
10 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Seibzehnte Auflage (Max Niemeyer Verlag Tubingen: 1993): 8. Heidegger’s 
expression “eine merkwürdige »Rück- oder Verbezogenheit«”, roughly translated as” a strange relatedness 
‘backwards or forward’,” expresses this non-linear, temporal dimension of Marcel’s thought. Marcel’s sinewy, 
coiling approach is indicated in his closing remark in “Postface (Epilogue)” in Philosophical Fragments: 1909-
1914, ed. L. Blain (University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), p. 127: “[This] recurring … inevitably spiral character of 
that intellectual motion that is one of the constants of my mind.” 
11 EBHD: 14-15.  
12 Since it is contrary to the spirit of Marcel’s thought to encapsulate life within a series of events and constellations, 
the above list is destined to incompleteness. It could have included, for example, the effect of the travels that Marcel 
experienced as a child due to his father’s job as Ministre Plénipotentiare and the impact that this had upon his 
“passionate interest” in the natural world, the concrete importance of people and places, and emphasis placed upon 
the value of the activity of journeying.  
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family who had come to extend their condolences.13  
 
 This tragic event early in Marcel’s life created a “lasting shock.” As one would expect, in 
an effort to shield young Gabriel from any additional suffering, his grandmother and aunt 
“bathed him in gentleness … envelop[ing him] in a balm-like tenderness.”14 The protection of 
this “balm-like” condition from the harsh realities of life would later predispose the young 
Marcel to idealism. However, despite the traumatic loss of his mother, her presence was still 
deeply felt by the boy. Marcel’s appreciation of this spiritually enduring aspect of presence is 
retained throughout his life through his appreciation of intersubjective experience and 
paranormal experience. Marcel expresses the importance of his deep appreciation of presence in 
the following: 
I clearly recall a certain walk with my aunt when I must have been about seven or eight, during 
which my aunt, having told me that no one could know if the dead were completely annihilated 
or lived on in some way, I exclaimed: “When I’m older I’m going to try to find out!” And I think 
it would be a mistake to take those childish words lightly: in some ways they determined the 
course I was to take.15 
 
 A somewhat unique turn of events transpired about two years later when his father and 
aunt announced their plan to marry. This event elicited a response by the young Marcel that 
would pre-figure the characteristic type of Marcellian effort to recuperate seemingly disparate 
aspects of things in terms of their participation in relations of greater unity: “[T]he unity of a 
broken household was reconstituted.”16 But the event also sounded a more somber, much less 
optimistic chord that would also resonate throughout the Marcellian corpus and is captured by 
the phrase a “broken world” (monde cassé) –a world divisively severed from its unity. In a 
“broken world,” a condition of discrete atomization and bare collectivization replaces a nostalgic 
                                                 
13 An Autobiographical Essay: 5. 
14 Ibid.: 6. 
15 EBHD: 25. 
16 Awakenings: 43. 
 34
memory of feeling whole, complete, and at home. Within their family “unit,” Marcel quickly 
became aware “of the profound differences … [and] their antagonism…, that they had married 
because of me and, quite unwillingly…. I thus held myself responsible for a marriage that was, 
in the end, unhappy.”17 
Experience of the Lycée 
 As the young Marcel began to witness the competitive regimen of the French public 
school system, he experienced a visceral reaction. His initial attending of the lycée was 
interrupted in 1898 when his father was appointed as a diplomatic minister to Sweden. During 
this time spent in the city of Stockholm, which he refers to as “the happiest of my childhood,” 
Marcel was educated by his aunt in lieu of attending a private school.18 However, Marcel’s 
happiness was short lived. After 15 months his father was transferred back to Paris for health 
reasons. Marcel’s vivid recollections speak for themselves: 
My consternation was total…. To return to Paris would be to return to banality … for I could 
begin to discern the menacing shadow of the lycée…. This somber premonition was later 
confirmed. My lycée years left, on the whole, the most disagreeable memories; and I can say in 
retrospect that I think they contributed to the retardation of my intellectual development and, in 
the last analysis, seriously affected my health.19 
 
 The lycée’s exclusive preoccupation with a fiercely competitive quantitative ranking 
system provoked a feeling of anxiety for the young Marcel because his parents placed a 
“disproportionate importance” upon his class rank. This precipitated two unhealthy responses. 
Marcel would compete anxiously and feverishly, trying to ensure he would always achieve the 
highest ranking. This emphasis on grades essentially destroyed any joy of learning that young 
Gabriel may have felt. At the same time, lurking in the background was an acute sense of failure: 
                                                 
17 Ibid.: 43. See infra: “[T]his premature awareness of being at once responsible and not responsible for an event 
was at the origin of a tragic vision which was eventually to take shape….” 
18 An Autobiographical Essay: 11.  
19 Ibid.: 11. 
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“[T]he thought that I might fail in my studies became intolerable to me … since it was because 
of me that these two beings, so different from one another, had decided to come together…. I had 
to be able at any cost to justify by my achievements the sacrifices that had been made for me.”20 
 The study of philosophy offered Marcel a way out of the sterilization and tedium of the 
lycée, taking him from a smothered existence to “an enchanted land.” In this land of 
enchantment, wide-open vistas appeared: “what had seemed to be a given, das 
Selbstverständlich, was in reality becoming the place for impassioned questioning.”21 A cluster 
of Marcellian themes arise from this confrontation between the suffocating lycée curricula and 
the liberating effect of philosophical reflection. The drudgery experienced at the lycée 
precipitated Marcel’s initial aversion to what is abstract, universal, and measurable. Marcel once 
commented that his “aversion to the lycée must have been at the root of his growing horror of the 
spirit of abstraction.”22 His exposure to philosophy, on the other hand, nourished his initial 
inclination towards what is concrete, personal, and tacit. This confrontation also ignited Marcel’s 
adamant refusal to be reduced to a set of competencies and would sustain his ardent belief that a 
human being ultimately exceeds his strict, functional identity. 
 Marcel’s pursuit of philosophy would continue in 1906 when he entered the Sorbonne. 
There he would attend the lectures of Henri Bergson who made a lasting impression upon him. 
From Bergson, Marcel learned to appreciate the rich spiritual interior of the self, the inability of 
static concepts to depict a dynamic reality, and the belief in an “open,” transcendent, as opposed 
to a “closed,” universe.  Marcel deferentially refers his encounter with Bergson in the following 
way:  
                                                 
20 An Autobiographical Essay: 12. 
21 Awakenings: 68. After his first philosophy class, Marcel immediately informed his parents that he was going to 
become a philosopher! 
22 An Essay in Autobiography: 113. 
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[A]mong all those whose courses I took, Henri Bergson was the only one whose thought had a 
sure and lasting hold on me…. [D]uring each lecture, he conveyed a sense of proceeding in a sort 
of interior jubilation in a labor of discovery in which his listeners were to participate…. In every 
instance I can testify that by a driving light he cut through the gray and indistinct background of 
notions that were being inculcated at the Sorbonne by academicians whose knowledge and good 
will were beyond question but who lacked the spark, the genius.23   
  
Rejection of Idealism 
 Marcel’s initial involvement with idealism is best understood in the context of the sense 
of domestic security that he experienced in his early years: 
When I recall my childhood, so carefully watched over and in some ways so confined … I can 
see why abstraction was the keynote of my early philosophical thoughts and why I was almost 
contemptuously hostile to empiricism. [O]n the plane of ideas alone I was able to create a shelter 
from the wounding contacts of everyday life. Thus to philosophize meant at first for me to 
transcend.24 
 
 Marcel’s foray into idealism is reflected in his earliest writings and effectively ends with 
Part I of the Metaphysical Journal. The idealistic writings offer a stark contrast in content and 
style when compared to his other works. Whereas the later writings seem to offer clear, detailed 
descriptions of concrete situations, the idealistic writings offer abstract analyses of conceptual 
problems often with an uneven clarity. As Marcel will retrospectively comment: 
Today I would be incapable of reading what was later to become the first part of the Journal 
métaphysique, and if I forced myself to do so, it would not be without experiencing at almost 
every page a feeling of irritation that I would not be able to master successfully…. But what 
strikes me is how this research that is so abstract and so awkward depended in the end on the 
safe and comfortable conditions in which I first found myself.25 
 
 Marcel’s “initial refusal” of idealism stems from his sensitivity to the problem of the 
transparency of the cogito and the awareness that reality cannot be “summed up,” or synthesized, 
                                                 
23 An Autobiographical Essay: 17. Marcel would later attend Bergson’s lectures at the College de France. See 
Awakenings: “I am indebted to Bergson for having freed me from a spirit of abstraction…. (p. 83.)” 
24 An Essay in Autobiography: 114. See Awakenings, where Marcel also states that “[WWI] made me get rid of any 
idealistic traces (p. 95).” 
25 Awakenings: 82. Cf. “Forward,” in Philosophical Fragments, “I find it hard to understand today how, … after 
having the privilege of hearing Henri Bergson at the College de France, I could still feel the need to undertake a 
groping inquiry pursued in such a rarefied atmosphere with the help of post-Kantian philosophy.” (Philosophical 
Fragments [University of Notre Dame Press, 1965], p. 23.)  
 37
within an intelligible whole. The cogito is an unsuitable point of departure for metaphysics 
because “a philosophy that begins with the cogito … runs the risk of never getting back to 
being.”26 Descartes assumed that through a rigorous attention to the ideational content of the 
cogito and its cogitations, a transparent connection to the outer world could occur—an 
assumption many now believe is problematic. Reality, for Marcel, truly reveals itself precisely at 
the moment it surpasses the forms of our representation – a thought which is not the thought of 
something “would be lost in a sort of dream of itself….”27 Furthermore, the pervasiveness of 
complex, variegated “insolubilia” within our basic experience foreshadows a domain beyond 
speech and objectifying knowledge: “[Reality] cannot be identified with any conceptual point of 
view…. I cannot without self-contradiction conceive the absolute as a central observatory from 
which the universe can be contemplated in its totality, instead of being apprehended in the partial 
and oblique way that it is by all of us.”28 
 The unification that the young Marcel was groping for through an idealistic synthesis 
would ultimately prove to be unsuccessful. Marcel likened his idealistic writings to “a drilling 
operation performed by unskilled hands and primitive instruments.”29 A process of excavation 
that began as an attempt to dialectically transcend what appeared to be the factical disunity of 
experience became a “steep and torturous path” that quickly led to an impasse. Marcel realized 
that the logic of abstraction that led him to idealism was part and parcel of the same logic that led 
to his feeling of depersonalization at the lycée. Marcel abruptly learned that it is dangerous to 
pursue a particular direction in metaphysics before undergoing any type of genuine lived 
                                                 
26 Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, trans. R. Rostal (Farrar, Straus and Company, Inc., 1964): 65. Hereafter 
referred to as CF.  
27 Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary, trans. K. Farrer (Peter Smith Publishers, 1976): 30. 
Hereafter referred to as BH. 
28 CF: 4. 
29 EBHB: 22 
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experience – the results of concrete, personal encounter supersede formal ratiocination or 
dialectical argumentation. The abstract can be reached only via the concrete; the converse is not 
the case. No abstraction can do justice to life in its irreducible originality and, as he would later 
clarify in his famous distinction between “existence” and “objectivity,” “existence precisely 
cannot be reduced to objectivity.”30 The unity that Marcel had attempted to overcome through an 
idealistic dialectic is later achieved through a type of “secondary reflection,” re-conquering the 
unity that Marcel’s idealistic drilling was unable to reach—“a hold on the real at the root of 
intelligence.”31 
Red Cross and WWI 
 Marcel’s work for the Red Cross during WWI proved to be of the utmost significance for 
him: “[T]he date August 2, 1914, truly marks the transition from one world to another.”32 For 
health reasons, Marcel was deemed unable to perform military duty. Unable to accept being an 
“outsider,” he joined the Red Cross. This event was anything but serendipitous: “Far from 
clashing with my genuinely philosophical activity, this Red Cross work involved a task of 
reflection the results of which were to have considerable importance.”33 Marcel’s role was that of 
a liaison whose purpose was to help families obtain information about soldiers who were missing 
in action. Marcel made it a point to deal with each case “personally,” treating each interested 
party with the “greatest possible sympathy.” As Marcel would reflect several years later: 
“Interrogating, making inquiries, and responding—these were my activities, and as a 
philosopher, I tried to throw some light on them.”34 
                                                 
30 Ibid.: 26. Emphasis added. 
31 BH: p. 47. See also TWB, p. 221, where Marcel refers to “[T]he indubitable character of existence … the 
condition of any thinking whatsoever.” Marcel realizes that this discovery places him on the “margin” of idealism. 
32 EBHD: 36. 
33 Ibid.: 36. See Awakenings, p 93: “[T]his was very important because, in the end, it was like the first 
apprenticeship of intersubjectivity as I was to define it later on.” 
34 EBHD: 37. 
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 The light that Marcel directs towards these inquiries is reported on July 23, 1918 in his 
Metaphysical Journal. 
What does understanding a question mean? First, putting it to oneself, placing oneself in the 
mental situation of the questioner. I can only give a full and proper answer to my own question. 
The consciousness of the answerer is the meeting place of the question and the answer…. [T]his 
interpretation depends upon the idea of the dynamism of the situation, which transcends 
individual destinies though in one sense it is only the material for them. This living contradictory 
dualism lies at the very core of the real; all spiritual life is essentially a dialogue.35 
 
 This insight led Marcel to “concentrate attention on the second person…. [It] was my 
concern to go to the root of the thou….”36 When seeing the other as a “second person thou,” as 
opposed to a “third person he, she or it,” an experience of a bond of fellowship – a “supra-
relational” kind of unity that serves as a kind of inter-human connective tissue – is made 
possible. In Marcel’s words, “the relationship is thus transformed [and] becomes one of subject 
to subject.”37 Similar to the cases in which Marcel explains that his dramatic works were able to 
express philosophical themes long before they are able to be thematically articulated in a 
philosophical register, Marcel’s experience in the Red Cross provided deep, pre-reflective 
confirmation to the phenomenon represented by “the indispensable term intersubjectivity … 
[which] it is difficult for me today to understand how I ever did without it.”38  
Engagement with Parapsychology 
 Around 1916 or 1917, about the same time his awareness of the intersubjective 
dimension of experience began to crystallize, Marcel began to explore his interest in 
parapsychology and telepathy. This is not a mere coincidence; the direct experience of 
                                                 
35 Metaphysical Journal, trans. B. Wall (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952): 139, 137. Hereafter referred to 
as MJ. The entire entry runs from pp. 135-145. Dense, “disconcerting,” and not initially planned for publication, 
Marcel is keenly aware of its difficulty: “[T]he backbone of the Metaphysical Journal [is that] being cannot be 
indicated, it cannot be shown; it can only be alluded to….” (Author’s Preface to the English Edition,” in MJ: vii.) 
36 EBHD: 39. 
37 Ibid.: 40. See MJ: p 146, where Marcel encapsulates this intersubjective experience as “We become simply ‘us.’”  
38 EBHD: 40. See Ibid.: 50, where Marcel comments about the ability of “dramatic vision [to be] anticipatory … 
revealing in lightening flashes a terrain [only] later to be explored in discursive thought.” Cf. TWB, p. 236: “[D]rama 
for me is like living tissue; it is more capable of internal regeneration than is properly philosophical thinking.” 
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intersubjectivity helped to lay bare that fertile network of relationships inaccessible to the static 
concepts of traditional logic. As Marcel says: 
[T]o reflect on a relationship of the kind that the word with suggests is to recognize how poor 
and inadequate our logic is. Apart from juxtapositions pure and simple it is in fact incapable of 
expressing relationships of increasing intimacy…. I might add that the English noun 
togetherness … has no possible equivalent in French. It is as if the French language refused to 
make a substantive of – that is, to conceptualize – a certain quality of being which is concerned 
with the ‘entre-nous,’ the ‘between you and me.’39 
 
 From Marcel’s perspective, when approaching the issue of telepathy, it is important to 
avoid “a materializing representation of thought.”40 Marcel’s formal reflections on 
parapsychology were not presented publicly until 1955 when he gave the twelfth Frederic W. H. 
Meyers Memorial Lecture to the Society for Psychical Research entitled “The Influence of 
Psychic Phenomena on My Philosophy.” However, as early as 1916 he revealed the fundamental 
importance of occult knowledge: “the ideas of so-called occult knowledge against which reason 
attempts to rebel are in reality at the root of our most ordinary most incontrovertible 
experiences….”41  
 During the time in which Marcel was working with the Red Cross, he was persuaded by a 
couple to explore his “mediumistic gifts.” This led to an experiment with a planchette.42 Marcel 
was approached by Mrs. Adolphe Reinach who was trying to obtain news as to the disposition of 
her husband, a reserve officer in the 46th Infantry Regiment who had been missing for some time. 
During a session when Mrs. Reinach was absent, “the planchette seemed to be imbued with what 
                                                 
39 EBHD: 41. 
40 EBHD: 41. 
41 MJ: 130. Marcel will use much stronger language later: “It is even likely that we must start from the paranormal 
in order to elucidate the normal—because the very idea of the normal is false, in that it derives exclusively from an 
entrenched habit of thinking which simply obliterates the fundamental strangeness of the datum” (EBHD: 43). See 
“The Influence of Psychic Phenomena on My Philosophy,” where he cites a conversation “in Switzerland during the 
winter of 1910-1911 … [which] made a profound impression upon me….” (The Twelfth Frederic W. H. Meyers 
Memorial Lecture, 1955, The Society for Psychical Research (The University Press, Glasgow: 1956): 5-6.   
42 A planchette is a small, triangular heart-shaped board supported by castors that moves to spell out messages. A 
pencil is typically attached to the planchette resulting in letters or designs that are interpreted by a medium. 
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I can only call ardent and affectionate energy, the entity addressed the absent woman by the 
name of Clio.”43 Later it was discovered that Adolphe had given his wife the nickname “Clio” 
because he felt that she resembled a statue of Clio during a visit to the museum at Caracalla’s 
Baths in Rome. This event had a profound impact on Marcel: “This little incident has always 
seemed to me very important; since any idea of a fortuitous coincidence was excluded, it seemed 
as though we there had proof of a communication inexplicable within the bounds of normal 
experience.”44 
 Over the course of time, these telepathic encounters had to be interrupted because of poor 
health. Marcel admits that “at best [these experiences] contain an adulterated mixture of truth 
and error…. [But] it is as though I had been given the ability to look from within at the facts 
which a great number of people can only envision from outside, because they have no experience 
of them.”45 
 Marcel’s involvement with paranormal psychology revealed the importance of 
“incarnation … the condition of a human being feeling connected to something.”46  This “non-
objective aspect of the body,” completely different from the Cartesian notion of a Res Extensa, 
will make “possible [the ability] to throw some light on telepathy….”47 Such a notion of 
incarnation will help to overcome the barrier erected by a Cartesian dualism and will serve as a 
wedge, or point of entry, enabling the subject to participate in a “supra-personal unity.” In 
Marcel’s words: “Telepathy is surely in regard to space what memory is in regard to time.”48 
 
                                                 
43 The Influence of Psychic Phenomena on My Philosophy: 9. Hereafter, referred to as IPPMP. 
44 Ibid.: 9-10. 
45 Ibid.: 13 
46 Ibid.: 14. See Section III for a discussion of the body. 
47 Ibid.: 14. 
48 BH: 97, note 1. 
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Destruction and Devastation of WWII 
 The experience of WWII had an immense impact upon Marcel and provided a direct 
stimulus to his thought. Whereas WWI presented Marcel with ample evidence of the harsh 
reality of war through “nameless sorrows, individualized to infinity,”49 WWII now presented an 
unprecedented moment of historical significance – the human race now possessed the 
technological means that could lead its suicide. Marcel began to question the ontological 
condition of the human being that it could come so close to being capable of such a heinous act. 
He concluded that the human being is capable of such in-human behavior in direct proportion to 
the degree that it becomes closed-in upon itself. This condition of being “closed” as opposed to 
“open,” – a distinction he appropriated from Bergson – locks the subject within a domain driven 
by functional, individualistic, and impersonal imperatives and prevents the self from 
participating in a wider conception of humanity. In this latter domain of “intersubjectivity,” 
separation disappears. As Marcel explains: “[T]he threats that today weigh upon our species … 
can only appear to be the materialized expression of an infinitely more essential degradation. 
This has to do with the way in which man … has cut himself more and more from what should 
be called his ontological roots.”50 
 This functional atomization, or “pulverization,” of the human being has contributed to 
this uprootedness. Experiences of fraternal and transcendental relationships are replaced by “the 
transmission of quite different currents, which are inhuman and magnetized by the ends purely of 
domination.”51 Once the process of functional atomization is completed, the individual atoms, or 
“monads,” are assembled into an impersonal collectivity. However, to use Leibnizian terms, 
these monads are completely “windowless,” self-contained within their functional identity, with 
                                                 
49 Awakenings: 131. 
50 Ibid.: 171. 
51 Gabriel Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, ed. M. Harari (The Havrill Press: 1954): 4. Hereafter referred to as DW. 
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no ability to see further. In this dehumanized state, a being conceived purely functionally 
atrophies due to the fact that it is replicating what are essentially subhuman capabilities – an 
inbreeding of sorts occurs. The self, turned upon itself, becomes encircled by an insular 
covering—closed within its own skin. The human being, once it becomes severed from any 
transcendent relationship, becomes malnourished and slowly withers away. For Marcel, there are 
two errors to monadism – a self is neither alone nor one: “If I do not breathe the spiritual element 
for want of which our existence denies itself, I die….”52 Acute self-consciousness, in the 
rationalistic sense, is synonymous with death. According to Marcel: “[O]nce we release 
ourselves from [our] schematizations, … we must become aware that we are literally arched over 
by a living reality.”53  
Interest in Music 
Taken as a whole my work can be compared, I think, to a country like Greece, which comprises at the 
same time a continental part and islands. The continental part is my philosophical writing…. The islands 
are my plays. [J]ust as it is necessary to make a crossing to get to an island, so to get to my dramatic work 
… it is necessary to leave the shore behind…. And it might be added—I don’t think this is superfluous—
that the element that unites the continent and the islands in my work is music. Music is truly the deepest 
level. In a certain way, the priority belongs to music.54 
 
 Marcel’s interest in music is central to his thinking. As a child, Marcel was exposed to 
the importance of music at home by his father, his aunt, and later his wife, Jacqueline. He took 
piano lessons at an early age – music offered a respite from the rigor of academic competition 
and enabled him to “breathe freely.” He was a gifted sight reader and good musician but he did 
not display the characteristics of a prodigy or virtuoso. Marcel wrote several thematic essays 
concerning the relationship between music and philosophy – the most noteworthy, written in 
                                                 
52 Marcel, Problematical Man, trans. Brian Thompson (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967): 57. Hereafter referred 
to as PM. For an account of the relationship between subjectivity and death, see Alphonso Lingis, Deathbound 
Subjectivity (Indiana University Press, 1989). 
53 Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being: Faith and Reality, Volume II, trans. R. Hague (Regnery/Gateway, 1979): 
186. Hereafter referred to as MB II. 
54 TWB: 231. 
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1959, is entitled Music in My Life and Work.55 Marcel consistently emphasized the ability of 
music to capture insights that were recalcitrant to philosophical inquiry. His interest in music and 
his appreciation of concepts relating to musical composition helped to articulate philosophical 
insights that could not be expressed by strictly linear thinking: “[My thinking] tended to become 
less and less optical. It is most likely that my passion for music helped to prevent me from 
imagining this world, if to imagine, is at least in some sense, to project a form into space….”56 
 Music provided a means by which Marcel could experience the deep sense of continuity 
and plenitude that pervades experience: “a superior awareness in which our being finds itself 
presented in its integrity.”57 Using his wife’s presence as a source of inspiration, Marcel would 
sit at the piano for sustained periods and improvise, substituting his role as a psychic medium for 
a musical medium: “enter[ing] fully into the melodious and harmonic world that was mine.”58 
Marcel would later remark that these improvisations represent his best musical accomplishments 
– delineating the direction of his thought more clearly than his philosophical works.  Perhaps in a 
way similar to Nietzsche but without the tragic, Dionysian emphasis, “Marcel felt the mysterious 
thread between the most elevated music and the most deeply lived experience.”59 
 Through improvisation, Marcel was able to overcome the dualism of subject and object. 
Improvisation is not tied to any Kantian Ding-an-sich that would serve as a standard of 
representational adequacy. This lead Marcel to comment: “[Musical improvisation] is a sphere 
where the thing stated cannot be distinguished from the manner of stating it. In this sense … 
                                                 
55 See Gabriel Marcel: Music and Philosophy, trans. S. Maddux and R. Wood, Intro. R. Wood (Marquette 
University Press, 2005): 41-70. 
56 An Essay in Autobiography: 105. 
57 Gabriel Marcel, Presence and Immortality, trans. M. Machado and H. Koren (Duquesne University Press, 1967): 
14. Hereafter referred to as PI. 
58 Awakenings: 177.  In 1946-47, Marcel and his wife transcribed thirty of his improvisations into musical notation. 
These improvisations are based upon poems by Baudelaire, Valery, Rilke, Hölderlin and others. For an in-depth 
treatment of the impact of music on Marcel’s thought, see Gabriel Marcel: Music and Philosophy. Robert Wood’s 
“Introduction” is especially informative. 
59 Awakenings: 57. 
 45
music has no meaning, but perhaps just because it is meaning.”60 Within this space of 
improvisation, a form of participation occurs in which one is already “on the inside.” This 
interior transcends “cinematographic representation [because] succession seems less and less 
given…. [To improvise] is rather to participate more and more actively in the creative intention 
that quickens the whole.”61  
 Marcel believed that the fundamental nature of existence was best revealed through forms 
of musical expression as opposed to forms of conceptual representation. Through music, one is 
able to become encapsulated within the experience of continuity and cohesion that is essential to 
being human. Music also enables one to discern a sense of plenitude, or the whole, of which we 
are a vital part. The act of musical creation is not an act solus ispe – an act generated exclusively 
within a solipsistic moment of subjectivity. The composer creates out of a primordial, universal 
type of subjectivity of which we all partake. The musical modulations that result from the 
composer’s creative activity raise the listener to this universal level – rejoining the listener with a 
comprehensive awareness that had been lost. Marcel will refer to a “musical mysticism” that is 
both sensuous and supra-sensuous:   
I am not a spectator who is looking for a world of structures susceptible of being viewed clearly 
and distinctly, but rather I listen to voices and appeals compromising that symphony of Being—
which is for me, in the final analysis, a supra-rational unity beyond images, words, and 
concepts.62 
  
 Marcel culminates his ontological vision using a powerful musical metaphor that is rich 
and symbolic:  
[I]n so far as we allow ourselves to give ear to the solicitations—countless in number even if 
slight in substance—which come to us from the invisible world, then the whole outlook 
undergoes a change …[a] transformation takes place here below…. Let me make use again of 
one of the musical comparisons for which you know I have a taste, and say that from the moment 
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when we open ourselves to these infiltrations of the visible, we cease to be the unskilled yet 
pretentious soloist we perhaps were at the start, and gradually become members, wide-eyed and 
brotherly, of an orchestra in which those who we so inaptly call the dead are certainly much 
closer to Him of whom we should not perhaps say that He conducts the symphony, but that He is 
the symphony in its profound and intelligible unity; a unity within which we can hope to be 
included only by degrees, through individual trials, the sum total of which, though it cannot be 
foreseen by each of us, is inseparable from his own vocation.63 
  
Conversion to Catholicism 
 Gabriel Marcel converted to Catholicism on March 23, 1929 at the age of 41. He had 
recently published a note concerning François Mauriac’s Souffrance du Chrétien. Mauriac sent a 
personal letter to Marcel urging him to strongly consider joining the Catholic Church. Marcel 
describes this period as one in which he was experiencing a deep sense of “calm and 
equilibrium”—a period unlike any other. Regarding the letter: 
It seemed to me that he was but a spokesman and that the call came from much higher up. It was 
as though a more than human voice was questioning me and putting me into my own presence. 
“Can you really persevere indefinitely in that equivocal position of yours?” this voice asked me. 
“Is it even honest to continue to think and speak like someone who believes in the faith of others 
and who is convinced that this faith is everything but an illusion, but nevertheless does not 
resolve to take it unto himself?  Is there not a sort of equivocation here that must be definitely 
dispelled; is it not like a leap before which you are obliged to decide?” It seemed to me that I 
could only apply to this last interrogative with an assent.64 
 
 The question remained as to which “confessional form” Marcel would adhere to. His 
religious upbringing, though Protestant, was largely agnostic. He chose the Catholic Church for 
characteristically Marcellian reasons. For Marcel, Catholicism was synonymous with the 
universal – multiple, divisive sects within Protestantism undermined the deep sense of unity 
Marcel was seeking: “It then seemed to me that I could not give my adherence save to the 
Church that presented itself as corresponding to the richest and most global vision.”65 In a 
journal entry dated March 23, 1929, Marcel discloses the following: “I was baptized this 
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morning. My inward state was more than I had dared to hope for: no transports, but peaceful, 
balanced, and full of hope and faith.”66 Marcel’s reference to “no transports,” implies that his 
experience was not characterized by any super-natural or other-worldly transmutation. However, 
one should not construe Marcel’s characterization of this experience as implying any lack of 
ontological impact. As he was quick to add: “Return to the here and now, which recover an 
unparalleled dignity and worth.”67   
 Marcel was not so naïve as to not recognize those aspects of Catholicism contrary to his 
sensibility, i.e. a rigid adherence to ritual, excessive legalism, and ideological encroachment. 
When asked about these divisions Marcel responded: “When we say: we other Catholics, we are 
outside Catholicism. [C]atholicity, ... in my view, that is what matters.”68 However, concerning 
fundamental matters of faith Marcel was devout: “[T]he Roman Catholic Church remains my 
own, to the extent that … I still see in it … an unfailing faith in Christ and the fundamental 
truths, the Incarnation being very much the point of ‘enracinement’ or being rooted for me.”69 At 
the same time, Marcel had a deep sense of religious tolerance. According to James Collins: 
“Marcel h[eld] that a realistic appraisal of our language, modes of thinking and prevailing 
imagery reveals the depth and persistence of Christian faith and its institutions…. He addresses 
himself to every man of good will and attentive mind, not just the Christian believer.”70  Marcel 
viewed everyone, regardless of their religion, as part of “a great Christian family” – God is 
glorified through each and every act of creation. 
 For Marcel, there existed an “essential agreement” between the fundamental truths of 
                                                 
66 BH: 24. 
67 Ibid.: 24. 
68 Awakenings: 181 
69 Awakenings: 181. It is interesting to note that Marcel’s wife began “to adhere” to Catholicism a few years prior to 
her death from a debilitating illness, giving her a sense of spiritual strength. 
70 James Collins, “Introduction to the Torchbook Edition,” in BH: x-xi. 
 48
Christianity and the integral structure of the human being: “Hence the more one penetrates into 
human nature, the more one find oneself situated on the axes of the great truths of 
Christianity.”71 But despite Marcel’s deep sense of being “irresistibly drawn”  into the domain of 
Christian beliefs, he clearly felt: “the need to reach a level universal enough to make what [he] 
was saying acceptable or understandable by non-Catholics and even perhaps by non-Christians, 
so long as they had a certain apprehension of what seemed … essential.”72 Marcel referred to this 
universal level of experience as the “peri-Christian” zone of existence. This notion of a peri-
Christian zone of existence is captured in the following comment by William J. Richardson, S.J.:  
Instead of “Christian philosophy,” let us speak rather of the unity of Christian philosophizing: 
the unity comes from the truth that is sought, whether through the light of revelation or of reason 
or, in fact, of both—truth that every Christian believes can never be untrue to itself. Its diversity 
would come from the kaleidoscopic, kergymatic, not to say kairotic, gifts of those who pursue 
it.73 
§ 
A Broken World and Its Consequences 
Whence something like a breach which seems indeed to open in the middle of what one could call the 
field of human experience. Everything takes place in reality as on an earth shaken by a seismic shock. 
Since the coming of Christ we live in a split world.74 
 
 A “broken world” is a world wrought with fissures, ruptures, and dualisms – a world 
lacking in continuity. At the pre-phenomenological level, a broken world reveals itself as 
consisting of discrete and disconnected units – a world predisposed to the quantitative matrix of 
modern science. At the “hyper-phenomenological” level, these discontinuities are dissolved in 
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favor of a continuity that is experienced first-hand at a level both personal and spiritual.75 This is 
a primordial, unified world – a Lebenswelt indicated by Husserl’s famous phrase die Sache 
selbst. Merleau-Ponty captures this unified awareness nicely in the following: “To return to 
things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge 
always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and 
derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learned 
beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.”76 
 Marcel illuminates how our world is broken on three levels: the dramatic, the 
philosophical, and the ontological. However, one should not be misled into thinking that these 
are, in fact, distinct levels – they are segmented expressions of a reality that is continuous – 
distinguishable but not separable. For Marcel, a broken world is a world that has “lost its inner 
unity, its living center—a … world where each person is concerned only with himself.  Yet, this 
world is not the only world.”77 
 Marcel captures the brokenness of our world dramatically in his play le Monde cassé. In 
this play, the heroine, Christiane, marries Lawrence – a man who was not her first love. Her first 
love, Jacques, declared his intention to take monastic vows just prior to the time that Christiane 
was about to proclaim her love for him. Jacques’ announcement crushes Christiane. In 
desperation, she married Lawrence – a man for whom she did not feel love, only pity. Christiane 
quickly realizes that she cannot follow through with this charade and commences a relationship 
with a younger man. At this point a revelation occurs. Through his sister, Genevieve, Christiane 
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learns that Jacques has died. Genevieve poignantly discloses that during the last moments of his 
life in which Jacques had come to realize that his decision to choose the monastic order had 
deeply hurt Christiane – that he felt a deep connection to her. This news has a tremendous impact 
on Christiane. The binding power of a love that subsists after death releases her from her 
isolation. She now feels as if she is participating more and more in an unbroken, continuous 
“spiritual” world – a world that Jacques now also inhabits.78  This realization obliged her to 
reveal her infidelity to Lawrence – a confession that he finds extremely difficult to hear. At the 
very moment he is about to recoil from the shock of her disclosure, Lawrence also feels himself 
drawn into the same “unbroken,” spiritual field as Christiane. They are finally able to recover a 
sense of togetherness within the continuity of a spiritually unbroken world. The drama ends with 
Lawrence uttering in a semi trance-like state the following words to Christiane: “It is as if you 
are coming back to me from the dead.”79  
The Spirit of Abstraction 
 Marcel develops the notion of a broken world in a philosophical register through his 
treatment of abstraction. For Marcel, a world becomes broken when its continuity is disrupted – 
broken down into discrete units that no longer exhibit any trace of a prior unity. Marcel refers to 
this disintegrating, analytic process as “the spirit of abstraction.” Abstraction – derived from the 
Latin verb abstraho, meaning “to drag away from” – is a process through which a wealth of 
detail is subtracted from a thing in order to simplify it, endowing it with a limited identity. For 
example, to speak of “triangularity,” one does not have to address the multiple, contingent 
features of particular triangular-shaped things. Through the process of abstraction, one can 
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successfully perform many intellectual operations. For example, one could not develop Euclidian 
geometry solely within the concrete realm of particular triangles. In order to determine that the 
sum of the angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees, one necessarily has to participate in the level 
of abstraction – it is necessary to move from triangles to triangularity. However, when one 
moves from the level of particular triangles to abstract triangularity, one sacrifices not only the 
wealth of detail that actual triangles exhibit, one also eliminates the concrete context within 
which particular triangular objects exists. This “sacrifice,” or truncation, is not only limited to 
geometry. It occurs any time a wider conception of a thing is let go for a narrower, functional 
conception. This process of vicious abstraction is most destructive when it is applied to a human 
being – a being who exhibits a vast multiplicity of characteristics and dimensions. Alfred North 
Whitehead – a thinker equally at home in the mathematical as well as the speculative – 
understood the debilitating effects of abstraction: “There is a development of particular 
abstractions, and a contraction of concrete appreciation. The whole is lost in one of its aspects…. 
But there is no groove of abstraction which is adequate for the contemplation human life.”80 
 Marcel is no luddite. He realizes that abstraction is an intellectual process that is 
necessary to rise above the sheer facticity of the concrete in order to achieve a condition of 
epistemic universality. He distinguishes this latter type of necessary abstraction – a type of 
abstraction that is cognizant of what it is sacrificing in order to achieve a condition of 
universality – with a thoughtless practice that immediately disavows any awareness of the level 
of detail that is being sacrificed. In this latter case, a strict, myopic focus occludes the wider field 
of vision. Marcel refers to this non-reflective, delimiting process as “the spirit of abstraction.” 
He offers this comparison of these two modes of abstraction: 
Abstraction, as such, is a mental operation to which we must have recourse if we are seeking to 
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achieve a determinate purpose of any sort…. This means that the human mind must retain a 
precise and distinct awareness of those methodological omissions which are necessary if an 
envisaged result is to be obtained. But it can happen that a mind, yielding to a sort of fascination, 
ceases to be aware of these prior conditions that justify abstraction and deceives itself about the 
nature of what is, in itself, nothing more than a method, one might say nothing more than an 
expedient. The spirit of abstraction is not separable from this contempt for the concrete 
conditions of abstract thinking.81 
 
 The mechanism driving this process of reductive, abstract thinking is referred to as 
“technique.”  William Barrett, in his famous study The Illusion of Technique, adopted a phrase of 
William Blake, “mind-forged manacles,” to refer to the unilateral and thoughtless application of 
technique.82 Manacles, like the chains Plato described in “the allegory of the cave,” limit human 
development in a fundamental way – degradation occurs at a spiritual level. According to 
Marcel: “In our contemporary world … the more a man becomes dependent on the smooth 
functioning of gadgets at the material level, the more estranged he becomes from an awareness 
of his inner reality…. What we have to fear … is submen – beings who tend more and more to be 
reduced to their own strict function….”83 This constitutes a crime of man against man – the more 
sheer technique is embraced for itself, the more subjects become depicted in that very image. 
But, perhaps more importantly, the subject who embraces pantechnicism to the exclusion of all 
else, becomes reflexively determined through this series of epistemic acts. When abstract 
thinking becomes embodied in technique, a type of decision procedure is automatically instituted 
wherein what is deemed functionally essential is culled out -- the remaining carcass is left to die. 
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A “decision procedure” is an apt phrase in this context insofar as de-cision etymologically 
implies “to cut from” – an etymological derivation of which Marcel is well aware. Once 
subsumed within the determining rubric of technique, the human being becomes closed in, cut 
off from a reality that transcends them. This leads to a stage of quasi rigor mortis – the term 
“rigor” here is quite ironic simply because abstract, technical thinking proudly identifies itself 
with rigor. One now becomes, as Nietzsche indicated: “a librarian and corrector of proofs, and 
wretchedly goes blind from the dust of books and printers’ errors.”84 Such a myopic state is 
indicative of what Marcel calls a “fanaticized consciousness.” A fanaticized consciousness is a 
consciousness trapped within itself, unaware of a wider perspective within which it is encircled – 
requiring only itself in order to exist. According to Gustave Thibon, a contemporary of Marcel 
and source of great inspiration, “Man does not stand alone: he is immersed in a totality of real 
entities by which he is at once transcended and fed.”85 
The Grip of Having 
 Marcel refers to the “devitalized” condition arising from the spirit of abstraction as 
“having.” “To have,” from the Latin verb hăbĕo, meaning “to have or to hold, in the sense of to 
have power over” is, for Marcel, an act of epistemological possession in which knowledge 
“becomes the center of a sort of mental space, arranged in concentric zones of decreasing interest 
and decreasing adherence…. This is something so natural that we forget to give it any thought or 
any representation at all.”86 This mental space is set up, or represented – as indicated by the 
German verb ‘vorstellen,’ “to place before one,” – exclusively within the domain of Cartesian 
subjectivity. A Res Cogitans, according to the Cartesian definition of substance, requires nothing 
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but itself in order to exist. This delimitation of “having” within the realm of subjectivity will 
cause Marcel to characterize it using such terms as “hominisation” and “aseity.” When any being 
is considered solely within the epistemological context of “having,” it is grasped solely in a way 
that is conducive to being functionally manipulated. Grasping in such a way that is ontologically 
constitutive is conveyed by the German word Begriff  meaning “conception” or 
“apprehension.”87 To conceive is to develop a concept regarding something – to frame it within 
the purview of a dominant albeit limiting characteristic. Simply stated, to conceive something in 
the mode of having is to obtain a controlling grip upon it – “Get a grip!” as one so often hears 
today. This profusion of partial knowledge is blinding – it leads to “a spiritual opaqueness or 
blockage.”88 For Marcel, the discreet multiplicity that is the result of “having” stands in sharp 
contrast to “Being [which] is above all inventories.”89 To the extent that we dwell in the realm of 
“having,” an “auto-anesthesia” occurs which means “a loss [at] the level of Being.”90  This 
occurs in the following manner: “If you posit the primacy of subject-object … or of the act by 
which the subject sets up objects somehow or other within itself, the existence of others … [and] 
any existence whatever … becomes unthinkable.”91 This insularity, or cloistering, imposed by 
the Cogito is dualistically opposed to the plenitude of Being. To the extent that Being is 
fragmented and particularized, any sense of an ontological trace or continuity is lost. Similar to 
that desperate condition Heidegger characterized as Seinvergessenheit, one forgets that Being has 
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been forgotten – a total eclipse occurs.  It is within this isolated space that Marcel establishes the 
connection between “non-disponibility” and “having.”92  
 Marcel’s famous contrast between the phenomenon of “having” and “Being” is indicative 
of a shift from a strictly epistemic perspective to the realm of the ontological and the reality of 
the invisible world. According to Merleau-Ponty: “With Being and Having, Marcel’s philosophy 
has been enlarged so to speak. To an increasing degree the center of the perspective shifts from 
the body to the soul…. This movement between being and having, this border zone, defines the 
human condition.”93  
The Realm of the Problematic 
 Marcel’s development of the question of what constitutes a “problem,” – the region of the 
problematic – is continuous with his treatment of the spirit of abstraction and “having.” The 
problematic is that which is susceptible to a solution. It is present in two ways. The most 
common manner in which the problematic appears is through that which has been solved, e.g. 
that πr² is equal to the area of a circle. But the problematic can also appear as that which is yet to 
be solved – that which will be solved once the appropriate problem solving methodology has 
been brought to bear upon it. The efficacy exhibited within the region of the problematic is due, 
using a Leibnizian phrase, to a “pre-established harmony” between the problem solving 
techniques of a mathematical-scientific methodology and the manner in which the world is 
refracted through the enframing processes of the spirit of abstraction and “having.”  As 
Nietzsche remarked: “[Once] human beings projected … ‘things’ as existing in their own 
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image…. No wonder that they later rediscovered in things only what they had put into them!”94 
As Marcel notes, problems are always viewed “in abstraction from the manner in which their 
appearance is woven into the very texture of life…. Any problem whatsoever implies the 
breaking-off of a continuity which the mind has to re-establish.”95 Combining the modes of 
abstraction, having, and the problematic results in a reductive, truncating episteme. Anything 
which resists articulation through this limiting mode of presentation effectively disappears. This 
latter region – of presence, adhesion, and intimacy – however, continues to beckon us from afar 
despite the hegemonic grip of the problematique. Similar to the case of “having and being,” the 
problematic will also graft itself onto a larger context that surpasses it – what Marcel refers to as 
mystery: 
The word ‘problem’ should be understood here with its Greek root in mind: problema. There is a 
problem when anything is placed before me…. At all events, it will remain necessary to hold that 
the subject cannot pose or solve objective problems except on condition of itself remaining in a 
non-problematic sphere…. And it is at this point therefore that I am lead to introduce or reinstate 
into our vocabulary the notion of mystery, in opposition to the notion of problem.96 
 
Dehumanization, Destruction, and Devastation 
 At the height of his success, Marcel was asked by his former student, Paul Ricoeur: 
“Could it be that your philosophy is a philosophy of the interior life, and therefore ultimately a 
thought which is out of contact with reality … so that strictly social relations are ignored?”97 
Marcel was clearly taken back by this question. His autobiographical accounts make consistent 
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references to the impact that the Dreyfus Affair had on Marcel growing up as a boy in Paris. He 
had written pieces over the past twenty years on such topics as justice, responsibility, and the 
dehumanizing effects of industrialization. Marcel takes Ricoeur’s question seriously, responding 
in the following way: “I think I can say that it would be a profound error, an extremely serious 
error, to claim that my thought is concerned exclusively with the interior life.”98  
 Marcel was hardly a stranger to misinterpretations of his thought – his mis-
characterization as a “Christian Existentialist” is a perfect example of such misconstrual.  But the 
question, or tacit criticism, raised by Ricoeur, stems from a superficial reading. Marcel was 
deeply concerned with what he referred to as the threat felt by “a humanity betrayed by its own 
creations.”99 He viewed the present as a time of monumental historical and philosophical 
significance – a time “without precedence” – because “it involves the possibility that [mankind] 
could destroy his earthly habitat by means of the techniques he has perfected—in short, commit 
suicide on a species-wide scale.”100 The fact that we have not witnessed a nuclear Armageddon is 
no refutation of Marcel’s concern. To destroy oneself does not necessary mean the end of life 
physically speaking. Dehumanization, the process through which a human being is no longer 
able to exhibit her spiritually endowed richness and integrity, is a mortifying process as well. 
 Despite the veiled criticism in Ricoeur’s question, Marcel’s writings offer a legion of 
examples that attest to his sensitivity to dehumanization and destruction. As Marcel traveled 
throughout the world, he had the privilege to observe many examples of beautiful, panoramic 
landscapes and vistas. But Marcel’s travels also took him to major cities – impoverished, third 
world cities as well as and major metropolitan centers of commerce and industry. For Marcel, 
there was little difference between the two. The modern city is an “agglomeration” – a massive 
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composite of human resources – as well as “collectivization” – a discrete, disjointed assemblage 
of atomic units gathered together for no other purpose than mere functioning. Note how these 
terms, “agglomeration, atomization, and collectivization” bespeak a sense of brokenness. If 
someone is unable to serve a particular function, they are considered “functionally defective.”101 
We are all familiar with these inhumane conditions, either first hand or while watching CNN. 
What makes Marcel vulnerable to the kind of criticisms expressed by Ricoeur is that Marcel is 
trying to bring to our awareness the epistemic and ontological basis that makes these 
dehumanizing conditions possible: “There is the danger of the technical environment becoming 
for us the pattern of the universe, that is to say, the categories of its particular structure being 
claimed to be valid for an objective conception of the world…. Mankind becomes a target for 
those techniques which, in principle, are legitimately applicable only to the outward world.”102 
 Marcel’s travels also took him to regions of Europe ravaged during WWII: “I think that I 
can never forget the more than physical horror and anxiety I experienced walking among the 
ruins of inner Vienna in 1946, or more recently in Caen, Rouen, or Würzburg.”103  The horror 
that Marcel experienced was “more than physical” because it was not only the visible damage 
that caused this emotion. The “more than” or surplus dimension of his emotional reaction, 
stemmed from the realization that a type of technological development – perhaps “devolution” is 
a more apt term – is what laid the ground work for this type of destruction. Marcel refers to this 
process as “the pragmatization of human beings and relations.”104 Through this process of 
pragmatization, the human being is shaped into an atomized, collectivized, and agglomatized 
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“thing,” or unit. Once the human being is shaped into such a depersonalized unit, she is 
transformed into an object of use – even if one of those uses entails being destroyed. Perhaps 
Heidegger’s controversial statement best captures the danger of this type of vicious, reductive 
type of thinking: “Agriculture is now a motorized food industry—in essence, the same as the 
manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same as the 
blockading and starving of nations, the same as the manufacture of atom bombs.”105 
 This pragmatization of the human being also leads to a condition of “uprootedness.” To 
be uprooted means to be torn from one’s natural surroundings. For Marcel, being uprooted plays 
a major role in the process of dehumanization. Here “uprootedness” means much more than to be 
physically displaced. For Marcel, there is a deep appreciation of what it means to be 
ontologically uprooted. Once a person loses their ontological mooring, a condition necessarily 
arises in which one is de-sensitized to the presence of the supra-personal: “[I]t is only where 
there exists a concrete and organic unity – and not a piling up or an accumulation – that we find 
ourselves in the presence of the supra-personal, and only there does it become possible to speak 
of a spiritual heritage.”106  
The Flight From God 
 Marcel borrowed a phrase from the theologian, Max Picard, to capture this process of 
becoming de-sensitized to our spiritual heritage. Picard coined the phrase “the fight from God” 
to emphasize the reverse direction in which humankind is moving. The word “religion” – from 
the Latin religio – connotes a bond or relation. According to Marcel, “Flight has taken to itself a 
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kind of independent existence; it has become an entity…. [But] no one remembers that he flees 
from God.”107 
 For Picard, “Flight” is represented by the constellation of quantitative practices that 
project the world as “technicalized” – a world conforming to the light of the technical image. To 
use a phrase of Heidegger, this image of technicity “holds sway,” becomes hegemonic, and 
determines the standard of objectivity. To use the language of Descartes, to engage in “Flight” 
means to live exclusively in the realm of “primary qualities,” i.e. extension. From such a singular 
perspective, to dwell in the realm of faith would be to bathe in the sheer subjectiveness of 
“secondary qualities.” Picard offers this characterization:  
What distinguishes the Flight today … is this: once Faith was the universal, and prior to the 
individual; there was an objective world of Faith, while the Flight was accomplished 
subjectively, within the individual man. It came into being through the individual man’s 
separating himself off from the world of Faith by an act of decision. A man who wanted to flee 
had first to make his own flight. The opposite is true to-day. The objective and external world of 
Faith is no more; it is Faith which has to be remade moment by moment through the individual’s 
act of decision, that is to say, through the individual’s cutting himself off from the world of the 
Flight. For to-day it is no longer Faith which exists as an objective world, but rather the 
Flight….108 
 
 Marcel viewed the 20th century as a time when the scientific world view prepared in the 
17th century had clearly taken hold, becoming entrenched, resulting in a world in which “ideas 
are objectified, reduced to formulas, and made into propaganda. [In this world,] thought is 
perverted and becomes demonic.”109  The responsibility of the philosopher is to serve as an 
“exemplary witness.” This unique type of witness attests, or gives testimonial, in order to bring 
forth an awareness of what man is essentially, regardless of his current, existential condition. 
Marcel wants to articulate the “extremely complex knot of relations [reflecting] different levels 
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reached by the human spirit.”110 Exemplary witnesses converge towards the universal in the 
sense of achieving a comprehensive vision resulting in a progressive overcoming of anything 
resembling self-centeredness. This need to recuperatively overcome the fissures of a broken 
world in the interest of a higher unity, will eventually cause Marcel to institute a radical return to 
experience – but not until an appeal to idealism first.  
§ 
Escape to Idealism 
 Marcel’s published writings frequently reference his overcoming of idealism. Less 
attention, however, is focused on his early idealistic writings.111 Marcel offers several disparate 
dates as the time he abandoned idealism – as early as 1915, about the time he commenced Part II 
of the Metaphysical Journal and, according to Being and Having, perhaps as late as June 26, 
1929.112 Idealism insulates the object within a conceptual matrix resulting in a condition where 
the object has no meaning other than that which is conferred upon it by the mind.  Simply stated, 
for Marcel, idealism’s concern with states of consciousness negated its ability to get “a hold of 
the real.”113 Any genuine ontological investigation qua interrogation of being assumes a pre-
ontological understanding of being. As Aquinas knew well, being is either there first or not at 
all.114 A classic example of Marcel’s early foray into idealism is Les conditions dialectiques de la 
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philosophie de ľ intuition.115 By tracing the argument of this essay, we can observe the process of 
an idealist-driven, dialectical method undermining itself during the course of its development. 
Most of Marcel’s later, isolated remarks concerning idealism are visible here in full bloom. So 
despite what Marcel says about formally abandoning idealism as late as 1929, there is evidence 
that the seeds of this abandonment were sowed as early as 1912! However, in typically 
Marcellian fashion, these seeds of discontent will generate fresher, more vibrant roots. Les 
conditions dialectiques de la philosophie de ľ intuition ends with an appeal to “an act of faith … 
ma[de] explicit only in a practical dialectic of participation.”116 
The Dialectical Conditions of Intuition 
 Marcel’s argument in this essay is dense and complex, a style typical of his idealist 
writings. The dialectical argument proceeds on two fronts. It begins negatively following a path 
that leads to “apparently paradoxical results [because] the philosophy of intuition must recognize 
the essential role of dialectic to affirm intuition. [But] to affirm intuition as independent of all 
dialectic would destroy thought – all thought – and thus intuition itself….”117  The argument then 
proceeds positively, by “establish[ing] that the philosophy of intuition can only be [re]constituted 
through a rational critique of the idea of absolute knowledge and that the [subsequent direction 
taken by the] philosophy of intuition is bound up with this rational critique.”118 For Marcel, if the 
possibility of absolute knowledge is discredited, then the “horizon” within which intuition can be 
considered must be “enlarged.” As Marcel frames the issue: “It is no longer a question of finding 
the conditions that make such a philosophy possible, but more profoundly if it exists.”119 For 
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those readers who already know the direction of Marcel’s later thought, the positive path is much 
more rewarding. 
 The general drift of this via negativa is as follows: Intuition, contrary to discursive 
knowledge, is supposed to provide direct access to being. To provide such access, a notion of 
“immanence” is required – being must be somehow present in the mind of the intuitor. But, how 
being would be present in the mind via intuition can only be determined by “exclusion” – by 
means of a contrast with the negative example of discursive thought. However, this 
determination that discursive thought is ontologically impotent is based upon a prior conception 
of being. According to Marcel, “pure thought is posited in a transcendent relation to being in 
order to “clear the path for intuition.”120 This is where a negative dialectic begins to wreak 
havoc. The intuitive affirmation of being is established as contrary to the negative ontological 
value of discursive thought. But, intuition cannot establish itself as a legitimate agent of 
knowledge: “In asserting that intuition attains being, and if this assertion is put forward as an 
objective judgment, pure thought would indeed be itself defined implicitly as transcendent in 
relation to being … [and] denies being as absolute.”121  In other words, if thought is to be 
endowed with a certain absolute perspicacity, the ability to validate that perspicacity now implies 
more than can be proffered by thought: “That which enables us to recognize the insufficiency of 
all concepts cannot itself be a concept. [B]eing can only be divined as an uncharacterizable 
plenitude.”122 Absolute knowledge, as well as the intuition it was intended to validate, are 
effectively disempowered in the course of their dialectical presentation. In short, “thought is 
powerless to convert the idea of being into being.”123 
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 The via positiva proceeds like this: Intuition presupposes that being is given and a 
potential object of apprehension. Intuition also presupposes a distinction between being and the 
idea of being. Can the distinction between being and an idea of being be reconciled? The 
reconciliation of “being” and the “idea of being” requires the development of a “criterion of 
being considered as such, being in so far as it is distinct from its idea and opposed to its idea.”124 
According to Marcel, there is no “criteriology of being” – a criterion falls under the category of 
an idea. If there is no criteriology of being, the question loses its significance – being cannot be 
identified with an idea: “Perhaps, when taken to its conclusion, this doctrine leads to a 
contradiction, i.e. to a thought that is not a thought.”125  
 The constructive assimilation of being and the idea of being is another vestige of absolute 
knowledge. The question remains, however, as to whether such a comprehensive system could 
be realized through empirical thought. Usually one is never in the position to refute absolute 
knowledge because such knowledge has a tendency to synthetically assimilate anything which 
stands in opposition to it. Yet Marcel finds a way: If one is going to make the claim for absolute 
knowledge, then one has to be able to claim that it is free of subjectivity. But in order to make 
that determination, absolute knowledge must be replaced by “some expedient such [as] 
intuition.”126 However, such a transcendent condition of being is necessarily lacking. Either it 
occurs within the system of validation, i.e. as an idea, and is powerless to provide the validation, 
or it is established externally and is no longer within “the total system of ideas.” 
 This is where Marcel’s turns towards an ontological realism – “a moment of capital 
importance [occurs] when it is doubtlessly possible to see the transition to a theory of being.”127 
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In order to conceive knowledge as absolute, one would be forced to reconcile “formal 
perfection” with “extensive particularity” – the collection of all finite points of view, i.e. truth 
and error. But this requirement in the end undermines the possibility of absolute knowledge, 
leaving only “a chaotic collection deprived of all order and the truth of which can no longer be 
defined.”128 Therefore, whatever regulative value absolute knowledge may possess as a heuristic 
notion, it “is powerless to constitute itself … [and] could not in any way express the nature of 
being.”129 Marcel is quick to emphasize the positive implications of this critique of absolute 
knowledge: “To postulate an object impenetrable to knowledge is to postulate a knowing beyond 
knowledge.”130 This surplus to discursive thought is what Marcel refers to as “being.” 
 Given this radical critique of absolute knowledge, what becomes of intuition? No longer 
simply a vehicle of representation, intuition becomes an act of creative transcendence in which 
“thought – conveying an awareness of the distorted character of every objectivization – asserts 
itself as irreducible to every conversion of that sort.”131 No longer posing as the ideal synthesis 
of being, intuition assumes a more circumspect role as “identical to being, at least when it is 
participating in it.”132 Any attempt at an absolute synthesis is abandoned. Existence is now 
viewed as a “zone of adhesion” that is incapable of being reduced to thought. Marcel is operating 
on the leading edge of a realm that exceeds the grip of knowledge – “[participating] through 
some successive steps of creation, to a center where it is compelled to renounce itself freely, in 
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order to make room for – the one who is (Celui qui est).133 
§ 
The Return to Experience 
What we call “the jump to existence” is really a kind of intra-existential transformation. That is the only 
way we can avoid idealism. We must say, then, that thought is inside existence…. I take this to mean the 
return to being.134 
 
 Marcel’s encounter with idealism confirmed the inability of thought to reach being solely 
through the vehicle of thought – Being is not a demonstandum: it exists as a global, “indissoluble 
unity of existence and of the existent.”135 If thought is inside existence, then a return to 
experience is required. According to one commentator: 
An identification of experience and reality is possible only when the term experience is given the 
full range of its significance, only when it is defined as the total life of the self…. The “return” 
must somehow be a “reconstruction.” It will no really be an effort to [simply] find something 
already there, buried under the debris of fancy, but rather to elaborate something new. It will 
really be an effort to reshape experience, to give it a new mold, a new direction.136 
 
 However, this return to experience entails an appreciation of experience in depth and is 
nothing resembling the reductive characterization offered by logical empiricism. Although our 
experience does provides access to non-sensible dimensions of reality, what we typically take to 
be “real” makes little or no accommodation for what is not materially perceivable. According to 
Theodore Roszak:  
 [P]hilosophy often trails off into much bookish discussion about something called “sense data,” 
conceived abstractly as a uniform species of evidence that politely registers its arrival and then 
waits to be accounted for by clever epistemological schemes…. The model for the unsensuous 
sense data so dear to the empiricist seems to be a scientist reading a thermometer as part of a not 
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so very eventful experiment – surely the most minimal exercise of our sensory abilities.137 
 
 This equivocation of experience and sensation is problematic. Sartre provides a powerful 
critique of this equivocation: 
Such is the notion of sensation. We can see its absurdity. First of all, it is a pure fiction. It does 
not correspond to anything which I experience in myself or with regard to the Other. We have 
apprehended only the objective universe; all our personal determinations suppose the world and 
arise as relations to the world. Sensation supposes that man is already in the world…. Sensation 
is a pure daydream. It must be deliberately rejected by any serious theory concerning the 
relations between consciousness and the world.138 
 
 According to Alphonse de Waelhens, classical arguments for the priority of the objective 
world – a world mirrored by sensation – move in a “vicious circle.”139 First, a conception of the 
objective world is founded upon sensation. Then, this objective conception is used to invalidate 
sensations as objective, thus relegating sensation to the purely subjective. A serious confusion 
between noetic and ontological simplicity leads to the absurd conclusion that the more 
fragmented and impoverished something is, then the more it exemplifies the real.  But, as 
Bernard Lonergan pointed out, “[K]nowing is an organically integrated act…. [E]mpiricism 
amounts to the assumption that what is obvious in knowing is what knowing obviously is. That 
assumption is false.”140 The early Wittgenstein also criticized this notion of pure representation, 
or “picturing” – by uncovering its dependence upon the notion of a pristine mirror-image: “How 
can the all embracing logic which mirrors the world use such special catches and manipulations? 
Only because all of these are connected to an infinitely fine network, to the great mirror.”141 For 
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the early Marcel, the “great mirror,” allowing for a synoptic representation of the world, is the 
conceptual equivalent of absolute knowledge – the identity of the idea of being and being.  
The Existential Orbit: The Human Body as Wedge and Probe 
But the awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and nothing else; and the soul is only a word for 
something about the body.142 
 
This notion of experience that Marcel develops is prior to the functional distinctions of 
subjective and objective. His goal is to “dig into” experience in order to re-establish vital 
connections that have been severed. Marcel’s outlook is in keeping with the conception of 
experience developed by John Dewey – a treatment of experience that extends vertically as well 
as horizontally: “Experience … reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to 
an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference.”143  
 For Marcel, the dimensions of depth and elasticity that one encounters in the world are 
made possible by the human body. In Marcellian terms, the body acts as a wedge by which the 
self becomes inserted into the thickness of the world. From this perspective, the self is incarnate, 
literally embodying the world. The expression commonly used to characterize this phenomenon 
is “body-subject.” The body also acts as a probe enabling the self to experientially traverse, in 
varying degrees of adhesion and intimacy, the entire spectrum of the world.144 This incarnated 
condition is ontologically prior to any form of Cartesian dualism. According to one 
commentator, “It is from human being and in relation to human being that we come to 
understand all of being. But this selfsame human being is not a being closed in upon itself. It is a 
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being open to all of being.”145 It is the embodied self that provides the necessary condition of this 
opening that serves as the basis of any contact with things whatsoever. Marcel characterizes the 
sum total of this relational field as an “existential orbit.” As early as the Metaphysical Journal, 
Marcel was aware of the pivotal role assumed by the body as a conduit, or sluice, to the world: 
“[I]t is clear that the datum common to my consciousness and to other possible consciousnesses 
is my body.”146 The immense reach of this orbit is reflected through the dimensions of depth and 
breadth that are attainable through the body – from the earliest traces of memory, up to and 
including the highest form of metaphysical speculation. In fact, Marcel will extend the reach of 
this orbit ultimately into the realm of the eternal.  Aristotle’s profound claim that the soul is 
potentially all existing things is possible only on the basis of this prior condition of 
embodiment.147 
 It is through this “extensive” reach of the body that the self is embedded in the world. As 
ex-tended, the body is literally “out-stretched” or plugged into the world – “the human body 
marks a person’s insertion into space and time.”148 The body and the world are then 
interpenetratively linked in a coordinated sense that forms an ambient nexus separated by no 
entitative barrier. This connection is fundamental – there is no need to bridge a gap through some 
type of epistemological device.  As Richard M. Zaner indicated in his excellent study The 
Problem of Embodiment, this connection is “neither posterior to experience (empiricism) nor 
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anterior (idealism) but ‘identical and coextensive with it’.”149 Using terms reminiscent Les 
conditions dialectiques de la philosophie de ľ intuition, one could say that a true “path” has 
finally been “cleared” between the self and the world.  As a human-being enmeshed within the 
world, sensation is ‘immediate” – things are given with a “fundamental internality,” – a 
characteristic connoted by the German word Gegebensein.150 This sense of incarnation is the 
primordial basis of all experience and cognition. In Marcellian terms, “experience [is] 
transmuted into thought.”151 
The Primacy Feeling 
 The type of pre-reflective experience being developed by Marcel is not based upon the 
classic, sense-data model. Marcel is quick to contrast the problem of sensation with the mystery 
of feeling. Like Whitehead, Marcel was aware of the disclosive capacity of feeling and its ability 
to reveal contours of the world otherwise inaccessible to thought. Thought, on the other hand, 
has a tendency to deform both the continuities and the vicissitudes within experience. This 
occurs through a process of objectivization in which wholes are isolated, analyzed, and 
ultimately solidified into forms of relations – integral unities congealing into facts. But as Robert 
Frost indicated in the poem, Mowing: “The fact is the sweetest dream that labor knows.”152 What 
if the discrete results of analysis are, in fact, derivative from a prior unity? Marcel’s answer is 
affirmative: “In the beginning … is a certain felt unity which becomes progressively articulated 
so as to make room for an ensemble of interrelated terms…. This transformation, indeed, will not 
take place without incurring an impoverishment, a kind of drying up of the realm of 
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experience.”153 In short, thought comes at a price and has its basis in feeling. 
 Marcel uses the French sentir, as opposed to toucher or tâter – verbs connoting the sense 
of touch – to describe the fundamental apprehension achievable through the body. The notion of 
sentir is opposed to any “message theory … like that between two telephone poles.”154 The 
message theory is problematic for the following reason. A transmission of sorts is assumed to 
occur between an emitting pole and a receiving pole. But in order for the act of transmission to 
occur – in order for the language sent to be transformed into the language received – the key to 
the transmission must somehow already exist for the recipient. However, what was sent cannot 
be pre-given to the recipient – if it were there would be no need for any transmission to occur. 
The “message theory,” for Marcel, operates at the level of “primary reflection” – a level of 
thematic reflection in which objects are discretely organized and fragmented into inter-objective 
relationships. At the level of primary reflection, relations “are fundamentally mediatized, 
conditioned by a series of mediations at the level of objects.”155 
 In order to overcome the instrumental space of mediation, Marcel will attempt to treat the 
act of sentir recuperatively, in the French sense of the verb recueillir, through a gathering 
process he refers to as “secondary reflection.” By viewing the body as my act of feeling, je sens, 
we arrive at the fundamental basis of experience: “the affirmation of a pure immediate, that is to 
say an immediate which by essence is incapable of mediation.”156 This feeling of the “body qua 
mine” provides the foundational, existential substratum, or touchstone, of all transmissive 
engagement whatsoever. For Marcel, this “non-mediatizable immediate” provides the baseline of 
                                                 
153 Gabriel Marcel, “I and Thou,” in The Philosophy of Martin Buber: Library of Living Philosophers Volume XII, 
ed. P. Schilpp (Open Court Publishing Company, 1967): 45. 
154 MJ: 327. 
155 The Problem of Embodiment: 37. 
156 MJ: 329.  
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all feeling – an Urgefühl.157 
Participation 
 The act of sentir articulated here is contrary to the blank slate or wax tablet described in 
empiricism á la John Locke. Marcel will develop a notion of experience as “participation” – a 
theme that goes back as far as his earliest idealistic writings. For Marcel, authentic participation 
is a type of intimate intercourse between a self and the world, consisting of a bond between 
human beings, or a covenant between a human being and God – it is a coesse. Through 
participation, a fusing together or essential ordination occurs: “[P]articipation is not a fact, not a 
dictum of the mind; it is a demand of free thought; a demand which is fulfilled by the very act of 
positing it, since its fulfillment relies on no condition external to itself.”158 Participation is bi-
directional – possessing both a centripetal and centrifugal dimension. Centripetally, participation 
moves towards a center. This is not the passive reception of classical empiricism. Instead, the 
subject engages in the act of reception: “[H]ere, to receive, means to open myself and give 
myself to an external action.”159 Marcel characterizes this movement as “an inward relaxation in 
which I abolish the sort of constriction which makes me shrink into myself.”160 The subject 
receives through a process of absorptive fusion – a process made possible only on the basis of a 
prior sense of embeddedness stemming from the body qua mine. To borrow a phrase from the 
Heideggerian lexicon, Dasein ist In-der-Welt-sein  – or, in Marcellian terms, étre-au- monde.161  
 However, if simply left to itself, this centripetal motion would result in a process of 
                                                 
157 See The Mystery of Being: 109. See also MJ: 247. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (Macmillan 
Company, 1938), p. 165: “The body is ours…. This fact of observation, vague but imperative, is the foundation of 
the connexity of the world, and of the transmission of its types of order.” 
158 Gabriel Marcel, “Theory of Participation (1913-1914),” in Philosophical Fragments (1909-1914): 106. 
159 CF:  91. 
160 Ibid.: 34. 
161 See Sein und Zeit: 52-62    See also CF: 21. The French express the act of being born as venire au monde, 
“coming into the world” as in “I came into the world on August 9, 1955.” I am grateful to Professor Oliva 
Blanchette for this insight. 
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deformation – becoming a self-divinizing act of anthropocentrism. A centrifugal movement is 
required away from self-centeredness in which “[one] moves more and more into the circle with 
reference to which and outside of which there exist third persons who are the others.”162 Marcel 
is fully aware of his dependence upon “insufficient metaphors.” Partly as a consequence of his 
failed encounter with idealism, Marcel was convinced of a “fructifying dimension” beyond 
thought and convinced of the superiority of an “open world” á la Bergson versus any closed 
system of thought. To do justice to the dynamism of this open world, metaphors become 
indispensable: “The problem for philosophers is to give us access to a dimension which can only 
be conceived dynamically, but which we perpetually tend to lose sight of, as we succumb to the 
vertigo of the object.”163 
 Qua ex-tended, the body exists in a symbiotic, centrifugal relationship to the world: “My 
body is in sympathy with things … I am really attached to and really adhere to all that exists – to 
the universe which is my universe and whose center is my body.”164 This tacit, albeit thick, 
corporeal awareness is anterior to reflection – an immediate which is absolute, “making all 
mediation possible.”165 
Dimensions of Intersubjective Being 
 This reciprocating movement of centripetal and centrifugal forces, originating out of the 
autochthonous body-subject, is illuminative of the basic structure of intersubjective being. 
Through a process of recollection, an interior, centripetal movement occurs resulting in an 
awareness of being contained in “something shaping me like a womb.”166 At the same time, the 
                                                 
162 CF: 33-34. In the language of John Dewey, participation, like experience, consists of both “doing” and 
“undergoing.” 
163 I and Thou: 47. 
164 MJ: 274. 
165 Ibid.: 275. See Richard M. Zaner, “The Radical Reality of the Human Body,” in Humanitas 2, No. 1, 1967: 73-
87.  According to Zaner, Marcel viewed the mind and body as “already intimately united. 
166 CF: 29. 
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self moves ecstatically outward, centrifugally: “We are no longer on the level of assertion but on 
that of engagement or adhesion.”167 For Marcel, as for Martin Buber, the fundamental datum of 
human existence is “man with man.” This sense of sursum is possible only on the basis of 
Marcel’s vision of the world as a “prolong[ation] of my body.”168 Without this reach, or 
prolongation, the result would be, in Whiteheadian terms, a “static morphological universe” of 
man contra man – a world described by Hobbes as a war of “all against all” in which “the life of 
man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”169 
 It is helpful to trace these respective contours of intersubjectivity. For modern 
philosophy, beginning with Cartesian dualism, intersubjectivity posed an almost insurmountable 
problem. Husserlian phenomenology, with its primary emphasis upon the intentionality of 
consciousness, was initially seen as offering a solution. Initially, Husserl conceived cognitive 
intentions as primary – being was identified with the object qua known within the transcendental 
ego. Intersubjective being becomes, at best, a second level, derivate type of intention. Marcel 
views intentionality at a more primordial level – that of inter-dialogical encounter. As Marcel 
makes clear in Metaphysical Journal, within the realm of dialogical exchange “between the 
question and the answer there must be a meeting ground which, if not selected,  is at least 
accepted … by the question.”170 For Husserl, intersubjectivity is a thematic problem to be 
phenomenologically overcome whereas, for Marcel, it is the basic presupposition of philosophy 
or any human activity whatsoever. Marcel’s position is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s remark 
that phenomenology was a “movement” long before becoming a “doctrine.”  In other words, 
                                                 
167 CF: 95. 
168 MJ: 245. 
169 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. M. Oakeshott (Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1962):100. 
170 MJ: 138. Emphasis added. See Thomas J. Owens, Phenomenology and Intersubjectivity: Contemporary 
Interpretations of the Interpersonal Situation (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1970) for an analysis of 
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intersubjectivity is a condition that exists ontologically prior to any attempt to solve it as a 
problem. The conception of intersubjectivity as a given, or Gegebensein, to be embraced, as 
opposed to a problem to be overcome, is captured in the work of Alfred Schutz, whose insights 
will lend direct support to Marcel’s view of the primacy of intersubjectivity.  
 For Schutz, the lines of intersubjective being run very deep and “serv[e] as the 
fundamental category of human existence in the world.”171  Intersubjectivity, for Schutz, is 
grounded in our condition of natality – the fact that we are “born of woman.” Due to the fact that 
our autochthonic, shared past stems from the womb of our mother, any type of subsequent 
intellectual activity – regardless of type or level – is “founded on the primal experience of the 
we-relationship.”172 In fact, Schutz will go further – perhaps anticipating what would come to be 
known as cloning: “We are simply born into a world of others…. As long as human beings are 
not concocted like homunculi in retorts but are born and brought up by mothers, the sphere of the 
“We” will be naively presupposed.” 173 
 There is little doubt that Marcel would agree with Schutz on the non-problematic nature 
of intersubjectivity and that it serves as a fundamental category of any genuine philosophical 
anthropology. Marcel would also fully validate the importance of natality – being “born of 
woman.” However, Marcel would want to trace the origins of intersubjectivity further, and at the 
risk of abusing spatial metaphors, by looking both outward and upward. 
 The centrifugal dimension of Marcel’s conception of intersubjectivity is instructive here. 
Marcel indicated that, centripetally speaking, something was “shaping [him] like a womb.” The 
                                                 
171 Alfred Schutz, “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl,” in Collected Papers, Volume III, 
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parallel to Schutz’s remarks here are uncanny. But Marcel’s notion of intersubjectivity also 
reflects a transcendent arc that seems to be lacking in Schutz’s discussion. For Marcel, the 
centrifugal, transcendent dimension of intersubjectivity serves as a line of connection to an Other 
that includes human being but, at the same time, also surpasses it. By plumbing the depths of the 
self de profundis “the whole world becomes one unified system of internal relations … an 
‘intersubjective nexus’ linking one being to another.... [This] is a continuous process of 
participation in the range of existence from the pre-reflexive (submerged) to the reflective 
(emergent).”174 This continuous process, qua embodiment, will provide the basis of three levels 
of participation: the “we” relationship, the “I-Thou” relationship, as well as a transcendent 
relationship to Being. 
§ 
Communion and Fellowship: A Higher Empiricism 
It is the private life which holds out the mirror to infinity; personal intercourse,  
and that alone, that ever hints at a personality beyond our daily vision.175 
 
 Marcel referred to his post-idealistic thought as a “higher empiricism.” Residing within 
the tissue of experience is an interstitial link to a universal sense of meaning de jure: “the 
unconditional which is the requirement and the very mark of the Absolute in us.”176 This is not 
the type of universality exhibited by “2+2=4.” Instead, “the task or vocation proper to the 
philosopher consists in preserving within himself the paradoxical equilibrium between the spirit 
of universality … and his personal experience.”177 David Abram, in The Spell of the Sensuous, 
refers to this phenomenon as a process of “turning inside out,” consisting of “a loosening of the 
                                                 
174 E. Straus and M. Machado, Marcel’s Theory of Incarnate Being: 126, 128. See CF: 17, where Marcel references 
“a centrifugal movement toward the external world.”  
175 E.M. Forster, Howard’s End (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1910,): 78. Cited in CF: 147. Marcel also used this 
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psyche from its confinement within a strictly human sphere, freeing sentience to return to the 
sensible world that contains us…. [Quoting Hölderlin] “The inner—what is it, if not intensified 
sky?”178 According to Whitehead, “We can phrase this shortly by saying that in one sense the 
world is in the soul.”179 
The domain that Marcel wants to uncover here is spiritual as opposed to material – it can 
be shown and shared but not proven as in QED. For Marcel, the spiritual is reflected through our 
awareness of increasing degrees of comprehensive experience.  Using an analogy of concentric 
circles, this experience can range from an intimate encounter with the natural environment, 
another human being, culminating in a participative comprehension of God, the supreme Other. 
Marcel believes adamantly that this culmination constitutes the most fundamental datum of 
human experience – “the truth of life.” Marcel draws upon the work of Georg Simmel in this 
context: “At the spiritual level life gives birth to something more than life…. [T]he way life has 
of raising itself to more than itself is not something given from without; it is rather its own being 
grasped in its immediacy.”180  
The “We” Relationship 
In its own intrinsic structure, subjectivity is already, in the most profound sense, intersubjective….181 
 Marcel’s emphasis on the primordiality of inter-personal relations places him in 
opposition to any form of dualism. The ego is not an “isolated reality” – it is the result of a 
process of emphasis placed upon a select segment of experience and is in no way reflective of 
experience as a whole. Contra Leibniz, the ego is not a self-enclosed monad – it is “a highly 
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sensitive enclosure.”182 Marcel’s ego is permeable, containing “windows,” enabling it to be 
“awakened” and to radiate rays of connectedness to the beyond: “It participates in the 
inexhaustible fullness of being from which it emanates.”183  As Paul stated in I Corinthians 6:19, 
“You are not your own.” Within this plenitude, the ego participates as a “trustee,” a shareholder 
or stakeholder within the whole. The analytic divisions and classifications commonly relied 
upon, i.e. self, world, other, etc. are, in fact, second-order, derivative distinctions that arrive on 
the scene after the original act of participation – an act founded upon the primary event of 
incarnation. These distinctions are, in the language of Dewey, taken as opposed to given. As long 
as these derivative distinctions are substituted for our initial condition as unified, the relation 
between the self and an other can only be conceived in an exterior way, denuding their essence 
as a moment in “the ontological bond which unites each particular being to Being.”184 This 
characteristic of being ontologically “bound” is vital to the human being, constituting its 
“vocation” – what one is “called” to do. Simply stated, the path that leads to the self must in 
some sense traverse the domain of the other. The connection between “self-realization” and 
“intersubjectivity” is essential here.185 From Marcel’s perspective, the primary vocation of the 
human being is to realize this ontological bond synoptically by incorporating “the most concrete 
forms of human experience … recognizing that the most humble of them … can go 
immeasurably deep.”186 
 Marcel will offer a variety of concrete examples to emphasize this point. When one 
travels using public transportation, one simply comes into contact with others. The exchange 
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between a traveler and a ticketing agent, despite any pleasantries exchanged, is a relationship of 
pure functionality. Each sees the other as merely an object. In Marcellian terms, the relationship 
is reflective of the mode of “having” as opposed to “being.” But once aboard and underway, a 
conversation may be initiated.  This conversation could simply consist of a benign question like 
“What is your destination?” Or, the conversation could shift to a discussion of shared 
experiences and acquaintances. The emphasis is upon sharing: “On this sort of magic voyage …, 
[t]hey are together in an elsewhere … which has a mysteriously intimate character. They are 
linked to each other by a shared secret…. [T]he notion of the secret is the mainspring of 
intersubjectivity.”187 
The “I-Thou” Relationship 
It can happen, however, that a bond of feeling is created between me and the other person, for example I 
discover an experience we both have shared…. [H]ence a unity is established in which the other person 
and myself become we, and this means that he ceases to be him and becomes thou; the words “you too” in 
this process take on primary value.188 
 
I’m going out to clean the pasture spring; 
I’ll only stop to rake the leaves away 
   (And wait to watch the water clear, I may): 
I shant be gone long.—you come too!189 
 This mainspring of intersubjectivity provides access to the wide sweep of spiritual reality, 
enabling the self to “open onto” the infinite.  To do so, a process of “secondary,” recuperative 
reflection must be undertaken in which the self undertakes “the indispensable task … of 
remaking, thread by thread, the spiritual fabric heedlessly torn….”190 The aim of secondary 
reflection is to uncover the spiritual relationships, invisible yet substantial, enveloping the self – 
relations that were severed by primary reflection. As Marcel says, the purpose is “to recapture a 
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reality and to awaken the soul to its presence.”191 The human being exists as an imago Dei – not 
in the sense of a material representation but as a reflection (εỉκόν), a glimmer of the totality. As 
Plato recognized, the capacity for sight is “like an eye” already contained in the soul, but is not 
turned in the right direction.192  Through a process of συνείδεσις193 – in the Greek sense of 
consciousness with – Marcel will attempt to steer a course to the infinite by modulating back and 
forth between the personal and the ontological. The realm of the infinite, as profoundly grasped 
by Nicholas de Cusa, is “a sphere of which the center is everywhere and the circumference is 
nowhere.”194 
 The “I-Thou” relationship occupies a higher position on the ascending plane of spiritual 
being than the “we-relationship.” Within the I-Thou relationship, two beings interact in a way 
that transcends the purely functional. As was apparent in the case of the two travelers, the 
“space” that existed at first between the “self” and the “other” was one of simple location – the 
two were “next to” or “beside” each other. These terms bespeak a sense of exteriority or distance 
from one to the other. As the sense of shared intimacy associated with intersubjective being takes 
hold, the barriers associated with the prepositions “next to,” “at,” and “beside,” become 
dissolved in favor of a feeling of “being with.” According to one commentator, “spatial 
proximity begins to be complimented by the awakening psychical proximity; position begins to 
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be transformed into presence.”195 This type of presence is characterized by a deep and intimate 
form of recognition, or reciprocity, as indicated by the French preposition avec or “with.” Taking 
advantage of the capacity of Romance languages to express the second person pronoun “you” 
both informally and formally, Marcel refers to the other as a “thou” (tu) as opposed to vous – the 
formal, polite version of “you.”  In order for the other to be perceived as a “thou,” the perceiver 
must loosen the tight grip of self-interest that encircles him. Once loosened, a shared network of 
relationships gradually becomes discernable entre nous – an intertwining, expanse of relations 
invisible to the naked eye. This is why Marcel refers to presence as a “communion” wherein “the 
co-articulation of the vital and the spiritual is really palpable.”196 Within the space of this co-
articulation, a reciprocal moment occurs involving a mutual embrace between self and other: 
“We are here at the exact point where honest thought changes into a De profundis and by the 
very fact of doing so opens to transcendence.”197 
The Bond of Fraternity 
The person who gives up his life for a cause is aware of giving all, of making a total sacrifice; but even if 
he is going to a certain death, his act is not a suicide…. Why? Because he puts his life at the disposal of a 
higher reality…. There cannot be any sacrifice without hope, and hope is suspended in the ontological 
realm.198 
 
 For Marcel, the notion of self-sacrifice is vital, offering a powerful key to the 
transcendent. There is no rational explanation that can be given for self-sacrifice because the act 
of self-sacrifice is not an act simply of quid pro quo. Marcel’s analysis is very insightful: 
We have to distinguish carefully between the physical effect of the act of self-sacrifice and the 
act’s inner significance…. Self-fulfillment takes place at another, an invisible level…. They 
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answer a call that comes from their very depths…. At this point it seems a strange overflow is 
taking place … as if death might be really, in a supreme sense, life.199 
 
The Marcellian notion of sacrifice in the interest of a higher reality is perhaps nowhere 
better exemplified than in Ernest Hemmingway’s novel For Whom the Bell Tolls. In this classic 
story, Robert Jordan, an American fighting on the side of the Republic of Spain during the 
Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, is wounded in the process of attempting to blow up a strategic 
target – a bridge that serves as a major avenue of approach for the enemy. While fighting along 
side of guerilla insurgents, Robert falls in love with a young woman, Maria. Their love is 
consummated the night before Robert is wounded. Robert is now transcendently linked to two 
higher causes. One cause is the Republic, for which he will remain behind in order to delay the 
enemy – realizing that he will be killed in the process – and the other is Maria, with and through 
whom he has entered into the realm of the truly intersubjective. It is hardly coincidental that 
Hemmingway, although writing in English, capitalizes on the opportunity to utilize the formal / 
informal structure of the Spanish language – represented by the words “you” (usted) and “thou” 
(tu) – a distinction characteristic of Romance languages.200 The following poignant exchange 
between Robert and Maria, just prior to be separated, exhibits the powerful dynamic that exists 
between the transpersonal act of sacrifice, the informal mode of address, and the intersubjective: 
“Guapa,” he said to Maria and took hold of her two hands. “Listen. We will not be going to 
Madrid—…. We will not go to Madrid now but I go always with thee wherever thou goest. 
Understand? As long as there is one of us there is both of us. Does thou understand? What I do 
now I do alone. I could not do it well with thee. If thou goest, then I go, too. Do you not see how 
it is? Whichever one there is, is both.” 
Now you will go for us both … you must not be selfish. You must do your duty now. 
You are me now. Surely thou must feel it….” 201  
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 This passage gives concrete expression to the presence of a spiritual dimension in 
experience – an awareness of the other through intersubjective feeling. That this intersubjective 
experience is arrived at through dialogic encounter is hardly coincidental: “The dialogue is the 
most primeval phenomenon, generally and necessarily experienced everywhere; this is its title to 
priority.”202 This experience is, for Marcel, religious: 
One thing that is not deceptive, one thing that cannot deceive – and this is my most profound 
conviction – is discovery. We might say that in a certain sense the road that leads to self passes 
by another. But we must add immediately that this self so mediated has hardly anything in 
common with the initial self. In this sense, discovery, as I understand it, can only belong to the 
religious dimension.203 
 
 For Marcel, intersubjectivity holds the key to the experience of being. If being is a 
condition of “plenitude,” then a self-contained ego – incapable of experiencing anything that 
exists outside of the domain of its restricted subjectivity – is incapable of accessing being.  The 
self, when exhibited in the full scope of its radiance, ex-ists “as being a presence, or as a 
modification of presence.”204 The very acts which disclose the subject as a being-in-communion 
are at the same time the acts which provide access to being. For Marcel, the paradigmatic 
examples of these spiritual acts are those moments of communal fellowship – hope, fidelity, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
John Donne, that Hemmingway chose as an epigram to his novel, implies the close relationship between 
intersubjectivity and the transcendent: 
  No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man 
  is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine; if 
  Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, 
as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor 
of thy friends or thine owne were; any mans death  
diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And 
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; 
It tolls for thee. 
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Lawrence and D. O’Connor (Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964): 350. See also by the same author, The Idea of Dialogical 
Phenomenology (Duquesne University Press, 1969). 
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love – in which the coesse of I and Thou is mutually recognized and embraced. In Marcellian 
terms, this reflexive, spiraling path to the self is possible only via the presence of the other.  
The Transcendent Orientation of Love 
 
Love … appears to me to be what one might call the essential ontological datum.205 
 
 Love, as Marcel conceives it, bespeaks the fundamental ontological unity that is exhibited 
between the self and the other engaged in intersubjective being – a process of spiritual re-
connection in which the beloved is lifted out of its quotidian position in space and time and re-
established within its rightfully endowed place in the eternal. Access to the eternal is not 
determined by the laws of nature. As Marcel was well aware from the death of his mother, the 
presence of a loved one does not cease with the end of their physical existence. In the spiritual 
realm, telepathic feeling often supersedes traditional methods of physical communication. 
According to Marcel, “Telepathy is surely in regard to space what memory is in regard to 
time.”206 
 Through the act of love, the beloved is re-instantiated into the eternal and “immobili[zed] 
… above the world of genesis and vicissitude.”207 This transmutation is not an act of wishful 
thinking but a re-instatement of the self in its aboriginal claim to being. Marcel was very 
influenced by the work of Louis Lavelle, a contemporary French metaphysician who advocated 
the primacy of the relation between the self and being. For Lavelle, the self is inscribed within 
being – human existence arises out of a region which is anterior to the critical distinction 
between subject and object: “la présence actuelle et inévitable de la totalité de ľ être en chaque 
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point.”208 When the beloved is transmuted into the realm of the eternal, their being qua spirit 
enables them to transcend the cycle of decay that is characteristic of existence physically 
conceived. No longer seen as completely tethered to a simply biological cycle, the beloved now 
exists in perpetuity by virtue of her re-affirmation in the eternal – thus the famous Marcellian 
dictum: “Thou at least shall not die.”209 Similar to the manner in which Marcel will speak of 
hope, love is “a sort of ontological counterweight to death.”210 
 Marcel refers to love as a “real interiority.” As the lover continuously attests her love for 
the beloved, each is spiritually lifted. In a quasi-Platonic sense, the lover’s soul is stirred by the 
sensuous beauty of the beloved, causing the former to recollect, albeit faintly, the pure, genuine 
beauty of the eternal. The beloved is lifted out of her empirical conditions of space and time and 
reinserted into the extensive field of being. At the same time, the lover, through the spiritual act 
of loving, attests to her faith in the plenitude of being – a realm in which lover and beloved are 
joined together. Victor Hugo describes this experience with poetic beauty: “Sentir ľ être sacre 
frémir dans ľ être cher….”211 The lover becomes acquainted with divinity through the beloved. 
For Marcel, love “is perfect knowledge … in which it is no longer permissible to disassociate 
being from appearance.”212 As perfect knowledge, love is no longer subject to the dualisms that 
pertain to the finite order, i.e. the dualism of flesh and spirit. Love, qua infinite, surpasses all 
dualism and reflects a sort of “divine mediation.” In order to recognize the possibility of love, it 
is necessary to envision a level of divine being “that does not meet any truth that it is powerless 
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to recognize.”213 For Marcel, unconditional love and faith in a divine plenitude go hand in hand: 
“love is only conceivable, only possible for a being who is capable of such faith…; such a love is 
perhaps like a prenatal palpitation of faith”214 God is the absolute Thou – invoked through the 
acts of faith and prayer.  This recognition of faith as integral to the self and its transcendent 
orientation was operative in Marcel’s thought from the beginning. In the Metaphysical Journal, 
Marcel wrote: “Faith is the act by which the mind is made, the mind … as living and active 
reality…. Through faith I affirm the transcendent foundation for the union of the world and my 
thought.”215 Marcel uses the terms “creative fidelity” to refer to the act through which being is 
concretely enacted. 
Creative Fidelity as the Place of Being  
[Fidelity occupies] the truly central position … in the general economy of my thought.216 
 “Being as the place of fidelity” is the pons aeternitatis in Marcel’s philosophy. Through 
engaging in fidelity, one ascends to the level of transcendence. One example Marcel develops 
involves paying a visit to a terminally ill friend in the hospital.217 Before leaving, you promise in 
good faith to return – knowing that the friend’s days are numbered. Soon after, you regret that 
you made this promise and begin to rationalize why you are not necessarily obligated to return. 
This rationalization occurs in the following way: Although I sincerely meant what I said at the 
time, my mind has since changed. Why should I be bound by an emotion I no longer feel? 
 The act of fidelity is indicative of a “primal bond” that is reflective of the unity and 
continuity of the human soul. Fidelity reveals the “supra-temporal identity” of the self: “the 
                                                 
213 Ibid.: 63. 
214 CF: 137. 
215 MJ: 44, 45. 
216 CF: 149. 
217 BH: 47. 
 87
evidence of fixed stars in the heaven of the soul.”218 This identity is not simply given apriori – it 
is achieved through creative appropriation. The self that is identified through the act of fidelity is 
one that is freely earned through a decisive act of choice. It is easier in many instances to be 
unfaithful – to accept the world as broken. Unlike Sartre, Marcel did not believe that man is 
condemned to freedom because of the non-existence of God. For Marcel, our freedom is 
achieved during those significant acts in which we re-create, or attest to, our being qua spirit. It is 
this freedom which can reveal the inconceivable richness of the universe: “[C]onditional pledges 
are only possible in a world where God is absent. Unconditionality is the true sign of God’s 
presence.”219 Our failure to execute our freedom, to be faithful to our choice, is the ontological 
source of the current state of malaise that surrounds us. According to Kenneth Gallagher: 
“Through fidelity I transcend my becoming and reach my being. But the being I reach is not a 
being which was already there: It is only there in as much as I reach it. [T]he self that fidelity 
reveals is a self which fidelity creates.... Fidelity creates the self, the self as non-object.”220  
 Through creative fidelity, one recalls a connection to spirit, thus re-establishing one’s 
place in the eternal whole. Like Bergson, Marcel believed that “[s]omething appears to overflow 
every part of the body … passing beyond it in space as in time…. [T]he soul … being precisely a 
force which can draw from itself more than it contains, yield more than it receives, give more 
than it has.”221 Recollection enables the self to recapture its ontological lineage by escaping the 
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confines of abstract, quantifying thought, entering again into a spiritual dimension that exceeds 
conceptualization. Recollection implies a repetition, not in a strictly mechanical sense, but in the 
active sense of a retrieve.  To recollect, as in recueillement, is to engage in the revivification of 
spiritual possibilities. As Mircea Eliade indicated, at all levels of religious experience there exists 
a “close connection between cosmicization and consecration.”222 This sense of consecration is 
captured by the German verb wiederhollen – to repeat is to “hold again.” But a Marcellian type 
of recollection should in no way be equated with a nostalgic romanticism that simply wishes to 
hearken back to the past. Recollection, properly conceived, resembles the Augustinian attempt to 
turn towards the interior reaches of the self through confession in order to become closer to God. 
This process of spiritual interiorization creates a dual condition of material poverty and spiritual 
fecundity: having nothing yet participating in being.  To be spiritually revivified is to engage in 
“the active perpetuation of presence.”223 To truly exist, for Marcel, is to attempt to become 
actualized in perpetuity by extensively re-absorbing oneself into the expanse of the eternal.  No 
longer simply a return to the past, an appeal is made to the future as well: “[T]his region where 
the now and then tend to merge … could be nothing other than Eternity.”224 
The Ontological Efficacy of Hope 
Hope is directed towards eternity….225 
 Hope is the act through which the self transforms its condition from material captivity to 
spiritual freedom. In order to best understand hope, it is necessary to contrast it with desire. For 
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Marcel, desire is a condition of the self-absorbed ego. If a person says “I hope I win the lottery” 
what they really mean is that “I desire to win the lottery.”  The difference, for Marcel, is crucial. 
To desire is to experience a “tension” that must be eased – a tension caused by a perceived lack 
of egoistic fulfillment, like hunger. Marcel notes our tendency to speak of desire in terms of 
having a fever, emphasizing the obsessive capability of desire to assume complete domination 
over one’s condition. Desire is necessarily connected to the condition of “having” and is doomed 
to non-fulfillment because the cycle of need is endless. Any lack of fulfillment is deemed to be a 
frustrating postponement. Due to its need to eliminate any type of resistance, desire sees time as 
a form of imprisonment. The desiring subject thus seeks to eliminate time – to close the gap 
between satisfaction and desire in order to avoid a Sisyphean condition of despair. Marcel 
chooses the example of a prisoner – a choice that is hardly coincidental – to illustrate his point: 
“Impatience manifested itself sometimes by attempts to escape…. These attempts corresponded 
to a rejection of waiting…. Trying to escape is escaping from the temptation to despair.”226 As a 
result of this sense of desperation, desire becomes “wishful thinking.”  
 To hope, on the other hand, is to “rejoin an immemorial experience … in a dimension 
which is that of perpetual novelty.”227 Unlike imprisionment, this experience of perpetual novelty 
is not undertaken within the unending cycle of desire. In the realm of hope, time is “relaxed or 
stretched” as opposed to cut short – “a range which goes from inert waiting to active waiting.”228  
A contrast with desire is helpful in this context. A person who wants to win the lottery, or escape 
a lifetime of confinement, desires to do so simply for him or herself – desire is an egoistic act 
executed in the mode of having. Hope, on the other hand, reflects an intersubjective possibility 
that is able to surpass the tension created through desire. When one truly engages in hope, one 
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reaches a dimension of intersubjective being insufficiently characterized by the pronoun “we.”  
The act of hope is a generative process whereby the subject interiorizes itself within the total 
spiritual economy: “I hope in thee for us.”229 Marcel expresses this phenomenon powerfully: 
“Hope is perhaps the very stuff by which our soul is made.”230 
 Unlike the condition of desire, in which the subject conceives itself as an object requiring 
satiation, hope “re-establishe[s] the subject in the condition of subject, and at the same time, [the 
subject] is re-integrated into a living relation with the world of men, from which he had cut 
himself off.”231 This living relation transcends the strictly material realm. One usually prays for 
that which is outside of one’s power to produce. But it is also the case that one prays for 
something that one does not have the power to specify – a movement from the realm of problem 
to the realm of mystery.232 Here mechanistic causality is left behind – life moves forward with an 
adventurous quality reflected in the Whiteheadian phrase of a creative zest towards novelty – 
existence conceived as “in the making” (faciens) as opposed to ready-made (factum). Hope, 
stemming from the “vital centers” of the human being, possesses “the power of making things 
fluid.”233 Once fluid, possibilities are set free with the potential to be transformed as part of the 
workings of a larger process.  As such, hope creates a condition of binding elasticity: “the very 
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cement which binds the whole into one.”234 No longer a condition in which a being is disaffected 
from Being, “hope culminates in the notion of the mystical body, of the all in all.”235 
§ 
The Ontological Mystery: Circulating Being 
Infinity, or this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, in which whatever is determined in one way or 
another, e.g. as being, is rather the opposite of this determinateness, this no doubt has been from the start 
the soul of all that has gone before….236 
 
 Marcel’s focus upon being (ľ être) provides the foundation and the unity of his 
thought.237 Contrary to many thinkers in the western tradition, Marcel’s conception of being is 
not univocal – it consists of several polyvalent notions that are irreducible to any sort of primeval 
Urgrund. Having closely examined Marcel’s critique of idealism, it is apparent that being cannot 
be conceptualized in any totalistic way – man is immersed in being in the mode of homo 
participans versus homo spectans. Being is best conceived in terms of a surplus that exceeds 
categorical inventory – any attempt to define a being as “x” simultaneously implies that this 
same being is not “y” or any number of other possible variables. But this is no admission that 
being is meaningless or, as Nietzsche is famous for stating, “the final wisp of evaporating 
reality.”238 In fact, one of Marcel’s fundamental ontological claims is that being serves as the 
immanent ground of any kind of intelligibility whatsoever.  
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 Being is conceived foundationally in the following ways: as the foundation of beings; as 
the foundation of existence; as the foundation of intersubjectivity; as the origin of value; and as 
the eternal. Marcel embraced a nuanced conception of being, reflecting a wide dimensionality – 
dimensions that are crucial to our very character as human beings. Before Marcel’s 
understanding of being can be satisfactorily investigated, it is first necessary to examine what 
Marcel refers to as “ontological exigence” or “the exigence of being” – a trace, or “blind 
intuition,” wherein human beings experience the alluring pull of a pre-reflective awareness of 
being. 
 Contemporary society suffers from a disease that is, at the same time, a dis-ease. The 
disease is nihilism – the belief that man is the measure of all things. Our narrowly conceived 
world of functions, technology, and bare abstractions leads to physical, spiritual, and 
psychological maladies. This dis-ease originates from an experience that “something” is lacking 
– a deep sense of striving, or nisus, towards that which transcends the abstract inventories of a 
broken world. Using a Kantian analogy, our barren functional world is the world of Verstand – 
the world of categories that define the world of Newtonian nature. Kant’s genius was that he 
recognized that the world of nature alone could not satisfy the demands of spirit – hence, his 
appeal to Vernunft. The latter manifests itself in a drive, or search, for transcendent completeness 
– the quest of pure reason towards that which it can’t comprehend but which, at the same time, it 
can’t ignore. As Marcel says: “[E]xistence comes to us as something which contains and also 
goes beyond everything to which we might seek to reduce it.”239 That which cannot be contained 
and “goes beyond,” is the plenitude of being. Qua plenitude, being cannot be reduced to a datum 
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– Kant’s conclusion that being is not a real predicate is true in a quite limited sense. But that 
which is not reducible to a datum, due to its universality and plenitude, somehow redirects itself 
towards us ecstatically in the form of an appeal that takes the form of “a deep-rooted interior 
urge.”240 
 In an effort to combat the tyrannical reign of functional categorization, Marcel will 
characterize being as an “ontological mystery.” For Marcel, a mystery – as opposed to a problem 
– cannot be approached in the external manner of a detached subject unleashing a technique 
upon an object. Through his failed venture with idealism, Marcel realized that ontological 
reflection precludes the ability of the questioner to remain outside of the scope of inquiry – 
knowledge is enveloped by being: “To pose the ontological problem is to inquire about the 
totality of being and about myself as a totality.”241 Technique, synonymous with abstract 
thinking, is unable to capture that aspect of presence which is most essential – it’s 
“uncircumscribed” nature.  As a subject rooted in being, we occasionally experience the 
“rupture” or the inability of categorical analysis to provide an exhaustive account of the course 
of human existence. Once the categories of an “egocentric topography” are broken down, the 
human being becomes capable of transparency, exhibiting a degree of permeability vis ά vis the 
plenitude of being. For Marcel, the distinction between the “full” and the “empty” is more 
fundamental than that of the “one” and the “many.” When the insular barriers of abstract thought 
are removed, and the self recognizes its fundamental being qua participans in esse, one leaves 
the cloistered region of the problem and enters into the realm of mystery: “mystery is a problem 
that encroaches upon its own data.”242  
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 In order to convey the primary, active, and foundational character of being, Marcel will 
stress the verbal, infinitival aspect of being (ľ être). Qua primary act, being is ontologically first 
– in order for a being to be “x,” it must first be. Stated in Marcellian terms, all beings must 
participate in being in order to be. Stemming from this original ontological participation, being 
reveals a categoreal surplus. Similar to the way in which a verb is conjugated out of its infinitive 
form, a being is in a sense conjugated, or derived, out of an infinite field of potential as this being 
and not that, or some other, being. Marcel combines this dimension of a surplus and foundational 
act to arrive at a conception of being as an “omnipresent unity … that transcends each and every 
category in as much as it includes (enwraps) them all and is the unity of them all.”243 
 It is important to note in this context that being, as Marcel conceives it, is not an empty 
abstraction á la Niezsche, but something similar to what Hegel referred to as a concrete 
universal.244 The concrete universal encompasses all beings in their uniqueness. Marcel avoids 
the classic ontological dilemma which consists of having to choose between a conception of 
being that is too focused upon singular beings, and a conception of being that is unified, abstract 
and totally removed from any consideration of beings in their particularity. The perspective of 
singularity places being at risk by conceiving it strictly as an abstract notion that cannot do 
justice to the uniqueness of beings. The perspective of abstract unification places beings at risk 
by robbing them of their haecceity. Marcel avoids this Scylla and Charybdis by conceiving ľ être 
both extensively and intensively. This allows Marcel to claim “[t]he more we are able to know 
the individual being, the more we shall be oriented, and as it were directed towards, a grasp of 
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being as such..”245 
 Marcel also considers being as the foundation of existence – the specifically human 
context within which the drama of life unfolds. An embroiled controversy exists within the 
community of Marcel scholars over the relationship between being and existence within the 
Marcellian corpus. It would take us too far off course to effectively mediate this issue. Suffice it 
to say that some Marcel scholars have confused the relationship between being and existence – a 
move that has met with some consternation within the wider community of Marcel 
scholarship.246 
 For Marcel to ex-ist is to be manifest – to assert oneself as a sensible presence and, at the 
same time, be inserted into the world. Marcel’s focus when speaking of existence is strictly upon 
incarnate being – a kind of being associated solely with the physical world – and does not 
include the wider connotation of being as the foundation of all types of beings. For this reason, 
according to Thomas Anderson, “Marcel chooses to never refer to [existence] as the act … 
because … he limits existence to the realm of the physical.”247 Although being qua existence 
offers a narrower conception of being than that of being as being, the concreteness that is 
associated with being is still operative – existence is incarnate being étre-au-monde. 
 For Marcel, embodied subjects do not exhibit the discrete atomism of windowless 
monads or the self-sufficiency of the Cartesian cogito. Prior to emerging as the singular, 
empirical ego, the subject is pre-reflectively enmeshed in an intersubjective Lebenswelt, 
consisting of a “fluid medium [with] a spiritual quality … in which everything is bound together 
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… beyond the plane of pure relations … [in] living communication.248 This is the realm of 
intersubjective being. Whereas being qua being founds a being, and being qua existence gives 
rise to a circumscribed region of being, i.e. living being, being qua intersubjectivity founds the 
person as a human being. As Marcel was fond of saying “the road that leads to self passes by 
another.”249 Personhood is not given at one stroke. In order to be achieved, the subject must 
escape from the prison of egoism and become re-integrated within the multi-textured fabric of 
intersubjective, social being. The transition from existence to personhood consists of a 
transmutation from living to being – from “I exist” to “I am.”250 The transition from the mode of 
being qua existence to the mode of being qua intersubjectivity, reestablishes the being of the sum 
in its inseparable wholeness. 
 It is by now apparent that abstract, functional thinking will never breach the 
insurmountable gulf it has erected through its legion of dualisms. However, the faint appeal that 
continues to speak from behind the wall of abstraction, provides a clue to Marcel’s conception of 
being as value. The realm of pure functionality, wherein the function a person performs 
somehow becomes equated with what they are, is dehumanizing. Human being is more than 
mere functionality: To be is always to be a value.251 However, the essence of a human being is 
not to be a functional quid or what. Contrary to Quine, “To be is [not] to be the value of a 
variable.”  The human being is a unique, un-replicable occurrence of being – a primary unity of 
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“this” and “what” in the Greek sense of tode ti.252 
 Marcel conceives of being qua value as a gift. Prior to our age of vulgar commercialism, 
in which most forms of human interaction have become depersonalized, to give a gift was to 
present something unique to the recipient – unique in the sense of symbolizing how unique that 
person is. Likewise for Marcel, a human being is a gift – a hierophany uniquely created out of 
the vast potential of being, i.e. of all that is and could be. Value is “a seal of the existent … 
incarnated first in order to radiate later.”253 According to Louis De Raeymaeker: “Since 
particular being is not the whole of reality, it exists only partially…. [I]t is an imperfect being. 
[But] the perfection of every particular being belongs itself wholly to being, and by that token it 
is to be distinguished in a clear-cut way from every other thing…. [T]he perfection which is 
proper to that being is necessarily distinct from that of the others.”254 Similarly, for Marcel, the 
course of a human life is also a unified, value-laden phenomenon. Within the living being 
“[a]xiology and ontology … are probably inseparable.”255     
For Marcel, values are actual dimensions of reality – real and objective structures 
residing within the tissue of experience. Values may not be perceptible physically in a crude 
materialistic sense, but our capacity for feeling liberates us from any need to rigidly adhere to an 
atomistic, sensationalist epistemology. The act of love serves as a true testimonial to this value 
dimension of experience. Through love, both the lover and the beloved, through the mutual 
recognition of their unique ontological value, become joined together in the realm of the eternal. 
Through a “unitive intention,” the lover surpasses the limits of her physical being by perceiving 
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the beloved in his radiance as a transcendent dimension of value. This ambient field of value is 
reflected through the beloved as an incarnate embodiment of the sphere of value. This notion of 
value as a bonding medium “seems to lure us forward in a movement which can be 
consummated only in the perfect κοιηωηία.”256 This “community” of the whole consists of both 
the quantitative totality of uniquely created beings and the qualitative totality – the aesthetic 
outcome resulting from the integration of uniqueness with coherence. Marcel characterizes this 
as “an immense skyscape, invisible but somehow felt.”257  
 This notion of “consummation within a perfect community” holds the key to 
understanding being as “pleroma” or “absolute super-being.”258 Here Marcel will focus on a key 
distinction made by both Bergson and Blondel between pensée pensée and pensée pensante – 
closed and open thought. Philosophical thought must exhibit the open character of pensée 
pensante “which can be developed only if it is constantly replenished in such a way that its 
uninterrupted communication with being is guaranteed.”259 To use a Spinozistic analogy, 
philosophical thinking must exhibit the sense of dynamic continuity captured by phrase natura 
naturans as opposed to the closed sense of natura naturata. This continuity is disclosed through 
an experience of parts fusing into greater wholes towards which the parts are teleologically 
guided and fulfilled – an act of recueillement or recuperation seeking the higher unities 
associated with over-all structures, organic wholes and intelligible syntheses without which 
physical being would not be recognizable. In order to capture this meta-problematic, hyper-
phenomenological reality, Marcel will turn to the role of secondary reflection in order illuminate 
                                                 
256 Ibid.: 55.  
257 Ibid.: 130. 
258 See TWB: 52. 
259 CF: 13. 
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a “reflexive intuition” that hints of “a reality which overflows and envelops me, without my 
being able to view it in any way as external to what I am.”260 
 If traced properly, this intuition of secondary reflection can lead the subject “toward the 
real and pleromatic unity where we will be all in all.”261 This complex skein of relations consists 
of a synthetic unity in which everything is bound together in homogeneous solidarity – a 
mystical “city of souls.” For Marcel, being par excellence, consisting of the supra-personal unity 
of all beings, is God: “the inside … to which … we are entirely unable … to imagine …a 
corresponding outside.”262 For Marcel there is no precise boundary between ontology and 
mystification: “Conversion is first of all the movement by which consciousness … transcends the 
obsession with numbers through the numberless.”263 No longer bound by the limitations of 
abstract thought, ontology converts to mysticism through an encounter with that which surpasses 
conceptualization – the eternal.  
Eternity reflects a dimension of time much different from that of clock or calendar. The 
eternal qua infinite time – time considered in its totality – transcends simple duration. To say that 
duration admits of no succession is to say that it has no terminus – beginning or end. Eternity is a 
timeless present or totum simul: It neither was, nor shall be, but is. The living present serves as 
the nexus of time and eternity because “in eternity, everything in all its modal temporal forms is 
together with everything else.”264 Diametrically opposed to what is referred to as a Newtonian 
“absolute present” – a theoretically constructed, yet vanishing, point between the “no longer” 
and the “not yet” – this eternal present is a nunc stans. As Aquinas said “Eternity is existing all at 
                                                 
260 Ibid.: 144. Cf. Joseph Grange, John Dewey, Confucius and Global Philosophy (SUNY Press, 2004), p. 41: “The 
cosmos itself swims in the sea of our feelings just as we swim in its feelings.”  
261 EBHD: 141. 
262 MB II: 12. For a discussion of Marcel’s treatment of God, see Leo Sweeney, S.J., “Gabriel Marcel’s Position on 
God,” in The New Scholasticism, Vol. 44, 1970: 101-124. 
263 Searchings: 52-53. 
264 Robert C. Neville, Symbols of Jesus: A Christology of Symbolic Engagement (Cambridge University Press, 
2001): 48. 
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once (totum simul existens).”265 
It is important to consider eternity dynamically as opposed to statically.266 At the 
phenomenological level, temporal experience is not discreet. Each of the modes of time – past, 
present, and future – are contained within the others. The present and the future inform the past. 
The past and the future affect the present. The past and the present constrain the future. William 
James characterized this stretch of temporal duration as “the echo of the objects just past [and] 
the foretaste of those just to arrive.”267 In order for our experience to be temporally integrated in 
this fashion, the discrete, evaporating now-points of Newtonian time must be supplanted by a 
thicker conception of the present. James refers to this more robust conception as the specious 
present: 
[The specious present] is no knife edge, but a saddleback, with a certain breadth of its 
own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of 
composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were—a 
rearward and a forward-looking end. It is only as parts of this duration-block that the relation of 
succession of one end to the other is perceived…. The experience is from the outset a synthetic 
datum, not a simple one.268 
 
 The modes of time, prior to their physical realization, must somehow exist in a prior 
state of inter-relation. Eternity consists of the ontological reality in which the modes of time are 
together eternally. Eternity, so conceived, is synonymous with the “divine life” because “God 
[is] … a Life embracing all determinate things in all their shifting temporal modes.”269 This is 
not a static realm that somehow exists simply totum simul, but an ontological dimension with an 
                                                 
265 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: 1.10.1. See Chapter 12 of the wonderful novel by Michael Ende, 
Momo (Puffin Books, 1985) for a rich, suggestive account of time and eternity. 
266 This “dynamic” conception of eternity is indebted to the work of Robert C. Neville. See Symbols of Jesus: A 
Christology of Symbolic Engagement: 44-55. See also Eternity and Time’s Flow (SUNY Press, 1993). 
267 William James, Principles of Psychology, Volume I (Dover Publications, Inc., 1950): 606. 
268 Ibid.: 609-610. 
269 Neville, Symbols of Jesus: 49. See James F. Harris, “An Empirical Understanding of Eternality,” in Philosophy of 
Religion, Volume 22, 1987: 165-183. Harris develops a notion of eternality using the Jamesian conception of a 
specious present as well as the notion of “stimulus thresholds” from cognitive psychology: “We can thus understand 
God’s eternality in terms of an infinite specious present and an absolute zero stimulus threshold, both of which seem 
to make sense in terms of contemporary epistemology and cognitive psychology (p. 179).” 
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“integrated” temporal structure. In Jamesian terms, this eternal variation of the specious present 
is “the original paragon and prototype of all conceived times….”270 
Hence, eternity should not be taken simply as an example of an other-wordly 
transcendens – eternity is realized within time. For Marcel, each being, qua created, “modulates 
between the intimate and the metaphysical … [providing] the magical fomentation around which 
personal existence is centered.”271 Marcel viewed the individual as a concrete instance of 
spiritual being; a value disclosed in time throughout the course of a life – a personal drama 
fulfilling itself as a unique being, within a community of beings, linked to the eternal. The 
presencing of being encountered through the perdurance of each entity, constitutes a temporal 
realization of the sacred. This infinite expanse of eternal time allows for the unfolding of “the 
continuous eruption into being of those myriad forms, the active thating or ising of everything 
which emerges into consciousness”272  Independent of the ordering systems of thought and 
language, lies the eternal sense of being – is-ness, Istigkeit, or, as the German mystics of the high 
Middle Ages expressed this phenomenon, itzt. Our lives consist of an immediate, albeit finite, 
realization of the eternal. Human existence, then, is both temporal – consisting of an integrated 
temporal sequence in which a past evolves into a future – and eternal – the integration of this 
temporal sequence within the larger context of divine, temporal unity.  As one observer duly 
noted: “Being is value born of the intersection of time and eternity.”273 
  
 
                                                 
270 Principles of Psychology: 631. See Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, trans. V. and G. Ringer (Henry 
Regnery Company: 1956), p. 78: “[T]ime gives us the form within which can be expressed all intention finality and 
meaning.… The world’s drama is played out in time.” 
271 EBHD: 85. HV: 71. 
272 Paul Brockelman, “The Miracle of Being: Cosmology and the Experience of God,” in Human Studies, 20, 1997: 
297. 
273 Erazim Kohak, The Embers and the Stars: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Moral Sense of Nature (University of 
Chicago Press, 1984): 196. 
 102
Part II 
From Idealism to Communitarian Fulfillment:  
Marcel’s Royce Interpretation 
I surrender in no whit my assurance of the unity of God and the World.1 
§ 
The Context of Marcel’s Royce Interpretation 
 
 Marcel’s La Métaphysique de Royce remains such a gold standard in Roycean 
scholarship that a reviewer once remarked “It is somewhat paradoxical that Josiah Royce 
should find his most eloquent interpreter in France’s Gabriel Marcel.”2 The essays 
contained within this work were originally published as a series of four articles in La 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale in 1918 and 1919. After being released in 
monograph form in 1945, they would later appear in English translation in 1956 as 
Royce’s Metaphysics.3 
 The circumstances surrounding the creation of these essays remain somewhat 
vague. Marcel could not “remember precisely” what led him to write these essays, 
although he believed they were prompted by a request from La Revue de Métaphysique et 
de Morale to review the work of Royce. Despite the retrospective comments Marcel 
makes downplaying the influence of Royce’s thought upon his own – characterizing 
                                                 
1 Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, First Series, The Four Historical Conceptions of Being 
(McMillan Company, 1899): x. Hereafter referred to as W&I (FS). 
2 Quentin Lauer, “Royce’s Metaphysics,” in Thought, Vol. XXXII, 1957: 450. This statement, of course, 
was made well before the superb commentaries on Royce written by Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J. 
3 Royce’s Metaphysics, trans. V. and G. Ringer (Henry Regnery Company, 1956). Hereafter referred to as 
RM. Prior to the Regnery edition, these essays appeared in French in a monograph published by Aubier in 
1945. They were recently reissued in French by L’Hartmattan in 2005. For a review of the L’Hartmattan 
edition, see Dwayne A. Tunstall, “La Métaphysique de Royce, avec un appendice de texts, publiée et 
prefacée par Miklos Vetö,” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2006: 582-585. 
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several aspects of Royce’s philosophy as “outdated”4 – there seem to be obvious reasons 
why a thinker of Royce’s character would have appealed to Marcel. Both Marcel and 
Royce, deeply opposed to any type of reductionism, appealed to a much wider conception 
of experience than that proffered by contemporary empiricism. As Marcel indicated: 
“Royce, with an eclecticism which by no means implies feebleness of thought, searched 
for his solutions wheresoever he found authentic and profound intellectual experience, 
wheresoever he felt a direct contact with that reality in which we bathe and outside of 
which we are nothing.”5 Additionally, both Marcel and Royce – in an effort to provide a 
synoptic link between the Absolute and the individual – were co-opted early in their 
careers by a serious infatuation with Absolute Idealism. And while it is certainly the case 
that Royce’s encounter with idealism lasted much longer than Marcel’s, both thinkers 
ultimately abandoned the systematic architectonic of Absolute idealism for a more 
concrete, historical approach.6 If Marcel truly believed that Royce’s thought was an 
anachronism, deserving to be relegated to the status of a relic, it is very difficult to 
explain how Marcel could have provided such a brilliant account as to how Royce’s 
ethical and logical writings grew organically out of his earlier metaphysical writings. 
Perhaps a decision as to the value of Royce’s Metaphysics is best left to such an astute 
reader as William E. Hocking, who characterized Marcel’s Royce interpretation as “the 
                                                 
4 Such comments (RM, p. x) typically emphasize the importance of Hocking over Royce and that Marcel 
read Hocking before Royce. See also the third appendix to Gabriel Marcel, La Métaphysique de Royce, 
avec un appendice de texts, publiée et préfacée par Miklos Vetö (Paris: L’Hartmattan, 2005), p. 239, where 
Marcel discloses in an interview with Karl-Theodor Humbach that he regards several aspects of Royce’s 
thought as representing “an outdated stage of philosophy” while recognizing that Royce’s mature ethics 
and philosophy of loyalty “are of permanent value.”  
5 RM: xvi. 
6 For a discussion of Marcel’s encounter with idealism, see pp. 7-9 & 34-39. For a discussion of how Royce 
engaged in re-thinking his commitment to Absolute idealism, see pp. 132-142. A concise summary of the 
transitional shifts Royce’s thought underwent on this issue can be found in John E. Smith, Royce’s Social 
Infinite: The Community of Interpretation (The Liberal Arts Press, 1950), pp. 13-19.   
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first, and still in my judgment, the most substantial and prescient, discussion of Royce’s 
entire metaphysical outlook.”7  
§ 
Unraveling the World Knot  
 
 Marcel begins his study of Royce by examining the latter’s attempt to “attack the 
world knot in a way that promises most for the untying of its meshes.”8 The world knot, 
for Royce, consists of the questions “What is an Idea?” and “How do Ideas stand in a true 
relation to Reality?” Royce knows quite well that as naïve realists, we take for granted a 
world of fact. But taking for granted a world of discrete fact leads quickly to a series of 
debilitating antinomies: “Begin by accepting, upon faith and tradition, the mere brute 
reality of the World as Fact, and there you are sunk deep in an ocean of mysteries.”9 In 
the “First Series” of The World and the Individual, Royce will examine, in a Hegelian-
like fashion, three examples of being “sunk” in an ocean of dialectical difficulty by 
examining three traditional conceptions of the “ontological predicate” – Realism, 
Mysticism, and Critical Rationalism.  
 At this juncture, an awareness of Royce’s methodological orientation is necessary. 
The world of fact is experienced through such a welter of qualitative contrast that it 
becomes “persistently baffling, unless we somewhere else find the key to it.”10 The key, 
for Royce, lies in consciousness. Royce sees the entire history of philosophy as a series of 
attempts to arrive at an understanding of “the problem of the whole relation between Idea 
                                                 
7 RM: vi. 
8 W&I (FS): 16-17. 
9 Ibid.: 17. 
10 Ibid.: 18. 
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and Being.”11 Each of the major philosophers Royce cites in this context – Plato, 
Plotinus, the Scholastics, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel – all assert the primacy of the “World 
as Idea” over the “World as Fact.” For Royce, idealism is implied in the most disparate 
philosophical positions. In fact, all roads lead to idealism – the truth of philosophical 
thought: “[by] dealing with the problem of Reality from the side … we are supposed to 
be able to attain reality, that is, from the side of ideas.”12 Royce’s neo-Kantian roots are 
evident here – roots which took hold from his earliest readings of Kant, Hegel, and 
Schopenhauer while engaged in graduate studies at Johns Hopkins. As Marcel astutely 
recognized, Royce was a “resolute idealist [for whom] idealism is co-extensive with 
metaphysics.”13 
 Royce’s idealism is not subjective idealism. As thinkers like James and Dewey 
indicated, ideas possess not only a representational capacity – ideas also have an active 
volitional and teleological dimension. According to Royce: “[I]ntelligent ideas of things 
never consist of mere images of the things, but always involve a consciousness of how 
you propose to act towards things of which you have ideas.”14 It is the “inner purpose” of 
an idea which Royce will focus upon by using the example of singing a melody. When a 
vocalist sings a melody, the primary experience is not that of approximating an externally 
independent musical value conceived as being performed by some ideal singer. Instead, 
“your melody, at the moment when you sing it … constitutes a musical idea. You may 
even suppose the melody original with yourself, unique, and sung now for the first time. 
                                                 
11 See RM: 3, where Marcel characterizes this problematic as one of how “thought accosts reality.” 
12 W&I (FS): 19. 
13 RM: 4. It is interesting to speculate just how much, at this point in his career, the idealistically inclined 
Marcel agreed with Royce. 
14 W&I (FS): 22. The importance of action will be developed further in the form of “possible modes of 
action” within the context of Royce’s logical studies. See Josiah Royce, “The Logical Generation of Types 
of Order,” in Royce’s Logical Essays, ed. D.S. Robinson (Wm. C. Brown Company, 1951): 373-374. 
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[F]or it would then and there, when sung, or even when inwardly heard, partly embody 
your own conscious purpose.”15  
 Royce will develop this important distinction between the representative capacity 
of an idea and its conscious purpose powerfully. The ability of an idea to refer to 
something beyond itself constitutes an idea’s external meaning. The internal meaning, on 
the other hand, consists of the partially fulfilled purpose embodied in the idea. Royce 
accounts for the internal meaning of a completed idea as “the purpose viewed as so far 
embodied in the idea, the soul as it were, which gives the idea body.”16 
  Returning to the example of the melody, the internal meaning of this musical idea 
consists of fulfilling the purpose of singing the melody. Whereas the external meaning of 
the melody might be to correspond to a particular work of Beethoven, the internal 
meaning speaks to the fulfillment of an affective disposition of the self. Needless to say, 
the internal and the external meanings of an idea may, at first glance, appear to be quite 
different from one another. 
 Marcel, through his own criticisms of objectivity, is sensitive to the bias displayed 
in favor of the external meaning of an idea. Additionally, as an advocate of recuperative, 
secondary reflection, Marcel is supportive of Royce’s attempt “to show that for 
speculative thought this dualism [between internal and external meaning] is resolved in 
unity, and that, in the final analysis, all meaning is immanent….”17 Royce addresses the 
realistic bias of inquiry head-on. Recognizing, to some degree, that a collection of ships 
is what it is before you count them: 
 “[N]o idea is true or is false except with reference to the object that this very idea first 
                                                 
15 Ibid.: 23. 
16 W&I (FS): 25. 
17 RM: 4. 
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means to select as its own object…. [U]nless ideas first voluntarily bind themselves to a 
given task, and so, by their internal purpose, already commit themselves to a certain 
selection of its object, they are neither true nor false, ― in this consideration, I say, there 
may be hidden consequences that we shall later find momentous for the whole theory of 
Being and of truth.”18 
 
 Royce’s intent is to problematize the realist’s preference for external meanings: 
“[W]e shall find either that the external meaning is genuinely continuous with the internal 
meaning, and is inwardly involved with the latter, or else the idea has no external 
meaning at all.”19 The human tendency to separate the internal and external meaning of 
an idea is due to a failure to reach “behind the appearances” and unravel the world knot. 
The strands of the world knot are tied together by a telic connection – comprehensive 
unity is ontologically prior to discrete instances. Royce maintains “that, at bottom, the 
external meaning is only apparently external, and, in very truth, is but an aspect of the 
completely developed internal meaning.”20 It remains to be seen as to what a “completely 
developed” internal meaning might consist. This answer will bring us to Royce’s Fourth 
Conception of Being or Absolute Idealism – an “absolute system of ideas … which is 
genuinely applied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however 
fragmentary.”21 This finite, fragmentary realization of meaning within the totality of an 
infinite system echoes Marcel’s notion of an exigence of being – a condition in which 
finite being strives to transcend its finite, fragmentary perspective and regain 
participation within a larger whole.  In Marcellian terms: “[F]inite thought is perpetually 
attracted by a beyond, by Another, which eternally escapes it.”22 
                                                 
18 W&I (FS): 31-32.  See Fashionable Nihilism (SUNY Press, 2002), p. 4, where Bruce Wilshire refers to 
this realistic bias as scientism: “[Scientism is] required to rule apriori and arbitrarily that the other ways 
couldn’t possibly be effective in [determining] their subject matter areas.” 
19 Ibid.: 33. 
20 Ibid.: 36. 
21 Ibid.: 36. 
22 RM: 5. 
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§ 
The First and Second Conception of Being: Realism and Mysticism 
The first conception of being, realism, identifies the real with the given as brute 
fact. The real is “independent of an idea or experience through which the real being is, 
from without, felt, or thought, or known.”23 Given the prima facie evidence before us, it 
should come as no surprise that realism is a belief that is philosophically widespread. 
However, the evidence in favor of the “knot” of realism quickly begins to unravel under 
the slightest scrutiny. If thought is independent of being, how can thought possibly know 
being? An ontological gap precludes any possibility of an epistemological bridge. 
Employing his typically understated sense of humor, Royce compares the realist project 
to the relationship between a horse and a hitching post “only that even here the horse can 
strain at the post while he pulls, while realistic knowing is absolutely naught to its 
object.”24 
 Royce offers a pragmatic explanation of realism – a necessary abridgement 
requisite for social progress. Realism ultimately consists of an attempt “to think narrowly 
in order to act vigorously.”25 Despite realism’s pragmatic efficacy, as a philosophical 
doctrine it collapses under its own weight by asserting the relationship of knowing and 
being while, at the same time, asserting that knowing and being are ultimately 
irreconcilable. Marcel captures these tensions beautifully in the following: “But here, as 
in many other instances, thought extrapolates, goes to its limit, and erects into an absolute 
                                                 
23 W&I (FS): 62. 
24 Ibid.: 70. 
25 Ibid.: 75. 
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principle what is really only a useful convention, which is valid only under certain 
conditions.”26 Even when operating under the guise of an orthodox realism, one acts in a 
manner of executing “internal meanings.” Although one may naively assume that the 
number of ships in the harbor is completely independent of the act by which they are 
counted: “[T]he counting of ships is valid or invalid not alone because of the supposed 
independent being of the ships, but also because of the conscious act whereby just this 
collection of ships was first consciously selected for counting. [N]o idea is true or is false 
except with reference to the object that this very idea first means to select as its own 
object.”27 
 Marcel, demonstrating his extensive grasp of the Roycean corpus, cites an 
important section of Royce’s The Religious Aspect of Philosophy in an effort to reinforce 
the Roycean position that “realism … is unable to satisfy the demands of spiritual life.”28 
The existence of values is a necessary prerequisite of spiritual life. Realism, presenting 
only a world of “powers producing effects upon any one thing or group of things 
[externally related],”29 offers no possibility of conceiving “the spiritual” – a relational 
dimension transcending the mechanistic order. For Royce, despite the hegemonic efficacy 
of a realistic conception of powers, a “still small voice is not heard in them.”30 In order to 
awaken from “the realistic dream,” a deeper view of nature is required. Marcel compares 
Royce’s critique of idealism to Hegel’s notion of an “unhappy consciousness” – a 
consciousness divorced from itself due to its tendency to seek truth not in terms of its 
                                                 
26 RM: 6. See Royce’s comment “[R]ealism never opens its mouth without expounding an antinomy [W&I 
(FS)]: 76.” 
27 W&I (FS): 31. 
28 RM: 11. See also Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (Harper Torchbook Edition, 1958): 
236ff. Hereafter referred to as RAP. 
29 RAP: 236. 
30 Ibid.: 237. 
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internal, changing nature but as an alien reality.  
 The Second Conception of Being that Royce critically investigates is mysticism. 
Royce possessed a catholic intellect. Poetry, especially that of Browning, mathematics, 
logic, economics, history, science – no subject truly escaped his voracious curiosity and 
extensive erudition. Mysticism, both Eastern and Western, is another subject in which 
Royce demonstrated a prolific understanding that was well ahead of his time.31 
Mysticism, for Royce, is synonymous with the doctrine that “to be means, simply and 
wholly, to be immediate….”32 The mystic is concerned with pure experience. Royce, 
clearly familiar with the more reductive forms of British empiricism, emphasizes that 
mystics are perhaps the only “thorough going empiricists” in the history of philosophy. 
Marcel, recognizing the important role feeling exhibits in cognition, characterizes 
mysticism as: 
 “[A] certain process of purification [seeking to] free itself from mediation [in order to] 
obtain pure experience, the immediate absolute…. This is because this fact alone is 
beyond the desire of discursive thought, beyond all quality and separation….  Being is 
wholly in immediate feeling…. [T]here is now but silence and God alone.”33  
 
 In Hegelian-like fashion, Royce will reveal the contradictions inherent in 
mysticism. Mysticism “expresses a fragment of the whole truth about being.”34 In its 
desire to seek the truly immediate, mysticism ultimately arrives at nothing. Royce cites 
the words of the Hindu mystic Yâjnavalkya, “Neti, Neti, Neti …” – in Sanskrit “not this, 
not that, not this, etc.” Since all finite thinking assumes the form of mediation, the 
Absolute must be ineffable but, adds Royce, “yet not outside of the circle within which 
                                                 
31 See Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J., “Royce’s Windows to the East,” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2007: 288-318. See also Kurt F. Leidecker, Josiah Royce and Indian Thought 
(Kailas Press, 1931). 
32 W&I (FS): 80. 
33 RM: 14, 12. Marcel’s later characterization of the body as “the non-mediatizable immediate,” and its 
pivotal role in secondary reflection should not be overlooked. 
34 W&I (FS): 84. 
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we at present are conscious.35  
 Mysticism is able to attain the Absolute only through a kind of sophistry – “a 
fascinating contrast-effect that, far from being itself anything absolute, or actually 
unknown or ineffable, is a constantly present character of our human type of finite 
consciousness.”36 Our finite consciousness gives us access to the Absolute only through a 
type of via negativa: Neti, neti, neti…. Though a kind of “homing instinct,” the mystic 
may, like a migrating bird, intimate true Being but, adds Royce quite perceptively, “this 
goal [true Being] is first conceived by contrast with the process of the pursuit.”37 In other 
words, the mystic’s “Absolute Being” is relegated to a “Mere Nothing” due to the 
absence in finite being of a basis of comparison. If the finite self is a mere illusion, then it 
cannot be utilized as the comparative basis of the Absolute. Mysticism, like realism, ends 
in a reductio ad absurdum.” 
 According to Marcel, mysticism has a “speculative value” which is greater than 
that of realism because it discloses “the teleological leitmotiv of Royce’s metaphysics.”38 
By recognizing a “homing instinct,” mysticism affirms that human being is oriented to 
Being – this “still small voice” of the spirit indicates something very similar to Marcel’s 
exigence of being.” Nevertheless, the failure haunting both mysticism and realism leads 
Royce to conclude: “[our] account of Being must be so amended as to involve the 
assertion that our finite life is not mere illusion, that are ideas are not merely false, and 
                                                 
35 Ibid.: 170. 
36 Ibid.: 180. 
37 Ibid.: 180. 
38 RM: 13, 14. As will become clearer in our later discussion of the Forth Conception of Being, this 
voluntaristic, teleological leitmotiv consists of “the preponderant part played by the will, by personal 
activity, in religious certitude, and the role of courage, even of risk, in the building of that certitude (RM: 
19).”   
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that we are already, even as finite, in touch with Reality.”39 
 
§ 
The Third Conception of Being: Critical Rationalism 
 In the Third Conception of Being, critical realism,40 Royce will attempt to build 
upon the strengths and weakness of the prior two conceptions. From mysticism, Royce 
wants to retain the mystic’s “homing instinct” for the whole while avoiding “the mystic’s 
mere series of gradually vanishing terms.”41 From realism, Royce wants to build upon the 
realist sense of “the essential preparedness of Reality for knowledge,” while abandoning 
the “extreme statement … of the absolute mutual independence of the Real and of the 
Idea.” 42  
 Emphasizing the “relative” independence of knowing and being, Royce defines 
“the Real as essentially [that] which, under conditions, would become knowable and 
known.”43 The reality of an object is correlative with the object being known. In Roycean 
terms: “[K]knowledge comes to pass when things that possess reality apart from 
knowledge come to influence … the conscious states of knowing beings.”44 
 Royce recognizes that multiple problems occur when the world is seen as 
somehow dependent upon one’s knowledge of it. Royce avoids the Scylla of a bare, 
autonomous externality and the Charybdis of mystical phantasm by developing a 
                                                 
39 Ibid.: 182. 
40 Although Royce will speak of critical rationalism and critical realism, Marcel will frequently use the 
term “critical idealism” to refer to the Third Conception of Being. As will become increasingly clear, the 
operative word is critical – pertaining to the role of thought in determining validity. Whatever one chooses 
to call that ontological condition which follows from the critical orientation – realism, rationalism or 
idealism – is less important. 
41 Ibid.: 194.  
42 Ibid.: 196, 195.  
43 Ibid.: 196. 
44 Ibid.: 196. 
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conception of the real as outside of any particular knowledge yet having to correspond to 
a set of universal epistemic conditions. A symbiotic relationship occurs between knowing 
and being so that it is impossible to determine exactly what either pole of the relation is. 
As in the case of Mill’s depiction of objects as “permanent possibilities of sensation,” 
reality can no longer be considered in abstraction from knowledge. Experience becomes 
an interactive, reflexive process in which subject and object are co-constituted and 
mutually impact the development of each. Royce characterizes his modified realism in 
this way: “[T]hat which, if known, is found giving to their ideas their validity, as that to 
which ideas ought to correspond…. To be real now means, primarily, to be valid, to be 
true, to be in essence the standard for ideas.” 45  
 The real now becomes determined phenomenalistically in the Kantian sense of 
Mögliche Erfahrung, i.e. the necessary and sufficient epistemic conditions required in 
order for cognitive experience to be possible: “What is, is … what, under certain 
definable conditions, I should experience. To be is precisely to fulfill or to give warrant 
to ideas by making possible the experience that ideas define…. What is Being then but 
the Validity of Ideas?”46 
 To summarize, being is external to any particular act of knowing, but being is not 
independent of knowing per se. Echoing James’ use of phrases derived from the 
marketplace such as “cash value,” Royce points out that such “facts” as price, credit, 
debt, etc. – although hardly arbitrary – have no reality independently of the ideas that 
refer to them.  However, Bishop Berkeley’s problem quickly arises: How is the real 
sustained over time independently of finite episodes of knowledge?  
                                                 
45 Ibid.: 201-202. 
46 Ibid.: 203, 204. 
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 Royce tackles this problem from a Kantian perspective. Kant established two 
levels of being: phenomenal and noumenal. Kant’s Ding-an-sich, although unknowable, 
is still considered to be real – a point overlooked by many critics. Phenomenal reality, on 
the other hand, is defined qua knowable through the transcendental conditions of 
experience. It is important to note that Kant never considered phenomenal knowledge to 
be the property of one person, solus ipse. Phenomenal knowledge entails a universal 
validity due to the fact that it is grounded in concepts of pure reason. Rational knowledge 
is both independent – qua universal laws of nature, and dependent – qua conditioned by 
the pure forms of intuition and the pure categories of the understanding. As Royce says, 
the Third Conception of Being “is objective, but not isolated from the realm of Ideas.”47 
 Royce raises a series of questions concerning the adequacy the Third Conception 
of Being and whether a “further supplement” is required. Such questions are pivotal 
because they “begin the final stage of our journey towards an adequate view of the 
meaning of the ontological predicate … [by asking] does our experience, as such, ever 
compass eternity?”48 
 At this point Royce will tap into his expertise in modern algebra and logic 
because “the modern mathematician rightly doubts every attempt to prove any 
proposition in his science unless … you can first empirically show him … the actual 
process of construction belonging to, or creative of, the ideal object of which your 
proposition undertakes to give an account. Construction actually shown is, then, the 
test.”49  Royce describes this process of constructive intuition in terms of the inner 
                                                 
47 Ibid.: 250. 
48 Ibid.: 251, 252. Cf. Marcel’s remarks on eternality…. 
49 Ibid.: 253-254. See also page 226: “[C]onstructive imagination has its own rigid and objective 
constitution.” 
 115
experience of the mathematician. In order for mathematical construction to occur, the 
object “must be capable of adequate presentation in the inner experience of the 
mathematician, if any exact result is to be attained.”50 How is it that a mathematician can 
reason about ideal objects that can never be present to him or to any other observer? 
 Royce’s response to this question is powerful: 
The mathematician, in his own exact way, is like Browning’s lover. His instant is an 
eternity. He sees in a transient moment. Every one of his glimpses of fact is like a flash of 
moonlight on the water. Yet what he sees outlasts the ages of ages. But nothing in all this 
eternal validity of his outcome makes him less empirical in his actual scrutiny. The 
validity is to be eternal. But his form of his experience is precisely that of any other 
human creature of the instants flight….  
 The valid, then, even the eternally valid, enters our human consciousness through 
the narrow portals of the instant’s experience. Reasoning is an empirical process, 
whatever else it also is. One who observes the nature of abstractly possible experience, 
does so by reading off the structure of a presented experience. Necessity comes home to 
us men through the medium of a given fact. 51  
 
 For Royce, this process of imaginative construction is not limited to modern 
mathematical logic. The very same process is operative in the empirical sciences as well. 
For example, returning to the example of the ship to be counted, “if you watch the ship 
longer, … you will under given conditions … get the presence of certain empirical 
facts.”52 However, the ship, or any given object of knowledge, is more than what can be 
verified at a particular point in time. This is why the version of phenomenalism 
associated with sense data theory was forced to posit the totality of possible observation 
statements – referred to as “subjunctive conditionals” – in order to bridge the 
epistemological gap between knowledge and reality.  As Hume recognized, during the 
course of our day to day encounters, we recognize the fact that there are possibilities of 
experience to be tested, but in the interests of faith, custom, and expediency, we simply 
                                                 
50 Ibid.: 254. 
51 Ibid.: 256-257. 
52 Ibid.: 257. 
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fail to test them. However, the fact remains that the majority of claims one makes about 
the world do not ultimately refer to how things actually do seem to anyone, but how they 
would seem if the appropriate conditions were fulfilled.53 
 From “moment to moment,” we may validate each of our occasions of experience 
but, at the same time, we recognize that “Being … possess[es] far more validity than, in 
our private capacity, we shall ever test.”54  In our episodic capacity as finite knowers, we 
are unable to establish the “infinitely more extended” notion of validity required to 
support the edifice of true knowledge. Critical realism “fails to explain … the difference 
between the reality that is to be attributed to the valid truths that we do not get completely 
verified in our experience, and the reality observed by us when we do verify ideas.”55 The 
crucial question that Royce poses is what is the nature of “Being in general” in which the 
totality of possible experience is “exhaustively presented”? Royce aims to avoid a 
condition of pure possibility held in suspension – what Hegel referred to “cognition 
naïvely reduced to vacuity” – by posing the question: “must not all Being prove to be 
pulsating with the same life as concrete experience?”56 
 Finite knowing is less than completely true, and the finite knower consists of “a 
self or subject not standing fully in himself.”57 Prior to his more direct appropriation of 
Pauline theology in The Problem of Christianity, Royce is already employing the Pauline 
notion of a plurality of the self – a higher, spiritual plane is contrasted with an earthly, 
profane plane of existence. The unity of knowing and being can be understood properly 
                                                 
53 For a relevant account of phenomenalism, see A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Penguin Books, 
1956), pp. 118-128. 
54 W&I (FS): 259. 
55 Ibid.: 260. 
56 Ibid.: 261. 
57 Frank M. Oppenheim, Royce’s Voyage Down Under: A Journey of the Mind (University Press of 
Kentucky, 1980): 27. 
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only within the context of an Infinite Knower. The universe must be viewed as an endless 
process of self-reflection through which the universal and particular are intimately 
related. Royce has now entered into the expansive breach of his Fourth Conception of 
Being – Absolute Idealism:   
“The world of validity is indeed, in its ultimate constitution, the eternal world. It seems to 
us so far a very impersonal world and a very cold and unemotional realm…. Before we 
are done with it we shall find it in fact the most personal and living of worlds…. Erelong 
we shall discover that it is a realm of individuals, whose unity is in One individual, and 
that theory means, in this eternal world, not mere theory, but Will and Life.”58 
 
 Marcel is acutely aware of the pivotal importance of this juncture in Royce’s 
thought. By articulating the finite conditions of possible experience, critical rationalism 
can assist the work of primary reflection but “outside the experience which is actually 
given to me … there is an infinity of other experiences which I take to be merely possible 
… which have not been actually realized…. [T]his penumbra of possible experiences 
extends around the narrow circle of my actual experience…. But what is this 
penumbra?”59  
A halo of infinite possibilities provides the fringe of every act of finite knowing – 
a “fissure” is opened which cannot be bridged by the limited reach of actual experience. 
The “possible” experience of the critical realist must somehow be aufgehoben in the 
infinite experience of a more comprehensive type of reflection – otherwise critical 
realism is powerless to eliminate the dualism of the actual and the possible. If the dualism 
between the actual and possible is not overcome “consciousness may remain forever a 
prisoner of its own creations.”60 Critical realism provides the possibility of a degree of 
plasticity by transforming reality from a dead externality to an expression of cognitively 
                                                 
58 W&I (FS): 222. 
59 RM: 17-18. 
60 Ibid.: 19. 
 118
based postulates but, as Marcel is quick to point out, what is gained by epistemic 
plasticity is lost in terms of ontological comprehensiveness. Speaking strictly for Royce, 
but having once traveled down a similar road, Marcel remarks: “There is no possible 
resting place on the road leading to absolute idealism.”61 
§ 
Into the Breach: The Road to Absolute Idealism—A Fourth Conception of Being 
 “Human thought must first sunder, in order perhaps later to reunite.”62 
 To understand Royce’s approach to the Fourth Conception, it is necessary to 
briefly consider his doctrine of judgment. Drawing upon lessons learned in the 
development of the Third Conception, it is clear that ordinary judgments “make some sort 
of reference to reality … but never without some sort of conscious intention to be in 
significant relation to the Real.”63 To properly judge is “to bring the what into relation 
with the that” – a vital link which is most often kept apart.64 Royce uses the example of 
classical Aristotelian logic to prove his point.  Using the three classes of syllogism – 
categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive – Royce argues that they are exclusionary, 
showing only what the world does not contain: “They tell us, indirectly, what is, in the 
realm of external meanings, but only by first telling us what is not.”65 For example, the 
categorical proposition ‘No A is B’ says that no instances of A are instances of B. If A 
exists, then A is –B, but, strictly speaking, this proposition does not indicate that A 
actually exists. For Royce, such judgments “do not directly tell us what the world of valid 
being actually and concretely contains, but do tell us what the real world does not 
                                                 
61 RM: 14. 
62 W&I (FS): 51, n. 1. 
63 Ibid.: 272. 
64 Ibid.: 273. 
65 Ibid.: 277. 
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contain”66 – in this case, the world does not contain an instance of A which is at the same 
time an instance of B! Echoing the pragmatic call for lived experience, Royce recognizes 
that life requires a plan of action – a plan not derivable from the abstract possibilities of 
syllogistic judgments in which Omnis Determinatio est Negatio. Any attempt to move 
from the abstract to the concrete is an “endless but hopeless” task due to the sundering of 
the internal and external meaning of ideas. In the negative categorical judgment, – ‘No A 
is B’ – “a cutting off of false possibilities [is involved], and an assertion of what therefore 
seems the more precisely and determinately limited range of valid possibilities [is 
believed to occur … a] range beyond which is simply inexhaustible so far as you take 
your object as merely external.”67  In the example cited, A is –B. Could A then possibly 
be C or D? But, if A exists, then what is A? In Roycean terms, what are “the positive 
contents of Being?”68 
 The act of judgment need not be exclusionary. Through a consideration of their 
internal meaning, ideas are capable of becoming “enriched in their inner life.”69  Internal 
meanings reveal a “positive constitution” to be contrasted with the “shadowland” of 
external meanings. This “positive constitution” lies within the power of consciousness: 
“If you can predetermine, even if but thus negatively, what cannot exist in the object, the 
object then cannot be merely foreign to you. It must be somewhat predetermined by your 
meaning.”70 
 Simply left to themselves, neither internal meanings nor external meanings are 
                                                 
66 Ibid.: 274. 
67 Ibid.: 280. Emphasis added. 
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able to fully articulate concrete individuality. An individual is an instance of value – a 
unique being which cannot be replicated. Qua externally defined, an individual becomes 
a definiendum – a mere type and no longer a unique being as such. Qua internally 
defined, the individual does not fare much better – running the risk of becoming 
completely subjectivized. The real exists as a limit – Grenz – which lies beyond our finite 
attempts, whether serially or conceptually, to reach a complete determination. The 
question becomes: What constitutes a complete determination? A complete determination 
must involve a unification of  internal and external meaning – a “linkage [which] is the 
deepest fact about the universe.”71 Royce exposes an antinomy within the notion of 
external meaning. Using his acute knowledge of symbolic structures used in logic and 
mathematics, Royce transcends a dependence upon spatial metaphors: “What is involved 
in correspondence is the possession, on the part of the corresponding objects, of some 
system of ideally definable characteristics that is common to both of them … and that is 
such as to meet the systematic purpose for which the particular correspondence is 
established.”72 There is no external criterion of truth per se. Truth is determined 
teleologically as purpose. In the relationship between idea et res, greater emphasis  must 
be placed upon the intentionality of the idea than upon the exclusive identity of the thing: 
“The embodied purpose, the internal meaning, of the instant’s act, is thus a conditio sine 
qua non for all external meaning and for all truth.”73 
Having successfully debunked the orthodox correspondence theory of truth, 
Royce recognizes that he can no longer simply presuppose the existence of the physical 
world: “No doubt there is this world,—but in what sense it is, that is precisely our 
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problem.”74 Here again, Royce is forced to navigate between a Scylla of bare externality 
and a Charybdis of wishful fantasy. To steer a proper course, Royce takes his bearings 
from Kant and presents the issue in the form of an antinomy. Simply stated, does the 
internally-based view of knowledge, as selective intention, completely rule out any 
independent being of the object apart from its relation to the idea? Or, is an idea unable to 
pre-determine objectively those characteristics in exacto which make an object true? As 
he works through the horns of this apparent dilemma, Royce shows again and again his 
capability of dialectical subtlety and rigor. While, on the one hand, “Hamlet is what 
Shakespeare’s intends him to be,” the possibility of error also demonstrates that some 
ideas are not able to conform to their object. Sounding contradictory at first, Royce will 
reconcile the contradiction in terms of the higher unity of Absolute consciousness:  
[The object] is at once uniquely determined by the true meaning already imperfectly 
present at the outset, and it is also not consciously present in the narrow instant’s 
experience with which we begin. A vaguely indeterminate act of will thus begins a 
process; the object sought is simply the precise determination of this very will itself to 
unique and unambiguous extension…. For the object is a true Other, and yet it is object 
only as the meaning of this idea.”75 
 
 Whereas in finite consciousness, ideas exhibit a “kind of fulfillment,” ideas do not 
reach a complete or “whole fulfillment.” Royce expresses his notion of complete 
fulfillment in the following: 
[A]the desired limit of determination, the idea … would face a present content which 
would imply, seek, and in fact permit no other than itself to take for this ideal purpose its 
place…. It follows that the finally determinate form of the object of any finite idea is that 
form which the idea itself would assume whenever it became individuated, or in other 
words, became a completely determined idea, an idea or will fulfilled by a completely 
adequate empirical content, for which no other content need to be substituted or, from the 
point of view of the satisfied idea, could be substituted.76 
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 Royce is now in the position to unravel the world knot and integrate the realms of 
the ontological and the epistemic – the universal and the particular. Knowledge is defined 
in terms of degrees of fulfillment. Whereas universality implies a defective 
incompleteness due to a level of specificity not yet reached, individuality is co-extensive 
with the complete fulfillment of your internal meaning. Having defined truth and being 
“at one stroke,” Royce is now in the position to lead us to the “threshold of a new 
definition of being.”77 Being is attained through a process in which an idea is completely 
realized. This is an “individual life, present as a whole totum simul.”78 An individual life 
must be realized totum simul in order to overcome the fragmentation of finite existence – 
a fragmentation contrary to the fulfillment of its complete realization. Qua whole, it is a 
divine life: “The sun of true Being has risen before our eyes … and we shall enter at last 
the homeland.”79  
 Being consists of the full expression of an idea’s teleological meaning. If finite 
consciousness had the ability to unhinge itself from its functional limitations, the entire 
expanse of existence would “spread before you as a simple and unique life.”80 Within the 
space of this totum simul, a life would exhibit the integrity of meaning and purpose that 
would cause one to say “It was meant to be.” Anything less than what is included in this 
total expanse would constitute a variance and entail being something other. In the words 
of the mystic, “That art thou.” In the completed life, abstract generality is superceded 
through individual form, “the what turns into the that …. [However] our instant is not yet 
the whole of eternity; but the eternal light, the lux aeterna, shineth in our every 
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reasonable moment, and lighteth every idea that cometh into the world.”81  
 Within the context of the Fourth Conception of Being, each episodic moment of 
experience is a reflection of a higher unity: “[I]f proof is what we want, and if every 
single power sends us beyond itself for the interpretation of the meaning of the whole, we 
cannot hope to grasp that meaning so long as we avoid studying the world in its eternal 
aspect.”82  Each episode is able to reflect the synthetic fullness of Being by virtue of its 
finite unity as a life. Royce expresses this sense of ontological unity poetically, 
powerfully, and prophetically in the following: 
No man experiences, for himself, at any moment, this final constitution of our realm of 
experience. [W]e see through a glass darkly. It is not yet revealed what we shall be. It is 
not yet known to us what our own whole experience itself in its details contains. But we 
know that it is…. It is through and through a constitution that answers our questions, 
embodies our meanings, integrates our purposes…. The now present but passing form of 
our human consciousness is fragmentary. We wait, wonder, pass from fact to fact, from 
fragment to fragment. [A] study of the concept of Being reveals to us precisely that the 
whole has a meaning and is real only as a Meaning Embodied.83 
 
§ 
The Fourth Conception of Being: A Marcellian Excursus 
 Marcel’s examination of the Fourth Conception of Being is incisive, displaying 
his knowledge of the entire Roycean corpus and his deep familiarity with idealism. From 
his extensive reading of Royce’s other works, most notably The Conception of God and 
The Religious Aspects of Philosophy, Marcel is clearly aware of the direction or “the train 
of Royce’s thought.”84 From his early readings of Kant, Royce carefully examined the 
nature of skeptical doubt. According to Bruce Kuklick, this concern of Royce dates back 
to his doctoral dissertation of 1878 entitled “On the Principles of the Interdependence of 
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Knowledge.”85 Royce’s objective was to rebut skepticism or the view that anything 
outside of the immediate episode of experience consisted of an inference or postulate.  
According to Marcel, Royce’s early skeptical doubt was destined to implode, 
demonstrating the fragile infrastructure upon which scepticism vainly attempts to build a 
foundation: “Doubt is possible only when it is based on what we admit. As a matter of 
fact, any judgment by which we would deny that there are real errors, claims truth, and 
hence its contradictory would be an error. Thus every judgment would destroy itself, 
since the pure and simple negation of an error is a contradiction.”86 Said differently, 
every denial of truth at the same time implicitly posits a notion of truth. Royce was aware 
of the implications of this insight at the time of writing his dissertation, recognizing that 
the overcoming of scepticism is not to be achieved through a more robust realism but 
through a greater appreciation of the creative, postulative power of thought: “one [of the] 
greatest of all philosophic results in the history of thought, and the one that will always 
be recognized as Kant’s greatest among his many great services—the principle namely 
that all knowledge is creative, that its objects such as they are, must exist in through, and 
for itself.”87 It is not an overstatement to say that extreme skepticism provided the path by 
which Royce journeyed to absolute truth. As one astute observer noted, “[Royce’s] entire 
undertaking was to discover a new ground of assurance on which men could eternally 
count.”88 
 Marcel was keenly aware of this aspect of “volitional dynamism” that Royce 
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appropriated from Kant. In The World and the Individual, “volitional dynamism” is 
expressed teleologically in terms of purpose. It is “not mere agreement, but intended 
agreement that constitutes truth.”89 Let us recall again the example of counting ships. The 
act of counting occurs within the context of the prior establishment of the intentional act 
of determining the number of a group of ships. The realist, beginning in medias res, is 
unaware of this prior act. As Marcel remarks, “It is illusory to believe that we subdue the 
world.”90 This pre-reflective intentionality constitutes an essential component of 
experience. As Royce indicated, “Only what is known can be erred about.”91 But how can 
we err about the unknowable? 
 Marcel draws upon Royce’s famous discussion of the conversation between John 
and Thomas. When viewed through a dualistic lens, this conversation becomes 
impossible. It becomes a conversation between six persons: the real John, the real 
Thomas, the image of John, the image of Thomas, John’s image of Thomas and Thomas’ 
image of John. In the language of Abbott and Costello, “Who’s on First?” According to 
Marcel, “we have locked ourselves inside a dream to which we agree that a reality 
corresponds, but which nevertheless remains a dream, only coinciding by chance with 
what happens ‘outside of us.’”92 The manner in which Royce is able to escape from this 
dizzying labyrinth is significant. Marcel insightfully depicts Royce’s attempt to unify the 
seemingly discrete, fragmented episodes of finite consciousness in the following: “A road 
opens before us. Why not let a third thought intervene, a thought that would comprehend 
both Thomas’ reality and John’s idea of Thomas and compare the one with the other … 
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the point of view of [a] third thought which confronts and appreciates.”93  
 This notion of a “third,” for Royce, consists of a complete consciousness in which 
fragmentation and dualisms are synthesized within a greater unity. Royce’s complete 
consciousness is not Erfahrung überhaupt. A system of possible experience in the end 
amounts to nothing actual. What is needed is “a totally actualized content …. [An] 
absolute reality which is present [as] an absolute and organized experience, ideally 
conceived.”94 
 Marcel’s reading of Royce’s Fourth Conception contains a distinctively Hegelian 
flavor. Following a method similar to what Hegel used in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Marcel explains that even the most immediate episode of experience is mediated within a 
larger network of relations. Marcel is quick to recognize as a result of his own 
phenomenological analyses of experience that the world is revealed through a rich 
tapestry of relations. Through the process of abstraction, these relations are truncated and 
ultimately forgotten. The focus is placed upon a pervasive identifying characteristic – a 
conventionally defined “essence” – much to the exclusion of other modes of being. For 
Marcel, a complete view of the entity in its “vector character” reveals a thread linking it 
to a rich and vast range of external associations – a range of associations that cannot be 
suppressed under the colonization of abstraction. Marcel’s perceptive recognition of the 
richness of experience brings him to the conclusion that “Empiricism, in making itself 
explicit, becomes absolute idealism … [and] Royce’s idealism is one with empiricism.”95  
                                                 
93 Ibid.: 24. The notion of the “third,” will play in Royce’s later studies in logic and semiotics. See W&I 
(SS), p. 89: “Between any two there is a third.” 
94 RM: 29. 
95 RM: 34, 32. “Vector character” is a term used by Whitehead, not Marcel. However, the similar manner in 
which both thinkers view concreteness and the prevalence of experiential relations is captured nicely in 
Jean Wahl, Vers le concret: études ďhistorie de la philosophie contemporaine (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932). See 
pp. 223-269 entitled “Le Journal Métaphysique de Gabriel Marcel.”  
 127
 Marcel provides a series of revealing clues as to how Royce understands “divine 
life.” Reality and experience are largely synonymous terms. Experience consists of the 
act of a consciousness which wills and understands at the same time. Here again, it is 
helpful to refer to Hegel. In his famous “Introduction” to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel recognized the need to destroy the Kantian notion of a Ding-an-sich or that which 
is external to consciousness. For Hegel, “Consciousness provides its own criterion from 
within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with 
itself…. Thus in what consciousness affirms from within itself as being-in-itself or the 
True we have the standard which consciousness sets up by which to measure its 
knowledge.”96 Royce, appropriating Hegel’s discovery, concludes that willing and 
understanding, indissolubly linked within absolute consciousness are “the two faces of 
the divine life.”97  Marcel is quick to point out that this is not a mere anthropomorphism – 
an infinite magnification of human finitude, projected upon the Absolute. Divine life 
must be viewed as an unrealized ideal consisting of the complete extension of 
experience, temporally and conceptually, arranged in an integrated unity. It may be 
helpful to cite Dewey’s remark concerning Whitehead’s philosophy in this context – a 
philosophy advocating a “complete extension” experience: “The difference [between the 
physical and the psychical] are differences in historic routes of derivation and hereditary 
transmission; they do not present fixed and untraversable gulfs.”98 In Marcellian terms, 
experience is the open circuit of being. 
Within the Roycean life plan, the individual is “not converted into a mere element 
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devoid of reality.”99 Absolute experience, i.e. God, and the individual represent a 
“concrete unity par excellence.” Neither will be sacrificed for the sake of the other. 
Speaking in religious images in order to do justice to the totality which he seeks, Royce 
cautions the non-believer: “Flee where we will, then, the net of the larger Self ensnares 
us. We are lost and imprisoned in the thickets of its tangled labyrinth.”100 
§ 
The Relationship Between Divine and Human Being: The Individual as a Life Plan 
We have reached the “central point” of Royce’s metaphysics – “the intimate 
relationship between absolute experience, i.e. God, and the individual as we know them 
… a concrete unity par excellence.”101 This spiritual unity is similar to what Marcel 
refers to as the “existential orbit” of the self – a spiritual arc wherein the empirical self is 
encased within a wider totality. The importance of this wider extension of the self is 
clearly stated in the following: “The private self, however, cannot stand alone…. Royce’s 
Absolute is the final stage of the attempt to make intelligible the given of the present 
moment of experience, and that the self is the mediating link from the given in experience 
to the ultimate in reality.”102 Tracing the spiritual arc connecting the individual and the 
Absolute reveals what Royce refers to as a fulfilled “life plan” – a unique, complete, 
teleologically defined moment of existence. 
Marcel probes Royce’s conception of individuality carefully. His initial foray into 
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Absolute idealism taught Marcel that “the pseudo-immediate leads us to the mediated.”103 
Discursive thought is incapable of attaining the concrete individual. Limited to ideal 
types, the best that discursive thought can offer is a picture of an individual through “a 
perfectly designed type … a universal form that is more and more determinate.”104 But a 
picture of a man is still not a man. Individuality, for both Royce and Marcel, is 
established relationally:  
Individuality is like a ferment. Introduce the germ of it into your world of 
knowledge, and the universe soon swarms as with yeast, and individuality bubbles 
out everywhere. For in relation to any one individual, you can define countless 
other individuals. But the first individual you can only know by breathing the 
breadth of a new life into the otherwise dead and stubbornly universal categories 
of merely abstract theory.105  
 
  Let’s look more carefully at what “breathing the breadth of a new life” might 
consist of. It can not be understood causally. Any understanding of God as external to His 
creation is destined to insurmountable difficulties. From the Absolute point of view, the 
concept of causality is a “partial” fact which can be understood only within the context of 
the whole. The continuous whole of experience exists prior to the finite divisions 
imposed by discursive thought. It is worth quoting Royce in detail here: 
In the last analysis, in fact, one cannot say: The world, or reality, or the Absolute, 
must be; but only: the reality, the Absolute, the world, is. Fact is always superior 
to necessity, and the highest expression of truth in terms of thought is inevitably 
the categorical judgment rather than the hypothetical, the assertory judgment 
rather than the apodictic. For this reason all assertions … must be subordinate to 
the ultimate assertion “The whole world of given fact is….” [A]ll finite 
experience must be regarded as a fragment of a whole, whose content is present 
in the unity of consciousness of one absolute moment….106 
 
 This passage marks a critical moment in Marcel’s Royce interpretation. Marcel 
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understands what is at stake if a “total accord” between the Absolute and the individual is 
not realized. Marcel finds the “soul of all intelligibility” in Royce’s notion of divine 
purpose or the “Arrest of fulfillment by free limitation.”107 Arrest is a free, Self-limiting 
decree through which the Absolute undergoes a process of Self-realization, exercising “a 
choice, [or] an attentive selection of the actual world within an indefinite or infinite series 
of abstractly possible worlds….”108 This “original and profound theory of metaphysical 
attention” supports Marcel’s notion of being as value. The process in which the Absolute 
“Arrests Itself,” becoming Self-conscious through a primordial act of hierophany, 
“creates individual beings in which it recognizes itself … not [through] a casual action, 
but rather a teleological and immanent development like that of a work of art….”109 
Considered within the overarching context of this hierophantic act, finite individuals are 
defined in terms of their unique value. Finite selves, no longer conceived empirically as 
discrete psycho-physical units, are now viewed as vital parts of a cosmological world-
order – a necessary order in which each instance of uniqueness resonates throughout the 
entire spectrum of Infinite created being. As Royce passionately states: “[T]he true or 
metaphysically real Ego of a man … is simply the totality of his experience in so far as 
he consciously views this experience as … the struggling but never completed expression 
of his coherent plan in life, the changing but never completed partial embodiment of his 
one ideal [purpose].”110 
 Royce views the ego as a metaphysical category. Using terms reminiscent of his 
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characterization of the human being as an “exigence of being,” Marcel frames Royce’s 
project in the following way: “[U]nity cannot come to the ego from the outside. Unity is 
not given to the ego. The ego must confer unity on itself…. But we can (and generally 
this is what we do) identify our remembered past with th[is enlarged] ego whose 
individuality is only indicated or suggested to us.”111 Without the enlarged sense of 
meaning and purpose that is provided by the enduring thread of Absolute being, our lives 
quickly become relegated to a Macbeth-like status – tales told by an idiot, full of sound 
and fury, signifying nothing. Royce depicts life without an absolute basis as: “[A] 
cauldron of seething and bubbling efforts to be somebody, a cauldron which boils dry 
when life ends.”112  
 Marcel’s deep interest in music and his belief in the power of musical “concepts” 
to express non-linear realities enable him to view Royce’s notion of a life plan as similar 
to the unique, qualitative character of a melody. A melody consists of a series of 
interacting patterns of change that are synthetically apprehended in terms of a single 
unity. What might appear to be mere fragments of discord are concordantly joined 
together within the eternal panoramic of Absolute consciousness. Jacob Loewenberg, a 
former student of Royce, characterized the latter’s “synoptic vision” in the following: 
“Like the celebrated flower in the crannied wall, every part of the universe is seen by him 
as involving a hidden concatenation with every other part. It is the inner nexus of things 
upon which his eye is ever focused.”113 Using Marcel’s famous distinction between being 
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and having, a life-plan does not consist of the completed act of possession of an external 
thing; a life plan must be achieved through the process of consecrating oneself to an ideal 
– thus, falling into the antecedent realm of being rather than having. Any homo sapiens, 
although exhibiting all the physical characteristics of personhood, does not automatically 
qualify as an “individual” in the Marcellian or Roycean sense. According to Marcel, 
“many people who phenomenally appear to us as human beings are not really distinct 
moral individuals, but are mere fragments of a finite personality….”114 It does not require 
careful observation to validate Marcel’s point. Such individuals could be viewed as 
suffering from a type of schizophrenia or some sense of multiple personality disorder 
because they have not succeeded in achieving a state of synthetic unity, or stasis, within a 
higher order or being. According to Royce: “The empirical ego, apart from the unity of 
life-plan, can be as truly called a thousand selves as one Self.”115 
 Marcel sees no shortage of important implications to be drawn from Royce’s 
profound insight into the ontological depth of the individual. First, without an ontological 
foundation connecting it to the whole, the self appears as a mere impoverished shell – in 
rather stark Rylean terms, a mere “ghost in a machine.” Royce wants “our knowledge to 
show us [that] the Being of things, is what reality, taken as an individual whole, or again, 
as this individual, finally is.”116 For both Marcel and Royce, finite individuals have a 
stake, or share, in divine experience. The finite self comprises an essential ingredient of 
divine experience – as an integral aspect of divine experience, a life-plan is simul a 
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concrete realization of God’s cosmic plan writ small. Nevertheless, the enactment of a 
life plan is a free act. In Roycean terms, “[T]he individual as I define him, is free,―free 
with the identical freedom of God, whereof his freedom is a portion.”117 This will enable 
Royce to utter in the same breadth such notions as divine compulsion, personal 
uniqueness, and freedom.118 The connection between the infinite and the finite is not one 
of logical possibility or causal determination, but of reciprocating “intimate solidarity.” 
To view the relationship in any other terms is to become entrapped in paradoxes of 
dualism and determinism. According to Royce, “God’s consciousness forms in its 
wholeness one luminously transparent conscious moment…. On the other hand, … this 
individual’s experience … when metaphysically viewed—[is] a unique experience, and 
consequently a unique constituent of the Divine life, nowhere else capable of being 
represented in God’s universe, and therefore metaphysically necessary to the fulfillment 
of God’s own life….”119 If I were otherwise, so would God be. Divine will is expressed 
through the finite individual but, as Royce is quick to point out, “the existence of an 
individual will [is determined], just in so far as it is this individual will, by nothing except 
itself.”120 By expressing God’s will, I express no will except my own. In the words of 
Meister Eckhart, “Were I not, God himself could not be.” For Marcel, Royce has 
captured “the most profound mystery of philosophy and religion” – the profound union of 
the one and the many.121 
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§ 
The Absolute as Totum Simul: Bradley, Dedekind and the Importance of Self-
Representative Systems 
 
 In the chapter entitled “The One and the Many,” Marcel demonstrates his often 
under-rated technical acumen as he explains “[Royce’s] ingenious and daring 
interpretation of the relations between time and eternity.”122 How can Royce reconcile the 
idea of a universal life-plan, existing as a moment within universal consciousness, with 
an understanding of the free acts of concrete, specific individuals? Such an understanding 
is reflected in the following excerpt from The Conception of God:  
[W]e may now without question say that the one act of absolute choice which is 
embodied in the world that contains the individuals A, B. C, etc., does as fact actually 
include many mutually contingent, that is, mutually undetermined acts of choice, each of 
which is identical with that mode of will which gets expressed in the life in the individual, 
and which as a fact includes his own personal self conscious will.123 
 
 Royce is able to reconcile what might appear to be contraries by an ingenious act 
“which overlaps metaphysics and higher mathematics.”124 The concept Royce utilizes to 
reconcile the finite and the infinite is known as “a self-representative system” – a notion 
he appropriated from Richard Dedekind – a 19th century German mathematician. Royce 
is coerced somewhat into demonstrating the possibility of reconciliation due to pressure 
exerted by the vocal opposition of F.H. Bradley, who argued that contraries brought 
about by relational thought can only be effectively reconciled after being transcended in 
the abstract monism of the Absolute. The entire argument – Bradley’s position, Royce’s 
appropriation of Dedekind, and Royce’s conception of “the actually infinite” – is all 
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contained in the famous “Supplementary Essay” to Volume I of the World and the 
Individual entitled “The One, the Many, and the Infinite.”125 The difficult, abstract issues 
dealt with in this essay preclude any type of exhaustive treatment. Before turning to a 
cursory look at the issues involved, let it be sufficient to say that this essay represents 
Royce at his technical and metaphysical best. 
 In trying to account for unity of a thing in the context of its relations, Bradley is 
quickly confronted with a dilemma: “[If] there is a relation C in which A and B stand, 
then the problem of the unity of the thing becomes the problem as to the genuine tie that 
binds both A and B to their now relatively independent relation C.”126 But this way of 
proceeding quickly leads to an infinite regress because “[t]his tie that unites A and B, in 
the thing, to C, hereupon appears as a new fact in the relation, D…. The links are united 
by a link, and this bond of union is a link which has also two ends; and these require a 
fresh link to connect them with the old.”127 According to Bradley, “There must be a 
whole embracing what is related, or there would be no differences, no relation…. This 
remark applies not merely to things, and to the relations that are to bind into unity their 
qualities, but to space, and time, and to every case where varieties are in any way 
related.”128 In order to escape an ad infinitum type of regress, Royce offers the following 
characterization of the Bradley’s Absolute, cannibalizing key Bradleyan phrases: 
[As] “immediate presentation,” [the Absolute] gives us the experience of a “whole” 
which “contains diversity,” but which is, nevertheless, “not parted by relations.” On the 
other hand, “relational form,” where known to us, points “everywhere to a unity,”—“a 
substantial totality beyond relations and above them, a whole endeavoring without 
success to realize itself in their detail. Such facts and considerations give us “not an 
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experience, but an abstract idea” of a “unity which transcends and yet contains every 
manifold appearance.” “We can form the general idea of an absolute experience in which 
phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole becomes immediate at a higher level 
without losing any richness.” But meanwhile we have “a complete inability to understand 
this concrete unity in detail.”129 
 
 The problems associated with Bradley’s Absolute are similar to those associated 
with Hegel’s notion of the negative or “bad infinite.” The bad infinite is destined to 
incompletion through the ongoing addition of the + 1. Likewise, Bradley’s position, 
according to Marcel, is akin to “quasi-agnosticism” – as thought becomes enmeshed in 
the “infinite fission” of hierarchical relations, it is destined to incompleteness because 
“completion would prove destructive … emphatically mak[ing] an end of mere thought. 
It would bring the ideal content into a form which would be reality itself, and where truth 
and mere thought would certainly perish.”130 Knowledge is somehow completed in the 
Absolute but the Absolute lies beyond relational thought. Here we arrive at agnosticism. 
 As Marcel sees it, Royce’s challenge is to demonstrate, contra Bradley, that a 
concrete, actual infinite can be “retained without contradiction.” Royce accomplishes this 
by returning to the teleological basis of his thinking, arguing “there really are purposes 
whose nature is such that their realization involves a multitude of particulars which could 
not be finite without that realization becoming impossible.”131 The conceptual analogue 
wherein the infinite and the finite are fused is called a “self-representative system.” 
 The famous image that Royce offers is a map of England that represents that 
which it maps in every detail.132 In Marcel’s words: 
Let us suppose … that someone wants to trace a literally exact map of England, i.e. with 
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a point by point correspondence between the map and the territory the map represents. 
Let us suppose, on the other hand, that the map is traced on the land of England itself. 
The image, the representation (the map) would therefore, to realize the intended purpose, 
contain as a part of itself a representation of its own contour and its own content, and so 
on. If there were a limit to this series of self-representations, the map would be imperfect 
and, strictly speaking, inaccurate. It is therefore clear to anyone who understands what is 
to be realized, that an infinite series of maps within maps is necessarily implied in the end 
which we have set. If we suppose now that this perfect map exists, we will be right in 
asserting that it contains actually, and not potentially, an infinite series of maps….133 
 
The following definition of a self-representative system is offered by Royce: “A 
System S is called ‘infinite’ when it is similar to a constituent (or proper) part of itself; in 
the contrary case S is called a ‘finite’ system.”134 Self-representative systems possess 
three defining characteristics. They are recursive – for each ideal element M, there 
“corresponds another element of the system, and one alone … which can be regarded as 
deriving from the first by way of recurrence.”135 They are distinct – “different elements 
have distinct images … [because] in the system which would be the complete and 
definitive expression, one element only would be derived from another element….”136 
Self-representative systems are also selective – “only a portion of the system is 
representative.”137  
It is important to note that a self-representative system is a “self-ordered” system. 
A self-representative system is able to confer order upon itself through being defined in 
advance by a single internal purpose, or defining plan, that involves an endless series, or 
Kette, of constituents. The self-ordered nature of the system, when combined with the 
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three defining characteristics of recursion, uniqueness, and selectivity, results in a 
powerful metaphysical implication. In the words of Bruce Kuklick: 
An internally Self-Representative system is one which can be represented by a part or 
“portion” of itself, produced by leaving out elements of the whole; this kind of system is 
said to be infinite…. The Universe, as Subject-Object, contains a complete and perfect 
image or view of itself. Hence it is, in structure, at once One, as a single system, and also 
and endless Kette [i.e. series]…. An internally Self-Representative system with the 
structure of the Absolute contains an infinite number of infinite subseries which are 
capable of representing the whole, and we may conceive human selves as subseries of the 
Absolute.138 
 
 Marcel, through his in-depth familiarity with idealism, is able to understand both 
the subtlety and the superiority of Royce’s approach over that of Bradley. Bradley was 
forced to transcend relational thought and to seek refuge in the dark monism of the 
Absolute due to his inability to recognize that “the intellect itself defines, by its own 
movement, what could never be given to us in our temporal experience: a self-
representative system of objects…. A well-ordered system [that] has the form of a 
completed self.”139 Temporal experience may present “endless dispersion,” but this 
“remains subordinate to the perfectly determined unity of the unique plan by which the 
Absolute defines itself completely at one stroke.”140 As the “initial term of the system, … 
Absolute Experience can be truly immediate [although] represented by an infinite number 
of points of view or ordered perspectives.”141 Royce characterizes this whole as “a totum 
simul, a single, endlessly wealthy experience.”142 
Although Royce’s “self-representative” account of the Absolute is a classic 
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example of creative metaphysical synthesis, it might be helpful to attempt to clarify by 
way of an example what Royce is trying to convey. Royce’s primary objective is to show 
the unified relationship that exists between the finite and the infinite that protects the 
concreteness and freedom of the former, while allowing for the ontological superiority of 
the latter. If one chooses to remain at the level of traditional thinking, one is left with 
either inadequate ontological conceptions, i.e. realism, mysticism, and critical-
realism/idealism, or a Bradleyan form of abstract monism in which the illusory particular 
is absorbed into an Absolute void. Dissatisfied with all of these “solutions,” Royce 
undertakes a brilliant, two-step process to grasp the unique character of Absolute being. 
First, for lack of a better term, he imaginatively “freezes” the Absolute in what might be 
referred to as an extended cosmic moment through an act of “conspectus” – a wide 
“apperceptive span” that allows for the presentation of the universe in its vast scope in 
depth and breadth, inclusively as well as exclusively. Royce then extracts a “diagonal 
slice” of this infinite expanse in order to illuminate in concreto the deep, subliminal 
traces of concatenations and connections crisscrossing throughout the finely interwoven 
nexus of the Absolute experience. The heuristic and symbolic power of the self-
representative system lies in the manner in which it is able to reflect the expansive 
breadth and depth of the universe at both a micro and macrocosmic level sub specie 
aeternitatis or, in Roycean terms, totum simul. Although the empirical ego may seem 
confronted with an endless dispersion of a discrete Kette, the metaphysical ego “knows 
itself as this and not something else” because it is a teleologically-ordered self that 
emerges out of a “recurrent process corresponding to an eternally true aspect of the 
structure of reality….”143  
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 Marcel is fascinated by one of the implications of Royce’s application of a self-
representative system to the Absolute – the possibility of different apperceptive spans or, 
in the language of contemporary epistemology, alternative conceptual frameworks. 
Marcel asks the reader to imagine how human experience might change in the event of 
different apperceptive spans and foci. While it is clear that communications between like-
minded individuals are possible only when experience has a common apperceptive span, 
it is possible to imagine: 
 A consciousness having the same content as our consciousness, but which has a different 
apperceptive span, [and] what seem to us to last a second is stretched out into a series 
lasting an entire era. And conversely, it could happen that what we understand only in a 
diluted state, and thus confusedly, is concentrated for an experience other than our own 
into an intelligible abridgement.144 
 
 When different apperceptive spans are viewed in a relationship of figure-ground 
or focus and field,  Royce’s philosophy of nature can be seen as depicting “a world where 
everything communicates … [and] exchanges and complex interactions are established 
between streams of [differing degrees of apperceptive] experience, so that newness would 
abound in all the regions of the conscious world.”145 Through a process of adjusting the 
variables impacting the width of the apperceptive span and the rate of change of the 
contents considered within a given span, a narrower or wider spectrum of experience is 
illuminated. Once illuminated, dimensions of experience which were previously invisible 
are now in statu nascendi – resulting in the emergence of new strata and strains of 
experience. An organic process, typically considered in terms of the slow rhythm of 
geological time due to the “infinitely segmented” impact of finite consciousness, is now 
possible to be experienced in such a way that would be forever capable “of living its 
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original and synthetic intensity.”146 Conversely, a spontaneous, loving glance, when 
viewed from the apperceptive vantage point roughly equivalent to that of a century, 
would become “empt[ied] of meaning.” 
 Marcel draws two important spiritual consequences from Royce’s insight. When a 
hierophantic irruption of the sacred occurs, it emerges within a prior context of profane 
space. According to Marcel, “what is indeed meaningful, what reveals a spiritual life, is 
always a variation in habits, the breaking of a rhythm which seemed inalterable.”147 The 
restructuring of apperceptive spans allows for the possibility of being awakened to 
dimensions of experience previously relegated to the most invisible part of the 
experiential continuum. In the words of Stephen Stills: “A new day, a new way, and new 
eyes to see the dawn.”148  Similar to that which is revealed through the technique referred 
to as “time lapse photography,” nature can be seen in its Aristotelian sense as consisting 
of “much longer series” of telic processes pursuing ideal meanings – a dimension 
previously precluded from experience conceived as an atomistic succession of efficient 
causes. Despite his appreciation of secondary reflection, Marcel exercises sufficient 
restraint vis á vis Royce’s caveat to recognize that “extreme caution” must be exercised 
when it comes to trying to ascertain – either microscopically or macroscopically –the 
essential integrity of the Absolute plan: “We are condemned to remain unawares.”149   
That being said, what Marcel finds momentous here is not the application of a hypothesis 
but the “general direction” where this discovery of possible levels of experience that are 
integrally linked and teleologically ordered might lead. What appears to the stark realist 
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as a world of opaque, “fragmentary givens,” can now, upon reflection, be seen as a 
universe that is experientially integrated – intelligent, although not always pellucid to the 
finite gaze.   
 The notion of the Absolute as teleologically-ordered provides a perfect segue for a 
consideration of Marcel’s analysis of Royce’s view of time and eternity. Marcel’s deep 
interest in music enables him to appreciate time in terms of the perception of variation in 
recurring patterns of order. In order to understand the meter of poetry or the composition 
of a melody, “the whole succession … [must be] present at once to our consciousness ... 
precisely as the beginning and the end of a rhythm are not the same for our experience, 
but are yet at once seen as belonging to one and the same whole succession.”150 
 Dimensions of time – past, present and future – are linked teleologically: “what 
comes after in any succession is related to what comes before as realization is related to 
desire.”151 This relation, when defined vectorally as “tending towards” some form of 
future fulfillment, is a mirror of eternity – an imago aeternitatis. Marcel is able to meld 
Royce’s conception of teleological development with his own notion of ontological 
exigence, resulting in a view in which “we discover in time ideas and inner meanings 
strain[ing] towards that Other in which they can be incorporated and actualized. [T]his 
other … is totality.”152 What the finite self perceives in a fragmented, incomplete manner, 
the Absolute – through its capacity of apperception – is able to, like the hearer of a poetic 
                                                 
150 W&I (SS): 120, 144. Cf. RM, p. 79: “[A]musical composition exists in every bar, not only in its final 
chord….” The importance of Royce’s notion of reality as a self-representative system must be emphasized 
here. 
151 RM: 78. See infra where Marcel adds a powerful point regarding space and time: “whereas space seems 
to spread out before us the contents of the world … time gives us the form within which can be expressed 
all intention, finality and meaning. This is why the temporal word is more exciting than the visible world 
when considered as immovable. Space only furnished the stage of the universe. The world’s drama is play 
out in time.” 
152 RM: 79. 
 143
stanza, apprehend time “both as a successive order and as a totality.”153 
§ 
The World of Description and the World of Appreciation 
 Marcel’s sensitive treatment of the distinction in Royce’s thought between 
“description” and “appreciation” is of seminal importance. It clearly demonstrates how 
Royce’s thought provided a fertile field in which the young Marcel could develop a host 
of themes that would occupy his entire philosophical life: the difference between primary 
and secondary recollection, the primacy of the concrete, the critique of abstraction and 
objectivity, the importance of telepathy, and the primordial basis of intersubjectivity. This 
distinction allows Marcel to crystallize Royce’s “new and profound insight whose 
importance cannot be exaggerated … [that] our experience is perpetually referred to a 
spiritual context which gives it true meaning.”154 
 Marcel’s first goal is to show that the “worlds” of description and appreciation 
are, despite appearances to the contrary, not necessarily incompatible and can penetrate 
one another through a higher form of reflection. A conception of objectively lurks in the 
background of the world of description. In order for something to be successfully 
described, an enduring notion of the discribendum must be capable of being assimilated 
through time. Categorization and reproduction are both a sine qua non of description. As 
Marcel knows, “Identity of description is the sole guarantee of objectivity.”155 
 Categorization requires an analytic discrimination in which – in terms of primary 
reflection – an entity is wrenched from its experiential context so that it can progressively 
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emerge as focus of attention. But as Marcel is quick to point out, a penumbral life-world, 
immediate and concrete, is oftentimes refused us and requires supplementation via patient 
and methodical description. Once objects are sufficiently discriminated, they become 
susceptible to becoming arranged into serial orders. In the section of the Gifford Lectures 
entitled “The Linkage of Facts,” Royce provides a clear and detailed account of this 
process.156 Marcel sees in Royce a kindred spirit who is not misled by what Whitehead 
called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness: “[T]he fundamental category of the exact 
sciences is order, not quality…. In what measure does a science succeed in bringing its 
objects into a serial order or a system of ordered series? This is the question which should 
be posed – not the question of the extent to which science succeeds in reducing the 
qualitative to the quantitative, since this reduction is largely illusory.”157  
 Marcel recognizes, like Royce, that the world of description is an “abstract” world 
and not the final expression of the way things are. In order for something to be subject to 
a defining description, a content must have eliminated from it – namely, those 
“indescribable,” personal characteristics which are not reproducible. The world of 
description is a world of Erfahrung überhaupt and not hic et nunc. Analytic reflection 
presupposes the continuous world of the concrete. Beneath the segmentations imposed 
through analysis, there lies a reality in which “direct contact … would be both action and 
complete realization.”158 
 Royce refers to this “true series” of the Self and its expressions as “the world of 
                                                 
156 See W&I (SS): 45-107. 
157 RM: 97. For a discussion of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” see Alfred North Whitehead, 
Process and Reality: Corrected Edition, eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald Sherburne (The Free Press, 
1978), pp. 7-8: “The fallacy consists of neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity 
is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought.” 
158 RM: 96. 
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appreciation.” Royce’s notion of appreciation is very similar to Marcel’s notion of 
secondary reflection – a non-analytic process of recuperative encapsulation of beings 
within the totality of Being. The world of appreciation is a spiritual world as opposed to a 
world that has been segmented into ideas and concepts. Within the span of “a single and 
divine moment,” value emerges simply because that which is unique, concrete, and 
personal takes immediate precedence over that which can be objectively distributed 
through a series. Marcel uses the example of a close friend who is more than a “whirlpool 
of molecules,” a social security number, or a picture on a passport. Using a phrase that 
foreshadows his later use of terms such as “circuit” and “orbit,” Marcel states that “in the 
creative initiative of the individual the world reveals its essence … the sap of the 
individual eternally circulates there….”159  
 Marcel’s account of Royce’s world of appreciation stresses the universal 
transparency that exists between members of a universal community: 
It is a communion of all in all, the transparency of each for each. Think, says Royce, of 
an ideal community of beings who would have such a full consciousness of the relations 
which bind them to the true [S]elf that their collective life would be a whole spiritual 
communion, so that each’s experience would be an open book for the others. In other 
words, think of beings who would read each others thoughts with perfect clarity. This 
highest spiritual world would be … that of the undivided soul, which, while remaining 
itself, flows inexhaustibly into individual souls.160  
 
 Marcel derives several interesting insights from this aspect of transparency. When 
one hears the term “transparency” in current parlance – usually in the context of financial 
or governmental disclosure – it typically refers to a situation in which tools and 
technology are able to analytically reconstruct all relevant data required for the 
                                                 
159 RM: 99. Emphasis added. 
160 Ibid.: 99-100. See RM, p. 151 where Marcel raises the question “[D]o we have the right to assert, by a 
daring extrapolation, the possibility, and even the reality, of a being which would transcend [the order of 
time] and understand it as a totality. This being, or more exactly, this act, would be situated nowhere.” 
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construction of a “complete” picture. However, this type of transparency only exists at 
the derived level of primary, analytical reflection. The type of transparency indicated by 
Royce and Marcel is a transparency at the level of secondary reflection – a universal level 
wherein individuals are already “directly and organically” connected. The “transparency” 
of Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue are derivative attempts to somehow reconstruct 
this original transparency by substituting a disfigured notion.  
 This ontological notion of transparency also has interesting implications for the 
issue of telepathy. Royce, like Marcel, had an interest in the occult. Royce’s idea of an 
“appreciate moment” wherein everything appears like “an open book … [to] beings who 
were mutually perfect mind readers of one another…. In such a world of spiritual 
intercourse, all the thoughts of one man would become directly the object of his 
neighbors thought. In such a case we should stand at the presence of an order in which 
the distinction of outer and inner would be no ultimate one.”161 For Marcel – a 
philosopher who also takes telepathy very seriously – this Roycean insight has significant 
implications both for science and consciousness. The “explanatory” categories of 
scientific investigation come upon the scene of “discovery” in a secondary manner and 
are oftentimes disruptive of the continuity that precedes thematic investigation. This 
disruption vitiates against any disclosure of organic connection such as would be required 
for a judicious treatment of telepathy. Likewise, if consciousness consists of an expansive 
network, or “field,”162 prior to being psychologically reduced to a simple egoistic unity, 
                                                 
161 SMP: 395-396. See Royce’s brief, unfinished piece referred to as “The Cult of the Dead” in J. Harry 
Cotton, Royce on the Human Self (Harvard University Press, 1954): 7. The context in which it was written 
is somewhat haunting. See Cotton, p. 6. 
162 For an interesting account of the “field theory” of consciousness, see Eugene Fontinell, Self, God, and 
Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation (Temple University Press, 1986), especially Part I. According to 
Fontinell, p. 29: “[F]ields are continuous with other fields; hence there are no absolute, definitive 
beginnings and endings of any individual field.” 
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then perhaps we have been premature in taking our epistemological bearings from the 
likes of Locke, Hume and Mill. Marcel, from his earlier readings of Coleridge, Schelling, 
and Hegel knew that despite the diffuse nature of Royce’s ideas of consciousness and 
telepathy, Royce’s adherence to the idealist tradition gave him a much wider explanatory 
matrix from which to account for the nature of consciousness. 
 Royce’s account of consciousness as a social or spiritual order is one such 
example of his explanatory reach. The worlds of description and appreciation, far from 
being irreconcilable, are capable of being “reabsorbed into the concrete unity of 
thought.”163  As Royce puts the matter: “[I]t is true that human nature, down to the least 
externally describable detail of its temporal fashion of expressing itself, is a natural 
phenomenon, a part of universal Nature, and is as much capable of some kind of 
explanation in causal terms as is any natural fact. But, on the other hand, this very way of 
viewing man sets to itself its own limits…. [W]hat remains causally inexplicable is 
precisely my being as this individual, who am nobody else in God’s world.”164 
 Both Marcel and Royce believe that existence is logically prior to possibility. 
From his investigations into logic, Royce knew that the hypothetical syllogism was 
derivative from the categorical syllogism. Furthermore, we believe in the existence of 
others before becoming aware of our own existence. Social relations provide a rich 
avenue of data from which to react, and grow. As Royce says: “It is nearer to the truth to 
say that we first learn about ourselves from and through our fellows, than we learn from 
our fellows using the analogy of ourselves.”165 Our experience, qua finite, is doomed to 
incompletion – our social awareness enables us to “enrich and progressively complete” 
                                                 
163 RM: 102. 
164 W&I (SS): 325, 326. 
165 W&I (SS): 170-171. 
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that which would otherwise be fated to being merely parochial. It is this process of 
enrichment and completion that provides a clue to the spiritual dimension of experience. 
According to Royce, by contrasting and comparing the finite elements of experience, “I 
get a notion of the boundless world of human meanings, which I can partially, but not 
wholly, grasp.”166 Marcel emphatically states that “This is a new and profound insight 
whose importance cannot be exaggerated.”167 Our finite slice of spiritual consciousness is 
“an imitation, a condensation, and an epitome of our literal social life.”168 Our 
embeddedness in relations – what Royce referred to a “reverence for the relations of life” 
– provides much needed fuel for reflection. Through reflection, these relations are 
“interiorized.” This process of interiorization results in the not-self “becoming an integral 
part of the self, and that the varying life of several personages, which is displayed in us, 
or rather which is ourselves, is constituted.”169 By emphasizing the social dimension of 
self-consciousness, Royce has attempted to overcome the barriers between self and other. 
The key to doing so, according to Marcel, is to show “that the objectivity which science 
seeks to realize, is but a substitute for that higher objectivity which is being itself....”170 
Despite Royce’s creative use of self-representative systems and serially-related orders, 
however, has his synoptic vision succeeded?  An adequate answer requires a 
comprehensive look at Royce’s “later” philosophy. 
§ 
Faith vs. Cognition: The Transitional Importance of Loyalty 
 Despite his appreciation of the brilliance of the Roycean synthesis, Marcel’s 
                                                 
166 SGE: 220. 
167 RM: 105. 
168 Ibid.: 105. See also SGE: 193. 
169 RM: 105. 
170 RM: 100. 
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suspicion regarding any type of absolute synthesis has been building for some time.171 
Marcel’s criticism takes the following form: “It is also doubtful whether the compromise 
Royce sought to establish is satisfactory, i.e. between a realist pluralism, according to 
which there are purely external relations in the world, and the concrete idealistic monism 
which is Royce’s doctrine, according to which the universe is nothing but a totally 
explicit meaning that is fully self-conscious.”172 
 Marcel perceives a bit of hesitancy in Royce due to the inability of the latter’s 
thought to free itself from the architectonic of Absolute idealism. As a result, Royce is 
forced to utilize a stock-in-trade inventory of conceptual tools and language that conflict 
with presenting “the concrete unity of freedoms in the midst of absolute freedom.”173 
While Marcel recognizes the genius of Royce’s metaphysical synthesis, he questions 
“whether this theory does not leave us with a ruinous dualism by re-establishing on a 
higher level among individuals the barriers it claimed to have broken down forever…. 
[Making] individuals proceed from God and … in the end reduce[ing] them to being 
nothing but Ideas, no longer Acts, i.e. ends which in the deepest sense create or deposit 
themselves.”174 Marcel possesses a deep appreciation of the heuristic power of Royce’s 
                                                 
171 It is important to note that Marcel’s criticisms are extremely judicious and, in some cases, akin to 
Royce’s own self-criticism. See  Frank Oppenheim, Royce’s Voyage Down Under (University Press of 
Kentucky, 1980) p. 19, in which Royce states in a letter to William James dated May 21, 1888: “In fine, I 
have largely straightened out the big metaphysical tangle about continuity, freedom, and world formula … 
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prophesying I have therefore had the fortune to do.” 
172 RM: 49. Regarding the issue of time and eternity, Royce characterizes the problem between the one and 
the many as: “Is this timeless consciousness, which understands as a totum simul, what we are forced to 
understand successively, not itself involved in a becoming which it cannot really control.” 
173 Ibid.: 49. For a cogent criticism of Royce’s position from the standpoint of Gabriel Marcel, see Dwayne 
Tunstall, “Concerning the God that is Only a Concept: A Marcellian Critique of Royce’s God,” in 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2006): 394-416. According to Tunstall, p. 
404: “Royce’s ethico-religious insight cannot remain a live one unless we separate it from his absolutistic 
conception of God.” 
174 Ibid.: 59. 
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self-representative system to depict how finite elements are joined together as the 
systematic expression of an immanent purpose. However, the question remains as to 
whether or not the “semi-pluralism” depicted by a self-representative system is uniquely 
suited to illuminate the nature of being. According to Marcel, Royce will eventually be 
forced to strongly modify the direction of his theory by jettisoning the notion of divine 
omniscience. For those who are familiar with the course of Royce’s thought, this will 
involve a change of course from an all-inclusive, eternal Absolute –  requiring a move to 
a more mediated, historical conception.175 
Yet despite Marcel’s sincere effort to explain and, to a large extent, defend the 
Roycean position, “it is unquestionably difficult to rid oneself of a certain feeling of 
uneasiness in the presence of the theory.”176 This uneasiness stems from the challenge of 
reconciling the causa sui nature of Being with the existence of radical contingency. For 
Marcel, the only possibility for harmonizing these two aspects is by “find[ing] a fulcrum 
in the actual [and] starting from the real.”177 Here is where Marcel sees a kindred spirit in 
                                                 
175 Marcel will ultimately comment that “Royce made a daring, but fruitless effort to reconcile a 
voluntaristic conception of the individual with the idea of an order which despite everything is given for all 
eternity…. We will have to ask ourselves … whether these difficulties are connected with the way in which 
Royce understood the ontological predicate.” See Herbert W. Schneider, A History of American Philosophy 
(Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 492, 493, for an indication of the shift Royce’s thought eventually 
takes: “The emphasis on mind as [an] objective logical structure has grown at the expense of the 
Absolute…. Most conspicuous and widespread is the shift toward a temporal theory of reality. Not only 
reason, truth, value, and being but also the Absolute itself have been given a temporal context…. [I]dealism 
has undergone a major transformation. For according to the newer theories Absolute experience is no 
longer divorced from human, temporal experience as an object of religious or logical faith, but is conceived 
as factor in actual experience, a human possession in time and at times.”  
176 Ibid.: 70. 
177 Ibid.: 73. As Marcel indicates in the final moments of Royce’s Metaphysics, p. 154-155: Either: the God 
who sees everything is a victim of His own perfection, and is destined to grasp only the cosmic order … 
without even suspecting anything of the lateral perspectives…. Or, on the contrary, He is a God with 
countless glances who is bound to all the vicissitudes of our individual experiences…. A third alternative 
seeks to reconcile these two apparently contradictory aspects … by substituting for the unpredictable 
richness of spiritual development, the over-rigid unity of a system…. [We must] transcend the three 
alternatives that … are inadequate to the proper object of metaphysics, and [move] towards a less 
systematic, but more faithful and profound interpretation of our spiritual life … [that] acknowledge[s] an 
order of freedom and love in which the relations of being to being, far from integrating into a single 
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Royce – a thinker who opposed anything resembling a metaphysical sleight-of-hand. A 
practical, personal relation to the Absolute is a sine qua non: “[T]his act partakes more of 
faith than of abstract thought. The relation which is established between God and myself 
is a relation of individual to individual.”178 
It is at this juncture that the importance of the Roycean doctrine of loyalty takes 
center stage. As a finite moment of Absolute consciousness, any form of dualism is now 
transcended through a relationship of reciprocity: “The Absolute will truly be for me only 
inasmuch as I serve it loyally.”179 As a member of a “spiritual community” – a term that 
will take on added importance in the later Royce – the self simultaneously exhibits two 
important dimensions. One the one hand, a person is somehow, qua human, primordially 
a member of this community by virtue of being born into its unity. In this sense, our 
spiritual destiny is to some degree initially assured. However, one can become an active 
member of a spiritual community only through the lived act of “participation” – a term 
that is near and dear to Marcel: “Individualism is a hollow word and should be 
mistrusted.”180 Through participation – an act wherein one exercises one’s unique 
capacity for free, temporal development – one is able to become quasi-porous and unified 
with the whole.  Loyal participation, unconstrained by the categorical divisions of 
discursive thought, provides for a more concrete connection between finite and infinite 
being. In the words of Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J.: “Royce’s musement [concerning 
                                                                                                                                                 
rational system … would remain the expression of separate but social beings who partake of God to the 
extend that they believe in Him.” 
178 Ibid.: 73.  
179 RM: 74. 
180 RM: 110. See also, p. 111: “[I]t would be an illusion to believe in a specific and irreducible content of 
the self….” 
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loyalty] enlivens his thought.”181 This act of loyal participation is an ontological defining, 
both in terms of the finite moment and the eternal life-plan: “[Without] participation in 
this community, the being of the finite consciousness … would otherwise not be at all…. 
[But as] my individuality is only an act, or more exactly an expression of the divine 
individuality, the act by which I determine myself is indeed identically the act by which 
God is.”182  The manner in which Royce achieves reconciliation is important to Marcel 
because, instead of arguing for a “block universe” – a criticism of William James – 
Royce realized that “metaphysical speculation is consummated by positing a practical 
relation, a personal relation between the Absolute and ourselves, a relation which … we 
might have been tempted to interpret in a too rigorously theoretical manner…. [T]he 
duality between the Absolute and myself can only be apparent.”183  By loyally 
participating in the eternal unity of a spiritual community, living beings are united and 
understood – but not absorbed – by That which transcends them. 
I become a person through serving a cause. I choose my cause and come into 
being as the person I am through the act of choosing and serving this cause. As Marcel 
indicates, the term “autonomy” is etymologically misleading – it does not consist of 
being a “law unto oneself.” Instead: “It is in the measure that I choose this cause, in 
                                                 
181 Frank M. Oppenheim, Royce’s Mature Philosophy of Religion (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984): 
282. 
182 RM: 75. Later, it will become more apparent how this notion of loyally serving the Absolute is a pivotal 
concept in terms of developing a view of the Absolute as the temporal unfolding of a spiritual community 
of interpreters. Cf. the following comment by John E. Smith, “Introduction,” The Problem of Christianity 
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individual nor a universal; it is a new and distinctive level of being…. (Emphasis added.) The selves are 
real and the items relating them to each other are equally real; community is the genuine form of the 
coming together of a one and a many.” 
183 RM: 74. 
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which I make myself, that I am autonomous.”184 
According to Marcel, this shift in Royce’s thought from a metaphysic of Absolute 
idealism to a theory of loyalty is due to “a sort of reflection on his own system … 
resulting [in] his discovery that there are certain ideal connections between apparently 
distinct orders of speculation.”185 Royce is attempting to merge metaphysics and ethics in 
such a way to arrive at the ultimate meaning of conduct. This revitalized ethic remains 
based in the tradition of rational thought but, at the same time, will be “thoroughly 
examined and purified.”186 As Royce says: “Let us bury the natural body of tradition. We 
want its glorified body and its immortal soul…. We need a new heaven and a new 
earth.”187 
This “new Jerusalem” – to use a term of William Blake – is achieved through 
dedication to a “supra-personal” cause. Through loyal service to a cause, “a relation of a 
special kind is established between an individual and the cause … which assumes both 
free action and self-subordination.”188 For Marcel, the ethical direction that Royce’s 
metaphysics has taken is not that of a mere abstract dialectic – it reflects the profoundest 
lesson of life. It is worth quoting Marcel at length here: 
We see clearly here how loyalty is founded for Royce in the nature of Being as his 
idealistic ontology defines Being. It is by no means a group of extrinsic bonds, but real 
ones, which are established between a loyal individual and a distinct community. Loyalty 
                                                 
184 RM: 111. In Royce’s words: “My life means nothing, either theoretically or practically, unless I am a 
member of a community … to which I essentially and by virtue of my relationship to the whole universe 
belong” (Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 2 Volumes [Macmillan & Co. 1913]). Hereafter 
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Western morals into his principles of loyalty at the outset, instead of having ‘deduced’ such a code from 
them as he claims.” See Peter Fuss, The Moral Philosophy of Josiah Royce (Harvard University Press, 
1965), p. 233. 
188 RM: 111. 
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is the living participation of the self in a concrete order which it undertakes to serve, and 
which in return confers on the self the only reality it can claim…. It is an advent.189 
 
There is a serious difficulty in the notion of pure loyalty. Much like the 
Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s ethic as “Königsbergian” – abstract and otherworldly – 
there must exist some type of hierarchy, or order of merit, among causes that might 
attract our loyalty. For Royce, the idea of loyalty furnishes such a criterion. Loyalty acts 
as a contagion that spreads “like a yeast with miraculous power.”190 Through the multiple 
directions in which loyalty can be served, we can begin to intimate the infinite 
dimensionality of the Absolute now conceived in ethical terms. This is, indeed, 
significant for Marcel because Royce’s Absolute need not be viewed as determining 
finite being by mere analytic implication. In order to be viewed as a logically ordered 
system, the Absolute now becomes a function of the infinite number and diversity of 
finite loyal initiatives as “the infinitely specified whole of the modes of manifestation 
allowed by the spirit of loyalty in the universe.”191 
Marcel is particularly interested in Lecture VIII in Royce’s Philosophy of Loyalty 
– especially the section dealing with “lost causes.” Here Marcel heralds the arrival of “a 
knot in Royce’s thought … at the intersection of ethics and metaphysics.”192 In order to 
seek the unity of the whole, loyalty must be pursued trans-generationally in perpetuity. 
Pessimism views this pursuit within the restricted perspective of finite temporality as a 
venture that is doomed to failure. Optimism, on the other hand, with the help a notion of 
an infinite conspectus, is able to leverage the relationship between time and eternity in 
such a way that optimism is no longer forced to succumb to the constraints of realism. 
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190 RM: 113. See also PL: 137-138. 
191 RM: 116. 
192 RM: 118. See also p. 117: where Marcel notes the connection between loyalty and religion. 
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For Marcel, this point is of the utmost significance: “There are … concrete wholes—and 
indeed, strictly speaking, nothing is concrete but wholes—and it is in our own 
consciousness that we find the type of those real totalities, those communities, which it is 
our function, as individuals, to will and serve.”193 This Marcellian notion of the exigience 
of being – that finite beings, qua persons, are ontologically connected with each other by 
virtue of a wider connection in Being – is confirmed in Royce’s powerful statement that 
“the sort of unity of consciousness which individual persons fragmentarily get, … must 
have this unity [available] upon a higher level than that of our ordinary human 
individuality.”194 
Nowhere is the notion of loyal service directed toward the pursuit of a higher 
unity more aptly demonstrated than in the quest for scientific knowledge. In keeping with 
his synoptic vision – or “speculative empiricism” as Marcel refers to it – Royce views 
science from both a macro and a micro perspective. Microscopically, the detached 
individual loyally contributes his small part adding incrementally to the larger 
epistemological edifice.195 Macroscopically speaking, the individual contributor is an 
active part of something greater – the extension of human experience into a greater 
comprehensive unity. Royce refers to this phenomenon in his famous lecture The 
Mechanical, the Statistical and the Historical as “the fecundity of aggregation … of 
various spiritual spectra.”196 Royce and Marcel were both able to anticipate the ensuing 
dangers of a post-modern constructivism if the real, concrete basis of experience is 
denied. Empirical truth requires “upon some higher level than ours, [that which] is 
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C. Brown Company, 1951): 60, 62. 
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experienced in some conspectus of life which wins what we need, which approves our 
loyalty, which fulfills our rational will which has in its wholeness what we seek.”197 This 
reality represents “a new and distinctive level of being … [consisting of] a certain type of 
logically ordered togetherness realized through the collective interpretive acts] of 
individual persons.”198 This whole consists of spirit historically realized in time through a 
progressive, communal act of interpretation. As Royce said near the end of his life: “The 
whole intention with which we approach our idealism is the intention to be as realistic as 
we can.”199 
 Like Hegel, Royce believed that the mind of God, qua Spirit, becomes actualized 
through its particular instantiations within the locus of finite consciousness. Spirit is 
revealed historically through the finite activity of self-consciousnesses. Scientific 
investigation, directed to the external world, reveals spirit qua objectified – in Blake’s 
words “Countenance Divine shin[ing] forth upon our clouded hills.”200  The whole is 
achieved through a process of mutual understanding that “is in some fashion spanned by 
one insight which surveys the unity of its meaning … [embodying] the form of [a] 
Community of Interpretation, and above all in the form of the Interpreter, who interprets 
all to all, and each individual to the world, and the world of spirits to each individual.”201 
 
 
                                                 
197 PL: 341-342. See also Josiah Royce, William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life (The 
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The Problem of Christianity: A Synergy of Peircean Logic and Pauline Spirituality 
 
  Here we reach a pivotal juncture of Royce’s thought – in Marcel’s term, “a 
renewal … establish[ing] a closer bond between the results of pure logic and … reflection 
on social and religious problems.”202  By recognizing the “extremely close connection” 
that logic plays in the development of Royce’s theory of community, Marcel again 
demonstrates his command of the Roycean corpus. Until recently, not much was known 
about the impact of Peirce upon Royce, nor was Royce given the recognition he was due 
as a first-rate logician. By emphasizing the continuity between the earlier and the later 
Royce, Marcel is able to communicate key insights derived from Royce’s own process of 
self-reflection. Insisting that The Problem of Christianity is “in essential harmony” with 
The World and the Individual, Royce clearly admits that “There is much in it which I did 
not expect to say when I began the task here accomplished.”203 The decisive event was 
due to a conversion experience – a “Peircean insight” that Royce underwent in 1912, 
when he realized the power of Peirce’s theory of signs and triadic logic to develop a 
semiotic view of the self.  According to Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J., “By avoiding the 
traditional dyadic logic of non-relative terms, the late Royce climbed up with Peirce into 
the logic of relatives. With the infinite triad, Royce came to appreciate an unending 
teleologically guided process that called selves to strive to promote the great community 
of humankind.”204 The creative appropriation of Peirce’s thought helped Royce work his 
way out of the most ensnaring labyrinth of Absolute idealism and the less than satisfying 
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204 Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J. Reverence for the Relations of life: Re-imaging Pragmatism via Josiah 
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attempt of dialectically reconciling the unity of the One and the many. By effectively 
naturalizing spirit “as the universal mind in which human minds exist only as developing 
signs … the Absolute [becomes] the perfectly ordered system which is the interpretation 
of those ideas.”205  As Marcel says, “Peirce [may have] invented the theory of 
interpretation, but Royce took it up again on its own account and gave it new 
ramifications.”206      
Royce saw the Peircean notion of interpretation as a creative way out of the 
longstanding dualism of conception and perception. This dualism has plagued modern 
philosophy up to Kant – accounting for matter either as a given or constructed. Marcel, 
following James’ penchant for the language of the marketplace, expresses it this way:  
[I]f the concept is a bill to which the coins of perception must always correspond, 
it is only too clear that that your mind cannot be ‘conceived’ by me, for no metallic 
reserve, no perception can ever detail it for me. There is thus a third mode of knowledge 
… [called] interpretation…. Monetary exchange will furnish us the best illustration of 
this process, since it corresponds to the regulated passage from one determined system of 
values to another.207  
Perception and conception inhabit a “deserted world” of insurmountable dyadic 
relations, i.e. dualisms. Interpretation – consisting of the triadic relation between the 
interpreter, the interpreted, and the interpretee – forms the basis of both self-
consciousness and the spiritual community:  
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in the form of the problem of the possibility of knowledge of other minds. For Royce, this problem cannot 
be solved through perception or intellection – only interpretation. See John E. Smith, “Signs, Selves and 
Interpretation,” in Contemporary American Philosophy, Second Series (Humanities Press, Inc. 1970), p. 
322: “A person [and] a community of persons, because both are time-spanning or enduring organic unities 
peculiar in that they are unified by a centre of intention expressing itself through what can be perceived and 
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apprehension.” 
 159
The life of the self rests entirely on interpretation…. In other words, the past is the text to 
which the interpretation refers, the present is the interpreter, and the future is the person 
to whom the interpretation is addressed. This applies to all possible history so that the 
present can be defined as the potential interpretation of the past to the future. It is thus as 
a function of this logical triad conceived either as a sort of intelligible cell, or 
dynamically, as the rhythm of spiritual life, that we must take into account….208  
 
The process of interpretation is constitutive of the most basic level of human 
reality: “[O]ur deepest inner life is always a spiritual commerce, a colloquy or a prayer, 
and thus can never be given, even by intuition.”209 From Royce’s perspective, a  
Bergsonian notion of intuition ignores what is most vital in the mind by remaining 
captive to an illusory conception of interiority. Spiritual reality cannot be made accessible 
through some exceptional act of pure inuition. Spirit is revealed whenever personal 
interaction occurs “from the moment when we acknowledge the reality and inner life of 
our fellows.”210 
The later Royce establishes the fundamental importance of interpretation by 
making it the “main business” of philosophy. By stressing the process of interpretation, 
Royce is able to place his Absolute idealism on its feet – much like Marx did for Hegel’s 
idealism – by depicting the conspective unity of consciousness socially through an 
infinitely conceived, semiotic continuum within which we are able to “establish 
connections between all of [our ideas], and thus … raise ourselves to that intellection 
which grasps them as a totality, i.e. as a community.”211  
In other words, the living element constituting the basis of our interior life – 
“which is always stimulated to fresh efforts by the inexhaustible wealth of the novel facts 
                                                 
208 RM: 122. 
209 Ibid.: 123. See PC, p. 285: “[T]here is no royal road to self-knowledge…. [T]here is no direct intuition 
or perception of the self. Reflection … involves what is, in its essence, an interior conversation, in which 
one discovers one’s own mind through a process of inference … which guide us in our social effort to 
interpret our neighbors’ mind.” 
210 RM: 124. See PC: 294. 
211 RM: 124. 
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of the social world ”212 – is concretely translated into a sign matrix through which the 
spiritual order is incarnated. The order is spiritualized by virtue of the fact that 
“Interpretation looks down from above…. Its goal is the ideal unity of insight … 
[obtained] only in relation to that ideal unity [from which] I can determine the truth of my 
interpretation.”213 It is important to note that the spiritual order is made concrete by the 
particular interpreter who, acting as both servant and agent, “embodies the divine and 
human approach more than in any other kind of experience.”214 We are now in a position 
to see the organic connection that exists between loyalty and interpretation. Through the 
act of loyally committing to an ongoing process of interpretation, we become self-
conscious individually, socially and spiritually. For Marcel, this process consists of “the 
placing of a being in communication with itself … purely and simply by our own activity 
… find[ing] in ourselves as we act … the revelation in us and for us of our deepest 
nature.”215 
Marcel, noting the close kinship between the early and the later Royce, makes the 
claim that The Problem of Christianity “marks a considerable progress in the explication 
of Royce’s main positions.”216 The omniscient conspectus of Absolute consciousness – a 
source of dialectical difficulty for Royce in The World and the Individual – has been 
                                                 
212 PC: 294. See infra: “[Interpretation] demands by virtue of its own nature, even in the simplest 
conceivable case, an endless wealth of new interpretations.” 
213 RM: 125. 
214 RM: 125. See also page 147: “[T]he doctrine expounded in The Conception of God and The World and 
the Individual is only intelligible when God is conceived as a Community…. It is within the Absolute 
Community that the universe is totally interpreted, or in other words, that all becoming is grasped in both 
its concrete and eternal meanings and that the most tragic oppositions are resolved in intelligible 
harmonies.” 
215 Ibid.: 125. 
216 RM: 127. Although Marcel should be complimented for seeing the organic development of Royce’s 
thought, he may have not looked deep enough. See George Herbert Palmer’s comment in “Josiah Royce,” 
in Contemporary Idealism in America, ed. C. Barrett (Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964), p. 5: “[Royce’s 
intellectual growth was ever changing, ever constant. In his first book he treats of a subject on which his 
thoughts were largely engaged at the time of his death. But how differently the subject was conceived!” 
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reconfigured and concretely transformed into a perpetual interpreter who, mediating 
between antithetical ideas, is faithfully engaged in the process of attempting to reconcile 
the whole of reality – “a world that encloses its own interpretation in itself.”217 Despite 
the explanatory power of the self-representative system in accounting for the relationship 
between the finite and the infinite, the idea of an interpretation derived from infinite 
series of interpretations “form[s] a more living and specific idea than the logico-
mathematical schema [offered in The World and the Individual].”218 Rather than attempt 
to explicate the nature of Absolute thought conceived in its infinite unity, the focus of 
Royce’s synoptic vision has now shifted to a burgeoning, historical process consisting of 
the temporal spread wherein an idea creatively develops through the mediation of two 
conflicting ideas. 
The fundamental notion, for Royce, both logically and metaphysically, is the 
notion of a sign as “something that requires an interpretation.”219 Contrary to an inert 
given upon which one overlays a meaning, a sign is essentially dynamic and concrete, 
requiring its interpretation in order to reveal its rich dimensionality.  The dimensionality 
of a sign becomes further enriched as it extends across an infinite series of 
interpretations: “a specific relation joining the initial term to the system to the series it 
announces and in which it is reflected.”220 The rich dimensionality” that results from the 
extended interpretation of a sign provides a perfect segue to Royce’s novel approach to 
Christianity. 
A few contextual remarks are required. Unlike the early Royce, who investigated 
                                                 
217 Ibid.: 127. 
218 RM: 127. 
219 RM: 128.  See also, p. 149 where Marcel expresses “a doubt that the category of interpretation is really, 
metaphysically ultimate.”  
220 RM: 133. 
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religious experience independently of sect or creed, the focus of the later Royce, in The 
Problem of Christianity, is the eternal value of the Christian religion: “In what sense, if in 
any, can the modern man consistently be, in creed, a Christian?”221 Traditionally 
speaking, Christianity has been fragmented into two perspectives – that of the personal 
teachings and life of the Savior and the interpretation of the religion of Christ. Royce 
insists upon the priority of the latter perspective because Christ’s personal teachings, 
purposely put forth in the form prophetic parables, were not sufficient in themselves – 
requiring a going beyond, or trans-lation, similar to a process of “sow[ing] a seed in the 
fertile soil of interpretation.”222 From Royce’s standpoint, the endless debate over the 
divine or human nature of Christ is misplaced. Jesus may have provided the initial 
impetus which initiated the “great current” of Christian life into the world, but it is a 
mistake to view the hierophantic event of Christ as a moment of exalted, individual 
psychology. For Royce, the origins of Christian experience were social: “The salvation of 
the individual man is determined by membership in a certain spiritual community, ―a 
religious community and, in its inmost nature, a divine community, in whose life the 
Christian virtues are to reach their highest expression and the spirit of the Master is to 
obtain its earthly fulfillment.”223 
Royce identifies the Apostle Paul as the “true founder” of Christianity conceived 
as a spiritual community. In Marcel’s terms, “a community … once it is unified by an 
active indwelling purpose … [is able] to renew the evangelical concept … [achieving] a 
                                                 
221 PC: 62. See RM: 131. 
222 Ibid.: 132-133. William Adams Brown disagreement with this aspect of Royce’s thought is shared by 
others. See Review of The Problem of Christianity,” in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
Method, Vol. 11, No. 22 (October 22, 1914): 608: “[Royce] believes that Absolute truth is revealed in 
history, but he is also sure that you must not identify it with any particular historical phenomenon, even if 
that historical phenomenon be one so august and sacred as the Christian religion itself.” 
223 PC: 72. 
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perfect synthesis … of passionate devotion to the community and tender affection for the 
individual….”224 The eternal implication of a finite life-plan, once conceived within a 
divine conspectus, has now assumed the more concrete form of loyal devotion to a 
spiritual community wherein an individual is united, glorified, and saved for eternity. 
Using the abiding presence of a spiritual community as a backdrop, Royce is able to offer 
compelling re-interpretations of the traditional Christian doctrine of sin, grace and 
redemption. These notions, viewed from within the connective tissue of an infinite 
community of interpretation, are of particular interest to Marcel who stressed the integral 
connection that exists between a self and a spiritual Other. 
Both Marcel and Royce recognize that individuality, atomistically conceived, is 
an abstraction that is derivative from a more primary, concrete social order. As Marcel 
says; “[T]he individual consciousness is posited only at the heart of social consciousness 
and as opposed to it.”225 Royce takes this notion a step further by arguing that social 
existence provides the catalyst for individual personality formation. As society extends its 
reach corporately, it infuses is norms and beliefs into its members. This process is not 
that associated with Marx’s “opiate of the masses” – it consists in an enriching process in 
which a higher level of consciousness is achieved. Marcel, a keen observer of the 
contemporary scene, realizes that this profound truth of Royce has a dark side as well. 
While this “awakening” of the individual “confers on him a radical power of self-creation 
which seems incompatible with the conditions of finite existence, [at the same time], a 
secret and depressed life of sudden destructive force … [is] interiorized.”226 Royce, well 
before September 11 and the notion of an axis of evil, coined the phrase “communities of 
                                                 
224 RM: 133, 134. 
225 RM: 134.  
226 Ibid.: 135. 
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hate.” As society becomes more massive, it becomes more “vexatious and oppressive,” 
leading to the detachment of those members who feel its threatening reach. Frank 
Oppenheim refers to this process as one “of swirl and sweep … [in which] deep currents 
of alienation … flood in upon the human self.”227  
For Royce, this capacity of self-consciousness to destroy the social fabric 
constitutes the true meaning of original sin. Paul, recognizing the destructive capacity of 
human nature, foresaw the importance of recognizing that “love must also be loyalty.”228 
Through loyalty to the community, members are able to exist on a spiritual level by 
extending the otherwise finite reach of their individual deed – a level opposed to Hobbes’ 
“war of all against all.” The community to which the member belongs – the physiological 
connotation of the word ‘member’ should not be overlooked – raises the member to a 
“supra-personal” level by virtue of the community’s capacity to sustain an infinitely 
extended activity of interpretation. According to one Pauline scholar, “We have no 
evidence that Paul ever conceived of a solitary isolated believer…. Paul’s followers, no 
matter what city they inhabited, were brought together by their shared death with 
Christ….”229 The community is, in a sense, representative of what Hegel referred to as a 
“concrete universal.” Through the manner in which the community is able to offer a 
higher value in which conflicting views can be reconciled and its constituents harmonized 
through their recognition of a shared past and a common future, it defies characterization 
as an abstract idea or a concrete particular. As a supra-individual reality, the community 
                                                 
227 Frank M. Oppenheim, Royce’s Mature Ethics (University of Notre Dame Press, 1993): 151. However, 
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228 RM: 136. 
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bridges chasms existing in the midst of bifurcation and abstraction.  According to Marcel, 
we arrive at the intellectually inspired “divine beatitude” of Aristotle – in which human 
wisdom (theoria) approaches divine wisdom qua “thought thinking itself” – now in the 
form of a self-representative system of a Pauline nature. No longer described in terms of 
an endless Dedekindian Kette, the self-representative system now announces the arrival 
of a universal community “in which the whole order of time, the process of the spirit, is 
interpreted, and so interpreted that, when viewed in the light of its goal, the whole world 
is reconciled to its own purpose.”230 This is a “living reason” unified and directionally 
inspired by the Holy Spirit – a kingdom of heaven on earth. Robert C. Pollock describes 
the powerful implications of such a world-view: 
But what a drastic alteration in perspective when men can envisage a wide open world in 
which development, spontaneity, and novelty are entirely at home! … Given this new 
image of the universe, experimentation and creativity are endowed with a new dignity, 
for they have gained a status within nature itself. Now looked upon as essential aspects 
of a growing world, they speak with an authority to which man gladly responds.231 
  
 This personal devotion to an order of reality offering the possibility of salvation 
cannot be explained simply in psychological terms. Grace is now viewed as a “radically 
free act” which is the fulfillment of purposeful conscious life. Marcel, quite perceptively, 
“rediscover[s] an essential motif of Schopenhauer’s philosophy”232 – a motif 
recognizable in some of Royce’s earliest works. In Pessimism and Modern Thought, 
Royce states 
 [Our] one goal is the rendering as full and as definite as possible all the conscious life 
that at any one moment comes within the circle of our influence. Devotion, then, to 
                                                 
230 RM: 144. See PC: “I shall know even as I am known, an endlessly restful spiritual activity, the activity 
of the glorified and triumphant Church, fills all the scene. It is an activity of individuals who still will, and 
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231 Robert C. Pollock, “Process and Experience,” in John Dewey: His Thought and Influence (Fordham 
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universal conscious life, is the goal of conscious life itself; or the goal is the self-
reference or self-surrender of each conscious moment in the great whole of life, in so far 
as that whole is within reach.233   
 
Marcel clearly understands the spiritual axis of Royce’s thought – “his religious 
philosophy [as] the transposition of his ontology [in which] the ethical primacy of the 
social [culminates in] a hierarchy at the summit [of] specifically Christian ideals.”234 
Perhaps the most creative example of Royce’s reinterpretation of Christianity consists of 
his treatment of redemption. Redemptive acts are not merely pragmatic responses but 
events which contain the principle of their own intelligibility. The paradigm case of 
redemption is treason – historically and spiritually represented by Christ’s disciple, Judas. 
An act of treachery consists of at least two moments – both of which are freely chosen. 
First, there is the act of loyally committing oneself to a cause; then, there is the act of 
treachery against that very cause. The two moments, taken together, create an “immanent 
logic” of irrevocability – nothing can undo the violation against the cause one chose to 
serve.  
The power of Royce’s conception lies in its ability to leverage the relationship 
between the individual and the community within the context of a decisive act of spiritual 
reconciliation. The egregious nature of the individual’s sin against the community 
bespeaks a prior intimacy that has been severed. In order for the traitor to be able to 
become reconciled with their act, the community must participate in the redemptive 
process. As will become clear, this process cannot exhibit the features of a contrived, 
deus ex machina type of solution. For that reason, the redemptive act will always exhibit 
a dimension of tragic imperfection. But it will also be ontologically efficacious albeit in a 
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mysterious way: “It must be the work of a creative will triumphing over the act of 
treason.”235 
A powerful example is contained in the gospel of Luke. An overzealous tax 
collector, Zacchaeus, in an effort to become reconciled with Jesus, commits himself to a 
redemptive act as a punishment for cheating his fellow citizens out of their savings. 
Zacchaeus’ redemption consists of repaying his victims with half of his possessions and, 
if that gesture should prove insufficient, paying them back fourfold.236 The authentic 
genuineness of Royce’s conception of redemptive salvation lies in its ability to become 
concretely and relevantly instantiated. As Marcel says: “Let no one reproach Royce for 
what is purely formal or abstract in this dialectic.”237 He then quotes Royce in some 
detail: 
Not treason in general, but just this treason shall give the occasion, and supply the 
condition of the creative deed…. Without just that treason, this new deed … could not 
have been done at all. And hereupon the new deed … is so ingeniously devised, so 
concretely practical in the good that it accomplishes, that, when you look down upon the 
human world after the new creative deed has been done in it, you say first, “This deed 
was made possible by that treason’; and, secondly, The world, as transformed by this 
creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had 
the deed of treason not been done at all.”238 
 
Royce’s account attests to the liberating power of redemptive acts to exercise a 
transmogrifying effect. Royce developed this notion of redemption within the context of 
community at a critical time in world history when the treacherous acts of nation against 
nation were being realized in World War I – a time that we know, through hindsight, was 
yearning for redemption. Marcel, also familiar with the devastation of WWI through his 
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participatory role as a non-combatant, recognized too the vital need to exercise “a 
reconstruction of the human world.”239  
Here we see the powerful implication of the “primitive” Pauline church – a 
church without any borders representing geography, sect, or race. If redemption – 
achieved within the context of love and grace – can occur, then the divisive wounds of 
treason can be healed within a larger unity. This process partakes both of the human and 
the divine. Simply stated, the reconciling acts are human, but only within the greater 
unity of Spirit can a greater reconciliation occur. The sufficient condition of a true, 
primitive church “is represented on earth by every social group that faithfully serves the 
cause of human unity.”240  The Roycean-Pauline church consists of the pursuit of a final 
horizon of a unified interpretation. The fact that when two or more people are “gathered” 
together by virtue of the logos, the foundation is laid both for a church and an 
interpretation that should not be taken as mere coincidence. Royce was well aware 
through his reading of Paul of the close connection between prayer and interpretation.241 
A Roycean conception of faith is motivated by a spirit of charity that redemptive acts of 
interpretation will result in a higher form of unity, thus providing a clearing for a living 
drama depicting the ongoing realization of spirit. For Royce, this is the true meaning of 
“the body of Christ.” We should therefore “simplify our traditional Christology in order 
to enrich its spirit.”242 
Marcel raises the vitally important question as to how a finite being participates in 
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that self-interpretation which serves as the life of the universal community. Royce, 
through his appropriation of semiotics via Peirce, anticipates many leading-edge issues in 
contemporary systems theory. In order for the world to achieve a goal of “total self-
interpretation” – in order for the logical totality to be incrementally realized through time 
– some degree of “pre-established harmony” – to use a phrase of Leibniz – must exist 
between the mind and nature. Royce, attuned to the most current scientific developments 
of his day, was extremely interested in the work of T. L. Henderson who argued for a 
teleological relation between the human mind and the natural world such that the mind is 
“attun[ed ] to the universe which our sciences progressively interpret … [and] that the 
time-world viewed as a whole … is a process which possesses, and includes … a total 
meaning and a coherent interpretation.”243 Royce was exploring how experience and 
reflection, now unified through the act of interpretation, can reveal the dialectical life of 
the spirit understood as an activity that proceeds interrogatively through questioning and 
answering. As Royce said near the end of The Problem of Christianity, the essence of a 
human being is to be mutually implicated, through the power of interpretation in the 
progressive odyssey of spirit: “[T]he natural world [is] infinite in space and time and … 
the salvation of man [is] bound up with the interpretation of an infinitely rich realm of 
spiritual life…. The core of the faith is the Spirit, the Beloved Community, the work of 
grace, the atoning deed and the saving power of the loyal life.244 In short, the teleological 
fulfillment of a process of self-interpretation – both human and divine – is a Beloved 
Community consisting of “the kingdom in which all hermeneutic acts receive immediate 
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confirmation and seal.”245 Only on the basis of this Beloved Community, can the Great 
Community be achieved – a community that exists through the reconciliation of diverse 
perspectives achieved through charitable acceptance. At this prophetic moment, 
humankind stands within the horizon of a new dawn in which “self-realization and 
fulfillment pass from the sphere of ideality to that of concrete realization.”246       
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Part III 
 
Gabriel Marcel and William Ernest Hocking: Companions of Eternity 
 
[T]he term that comes back to me is “companions of eternity,” a term that W.E. Hocking 
and I used at the time of our first and unforgettable encounter….1 
 
§ 
 
The Relational Context 
 
 William Ernest Hocking provides an important link between Marcel and Royce. 
Hocking initially came to Harvard to study with William James but quickly became a 
student of Royce.2 Although the influence of Royce on Hocking’s philosophical 
development is undeniable, there exists a significant point of disagreement concerning 
the primacy of intersubjective relations. In The World and the Individual and The 
Problem of Christianity, Royce viewed intersubjectivity as possible only on the condition 
of the existence of a “third” – the Absolute or the set of universal symbols through which 
the Absolute is disclosed. This point of disagreement is described by Hocking in the 
following: “We have, [Royce maintained] no direct empirical knowledge of ourselves, 
nor of other minds, and hence, in substance, of our entire social environment….”3 
 At the appropriate time, Hocking respectfully confronted Royce, his esteemed 
professor, and it is worth quoting Hocking’s poignant description of this event at length: 
 There was a magnanimity in [Royce’s] attitude toward criticism…. In an essay 
submitted to him during my last graduate year at Harvard, 1903-1904, I ventured to differ 
                                                 
1 Gabriel Marcel, Awakenings: 211. 
2 See Leroy S. Rouner, Within Human Experience: The Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking (Harvard 
University Press, 1969).  Hocking was initially attracted to Harvard after reading James’ Principles of 
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Lectures. Hocking wrote his Ph.D. dissertation under Royce’s supervision. 
3 William Ernest Hocking, “On Royce’s Empiricism,” in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LIII, No. 3: 
February 2, 1956, p. 61. See also Rouner, p. 21: “For Royce, individuals are like the monads of Leibniz, 
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from one of his central doctrines, namely, that we have no direct knowledge of either our 
own minds or of other minds…. In this particular essay, I reported an experience in 
which, as I read it, I was directly aware of another mind and my own as co-knowers of a 
bit of the physical world, a “Thou” and “I” as co-knowers of an “It.” So far as feeling was 
involved, that feeling was cognitive … [and] we must extend the conception of empirical 
knowledge, and so admit an element of realism within the ideal totality. I was expecting a 
radical criticism from my revered professor. Instead, when Royce handed my essay back, 
he pointed out the dissenting passage with the comment, “This is your insight: you must 
adhere to that!” Without assenting to my view, he had given me his blessing for its 
development.4 
 
Marcel would seize upon this important insight of Hocking. Ultimately frustrated 
by the idealistic projectory of Royce’s thought, Marcel believed that Hocking’s 
“provocative accent on intersubjectivty … challenged Proust’s monadism.”5 In keeping 
with his tendency to describe his philosophical development in personal terms, Marcel 
discloses that “the magnum opus of W.E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human 
Experience ... I am sure, had a lasting influence on me. But it cannot be doubted that 
Hocking’s book was an advance on Royce’s thought, an advance in the direction of that 
metaphysical realism toward which I resolutely tended.”6 
A shared concern with the cognitive dimension of feeling, the primacy of 
intersubjective relations, and the presence of God within human experience served as the 
catalyst for a long term relationship between Marcel and Hocking. The relationship 
consisted of personal correspondence, visits by Marcel to Madison, New Hampshire and 
published commentaries upon each other’s work. In 1919, Marcel published “W.E. 
Hocking et la dialectique de ľ instinct.” Hocking reciprocated in 1954 with “Marcel and 
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the Ground Issues of Metaphysics.”7 In 1966, Marcel would offer his signature 
contribution to Hocking’s Festschrift – an essay that superbly crystallizes their affinities 
on the important issue of overcoming solipsism.8 
§ 
 
The Repudiation of Solipsism: Living Out of Doors 
 The keynote theme of Hocking’s philosophy is the importance of “liv[ing] out of 
doors … in the inexorable taciturnity of Fact….”9 Opposed to any principle of 
immanence in which consciousness is viewed as being located behind a wall, Hocking’s 
question is “Why are we so made that I gaze and see of thee only thy Wall, and never 
Thee?”10 Contra Husserl, who argued that intersubjectivity is achieved through the 
workings of transcendental subjectivity, Hocking maintained that human beings make 
contact with each other not by ascending from the transcendental recesses of 
consciousness but by ex-isting out front in a shared foreground of experience. Sounding a 
bit like Heidegger, Hocking believed that human beings ex-ist or literally rise up out of 
Being. Because we are already in Being, life consists fundamentally of a response of 
being to Being. Unfortunately, modern philosophy has seized upon two premature 
insights and, as a result, missed the evidential primacy of intersubjective being. When 
Descartes established the Res Cogitans as the fundamentum inconcussum of “first 
philosophy,” he failed to grasp an important point. If the isolated Cogito is the 
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8 See “Solipsism Surmounted,” in Philosophy and Religion In The Coming World Civilization, ed. Leroy 
Rouner (Matinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1966): 23-31. 
9 See William E. Hocking, “Fact, Field, and Destiny: Inductive Elements of Metaphysics,” in Review of 
Metaphysics, Vol. 11 (1957-1958): 525, 526. Hereafter referred to as FF&D. 
10 William E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (Yale University Press, 1912): 265.  
Hereafter referred to as MGHE. See Marcel’s remarks in Solipsism Surmounted, p. 23, concerning the 
principle of immanence as a “suffocating prison” from which Hocking’s philosophy released him. 
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cornerstone of a modern metaphysic, isn’t Descartes through the act of proclaiming the 
universal truth of this discovery, making the defacto claim that this insight extends across 
the entire spectrum of human experience? Likewise in the case of Leibniz, if all monads 
are “windowless,” must there not be a universal, non-windowless, panoramic perspective 
from which the condition of “windowlessness” can be accertained? According to 
Hocking, “[N]uclear certitude is composite: in our lonely self awareness, we are not and 
cannot be solitary; the thinker without something-thought-about is a zero; and something-
thought about is something-to-be shared, as common object, with a ‘Thou’ co-present 
with the self.”11 
 Hocking is clearly a more systematic philosopher than Marcel. The former’s 
important distinction between a “system from without” and a “system from within” helps 
to shed important light on a major aspect of Marcel’s thought. A “system from without” 
results in a type of systematicity of the worst degree – a contrived type of organization in 
which form, deductively imposed, ultimately determines the structure of any content. 
Marcel’s approach is diametrically opposed to this type of systematicity. A “system from 
within,” on the other hand, provides a degree of systematicity more along the lines of an 
organic integrity through which a body of thought is viewed as an ongoing, 
developmental process. Hocking argues that Marcel’s thought exhibits this latter type of 
systematicity. Although Marcel, will ultimately disagree with Hocking over the issue of 
systematicity, Hocking’s point is to emphasize the potential universality of subjective 
experience. Like Marcel, Hocking is also dedicated to unveiling the connections inherent 
in experience. Tracing the private ininerarium mentis may offer some insight to be sure, 
                                                 
11 MGHE: 152. 
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but “the ultimate issues of life can never be purely private concerns.”12 If Marcel 
jettisoned any hope of achieving systematicity – either from “within” or from “without” – 
why did he go on to publish his Journal métaphysique – a collection of “private” 
ruminations? Hocking states the issue in the following manner: 
The autobiography of passion, like the literature of confession, is of perennial human 
weight … for its revelation of the meaning of human existence…. I am inclined to the 
thesis that all meanings, including the wordless meanings of music and other arts, are 
destined to meet the relentless and ultimately successful assault of the concept. For, after 
all, the concept imposes no constraint on that which is conceived…. A concept of “the 
whole” builds no fence around what is meant by it.13 
 
 Hocking’s point is that “subjective” feeling somehow exhibits a universal 
resonance across the spectrum of human experience. We live not only “out of doors” but 
also “under a common sky.” Universality is ultimately a social phenomenon. A fact is 
true for the whole conscious universe as well any particular, finite individual. In a letter 
to Daniel S. Robinson, Hocking once remarked that “Man is born in the freedom and 
unity of the Spirit, but everywhere he is in the chains of bodily separation….”14 
Hocking’s “concept of ‘the whole’” provides the aboriginal apriori, serving as both the 
backdrop and foreground of experience. Displaying his prior training as an engineer, 
Hocking equates “the whole” to a textile loom: “In the beginning was, at least, the Loom; 
and always remains the simple-total frame of things….”15 But the loom also weaves a 
fabric of growing and changing knowledge – an intricate structure of “mid-world 
knowledge.” Hocking’s major argument against pragmatism is not that knowledge has a 
volitional, telic aspect. Hocking clearly recognizes the purposive dimension of 
                                                 
12 Marcel and the Groundwork of Metaphysics: 441. 
13 Marcel and the Groundwork of Metaphysics: 441. See MGHE, p. xvi: “There is no inaccessible truth. If 
any object has possible bearing on human interests …there is some cognitive way to it.” 
14 See Daniel S. Robinson, Royce and Hocking: American Idealists (The Christopher Publishing House, 
1968): 160. It should be noted that Hocking was ultimately unsatisfied with this characterization.  
15 MGHE: 97. 
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experience.  His criticism is that pragmatism fails to see that “Possibility is neither a 
human product, nor a mere form of expectancy: it is an objective property of things, 
antecedent to our action.”16 Once produced, the texture of the weave exhibits no visible 
sign of the loom – but the loom’s presence is felt nonetheless as a “non-impulsive 
background.” As Hocking says, “[A]n idea of the universe can never have been wrapped 
up in small compass for gradual unfolding…. He who comes into the world at all comes 
at once into the presence of the whole world.”17 
§ 
Fact, Idea, Feeling: Hocking’s Absolute Empiricism 
 Hocking’s brand of empiricism is absolute – its goal is “to understand … the 
given world which, as given, is one stupendous fact.”18 Hocking stresses the organic 
continuity existing between feelings and ideas, culminating in an awareness of God’s 
presence. Despite his training as an engineer, Hocking preferred biological explanations 
over mechanical ones – mechanistic accounts simply cannot do justice to dimensions of 
infinitude and incessant change that reality exhibits: “[R]eligion is the function of in-
letting, or osmosis, between the human spirit and the living tissue of the universe wherein 
it is eternally carried.”19 Hocking’s refers to this project of deepening of our 
understanding of feeling and providing a more substantial basis for religion as “the 
retirement of the intellect.” Reminiscent of Dewey’s distinction between “religion” and 
                                                 
16 William E. Hocking, “Action and Certainty,” in Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 9, (Apr. 24, 1930): 
236. See MGHE, p. xvii: “[P]ragmatism … is a self refuting theory. The only kind of truth which in the end 
can comply with the pragmatic requirement that power shall be conserved is a non-pragmatic truth, a truth 
which has an ultimate aspect….” 
17 MGHE: 95. See also p. 50: “Religion is a reaction … of small and highly aspiring beings in a huge – 
perhaps infinite – arena.” 
18 Fact, Field, and Destiny: 525. In Marcel and the Ground issue of Metaphysics, Hocking refers to 
“experience in the verbal sense of experiencing … a higher-level or reflexive empiricism (pp. 439-440).” 
19 MGHE: 23. See also p. 542: “[P]sychical categories are complementary to physical categories.” 
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“the religious,” Hocking offers the following diagnosis of the contemporary spiritual 
malaise:  
With the rise of the critical business of thinking and philosophizing, the decline of 
religious vitality keeps even step. As passion cools, theology spreads; and as theology 
spreads, passion cools even more…. The stream which at its source is impetuous, fierce, 
channel plowing, here at its mouth lies lazy, divided, straggling off to the dead-level of 
religious homogeneity, through the arms of shallow reasoning sects….20 
 
 If genuine religious experience withers under the yoke of rationality, so too do 
other facets of experience. For Hocking, thoughts are the circuitous means by which we 
struggle to attain externality. Make no mistake about it: “That which in human nature is 
fundamental, intimate, genuine, private, and wholly owned is feeling: in feeling we 
substantially exist.”21 
 For Hocking, religion must be understood from the inside. Sensitive to Kant’s 
notion of a “dialectical illusion,” Hocking is acutely aware of the adverse consequences 
of trying to frame religious experience in terms derived solely from a fixed conception of 
experience. Hocking’s solution lies in “attacking the division already set up between 
feeling and idea.”22  Feeling and idea are inseparable – a distinction without a difference. 
What is mistaken as a dualism is actually a divergence within continuity: “[T]here is no 
such thing as a feeling apart from idea; the idea is an integral part of all feeling; and that 
it is the whole meaning and destiny of feeling to terminate in the knowledge of an 
object.”23 Through ideas, the self is able to participate in the object – an idea is that part 
of the object that has been affectively assimilated by the self. According to one 
                                                 
20 Ibid.: 41. 
21 MGHE: 44. See infra., p. 48, where Hocking refers to “the tap root of human instinct….” See also, p. 66: 
“Feeling is outward-pushing [that is directed towards that which is] other-than feeling … consciousness of 
an object.”  
22 Ibid.: 63. 
23 MGHE: 64. See p. 69 where Hocking refers to “idea-feeling couples.” 
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commentator, “[E]xperience, in so far as it has been able to be expressed in idea, 
becomes a permanent part of the self. This is to say that ‘ideas’ are not what we think of, 
but what we think with.”24 
 Feeling, qua e-motive, etymologically suggests the active capacity to stretch – a 
nascent intentionality directed towards a beyond. According to Hocking: “[T]hat which 
will restore the stability of this [feeling] self lies not within its own border but beyond 
it.”25  The terminus ad quem of all feeling lies in the experiential knowledge of an object. 
There is no epistemological gap to be bridged here: “In the satisfaction of feeling, the 
guiding idea coalesces immediately with the object then known as present: to the 
including mind there is perfect continuity between prophecy and fulfillment….”26 
 Hocking is aware of the destructive capabilities of thought severed from feelings. 
Having read Bergson, Hocking recognizes that when we think with static, rigid ideas, 
what we think of  is impacted in an adverse way. Static, codifying ideas “contain enough 
truth to be exceedingly useful, enough also to be exceedingly seductive … [but such] 
logic itself may appear to be nothing more than a sort of space-play or topology [in 
which] our thinking possesses a sort of ‘geometrizing.’”27 In the interest of specificity 
and universality, our ideas necessarily exhibit a degree of abstraction by incorporating a 
definitive set of inclusions and exclusions. What is needed is the ability to inject 
dynamism into ideas – providing refreshment against the ever-present possibility of what 
Bergson referred to as mésalliance – the threat of mechanization.  
                                                 
24 Arthur R. Luther, “W.E. Hocking on Man’s Knowledge of God,” in Philosophy Today 11:2 (1967: 
Summer), p. 132. 
25 MGHE: 66. 
26 Ibid.: 68. Emphasis added. See infra.: [C]ognizance and feeling are but different stages of the same 
thing.” One is reminded of Plato’s conception of eros here. 
27 MGHE: 80. 
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 From his work with Royce at Harvard, Hocking understood that “all ideas contain 
an infinity ― though an uncounted infinity.”28  In other words, every idea – no matter 
how basic must be “on duty forever” – potentially ready to assume infinite iterations of 
instantiation. This leads Hocking to make what appears, at first glance, an extraordinary 
claim: “So far as the idea’s object is concerned, it seems to me doubtful whether there are 
any finite ideas at all…. To the question, Can we think the Infinite? Let me propose the 
answer, We think nothing else.”29 
 Hocking arrives at the infinite capacity of ideas by invoking the primordiality of 
the concept of the whole. Knowledge is not a arrived at simply through a genetic process, 
in the way Locke conceives it, in which atomic propositions combine to form more 
complex, molecular clusters of atomic units. Knowledge essentially consists of a process 
that moves from whole to part. Using the example of space, Hocking argues that “we do 
not learn to see space little by little. The child’s space is as great as the man’s, ― namely, 
whole space…. [R]eality, in its full infinity and wholeness, is now before me and has 
been so from my conscious beginning.”30 This concept of the whole is not conceived 
statically – the whole is both perennially present and, to use a Whiteheadian phrase, 
cumulatively in the making. Like Royce’s eternal Logos, the dynamic, emerging nature 
of “the whole” makes it “no idle spectator of mental progress, but partaker of all mind 
growth and evolution.”31 
                                                 
28 MGHE: 92. See also p. 544: “[T]here is a biological equivalent for the permanent identity (sometimes 
called the ‘timelessness’) of an idea … but also to show that the idea has a more continuous presence in 
consciousness than the experiences in which it is subsumed from time to time.” 
29 Ibid.: 93, 94. . See also Andrew J. Reck, “Hocking’s Place in American Metaphysics,” in Philosophy, 
Religion and the Coming World Civilization, p. 34: In Hocking’s Meaning of God in Human Experience … 
[he] attained the irenic perspective of the Olympian.” 
30 MGHE: 95-96 
31 Ibid.: 99. 
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 The subjectivist orientation of modern philosophy has caused this concept of the 
whole to be peremptorily dismissed.  If this objective whole cannot be grasped by means 
of a finite idea-predicate, then the “whole-idea” must, in fact, be “no-idea.” But 
according to Hocking, the irony of the “no-idea” argument is that “in spite of all 
difficulties the assault continues, unremitting, through all mental eras.”32 Despite our 
numerous failed attempts to “hit the mark” of the whole, there exists a nagging sense of 
an “identity of Idea.” We possess a concrete, a priori sense of the infinite, even if we are 
oftentimes unable to definitively articulate what “the whole” is. In fact, this capacity to 
conceive the whole may be conceived as our “ontological birthright” – we cannot claim 
to be fully human until we are able to tap into this “Idea” of the infinite whole. For 
Hocking, “the foundations of religion lie deeper than idea …. deeper than idea is Idea.”33 
If our destiny lies in reconnecting with the foundational source of life, our infinite 
ideational capacity must somehow be re-attached to our deep capacity for feeling. 
 For Hocking, idea and feeling are organically continuous and two things that are 
organically continuous cannot be separated except through great labor. Despite this 
connection, “the world of ideas does aspire to be independent of the current flux of 
feelings.”34 Ideas have the capacity to function in the absence of feeling and in many 
cases this capacity is to our great benefit. For example, a military leader – in the interest 
of planning expedience – must invoke an “idea” of war that is strategic. However, at the 
same time we know the vast “feeling dimension” brought about by war – not only death 
and destruction but patriotism and heroism as well. As abstract as the theoretical 
                                                 
32 Ibid.: 100. 
33 MGHE: 107-108. Concerning our understanding of the whole as an ontological birthright, consider the 
following: “Unless God is that being for whom the soul is inescapably destined by the eternal nature of 
things, the worship of God will get no sufficient hold on the human heart (p. 152.)” 
34 Ibid.: 110. 
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dimension may be, “[w]ere it not possible to lift the eyes from the movement of affairs in 
course to other idea regions without at once experiencing the full feeling-effect of these 
ideas, humans could scarcely move in any such roomy spiritual place as it now 
possesses.”35 In other words, ideas, when liberated from feeling, can exhibit a wider 
reach. Aristotle was clearly aware of this when he placed the intellectual soul over the 
sensitive. But as James warned, feeling can be deceptive – cool, intellectual detachment 
is as much a product of feeling as white, hot fervor! The splitting of ideas and feelings is 
the result of no simple “throwing of a switch” – it is a “hard-won accomplishment.” From 
Hocking’s perspective, ideas are connected to feelings universally but, at the same time, 
“externally … by way of annex … always as additional and extraneous fact.”36 Hocking’s 
insight is the basis of his critique of pragmatic instrumentalism. Take the example of 
grape wine. For the pragmatist:  
[W]ine is something to be drunk: yet wine cannot be so defined…. Wine must be defined 
… by its relation to the grape, ultimately by its root in nature…. [A]ll meanings must be 
made to touch base in a region of indifference before they may spin lawful alliances with 
feeling and action…. What ever the impulsive foreground of an idea, there will 
necessarily be a non-impulsive background, and in this our idea-meanings will rest.37 
 
 This non-impulsive background constitutes “the aboriginal fact of 
consciousness.”38 Consciousness is pre-reflectively connected with the world 
ideationally. Ideas connect us to prior and independent unities belonging to a reality not 
of our own making. Hocking believes in the power of the self through its capacity for 
framing ideas, to extend infinitely and to regain contact in medias res with a world that 
the self is pre-reflectively already a part: “It means, in the first place, priority of being…. 
                                                 
35 MGHE: 111. 
36 Ibid.: 117. 
37 Ibid.: 118. 
38 MGHE: 120. 
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[T]hough all reality be in truth spiritual, the finite knower knows realistically; the being 
of the object is prior to his own.”39   From his time spent with Husserl in Göttingen, 
Hocking became acquainted with the Wesensschau approach of the early Husserl,  but it 
was Hocking’s initial predisposition towards the primordiality of intersubjective 
experience that prefigured the direction of Husserl’s later approach would assume – a 
philosophy rooted in the Lebenswelt. As Hocking said much later: “To Husserl’s 
technical Wesensschau … we must add for the further widened empiricism of our 
opening era, a just recognition of the presence in experience of three aspects of 
metaphysical reality – the Self, the Other, and the Thou.”40 
 Feeling serves as the engine that unites ideas with reality. Our experience “is 
attached in its ‘external meaning’ to the idea of reality.”41 Reality, for Hocking, serves as 
the foundational source of value. In order to understand the nature of value, we must 
understand the valuational process ultimately in terms of our fundamental drive to attach 
ourselves to what is real:  
Our values, then, remain essentially unexplained…. [O]ur interest in reality … [is] by a 
sort of distillation … an instance of pure value…. I have no doubt that … interest in 
reality has priority…. Work done by us on the idea [of reality] … is the creation of the 
very fabric of value.42 
 
 Reality is not, as Russell and Moore would have it, something that exits in 
complete independence of our capacity for ideation. Our ideas, or what Hocking refers to 
as our “apperceptive mass,” prepare us for the process of experiencing the world in a way 
that reflects its infinite variety. This “apperceptive mass” consists of a collective reservoir 
                                                 
39 Ibid.: 571. 
40 William E. Hocking, “From the early days of the Logische Untersuchungen,” in Edmund Husserl 1859-
1959: Recueil Commémoratif á ľ occasion du Centenaire de la naissance du Philosophe (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 7. 
41 Ibid.: 125. 
42 Ibid.: 125, 126, 127. 
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of shared experience “referred to reality.” As Hocking succinctly states it: “Value varies 
with idea-resource.”43 
 In order for a “mutual fitness” between ideas and reality to occur, this 
apperceptive “idea-mass” must seek out its “meaning terminus” in reality. For Hocking, 
qua idealist, we think using ideas. Our idea of “the whole” – resulting from the 
sedimentation of this “apperceptive mass” – serves as a determining fore-conception of 
experience. When we frame an idea about a particular thing, that thing is viewed as “a 
case, more or less complete, of what reality [as a whole] means to us.”44 The question 
that Hocking poses is whether this “reality-idea” serves as the determining fore-
conception, i.e. “determining the level at which all our values will stand.”45  
 Feeling consists of the process through which the idea is “at work,” actively 
seeking out the realization of its object. It makes no sense to speak of an idea that is not 
intentionally directed towards an object – “the destiny of feeling is to fund itself in 
idea.”46 As our ideas journey towards their objective resting place, the idea of “the 
whole” comes into play. Regardless of whether a finite idea is being considered solely as 
limiting case, or whether one is concerned with “thinking about every other object upon 
which it may even remotely bear,”47 an idea must be affectively stretched, or spread, 
across the entire spectrum of experience. The e-motive stretch is obtained through our 
extended capacity for feeling. The example Hocking uses concerns the idea of a hat: 
“With what idea, pray, do I think hat? With the hat-idea, to be sure.  Yes, but is the 
clothing-idea unconcerned? ― or the city-street-idea? Or the civilized-society-
                                                 
43 MGHE: 129. Hocking construes this notion of “apperceptive mass” or “idea masses prepared beforehand 
in some more elemental experience” (p. 233) broadly to include experience that is personal, cultural, 
historical, ancestral, and instinctual.  
44 Ibid.: 130. 
45 Ibid.: 130. 
46 MGHE: 72. 
47 MGHE: 131. 
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extraordinary-requirements-ideas? Or the man-and-woman-ideas? …With all these, and 
with all other ideas summing themselves up currently in my whole-idea, hat is thought.48  
 
 Like Hegel, Hocking recognizes the hierarchical stratifications of meaning that 
exists within experience. The simple pleasure one finds in noting a case of resemblance – 
or the ability to engage in the activity of generalization – are, for Hocking, indications 
that the human self is ultimately a “total self” or “mind-total.” Consciousness in this 
emergent capacity is essentially cumulative: “The real is the permanent and the ancient, 
as well as the germinal and creative.”49 But the vast scope of the whole cannot be 
accessed without the emotive capacity of feeling to expand, or stretch, our ideational 
capacity.  Feeling, for Hocking, “constitutes the very tour de force of objectivity.”50 This 
desire for comprehensiveness provides the basis of any attempt to grasp reality through 
the use of ideas – “[A]ll idea making, is [feeling] itself directed to reality.51 
§ 
 
The Refractory Kernel: Our Experience of God 
 Hocking’s idea of “the whole” is a pivotal notion in the transition to the idea of 
God.  Our belief in God defies any type of orthodox account. Religious consciousness is 
evanescent – an experience of what Hocking refers to as “intellectual equipoise.” 
Regardless of the age we inhabit, multiple historical accounts exist concerning some 
vague notion of this vast “whole” and its ability to threaten things of value. Throughout 
history, the “whole-idea” has assumed a variety of names – Jaweh, Deus, and Nature are 
to name but a few. This recognition of our futility in the presence of an all-embracing, 
                                                 
48 Ibid.: 131. 
49 MGHE: 46. See also p. 134: “[T]o see everything as bearing upon the whole is both genius and 
happiness. To see all things sub specie aeternitatis is the joy of religion itself.” 
50 Ibid.: 135. 
51 MGHE: 135. For another reference to the cognitive dimension of feeling, see p. 72: “[L]et us say, 
metapathy, a state beyond feeling, not beneath it … feeling exist[ing] as a heightened value diffused over 
all experience … present as a measure of cognitive penetration.” 
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overwhelming power is the first step to religious conversion because this awakening of 
the feelings of futility, resentment, and self-assertion somehow combine to generate a 
feeling that “will[s] that my reality should be a living and responsible reality.”52 
Hocking’s propensity towards idealism is clear. The presence of divinity in the world 
requires the willingness of human beings to adopt a non-dogmatic attitude under a 
“dome” of reverence. Hocking supplants the more traditional “seek and ye shall find” of 
the gospel with the more philosophical question “Whatever we impute to the world 
comes back to us as a quality pre-resident there ― is this not the whole illusion of 
reality?”53  
 If God’s presence cannot be experienced prior to the adoption of an attitude of 
reverence, then how is it possible – especially in this age of growing secularism and 
fanaticism – to re-awaken a humanity that is desensitized to any presence of Spirit. For 
Hocking, the key to religious experience lies within human experience: “If [experience] is 
to be re-animated with worth, it must be by that miracle which continually repeats itself 
in our experience ― the Spirit breathes upon it from its own resources the breadth of 
life.”54 This is the point where Hocking’s robust empiricism is able to work in tandem 
with his idealism. Hocking believed that the key to religious experience lies in a 
heightened appreciation of the “metaphysical density” of secular experience. Through a 
heightened appreciation of the secular, we can trace the systematic connections residing 
                                                 
52 Ibid.: 146. As in the case where the “whole-idea” was the source of value, the “God-idea” assumes the 
role of a “postulate of moral consciousness (p. 146).” 
53 MGHE: 147. See also p. 573: “[L]ogic is nature … the only form in which nature can now be approached 
by human consciousness.” Cf. the remark by Novalis: Hypotheses are nets: only he who casts will catch.” 
54 Ibid.: 148. 
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in secular experience, ultimately viewing experience in its metaphysical amplitude – that 
“original and evanescent experience of God [now] established as veritable truth.”55  
 This tracing of experience begins with sensation. Within the history of 
philosophy, several attempts have been made to derive meaning from sensation. 
Descartes, in his Meditations, entertained a skeptical view of sensation and, as a result, 
arrived at his epoch making discovery of the ontological primacy of the Cogito. Hocking 
refers to these attempts to explain the baffling nature of the external world by securing 
safety within the internal domain of consciousness as the “reflexive turn.” As one might 
expect of a thinker whose passion was to live “out of doors,” Hocking had no patience for 
solutions that look strictly inward: “The absolutes that are found in the reflexive turn are 
not useless…. [T]he reflexive turn reveals never alone the Absolute within, but always 
the Absolute within in conjunction with the Absolute without.”56 
 Human beings exhibit a pre-reflective, anterior awareness of the Absolute. As we 
engage in thinking about reality, we undergo a nascent experience of God. Our “whole-
idea” is contained within the fringe – to use a term of James’ – of the entertainment of 
any finite idea. This leads Hocking to claim: “[T]he infant’s first thoughts are 
metaphysical, that is to say thoughts of reality ― though not by name and title.”57 
However, it is important to understand the source of our “God-idea.” Historically, the 
existence of God has been arrived at by reasoning from God’s effects in rebus naturae. 
This approach works against Hocking’s sense of wholism, in which experience must be 
interrogated completely – “[W]e must be free to open ourselves, wholly, in imagination 
                                                 
55 MGHE: 155. 
56 MGHE: 202. 
57 Ibid.: 215. 
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… to the whole of human experience.”58 As we open ourselves to the entire spectrum of 
experience, we have a definite sense of not fully comprehending “the whole.” This sense 
of mystery pervading the whole gives rise to a vague comprehension that although I do 
not know, somehow “it is known.” According to Hocking: “[M]an first realizes his 
ignorance only in so far as he becomes conscious of mystery; the negative side of his 
experience is made possible by some prior recognition of a positive being, on the other 
side of his limitation.”59 Hocking views this nascent intuition, as does Royce, as the 
source of a potential rapprochement between science and religion. If reality is viewed as 
essentially knowable, the project of scientific discovery is given a metaphysical 
foundation. At the same time, religion secures what Hocking refers to as a “vicarious 
attainment” because there is “nothing in the world that will prove wholly refractory to the 
work of idea-making.”60 
 In order to understand Hocking’s conception of religious experience, it is 
important to be clear as to how he conceives the possibility of knowledge of other minds. 
The problem of “other minds” has pre-occupied modern philosophers since Descartes. 
According to Hocking, the reason for the perennial preoccupation with this problem is 
that philosophy has hastily adopted an “over-dogmatic” conception of knowledge. Both 
continental rationalism and British empiricism fail to overcome the epistemological gap, 
offering “no sense by which we can discern another mind.”61 At the risk of 
oversimplifying, both schools of thought begin with a concept of knowledge located in 
mente – holding no key to escape this prison.  Breaking with tradition, Hocking attempts 
                                                 
58 MGHE: 218. 
59 Ibid.: 236. 
60 MGHE: 238. The similarity between Hocking’s position and Royce’s notion of the infinite community of 
interpretation should not be missed here. 
61 Ibid.: 242. 
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to transcend this problem by viewing knowledge ec-statically as standing out front “at 
[its] periphery” within the shared space of human traffic with nature. Nature, 
synonymous with Hocking’s notion of Substance as the non-impulsive, real background 
of experience, provides the pivotal notion here.62  Our shared experience of the “common 
ground” of nature provides the link required for the possibility of social experience. No 
longer confined within a false prison, consciousness is ahead of itself by virtue of a 
shared, intentional grasp of an independent real. 
 Hocking stresses the dialectical relationship between the subjective self and 
objective nature. As recipients of the project of modernity, we have become accustomed 
to Descartes’ notion of the ontological primacy of the Cogito.  At the same time, we 
experience a recalcitrant objective world that seems to exist independent of our thinking. 
For Hocking, this dilemma of modernity – between subjectivity and objectivity – is 
avoidable. Hocking argues, á la Hegel, that this knowledge of objective nature is our 
knowledge – objectivity is an intra-conscious notion. Building upon his early exposure to 
Husserl, Hocking stressed the intentional character of thinking. One does not think 
simply in vacuo – we think intentionally about something – nature is the realm of both 
objective fact and concrete action: “[A]n idea is always an idea of something, and the all-
available first something is physical stuff, whatever else it may be.”63 
 When two subjects experience the world, they are intra-linked by virtue of the 
presence of a shared world. Hocking refers to this fundamental insight as the “refractory 
kernel” of his metaphysics: 
                                                 
62 See MGHE, p. 260 where Hocking refers to as “Substance, doubtless first seen behind Nature….” See 
also, p. 119: “Through serving all idea-differences, this background looms large: background and all 
foregrounds merge into one vast non-impulsive World-object…. Such World-object, in its complexity, is 
partially summarized in our idea of Nature….” 
63 MGHE: 260. 
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 I have sometimes sat looking at a comrade, speculating on this mysterious 
isolation of self from self…. How would it seem if my mind could at once be within 
thine; and we could meet and without barrier be with each other? And then it has fallen 
upon me like a shock—as when one thinking himself alone has felt a presence—But I am 
in thy soul. These things around me are in thy experience. They are thy own; when I 
touch them and move them I change thee. When I look on them I see what thou seest; 
when I listen, I hear what thou hearest. I am in the great Room of thy soul; and I 
experience thy very experience.64 
 
 Reality cannot be detached from experience. Intersubjectivity is no longer 
constructed out of the ineffable vapor of consciousness – our identity with others within 
the central foreground of common experience: “[M]ind must, as it were, abrogate itself in 
order to appreciate itself; it must wander in a world alien to its nature and come to itself 
again.”65  
Hocking, much like Royce, recognized the inability of the finite intellect, left to 
itself, to achieve any type of synoptic vision. He once wrote in a letter that “In short, it is 
God who from the beginning shares all of our objects and so God is the real medium of 
communication between one person and another.”66 Nature is a realm of mind but a realm 
of “mind” other than one’s own. It is the potential to be known that is exhibited by 
objects which serves as the basis of the connective link between selves: “The best 
originality of the mind is but the truth of nature; it is the master stroke of release, the 
release of nature into the condition of idea.”67 When we gaze upon the objective world, 
                                                 
64 Ibid.: 265-266. Emphasis added. See also p. 483: “The ultimate appeal of man to man is built on man’s 
grasp of God.” 
65 William Ernest Hocking with the collaboration of Richard Boyle O’Reilly Hocking, Types of Philosophy 
(Charles Scribner and Sons, 1959): 186. This notion is of mind losing itself in order to come to itself is 
Hegelian. See G.W.F. Hegel, “Preface,” Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford University 
Press, 1977), p. 32, where Hegel refers to the self-moving soul: “The movement of a being that 
immediately is, consists partly in becoming an other than itself, and thus becoming its own immanent 
content; partly in taking back into itself this unfolding [of its content] or this existence of it, i.e. making 
itself into a moment, and simplifying itself into something determinate.” 
66 Cited in Rouner, Within Human Experience: p. 41. The letter was dated 1920. Unfortunately, Hocking’s 
copy contained no salutation and Hocking could not remember the name of the recipient. 
67 MGHE: 566. See A. Luther, W.E. Hocking on Man’s Knowledge of God: “The inherent publicity of 
nature, the fitness of objects to be communally experienced is no empty potentiality, but one founded on 
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we derive a deep sense of what Hocking refers to as the “cloud of witness” – a sense that 
this fact belongs to others as well. This is the point at which Hocking diverged from 
Royce. Instead of social experience being derived from “the background” through an 
inward experience of the Absolute, social contact is lived out front, in “the foreground” 
of experience. The sheer immediacy of this sense of connection is indicated by Hocking 
in the following: “I can imagine no contact more real and thrilling than this.”68 
Authentic social experience within a common world requires a continuous basis 
in reality. Hocking once remarked that “I cannot find a genuine social experience at all 
except as a continuous experience.”69 Our experience of the environing world of nature 
extends beyond the scope of any limited encounter. The world of space and energy, for 
Hocking, remain a “constant object.”  This “unvarying field for these varying locations,” 
extends in all directions indefinitely, interpenetrating “reach[ing] me and my place, 
reach[ing] Substance – that same Substance which I also reach as my ultimate object.”70 
This connection to the environing world is autochthonic – interlocked and inseparable. 
We are equiprimordially in the world of another. Any concept of isolation must utilize in 
some notion of barriers which can be conceived as barriers only within the context of 
some prior notion of continuous experience. In many ways anticipating the pragmatics of 
communicative discourse, Hocking recognizes that the possibility of any type of 
intersubjective being necessitates the existence of a common field:  “If … experience 
                                                                                                                                                 
actuality…. Man becomes who he is precisely in and through his interaction with Nature, and to this extent 
Outer Reality is seen to be creative of a self, which is to say that it displays the character of another Self or 
Other Mind (p. 137).” 
68 MGHE: 266. On p. 261, Hocking qualifies his account somewhat: “I do not say that knowing thus the 
objects of another is equivalent to knowing that mind; I say that such knowledge of the objects is a 
necessary, an integral part of social consciousness, even ideal social consciousness.” 
69 MGHE: 269. 
70 MGHE: 271. 
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ever becomes actually social, it has, in more rarefied condition, always been so; and 
hence is, in the same fundamental sense, continuously so.”71 
Hocking recognizes the danger of fixated realism. If nature is absolutely 
independent of our awareness, solitary experience is possible – there is no possibility of 
weaving any referential connection between the self and other. Hocking’s position is 
subtle and nuanced – Nature is “That Which” serves social consciousness: “this social 
reference … rides on the outside of nature.”72 How does Hocking reconcile this 
independence of nature with the possibility of social experience? 
Hocking argues that through its obstinate independence, nature assumes the 
aspect of another mind. Recognizing the importance of empiricism, Hocking affirms the 
importance of taking in what is given. At the same time, his appreciation of the subject’s 
“apperceptive mass” enables him to view experience as a projective activity, running 
ahead in anticipation of the experiendum. Hocking reconciles this apparent contradiction 
in the following way: Outer reality provides the “irruptive material … [that] in its 
constant action … is creative of me.”73 Emphasizing the creative impact external reality 
exercises upon the mental formation of the self, “Nature begins taking on the aspect of an 
Other Mind.”74  For Hocking, nature is a self-in-its-otherness. As one perceiving self 
among many, I somehow reside in nature’s “deepest objectivity.” Said differently, the 
objectivity of nature is constitutive of nature’s selfhood – a level of selfhood that is 
somehow greater than that of the finite self. Hocking states the matter somewhat 
                                                 
71 Ibid.: 273. See p. 280: “We look at nature through the eyes of a social world.” 
72 MGHE: 283. 
73 MGHE: 286. 
74 Ibid.: 287. 
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cryptically in the following: “The objectivity of the physical world is derivative: it shines 
by reflected light, not by its own.”75 
Our cognitive experience of the objectivity of nature yields an immediate 
experience of the “active decisiveness” of an Absolute Other.  This is an immediate 
experience. Experience does not consist of some type of privileged immediacy in which 
shared knowledge is somehow teased out through some type of magical inference. 
Objectivity, grounded in what Hocking refers to as the “Other Mind,” serves as the 
fundamental substratum upon which of the continuity of experience and the connection of 
selves arise. As a “private” self receives something from without, it assimilates an 
“objectively shareable core experience.”  The whole that surrounds this fact is the basis 
of community: “the presence of this uniting selfhood provides the assurance that the 
common experience of mankind has an indwelling purpose, a telos, in which the I-am 
also participates.”76 Experience qua objective is the basis of community. 
The basis of this shared community is God – “a region of literal common mind.”77 
Echoing Aquinas, Hocking believes that we will always be more certain that God is than 
what He is. God is the basis of that unity which makes the world conceivable as a whole 
– a unity grounded in the God’s nature as Absolute mind. No longer must one hibernate 
in the solipsistic isolation of the reflexive turn. Nature becomes a “living language … [a] 
net which being hung out in experience will gather in what supplementation of my own 
fragmentary meanings … may be discoverable there.”78 From his metaphysics, Hocking 
                                                 
75 MGHE: 285. See also p. 301: “We are looking for man, and we found God.” 
76 William E. Hocking, The Coming World Civilization (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956): 32. The 
existence of community is due to the fact that once objectivity is conceived as a function of the Other 
Mind, “the empirical factors of experience extend thus through my whole self-hood” (p. 289).” 
77 MGHE: 299. 
78 Ibid.: 297. See also p. 541: “[W]e should naturally look for our principles of synthesis in that same 
region of things which reveals a cleavage.” 
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is able to derive an ethic of missionary service dedicated to restoring the unity originally 
provided through God.   Hocking characterizes religion as a “heightened consciousness 
of self” and nature as a region in which “spirits wander as shapes embedded.”79 Acting as 
mediators, our responsibility is to articulate and share the presence of God. This 
relationship is best viewed in terms of a “metaphysical syllogism.” The Absolute is the 
major premise; the self is the minor premise: “The world has its nature; the self has its 
character: when nature and character come together, action results.”80 However limited 
our means to reach our destiny, each one of us must somehow “reproduce the relation to 
God in a visible relationship within God’s world.”81 True to his idealism, behavior 
assumes a symbolic dimension – there can be no such thing as “nature” considered in 
absentia from any reference to acts of human character.  
Hocking’s understanding of God as a concrete a priori adds an interesting twist to 
his reappropriation of the ontological argument. Traditional versions of the ontological 
argument have built upon the speculative connection believed to exist between an idea of 
perfection and the reality of that idea. Hocking approaches the issue differently. We are 
not “justified in inferring from any idea to its reality that reality can be present to the idea 
in experience.”82 God exists at the level of sensation. Contrary to epistemological 
accounts that have abrogated sensation to the lowest realms of the cognitive ladder, 
Hocking characterizes sensation as “essentially metaphysical.” Sensation provides access 
to a dimension of “literalness” possessing a sense of definite, individuality. This 
                                                 
79 Ibid.: 298. 
80 MGHE: 190. 
81 Ibid.: 298. William Adams Brown characterizes this spur to activity in the following: “[I]n order to 
insure the most effective social activity one must from time to time withdraw into oneself for renewal  
through contact with the primal founts of being (“Review: The Meaning of God in Human Experience: A 
Philosophic Study of Religion,” in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, Vol. 10, 
No. 9, [April 24, 1913]: 246.) 
82 MGHE: 313. 
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literalness provides what Hocking refers to as “the line of our limitation” – the line where 
we meet God. As God is the basis of the whole-idea, “we can interpret the whole 
individuality of Nature as one with the individuality of God in its communicated form.”83  
The path followed by this revised version of the ontological argument is not deductive. 
Instead it consists of a “clearing of the mind” so that the rich connections residing in 
experience can be seen. Similar to the activity of prayer, the “filament” depicting the 
organic connection between God and man must be traced. 
The manner in which Hocking traces this “lifting of the mind to God” is 
reminiscent of Royce’s argument for the Absolute. Hocking begins with affirmation of 
the reality of nature. Any construal of nature as illusory can be articulated only within the 
context “of some moment of unusual clearness of perception … a moment of 
‘illumination’ in which the relation of myself to what is beyond my self becomes 
presently distinct … not abstractly, but in experience.”84 Likewise, if nature is conceived 
as self-sufficient, i.e. there in its own right, then where does the interdependency of 
nature come to rest? With man? No, says Hocking: “the original source [of the 
knowledge of God is] an experience of not being alone in the world, and especially the 
world of nature.”85  
Within this space of illumination, one experiences a “play of unrest” in which the 
dialectical relationship between contrary terms is overcome. A positive content is reached 
in which “this [play of] unrest does not apply…. [The] absolute object … whatever idea I 
                                                 
83 MGHE: 301-302. See also p. 543: “[T]he shape of nature are but the intaglio of the spirit.” 
84 Ibid.: 310, 311. 
85 MGHE: 248. Cf. Karl Rahner, “Experience of Self and Experience of God,” in Theological 
Investigations Volume 13, trans. David Bourke (London: Darton, Longman & Todd LTD, 1975), p. 123: 
“Th[is] kind of knowledge … is present in every man as belonging essentially to the very roots of cognition 
in him, and as constituting the starting-point and prior condition for all reflexive knowledge, and for all 
derived human knowledge in its function of combining and classifiying.” 
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make of it is an idea derived nowhere but from experience.”86 This is not a syllogism of 
formal logic but a report of experience. In other words, the validation of the self and 
world qua real require a deeper foundation than either self or world can provide. The 
feeling of defectiveness which accompanies this search contains, albeit to a faint degree, 
the notion of a positive object that is free from defect and limitation. This event is 
ontologically decisive for Hocking:  
Any reflection that can infallibly break the walls of the Self, opens at once upon an 
infinite World-field. A single point outside of ‘Bewusstseins-immanenz,’ and I am free to 
open myself to all reality and to all men…. Here, in the immediate, is my absolute escape 
from immediacy … my window opening upon infinity, my exit into God.87 
 
 For Hocking, authentic religion provides the genuine possibility of human being 
escaping its self-enclosedness and participating in the unity provided by spirit. This unity 
is available through thinking – human being is uniquely capable of com-prehending its 
world into greater unities. What we have come to understand separately as predicates, 
facts, truth, and objectivity are really instances of the unity of spirit. Aquinas recognized 
this very fact when he stated that the purpose of human being was to gather, or collect 
(colligere), finite instances of knowledge so that the great chain of Being could become 
universum or, turned towards unity – back to its originating source in God. Needless to 
say, our experience of the God is necessarily finite: “Religion … is the present attainment 
in a single experience of those objects which in the course of nature are only reached at 
the end of infinite progression. Religion is anticipated attainment.”88 
 “Anticipated attainment” is possibly only within the context of some type of 
existing rapprochement between the self and God. The whole is always ontologically 
                                                 
86 MGHE: 311. 
87 MGHE: 315, 316. 
88 Ibid.: 31. See p. 352 where Hocking claims that “[T]hinking is definable as partial worship” and p. 376: 
“[P]rayer is, in effect, a process of self-reminding … which the activities of living tend to obscure.” 
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primary – even prior to the instances of divine revelation that follow. Drawing upon the 
distinction within the Holy Trinity between God “the Father” and God “the Son,” 
Hocking makes the following point: 
We have God the Son…. But while God the Son may now have become our necessary 
way to practical union with the Father, yet the Father must first be known before the Son 
is recognized as God. Without the Father, the Son is a mere man: for the incarnate is 
always bound and infected by the finite thing it touches. Until the human spirit knows the 
self that is more at home in the Infinite than here among Things, it has not yet found its 
Self nor its God.89 
 
 Hocking views the relation between the self and God organically. Because inner 
relations assimilate themselves to outer relations, members within an organic system 
appropriately reproduce within themselves some feature of the systemic whole. A similar 
case exists in the relation between the self and God – God is first, the self is derivative: 
“We may find our thought of God following in arrear of the best conception we have of 
ourselves; but it is only because we know that whatever selfhood we have is an 
involution of the selfhood of the Whole….”90 
 Regardless of the organic sense of unity pervading the whole, action requires 
dualisms, abridgements, and choices. Hocking addresses this problem through his 
“principle of alteration.” Although life requires concrete acts of decision making, the 
presence of God in the world is not foredoomed: “God and the world … must be worked 
in with one another forever: forever they must be pursued in alternation.”91 
 Hocking develops a critique of abstraction and a notion of primary and secondary 
reflection very similar to Marcel. Abstraction, an important intellectual tool, is a 
necessary act that leads to greater acts of comprehension as well as to our survival. If 
                                                 
89 MGHE: 330. 
90 Ibid.: 335. 
91 Ibid.: 407. 
 197
Euclid could not understand the difference between a triangle and triangularity, our 
geometry would be called something other than Euclidean. On the other hand, if Joshua 
Chamberlain had pondered the nature of “bayonetteness” at the battle of Little Round 
Top – instead of giving the order to “Fix Bayonettes!” – it’s questionable whether the 
Union Army could have maintained its tactical advantage and been victorious at 
Gettysburg. Hocking identifies the appropriate balance: “We know what the tools for 
intellectual discovery are…. But we know too that there comes a moment where these 
very things … become poisons. [Our] technique cannot serve us unless we can see 
beyond it. The self must be withdrawn and re-oriented: it must turn its back on itself, and 
revert to the whole.”92 
 The key is to integrate both aspects of knowledge – the universal and the 
concrete. At the center of day to day experience – albeit not immediately visible – are 
substance, reality, and God. Hocking creatively describes this “vision” artistically: “My 
total picture of this world is drawn like an artist’s sketch—not by a line continuous and 
adequate in the field of vision, but by a series of lines which err, and which are broken in 
their course by recurrence to the (undrawn) idea. God is in the world, no doubt: the plural 
and visible aspect of things is divine also – that is, if we are able to see it so.”93 
 Hocking’s principle of alteration requires stepping back from a functional, 
pragmatist orientation – through which we “get into our own way” – and reacquaint 
ourselves with the whole. We have become so obsessed with our power to analyze that 
                                                 
92 MGHE: 408. See also pp. 413-414: “[T]he practical will is necessarily theoretical, and, so far, abstract, 
incomplete. We gain firmness in the saddle of self-possession only by condemning to death a certain 
margin of our consciousness.” 
93 Ibid.: 410. See also p. 412: [O]ur physical existence … requires us to recover our spiritual integrity by 
bringing the whole down among its parts, and treating it as a thing of time and space like ourselves.” The 
sketches of Paul Klee are wonderful examples of Hocking’s point. 
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our ability to synthesize has grown puny in comparison: “The process of ‘objectification’ 
normal to the physical sciences, with its ideal of knifing the thing thought about clearly 
off from the thinker, and vice versa, would, if applied to existence, through its very 
success, destroy the life of its subject-matter inseparable from being felt.”94 A widening 
breach occurs between the “artificial self” and the “natural self” – the self originally 
connoted by the phrase homo religiousus. We digress from the metaphysical doctrine of 
the concrete universal – in which God and the world are together – to a doctrine of the 
“abstract universal” in which “I find nothing individual in my world…. My universals 
have parted company with my particulars. I find illustrations of value; things good in this 
respect and bad that; specimens of general concepts; but no individual.” Normativity 
becomes a failed project – Deus absconditus. 
 The hegemony of the abstract universal creates a condition of spiritual fatigue and 
spiritual death. Worship is required in order to reacquaint ourselves with the whole that is 
common to all things. In our time where the quotidian “work-a-day” holds complete 
sway, Hocking has many relevant observations – some developed as early as 1912!  It is 
not simply external failure à la Elmer Gantry that causes an appeal to the act of worship. 
What drives one to despair is “the internal decay of the incentive of work, the drooping of 
the sails of ambition … the mysterious vanishing of the raison ď ětre of life as a sphere 
for the theoretical will.”95 Worship is a response to the foundational question of the 
meaning of existence by recovering the natural vigor of the whole-idea. What is 
important to note is that our everyday encounter with things is a form of worship writ 
small. To understand this important fact, we must return to Hocking’s initial insight that 
                                                 
94 Marcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics: 445. 
95 MGHE: 418-419. 
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“all ideas contain an infinity.” The plasticity of our ideas, coupled with the extensive 
reach of feeling, contain the potential expanse similar to that which is experienced 
through worship. Our problem is that we are not aware of the extent of this reach. 
Hocking explains it this way: 
It is nothing more than doing with the whole self, and consciously, that which in blinder 
and more fragmentary fashion we are doing at every moment in our waking lives…. In 
reality, in the logical and the eternal order of things, these two phases of experience 
belong together, and in time are also finding their way together: but in the natural history 
of the mind, they fall apart, and must be pursued separately.96 
 
 The principle of alteration is Hocking’s way of maneuvering through a Scylla of 
vicious abstraction and a Charybdis of mystical dissolution. More than simply a case of 
executing the power of will, a vision of the Absolute is required: “[S]ight does its own 
transforming: sight turns the energy of our own desires into the work of their own re-
making.”97 Similar to the condition Plato describes at the conclusion of the “allegory of 
the cave,” philosophy understands that it is important to recognize that “sight is there.” 
What is necessary, then, is to turn the soul in the right direction – re-inscribing one’s 
thought and action within the context of that vision. 
 Experience of novelty is achieved as familiar things become disclosed in an 
unfamiliar light, reflecting the appearance of being reborn – what Heidegger referred to 
as die Pracht des Schlichten or “the splendor of the simple.”98 This phenomenon of 
creative emergence is the result of tandem acts of consciousness and reflexion: “[T]he 
event of this birth is to be traced … to this touching to the quick of self-consciousness: 
the old idea has penetrated the self; the self has been stung by it; and in the reflexion 
                                                 
96 MGHE: 422, 427. 
97 Ibid.: 437. 
98  Martin Heidegger, Aus Der Erfahrung Des Denken (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954) p. 13. 
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thereby occasioned, the new thing is engendered.”99 Through the “reflexive” act of 
reflection, self-consciousness emerges out of the quotidian, object-centered world. The 
key to understanding this process is to follow the trace from the object per se to the wider 
relational context within which the object exists. If we follow this continuous thread of 
associations, we begin to enter into an understanding of the relationship between a self 
and the whole. Displaying the influence of Royce, Hocking states the issue in the 
following way: 
There is no criticism of any self or system except in the context of a present view of a 
positive content beyond them. And that which is outside any finite system … is precisely 
the absolute….I am able to reflect upon any world-self system because and only because 
I have experienced something beyond it…. In brief, all of my partial reflexions are 
parented by some previous total reflexion. Total reflexion, reflexion on the whole of 
things temporal, is precisely the cognitive side of mystical experience.100 
 
 Hocking views induction as a mental process akin to reflection. Taking a position 
in stark contrast to those engaged in the ongoing debate concerning “the problem of 
induction,” Hocking sees induction as the original, paradigmatic religious insight. 
Induction is a product of genius – attention directed towards the same “scent for reality” 
as reflexion. Induction and reflexion are both engaged in the pursuit of greater wholes in 
a non-linear fashion. Reflexion traces the wider arc of the empirical self; induction 
unifies external things within a concept of a whole. For Hocking, “Induction is external 
reflexion; and reflexion is internal induction…. For the most part, these operations are 
simultaneous, parts of the same mental movement.”101 Our ability to create, invent, and 
generalize is dependent upon a distinguishing fact of consciousness – an activity, internal 
                                                 
99 Ibid.: 470. 
100 MGHE: 473. 
101 Ibid.: 476. Hocking’s assimilation of the activities of reflexion and induction is reminiscent of the neo-
Platonic understanding of the relationship between the immanent and transcendent. See Eric D. Perl, “The 
Power of All Things: The One as Pure Giving in Plotinus,” in American Philosophical Quarterly, 71 
(1997): 301-313. 
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to the self, that is dialectical in a sense reminiscent of Kant, i.e. “restless and groping for 
further predicate-giving.”102 This insight is confirmed by the fact that a truly creative 
artist is severely challenged to identify the difference between the external focus of his 
activity and their personal, interior musing. Whereas most modern discussions of 
induction have focused upon induction as a problem – due to the fact that induction 
cannot claim deductive validity – for Hocking, induction is deduction. While this claim 
may shock contemporary epistemologists and logicians, Hocking’s reasoning is as 
follows: 
Every induction is induced by a prior induction, ultimately a total induction, or judgment 
about the whole of things … derived from whatever knowledge of the whole and of God 
my experience has built up for me. Every induction is at the same time a deduction, 
then,―an ‘It must be so,’ parented, though from the background of consciousness, by an 
insight which is in its origins religious.103 
 
 Hocking’s metaphysics and epistemology, when combined, provide for the 
possibility of a “mind-cure” approach to well-being similar to that offered by William 
James. For Hocking, as for James, the conditions for happiness lie within the self, not in 
the verdict of history, external circumstance, or pharmaceutical research and 
development. Hocking’s notion of the Absolute as formative of the finite self offers a rich 
pool from which to draw: “Nothing befalls us which is not of the nature of ourselves…. 
Happiness … is the idea of the whole in unhindered operation upon experience.”104 
Incorporation of the whole within experience enables the self to overcome its 
divisiveness and reunite the fragments of a consciousness operating under the illusion of 
                                                 
102 MGHE: 477. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (Macmillan & Company 
LTD, 1964), p. 7 where Kant refers to the desire of human reason to” transcend all its powers.” 
103 MGHE: 477. See also p. 541: “We have not first to deduce the thing and then its application; but if we 
find it at all, we shall find the application first and the thing in the heart of the application.” 
104 Ibid.: 488. See infra: “The controlling conditions of welfare lie within … [our] destiny.” Cf. William 
James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (Mentor Books, 1958), p. 58: “[T]he controlling energies of 
nature are personal … the powers of the universe will directly respond to your individual appeals and 
needs….”  
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divisive technique. Experience, although at times appearing atomic, springs forth within a 
great canopy sub specie aeternitatis. Our task is to inductively re-unite experience under 
the dome-like presence of the whole. It matters little what shape the means to this end 
assume – almost any positive fulfillment of a project will suffice: “It matters not how we 
regain our singleness of thrust―whether by ascent of a hill, or in prayer, or through a 
book or a human being: the ground of blessedness of such a moment … lies in its power 
to recall the divergent channels of our attention into a unity, to ‘make us whole’ from 
[the] center.”105 
 Hocking’s conception of reality as amenable to our hopes and aspirations leads 
him to develop a notion of consciousness as prophetic. Prophetic consciousness refuses to 
see reality as a “realm of chance” in which spirit may or may not be naturalized. In order 
to avoid any type of dogmatic pronouncement, Hocking qualifies the notion of prophetic 
consciousness with great care. While recognizing that the actual occurrence of prophecy 
may be difficult to prove – its possibility is nevertheless necessary: “[E]very soul of us 
knows the whole, and feels in his own limbs the thud and impulse of the engines of 
reality, it must be possible, then, for our wills, to some degree, to contain the will of the 
universe…. The arc of the destiny of that idea must now coincide with the swing of his 
own arm.”106 
                                                 
105 MGHE: 492. See also p. 535 where Hocking discusses deliberate reflection: “Experience, in this matter, 
as in all matters, brings about the possibility of conscious control of uniting the disjoined fragments of 
selfhood.” 
106 Ibid.: 502, 511. Emphasis added. See also page 505: “Our conscious enterprise is three-fourths 
experiment; but it steps out from a vast substratum of the indubitable.” This conception of experimental of 
reality is emphasized by Robert C. Pollock: “But what a drastic alteration in perspective when men can 
envisage a wide open world in which development, spontaneity and novelty are entirely at home! Given 
this new image of the universe, experimentation and creativity are endowed with a new dignity, for they 
have gained a status within nature itself.” (“Process and Experience,” in John Dewey: His Thought and 
Influence, ed. John Blewett[Fordham University Press, 1960]: 165.   
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 Prophetic consciousness represents the epitome of religious experience simply 
because it enables the self to recognize both the divinity inherent in the present moment 
and the need to act in its behalf. Mystical experience, in order to make some type of 
difference in fact must partake of some degree of prophecy . Prophetic consciousness acts 
through what can be referred to as a “looping effect.” Viewing experience in terms of a 
“looping effect” is diametrically opposed to the notion of a scientific empiricism which 
adopts a stance of objective, passivity towards the world. For Hocking, classical 
empiricism is “but half the story: it is the backward gesture for a forward throw.”107 
Classical empiricism is “backwardly” docile only after having “forwardly” put nature, in 
Baconian terms, on the rack. Yes, we have to assume a stance towards nature; but let it be 
a stance that is conducive to achieving unity. In order to engage reality prophetically, 
reality must exhibit a permanence that leads to the conservation of values: “The fluid 
mass of free wills conserves nothing…. A world which promises to conserve must itself 
be unitary and eternal.”108 But if a foundational unity cannot be found in the world, the 
self must create such unity. The self establishes unity through a form of “social 
contagion” that is self-perpetuated: “[I]t begins to crystallize its environment, that is, to 
organize the social world upon its own principle…. [T]hat environment is created which 
this same type of will requires … adopting as its own special responsibility the extension 
of its own unity….”109 A complete experience of the whole, denied the finite self, is now 
made possible through the prefiguration of an all embracing form disclosed in history.110 
                                                 
107 Marcel and the Ground Issue of Metaphysics: 447. 
108 MGHE: 517. 
109 Ibid.: 519. This process of inductive unification is different than that of abstractive analysis. The latter is 
described on p. 530: “The focal center of life hardens, polishes its surface, and tends to perpetuate its own 
quality.” 
110 Martin Luther King’s vision, or “dream,” of racial equality is a powerful example of the social 
contagion of prophetic consciousness. 
 204
For Hocking, the Absolute is not to be conceived tyrannically or dogmatically as a 
superimposed outcome that predetermines the diversity required for life. Instead, the 
Absolute is the creativity that “nourishes and sustains” human existence by allowing for 
the expression of the widest range of diversity in a way that these diversities are mutually 
sustaining – what Whitehead referred to as the unity of felt contrast. Within Hocking’s 
metaphysics, the “continual recovery of coherence together with the acceptance of 
innovations, this widening of coherence in the life of every individual as he matures from 
infancy to some level of attainment, and this extension of coherence through a sequence 
of generations when a culture is being created, is … the work of the ‘whole idea.’”111 
§ 
 
Experience as a Field of Fields 
 
 Hocking’s treatment of the self as a “Field of Fields” emphasizes the role of 
invention and pure imagination in the concrete exercise of freedom. For Hocking:  
Freely thinking and groping human minds, as they perceive the inadequacy of thoughts 
which have been guiding them, … turn toward something better, [with a] general 
intuition of a way to move beyond. Ideas contain action as the valley walls contain the 
stream…. [T]here is no automatic motion onward … it waits the arrival in human heads 
of a truer idea. There is no prior social organism: there is an organism to be built … by 
individuals endowed with the joining function. [M]an is by nature an active agent.112 
 
 Take, for example, the common phrase “Here we are.” This simple phrase is “the 
most compact expression of our elemental intersubjectivity.”113 The expression bespeaks 
a relational expanse in which “I exist,” “we exist,” and, most importantly, a “third entity 
                                                 
111 Henry Nelson Wieman, “Empiricism in Religious Philosophy,” in Philosophy, Religion and the Coming 
World Civilization: 186. 
112 William E. Hocking, The Lasting Elements of Individualism (Yale University Press, 1937): 97-101. 
According to Frederick Werner, “Hocking’s ‘Field of Field’ concept, in suggesting the idea of a hierarchy 
of physical geometries as a theory-building tool, may serve as an impetus for creating a general theory of 
interaction, taking into account both the foundations of quantum theory and relativity.” (See “Integrity,” in 
Philosophy, Religion and the Coming World Civilization: 100.) 
113 Marcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics: 451. 
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– the field in which ‘here’ lies – that somehow binds us into a ‘we.’”114  The “native air” 
we breathe consists of a latent intersubjectivity, a “trans-pathy of existence,” resulting 
from an awareness of participating in a field of ontological commonality. This native  
intersubjectivity is latent or unfulfilled: “There can be no genuine community among men 
except through their several hold on the universal.”115 In order for the universal to be 
realized, a “space-time assemblage” of persons must exist in order to provide the 
contextual field needed for realization – a clearing in which the “flitting universal” can be 
fastened to concrete fact.  
For Hocking, “intersubjectivity is either everywhere or nowhere.”116 
Intersubjectivity is “intra-uterine” – traceable to the inaccessible beginnings of mental 
life. But there is also a dimension of intersubjectivity that is in the making, marked by a 
transition from sensation to thought. This emerging dimension of intersubjectivity results 
from the act of constituting a world – a process in which the flux of sensation is framed 
within a stable, unifying concept. Hocking characterizes this process of world 
constitution as a response: “A moral act in which the incipient human will commits itself 
to a destiny of intersubjective truth seeking.”117  
Hocking’s original insight is his insistence that the things most certain in 
experience are not physical objects but centers of conscious rational activity. In order to 
comprehend his insight, we must follow the direction of his thought as it moves from a 
consideration of the nature of factuality in the direction of a “con-subjectivity” consisting 
of a nexus of the self and God.  Facts constitute the “given” aspect of experience. 
                                                 
114 Ibid.: 451. Emphasis added. See intra where Hocking describes this “third [as], in part, a region of 
coincident selfhood and therefore of direct intersubjectivity.” 
115 Marcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics: 456. 
116 Ibid.: 458. 
117 Ibid.: 459, 460. 
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Although we are active in the process of receiving facts, facts demonstrate a “firmness” 
of their own – reception of is prior to reaction to. Hocking agrees with his Harvard 
colleague C.I. Lewis that it is “the thick experience of the world of things, not the thin 
given of introspective immediacy, which constitutes the datum for philosophical 
reflection.”118 As the German word for object, Gegenstand, implies, objects “stand-
against” a conscious that “stands before” (verstanden) in a relationship of under-standing. 
Hocking’s analysis of factuality is nuanced – there are contrarieties in the 
structure of facts. Facts exhibit a contingency Hocking characterizes as “the necessity of 
the unnecessary.”119  Since Hume, we take it for granted that facts could be otherwise – 
the sun may not rise tomorrow. Facts also exhibit what Hocking refers to as “an internal 
opposition.” On the one hand, facts qua pure particulars leave us unfillfilled – we want 
more, craving that which we don’t have. The particular potentially embodies the status of 
the universal: “Will not factual usage, unopposed, in time create a right of way?”120 
When this right of way is traversed, experience manifests itself as religious: “biographies 
merge into sacred history … often begin[ing] to glow with almost sacred warmth.”121 
Philosophy must make sense of this potentiality of fact. Facts do exhibit a 
dimension of non-deducibility – but this does not condemn facts to meaninglessness and 
absurdity as Sartre would have it. As speculative philosophy has long been aware, facts 
do not stand alone in isolation – they must be incorporated within a wider context of 
                                                 
118 C.I. Lewis, Mind and the World-Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Publications, Inc., 
1929): 54. 
119 FF&D: 529. 
120 Ibid.: 529-530. 
121 Ibid.: 530.  Cf. Hocking’s “Fact and Destiny (II),” in Review of Metaphysic, Vol. IV, No. 3, March 
1951, pp. 339-340: “In action, we adopt particulars into our life circuits … the deed is ‘executed’ … some 
relic hunter makes away with the quill! Gandhi fasts, and breaks his fast by drinking a cup of orange juice; 
someone spirits away the cup, as emblem of a turn in Indian history…. The physical object is no longer its 
impersonal self: it has become a symbol.” 
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understanding. As Dewey once remarked, “[N]eglect of context is the greatest single 
disaster which philosophic thinking can incur.”122 Building upon the metaphysical insight 
of Bradley, Hocking’s objective is to illuminate the importance of the relations between 
facts – bringing relations out of the background and into the foreground of metaphysical 
investigation. 
Hocking refers to this relational context as a “field.”123 Appropriating some of the 
most recent insights of quantum theory, the idea of field exhibits the properties of 
overlapping continuity while maintaining, at the same time, distinctness and 
interdependence. Objects participate in a series of fields: submicroscopic (protons, 
neutrons), microscopic (cells and molecules), macroscopic (individual organisms) and 
ultra-macroscopic (earth field, solar field, galactic field, universal field). The self, in 
addition to the above fields, participates in a wider field-series: the unconscious, the 
dispositional, the historical, the cultural, the conceptual, the personal – there are more. 
This image of the self as a plurality of subfields exhibiting a vector-character radiating 
outward – overlapping and being overlapped by numerous other fields – is indicative of 
the self as a “field within fields.”   
Time and space are examples of macroscopic fields. Kant understood space as a 
container – the removal of the “contained” object in no way affects the “container.”  
Unlike the Newtonian-Kantian understanding of space and time, Hocking depicts fields, 
as John Dewey does, as strictly derivative of events.  In Experience and Nature, Dewey 
argued that the substitution of “qualitative events” for “fixed substances” is indicative of 
                                                 
122 John Dewey, “Context and Thought,” in On Experience, Nature, and Freedom, ed. Richard J. Bernstein 
(Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1960): 98. 
123 For an excellent account of field theory from a pragmatic standpoint, see Eugene Fontinell, Self, God 
and Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation (Temple University Press, 1986). 
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a shift in the conception of mind and matter “as significant characters of events presented 
in different contexts, rather than underlying and ultimate substances.”124 Contents within 
a field are related contextually – relations make a difference in the relata. 
Hocking views this “background-continuum” as not undifferentiated. Distinct, 
albeit tentative, boundaries exist within a field – the submicroscopic is to be distinguished 
from the macroscopic. Fields are processive-relational realities as opposed to rigid and 
complete substances. As Dewey insisted, events are characterized by historical continuity 
and are therefore unfinished, incomplete, and indeterminate.”125  Whereas objects can be 
known, events are “felt” – objects are events with meanings. But qua continuous and 
interdependent, a field has no fixed boundary – the submicroscopic resonates across the 
entire experiential field. Fields are given all at once – in Jamesian terms, a field is all 
shades and no boundaries. As Hocking is fond of saying: “If you have any space, you 
have all space; if any time, all time.”126   
Hocking uses his understanding of fields to argue against naturalism and in favor 
of metaphysical idealism. If fields are derived from events, then the possibility exists for 
independent events and independent parallel, fields: “Infinitudes [of fields] do not imply 
their interpenetration….”127  That being said, there is an entity through which all 
independent systems are related. Hocking refers to this entity as “the self … the vinculum 
between various possible spaces, possible nature systems, possible histories.”128 This 
                                                 
124 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Dover Publications, Inc., 1958): xi. 
125 See Experience and Nature: xi-xiii, 159. 
126 FF&D: 532. 
127 William E. Hocking, “Theses Establishing an Idealistic Metaphysics by a New Route,” in Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 25 (Dec. 4, 1941): 688. Hereafter referred to as Theses. 
128 Theses: 689. 
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comprehensive nature of the self as a field within which the members are total fields 
causes Hocking to refer to the self as “the field of fields.” 
Hocking’s construal of the self as a field of fields has rich implications. The self is 
a pivot standing between actuality and possibility. Although embedded in an actual field, 
attending to a possible field enables the self to realize independent possibilities. Given the 
existence of internal relations, the particular possibility that is made actual will 
reverberate across the entire spectrum of actuality. According to Hocking, “This is the 
concrete meaning of freedom.”129 
Hocking’s development of field-theory provides him with a more mature version 
of the refractory kernel, the hinge leading to an understanding of God: 
The field within which … nature systems are related is not a function of events 
within any such system. Hence, the mind, as a vinculum between possible nature 
systems, cannot be a function of events within any one nature-system. Naturalism is thus 
cancelled as a possible description of fact. Metaphysical idealism remains, inasmuch as 
the self is not merely a field of fields, but a concrete event determining the field of 
fields.130 
 
This creative capacity of the self is the key to transcendence. Thorough its 
capacity for creative decision-making, the self has the ability to engage in what Hocking 
refers to as “field-reckoning.” By appropriating possibility within the realm of actuality, 
“the phenomenal world [may be] a closed system, [but] the real universe is to some 
extent ‘open towards the future.’”131 Said differently, a teleology of the particular exists 
in which the particular inductively participates in a series of more cumulative meaning 
relationships. This is not subjective idealism: “The teleology of the world is apparent 
                                                 
129 Theses: 690. 
130 Ibid.: 690. 
131 FF&D: 542. Hocking’s notion of “field-reckoning,” does not lead to relativism: “There is a reality and it 
is living; but it is one, not many.” 
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chiefly in this, that the particulars which environ us prove to be such as we can clothe 
little by little with the meanings for which they have waited.”132 
§ 
 
Body, Self and Immortality 
 
Hocking’s propensity for unity is apparent in his treatment of the mind-body 
relation – “distinctions are necessary; but dualisms are delusive.”133  Mind and body, 
although different, must be viewed as belonging together within a single system. 
Descartes failed to realize this, believing that a rigorous attention to ideational content 
could secure a connection with the external world. As a result Descartes’ mind-body 
dualism remains “the most brilliant speculative failure of history.”134 
Like Marcel, Hocking emphasizes the foundational role of the body as an 
intramundane medium between the self and the world. The body is situated in a natural 
field subject to the laws of space, time, and causality. The mind, however, is endowed 
with the gift of envisioning multiple spaces and a span of time that extends into the past 
as well as the future. Through the powerful reach of the mind, the self has unique ability 
to be “space-free … [and] time-free, as the body is not.”135 Hence, the self can be 
conceived two-dimensionally as the “excursive self” and the “reflective self.” The 
excursive self is the empirical self – created, finite and bound by space and time. The 
reflective self, on the other hand, is creative, potential, and infinite.136 Reminsicent of 
                                                 
132 Fact and Destiny (II): 341. 
133 Ibid.: 53. 
134 SBF: 48. 
135 SBF: 31, 35. See pp. 30-31: “[T]he mind is capable of thinking of not only all-of-space but, but also of 
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136 See William E. Hocking, The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience (Harper & Brothers 
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Aristotle’s discussion of the intellectual soul in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, the 
reflective self partakes of a divine element” and is to some extent immortal, capable of 
traversing a depth of being otherwise unattainable. 
In order to understand Hocking’s philosophy of the body, a complete conception 
of the self is required. The self has an extensive quantitative and qualitative reach: “[T]he 
kingdom of philosophical truth is within…. A recall to such self-knowledge … is one of 
the perennial functions of philosophy.”137 Influenced by William James’ investigations in 
psychology, Hocking believed that the self-world distinction is more a matter of degree 
than of kind, arising out of the diaphanous, tissue-like contours of experience – a 
distinction that is taken as opposed to a dualism that is given. In keeping with his 
tendency towards field-theory, Hocking cautions us to “[l]ook at mind and body as 
systems of events rather than as substances, and the differences between them seem to 
become tenuous and reconcilable.”138 Within the context of this event-field, human 
experiences exude a reflexive dimensionality within which self and world are 
interstitially co-constituted and mutually implicated in the development of each. Echoing 
the bravado of James, Hocking boldly exclaims that “the self is thus the counterpart of 
the whole of the observed world: … there is as much of the self as there is the world: ego 
and non ego are on par with each other.”139 
                                                 
137 William E. Hocking, The Self, Its Body and Freedom (Yale University Press, 1928): vii, viii. Hereafter  
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138 SBF: 23. 
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In order to understand Hocking’s remark that “What my body as a whole does, 
that I do”140 we must examine his important distinction between fact and meaning. As a 
phenomenon within the world of nature, the body lacks the capability of being space-free 
and time-free. The mind, on the other hand, has the ability to transcend its instantiation 
within a particular space-time locus and traverse an extended array of meaning directions. 
Hocking characterizes this situation succinctly: “The body is a set of facts, and the mind a 
set of meanings.”141 
The mind has the power to act dynamically through its ability to determine its 
perspective within the context of a determinate meaning-focus: “Brain connections mean 
something only if there is some meaner in the offing. Meaning is like light: when it exists 
anywhere, everything takes on color as if it existed in its own right.”142 Hocking, 
following a long teleological tradition that includes Aristotle, James, and Royce, 
emphasizes the importance of hope in the emergent process of the articulation of 
meaning. The telic dimension of our thinking cascades upon the multi-faceted data of 
experience, shaping its “details” within the context of a growing unity: The self is “a 
system of purposive behavior emerging from a persistent hope…. Meaning descends 
from this single source upon the details of behavior.”143 
In defense of dualism, no one ever perceives the mind in the act of affecting the 
body, nor a body affecting the mind.  There simply are no observable facts there. At the 
same time, we do not hesitate to say that body-changes typically cause mind-changes, 
and mind changes commonly cause body changes. Hocking describes this process of 
                                                 
140 SBF: 23-24. 
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142 Ibid.: 38 
143 Ibid.: 46. For a pragmatically-based account of the persistent, meaning dimension of hope, see Patrick 
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mind-body interaction circularly: “Except in the simplest reflexes, … no stimulus has its 
own mechanical way with us. It depends upon us which of the thousands of appeals 
raining upon our sense organs every moment we shall attend to…. Our response to outer 
things is thus ‘circular,’ and the self stands at the head of the cycle.”144  
We are now in a position to understand the importance of the mind-body nexus. 
The self’s ability to be both space-free and time-free is the source of its ability to derive 
the possible from within the actual. Much like Aristotle’s comparison of the sensitive and 
intellectual soul, our visionary capacity exhibited through hope is creative of a condition 
in which “hope is a hold on a good which is not actual, but only possible.”145 However, 
the self must be embedded in a natural context – it can derive no natural nourishment 
through anything resembling an “angelic eye.”  Without the intramundane capability of 
the body, the self is permanently related to a condition of “being on the outside looking 
in,” with no ability to access to a full-bodied world: “the body, instead of being an 
additional fact, is required by the mind as a part of its own being.”146 Through the ability 
of the body to insert the self into the world, thought now becomes actualized through its 
ability to transform latent possibilities in statu nascendi into emergent realizations: 
“[T]he body as we are directly aware of it, is the region in which thought turns into 
actuality. Emotion is simply thought becoming concrete, showing its meaning in the 
body….”147 
                                                 
144 SBF: 68. See also William James, Psychology: Briefer Course (Dover Publications, 2001), p. 42 “Each 
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The body is neither an epiphenomenal appendage of the mind nor an independent 
instrument. The body is an “inseparable organ” of the mind. As a system of purposive 
behavior, the self stands in a symbiotic relation with the world: “In order to carry on this 
intercourse, it must appear in the world in a form akin to that world in structure … for the 
income and for the outgo, I must be of that world. If it is bodily, I must be bodily.”148 
Despite Hocking’s desire to re-instate the bodily dimension to its proper place 
within the experiential continuum, he is not on par with thinkers like Hobbes and 
Schopenhauer who insist that the world is an epiphenomenon of bodily states:  
There is, first, this steady feeling of homely warmth, as of the hearth-place of life, 
a sense of being, which is usually a sense of well-being. It is only by second thought that 
I qualify this pervasive sense of being as ‘bodily’ warmth or as coenesthesia, and when I 
do so, I suspect that I have left something important out of it.”149 
 
Hocking’s reluctance to collapse the distinction between self and body should not 
be taken as a denial of their mutual relatedness. Through what he refers to as the 
principle of persistence, Hocking stresses the important relationship existing between the 
transversal capability of the self and its localized instantiation in the body: 
[T]o exist and to have particular existence are inseparable, and the body is to us that 
sphere of existence which is completely particularized…. The life of a self is a spreading 
circle of experiment—experimenting with new goods, and with new ways of reaching old 
ones. But if this moving on were like the progress of a grass fire, which has to leave its 
old ground or die, because there is nothing else for it to live on, the self would bear no 
resemblance to ourselves. As we move on, something is kept permanently.150 
 
Our body is an interlocutor within a system of “radical exchange” between the 
self and the world. The body serves as “the port of entry of new experience…. And 
through this portal, the self peers out into a dark cavernous background in which the 
                                                 
148 Ibid.: 94. See infra. pp. 95-96 where Hocking describes the concrete unity of the mind-body relation: 
“The self is a hold on possibility, but not without its own actuality: it is an actual holding of possibility. 
149 SBF: 78-79. 
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perspectives of its living past merge insensibly with the vast shapes of physical 
nature.”151 The body cannot be explained away simply as an embodiment or 
objectification of the self. Its essence is to be transitional: a between. As a unified 
arrangement of perceiving organs, our body provides our primary means of access to the 
world. The appearance of the world is inconceivable without the embeddedness of the 
body within it:  “Like most between- things, it has a wavering allegiance.… It is, in fact, 
more like a frontier between self and not-self, and a function of both.”152 
For Hocking, the human self exists in the world as a unified whole. Simply stated, 
the body is the receptor of brute being. However, brute being is never a pure given – the 
real is always mediated by the Janus-like head of the mind and its ability to 
transcendently direct experience into frontiers oftentimes levels removed from their point 
of entry:  
Habit has its body; but that body is not out of mind! [This] means something more than 
my body has certain abstract possibilities of action: it means a positive element of 
awareness that these possibilities are available…. [T]hese possibilities in their sum 
constitute what we feel each moment as a volume of selfhood, a quantity with which, as 
an equipment, we are meeting experience.153 
 
§ 
 
Importance of Destiny 
The self-modifying process is slow—glaciers are swifter—but it is indubitable…. Man’s self-
consciousness is an active destiny, partly a magnet luring him forward towards what he thinks he 
is, partly a lash driving him to self change. Self-criticism is an ominous gift of the gods…. [I]n all 
psychological history there is, as there should be, a mighty ballast. But in it all there is a slow and 
strong movement ahead.154 
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For Hocking, purposive human action, once formed, is formative – enabling the 
self to inject “an occasional touch of telos in our own purposive action…. The destiny of 
particular beings is a particular destiny.”155 Despite the telic dimension of the self, our 
ability to create is “fractional.” Hocking’s distaste for a facile pragmatism precludes him 
from conceiving creativity completely ex nihilo – rearrangement, rather than production, 
more aptly describes Hocking’s position.  Creativity must be dependent upon a “prior 
realism,” the non-impulsive background that is not of our own making. Creativity is 
“maternal,” requiring a sensitive balance between a caring effort and docility on the part 
of agent: “It is the maternal brooding, in cooperation with nature, that brings the child to 
the crisis of birth…. Though the child has been given her, it is hers. The impersonality of 
the co-operati[ve] background leaves human authorship valid and salient.”156 
Given Hocking’s understanding of the self as “a field of fields,” it is not 
surprising that the individually engendered telos assumes a wider arc. Our thoughts and 
actions have a destiny that reaches beyond. Destiny is an empirical category, not an 
other-worldly notion.  Fields are present hic et nunc in their “full-range.” We have 
become captivated by a discrete, itemized conception of experience and we consistently 
fail to recognize that “the simplest fact is seen in the light of what it is not…. [E]very 
included fact … becomes as if lost in an infinite shadow.”157 Hocking’s field concept 
enables a view of the world in terms of “simply felt unity.” Failure to embrace such a 
unifying, comprehensive conception leaves us with a bleak alternative “in which … we 
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might forever pass in review our shard bits of knowledge as in some nightmare quiz 
show….”158 
In order to retrieve this infinite, penumbra-like, shadow of experience, we must 
re-emphasize the importance that Hocking and others have placed upon our capacity for 
feeling. Like his colleague Whitehead, Hocking stressed the vector character of feeling – 
the forward, intentional direction feeling assumes as it strives to “meet the total object-
over against-me.”159 This sense of something greater – the whole, and the pursuit thereof 
– constitutes destiny.  
Destiny is our sense of the horizon of possibility. Although not immediately felt, 
it consists of a nascent awareness of potential fulfillment – “a nuclear intimation of outer 
expectation.”160 Like Marcel’s conception of the exigence of being, Hocking’s notion of 
destiny bespeaks of a condition of unfulfilled possibility, luring us on to a wider 
understanding. It is important to stress the empirical element of destiny. We possess a 
“Destiny-sense” within our own telos – an awareness of a directive within which all of 
our partial ends are collectively integrated. This sense of direction is open. This sense of 
openness is powerfully suggested by Benjamin Blood, a contemporary of William James: 
Not unfortunately the universe is wild, –game flavored as a hawk’s wing. Nature 
is miracle all; the same returns not save to bring the different. The slow round of the 
engraver’s lathe gains but a breadth of hair, but the difference is distributed back over the  
whole curve, never an instant true, –ever not quite.161 
 
Hocking’s critique of instrumental pragmatism provides an integral part of his 
view of destiny. The non-impulsive, inanimateness of nature provides the potential 
                                                 
158 Louis O. Mink, “History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,” in New Literary History, Vol. 1, 
1970: 553.  
159 FF&D: 546. 
160 FF&D: 546. 
161 Benjamin P. Blood, The Flaw in Supremacy, cited by William James in the “Preface” to Will to Believe 
and Other Essays (Dover Publications, 1956): ix. This leads Hocking to deny destiny the status of fate – 
characterizing it as a “destiny without predestination.” 
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freedom required in order for reality to undergo the shaping required for the fulfillment of 
destiny. Hocking was forever insistent that the circumstance that we are primordially 
confronted with a world of fact provides a perfect receptacle for the potential array of 
meanings we may impose: “A world of conscious and especially social enterprise would 
be impossible without such an impassive base.”162 
Hocking’s desire to keep the path of destiny unshackled by the decree of fate 
should not be mistaken as authorization for a moral holiday. The fulfillment of destiny is 
at the same time personal and universal, free and necessary. Maintaining his preference 
for examples derived from nature, Hocking emphasizes the inner necessity characteristic 
of destiny: 
To the salmon after thousands of miles of sea-wandering there is just one stream in the 
world where it can breed and die; that stream is carried with it in the implications of its 
own body, and presumably also its sense of being. It is not less true of higher creatures 
that their worlds of fact enter into the definitions of their selves.163  
 
But whereas the salmon possesses a sort of homeostatic homing-device, humans 
are endowed with a higher-level functioning that is exhibited through their capacity for 
theoretical reason. The self, through its ability to combine the data of experience 
intentionally and synthetically, is both the “organizing principle” and, more importantly, 
the “owning principle.” The cognate ability of the self, its capacity to serve as a vinculum 
or reflexive bridge to higher levels of reality, is the basis of its potential for freedom. The 
German word Geistigheit is instructive here – our mental capacity is at the same time our 
link to the world of Spirit. Reflexion is a processive activity in which the self turns 
inward and, through looking at itself, makes itself an object of contemplation.  The 
course of this activity leads to a burgeoning awareness wherein the self becomes more or 
                                                 
162 SBF:135. 
163 SBF: 141. 
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less aware of the critical breach arising between the present self, qua observed, and the 
future self it desires to be: “Reflexion is the beginning of freedom”164 
Similar to the way in which a tributary stream feeds into a river, the act of 
reflexion enables the self to serve as a sluice entering and contributing to a wider circuit 
of meaning. Employing his penchant for both engineering and natural analogies, Hocking 
stresses the subtle changes that can take place in both the sources of motion and the 
direction of movement: “[E]nergy is being sent into the circuit, as it were, through its 
pores…. Reason is building the meaning of every impulse or passion into the body of its 
hope; and the courses of outgoing action are being turned into channels in which the 
promise to promote that hope.”165 Meaning is necessarily reflexive; our metaphysical 
“dream-shapes” cast an immense foreshadow, determining our acts and restructuring our 
sense of the world. When our ideas are channeled in the directions of our hopes, a wedge 
is driven into the tissue of experience and possibilities are evoked that resonate across the 
experiential field like a series of concentric circles. We reap what we sow: 
[E]xperience moves … like a reapers swath,—concerned at every point with the 
particular … masses and bundles of grain, while having before it generalities of higher 
and lower levels. The result of this reaping of experience is nothing is left standing…. 
Everything is now brought into relation to the purposes of the reaper. No natural impulse 
can become a matter of experience and remain unchanged. 166 
 
Our capacity for reflexion, as an act of self-awareness, provides the hint of a 
promise of a surplus – the self that knows itself to be caused, causation has ceased to be 
the whole truth. The ensuing range of vision is greatest when contending impulses are 
                                                 
164 Ibid.:150. 
165 SBF: 168-169. The implications for quantum physics should not be overlooked. See Patrick J. Heelan, 
S.J., “Nature and Its Transformations,” in Theological Studies, Vol. 33, 1972, p. 498: “[E]very observation 
of a quantum-mechanical system is dependent on the context of observation. Given a definite observational 
or descriptive context, say, that for localizing a quantum mechanical system with precision, a horizon of 
possibilities (of localized phenomena) opens up.” 
166 William E. Hocking, Human Nature and Its Remaking (Yale University Press, 1923): 178. 
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held in suspense, while the self considers which impulse shall become the standard bearer 
of its meaning. Reminsicent of Hegel’s powerful declaration that the owl of Minerva flies 
at dusk, Hocking provides this powerful account of the liberating affect of self-
consciousness: 
There is nothing in the field of natural causation entering into me upon which I 
may not thus reflect…. [A]ny series of natural consequences which flows up to me 
becomes distinct from me when I discover it. If I find that my body is the last term in 
some evolutionary series, I cease to be that last term. I am never merely the last term of 
any series which I observe. The clock strikes twelve: to the physical order, the last stroke 
is the last, and no other. To me who listen it is “twelve;” for I am keeping the others in 
mind with it. I am with the other strokes while I am with the last stroke: so what is true of 
the last term of such a series is never all the truth about me…. The self is free from the 
single-series determination of whatever it makes its object.167 
 
§ 
 
The Coming World Civilization 
The era of “civilizations” being past, what we now enter is either the era of civilization or the era 
of universal desolation.168 
 
The self in its exercise of freedom looks into a world of imagination, another space-time order, 
but with an intention different from that of a dream: its intention is that this other world shall 
become real, and it does so.169 
 
Hocking’s last major work, The Coming World Civilization, weaves the dominant 
themes of his past efforts into a unified vision for civilization. The advent of a new 
“world civilization” is not a deterministic fait accompli; it is an event that must be shaped 
by the creative vision and courage of humankind. The possibility of a world civilization 
rests upon the successful realization of universal intersubjective being – a life-long pre-
occupation of Hocking’s. Seeing the difficulty of recognizing the primordiality of 
intersubjective being in a post-Cartesian world, Hocking begins with a careful 
                                                 
167 SBF: 151-152, 155. 
168 William E. Hocking, The Coming World Civilization (Harper & Brothers, 1956): 52. Hereafter referred 
to as CWC. 
169 SBF: 176.  
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examination of both horns of the Cartesian philosophy: the private certitude of the 
Cogito, solus ipse, and a mathematical, value-less philosophy of nature – what Whitehead 
meant by the phrase “vacuous actuality.” 
 Despite the epoch making significance of Descartes’ inference – Cogito ergo Sum 
– the self-referential implications have been largely overlooked. Descartes’ private 
certitude, in order to do its work, had to become de facto universal certitude – resonating 
across the entire spectrum of intersubjective experience. A deepening of subjectivity is 
required in order to transcend the appearance of insularity. Subjectivity possesses an 
inherently liberating capacity. Following the logic of solipsism to its illogical end – that 
point at which solipsism runs up against the “paradoxical immediacy of otherness” – 
provides the bridge leading to a passage beyond modernity. 
 Recognizing the importance of the intersubjective insights of George Herbert 
Mead – and anticipating those of Jürgen Habermas – Hocking recognizes that the I-think 
is molded through language and social interaction. A more perceptive analysis of 
experience is required that attends to the dimension of “an intersubjective Thou-art, 
inseparable from each subjective I am….”170 What is commonly assumed to be “private” 
experience can be taken as such only to the extent that it partakes of a common dimension 
of objectivity – Hocking’s non-impulsive background. Our conception of solitude can 
only arise in the context of what it means to not be alone. Solipsism is self-refuted from 
within the experiential field. Our common recognition of objects is embedded within a 
singular world-unity that has always served as the basis of our common intuition. In fact: 
Our empirical receptiveness to the sensed world is something more crucial and inward 
than an observing of variegated qualities out-there: it is also a receiving of my own life 
from a life-giving entity, which can by no stretch of imagination be a physical “stimulus,” 
                                                 
170 CWC: 31. 
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and nothing more. That is what “experiencing” literally is—a process in which the not-
self is continuously becoming self…. While the self is being sustained in being … it is 
being created. We might now take it as a self-evident proposition that whatever creates a 
self can only be a self. We … have arrived at our goal.171 
 
Different selves overlap through their shared perception of a common world. Each 
person is not merely an fragmented episode consisting simply of “I think,” but is instead 
a “noetic-noema” combined center of activity– there is no thought without an intentional 
correlate.  Through the act of participating in shared experience, a self is linked to other 
selves – a connection grounded in the existence of the common world. For Hocking, the 
continuity with the natural world that was realized through the body is now reinscribed at 
a higher level through a noetic continuity realized per mentem – a continuity wherein the 
self is creatively sustained in being. Reflexion leads to an aboriginal and intrauterine 
experience of the “firm pressure of being” within a field of experience that is not mine 
alone: 
For something of association adheres to the growing mind: to associate with any person is 
to associate vicariously with his associates…. [T]he relation of mental with-ness is 
transitive: if A is with B, in this sense, and B is with C, the A is with C; for B, having  
associated with C is now, whether he likes it or not, and always, B with C—that is what 
he is! Such a chain of intercourse clearly extends without limit to all participants in any 
historical nexus.”172 
 
From out of the interstitial depth of subjectivity, we become grafted upon the 
intersubjective nature of being. The intersubjective depth of human subjectivity is like a 
compass needle pointing to “an intimation of our destined way of living.”173 
A revitalized notion of the soul is required – an integral, spiritual conception of 
the human self in its dealings with its total horizon. The hegemony of the mathematico-
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172 SBF: 137-138. 
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physical world-picture and the resulting predominance of the abstract universal creates a 
condition of separation and lack of balance. According to Hocking, we must recover sight 
in both eyes: 
The truth is the healing fact of which we are in search, a fact as simple, as ever-
present, and as easily overlooked as the fact of one’s own existence. It is accessible to 
every man … on the same terms; yet it falls short of being notorious common knowledge 
because of the same single-eyed industriousness of inquiry which loses sight of the 
soul…. It is the truth that the world, like the human self has its unity in a living purpose. 
It is the truth of the existence of God.174 
 
As Whitehead was keenly aware, objectivity is a necessary abstraction required 
for social progress. In order to avoid the pitfalls of scientific reductionism, it is necessary 
to re-inscribe objectivity within the wider domain of consciousness that Hegel spoke of: 
“Thus as what consciousness affirms from within itself as being-in-itself or the True, we 
have the standard which consciousness itself sets up by which to measure its 
knowledge.”175 Recognition of this fact is of paramount importance for understanding 
that science and religion are engaged in similar projects. Science oftentimes fails to 
recognize that the methodology of scientific investigation is very much inscribed within 
the activity of consciousness. Failure to recognize this important insight leads one critic 
to comment that “Science is inherently not only realistic, trying to describe the way 
things really are, but also imperialistic, bent on proving the only genuine description.”176 
To demonstrate the possibility of a rapprochement between science and religion,  
Hocking draws upon the work of Francis Bacon – a prophet of the modern scientific 
method. Most scholars focus upon the Bacon’s remark that we “put nature to the rack” in 
                                                 
174 What Man Can Make of Man: 59. For poetic expression of “single vision,” see William Blake:  
And twofold Always.  May God us keep 
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175 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit: 53. 
176 David Ray Griffin, “Introduction,” in The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals, ed. David 
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order to force her to reveal her deep secrets. Hocking takes a different approach, focusing 
on the Baconian dictum that in order to master nature we must first yield to her in 
obedience. Yielding in obedience to nature involves an awareness of a sense of 
fundamental unity existing prior to the rack of explanatory “efficient” causes. Once the 
whole of this unity is thematically grasped, Christianity can be viewed as the birth-right 
of humankind because the kingdom of God lies within the awareness of each and every 
person. It is necessary to appreciate the philosophical register of this teaching from the 
gospel. The self, through its capacity to reconnect with a whole of which it has always 
been a part, is a microcosm of the whole – a participant in the universality of experience. 
Experience, not as a brute given but the Wesensschau of Husserl, yeilds the universal 
thread of meaning that is inherent throughout the expanse of Being. Religion can now 
assume a cosmic as opposed to sectarian form. Religion is the reflexive “binding 
together” of the finite self within the unity of the whole – access to which requires the re-
collection of the self in its prior unity. In the authentic Christian sense, “to be chosen” is 
to participate in the “pervasive spirit of induction” that is represented by the teachings of 
Jesus. Through the multiple examples of understanding, reconception, and integration a 
logic can be discerned – a λόγος in the sense of a unified, gathering of the whole hic et 
nunc. Here lies the path to being reborn: 
If a man can somehow fall in love with the Real, as a source of life, he may fall out of 
love with his self-absorbed self; it is hard to see how else he can be “reborn”…. 
  [R]ebirth … must come to a person as all values come—through discovery, through an 
encounter with some character in things that elicits spontaneous allegiance.177 
 
Christian life is best viewed as a constant “rearrangement of the permanent” 
obtained at the cost of suffering and sacrifice. As Hocking powerfully states: “[T]he 
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deepest reach of the Christian ethic is an immediate consequence of the deepest reach of 
its worldview, whereby each person participates in the life of God.”178 When this 
ontological condition is realized in praxis, we understand the true sense of “Thy Kingdom 
come.” For Hocking the shared experience of religion and philosophy is “an immediate 
perception of, and commitment to, the forward thrust of being.”179 
For Hocking, echoing Augustine, “the city to be built, already present in its 
conspectus—universus hic mundus nam una civitas— is still in its architecture out of 
sight.”180 The architecture remains in the making and the human person – qua 
ontologically speaking, a “frontier being” – stands on the cusp of participation in the 
civitas Dei. The individual is not divine per se – we participate in the divine nature but 
our degree of participation is a function of our liberty. We have the choice of acting as an 
isolated ego or as a contributing partner of the divine purpose.”181  Drawing upon the 
insight of Marcel, Hocking insists that the telos of human being is realized within the 
process of ordering oneself to the cosmos as opposed to ordering the cosmos to the needs 
of man – recuperative, secondary reflection partakes of a higher order than primary 
reflection. Human achievement must be continually re-assessed within an emerging 
context of novelty. The real remains, in many ways, a riddling Sphinx but “the unreal 
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must lead to the real.”182 In the presence of this aboriginal philosophical mystery, we 
must proclaim the potential divinity of the individual soul. Human being is on the way to 
being:     
Opus hic terminatum 
Sed non consummatum 
dico183 
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Part IV 
 
An Inward Morning: The Experiential Philosophy of Henry Bugbee  
 
“Metaphysical thinking must rise with the earliest dawn, the very dawn of things themselves.”1 
 
“Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn.2 
 
§ 
 
Introduction 
 
I first heard the name “Henry Bugbee” several years ago in a graduate seminar on 
Heidegger. After discussing the mystical-poetic aspects of Heidegger’s later thought, the 
question was posed as to what prospects were left for philosophy. A silence fell over the 
classroom. The professor quickly filled the void by offering the example of a philosopher 
who “moved to Montana and took up fly fishing.” I approached my professor after class 
inquiring about specifics. At that moment, I became acquainted with the name “Henry 
Bugbee.” 
Anyone who knows anything about Henry Bugbee realizes that his thinking defies 
any type of category or label. Calvin O. Schrag once described Bugbee as one of the 
more marginalized philosophers of the twentieth century while Willard van Orman Quine 
characterized him as the ultimate exemplar of the examined life – years after Harvard 
University denied Bugbee tenure for lack of scholarly output.3 Aside from a handful of 
published papers, his The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form 
(1958), consists of a series of journal entries reminiscent of Marcel’s Journal 
métaphysique. In its title alone, this work contradicted the two reigning genres of 
                                                 
1 Henry G. Bugbee, Jr., The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form (University of 
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philosophical writing: the “treatise-in-tome” monograph and the argument-based, 
refereed journal article. Bugbee’s work has come to signify a transcendence of the 
academic register, both in terms of rational economy and disciplinary focus. Already 
keenly aware of the limitations of formal philosophical writing as an undergraduate, he 
confesses: “Certainly anyone who throws his entire personality into his work must to 
some extent adopt an aesthetic attitude and medium.”4 
Harvard’s loss was philosophy’s gain. Bugbee was eventually able to secure a 
tenured position at the University of Montana where he remained for many years – a 
place welcoming both to his unique philosophic sensibility and his love of the outdoors. 
The story of Bugbee’s important place in American philosophy is just beginning to be 
told; but one major example of his contribution is his close relationship to Gabriel Marcel 
– with whom he attended Heidegger’s lectures at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1955. Marcel found a 
kindred spirit in Bugbee’s thought – their shared emphases on concreteness and place, the 
peripatetic nature of reflection, and the personal testimony given to the ethical, aesthetic, 
and religious dimensions of experience caused Marcel to comment that “Henry Bugbee 
and I inhabit the same land … [a land] illuminated by a light of its own.”5  According to 
Bugbee: “Marcel’s writings … spoke to my condition…. Marcel helped me to find my 
own voice….”6  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Henry G. Bugbee, Jr., In Demonstration of the Spirit (Princeton University, 1936), unpublished 
undergraduate thesis. Hereafter referred to as DS. 
5 Gabriel Marcel, “Introduction” to The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form: 
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6 IM: 13. See also Henry Bugbee, “A Point of Co-Articulation in the Life and Thought of Gabriel Marcel,” 
in Philosophy Today, Volume XIX, Spring 1975): p. 62: “That the world could thus make itself known in 
an essentially dialogic manner becomes a deliverance of experience commanding recurrent meditation.” 
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§ 
The Undergraduate Thesis: In Demonstration of the Spirit 
   Every time I retrace the course of my reflections since ‘their beginning’ in my undergraduate 
years I discern as central this preoccupation with [the] ‘somewhat absolute’ in experience….7 
 
   My task has been … to accommodate the life of spirit with all [of] the mind.8 
 
Bugbee’s propensity for concreteness and originality can be traced back to his 
youth. The son of a successful physician, Bugbee grew up in Manhattan where he 
cultivated a deep appreciation of classical music, art, and jazz. Urban legend has it that 
while an undergraduate at Princeton, he would purposely turn up the volume of a Mozart 
recording at lunchtime. This would catch the attention of Albert Einstein who routinely 
passed by Bugbee’s dormitory room on his way to lunch. Bugbee was aware of the power 
of classical music to lure the famous physicist off his habitual path, all for the purpose of 
engaging him in conversation.  It will become immediately evident that “[T]his is no 
ordinary thesis, and no ordinary college senior.”9  
Bugbee’s undergraduate thesis was directed by Werner Fite. Little, if any, 
attention is paid to Fite today. This is unfortunate because it was Fite who first exposed 
the young Bugbee to the importance of concreteness and the primacy of the personal.10 
Bugbee’s thesis begins with a pointed indictment as to how prevailing philosophical 
doctrine has led to a balkanization of fact and value, resulting in “a dichotomy of 
                                                 
7 IM: 131-132. 
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experience … produc[ing] one of the most fundamental and evasive problems ever to 
persist.”11  The thesis begins with a preliminary account of consciousness, followed by a 
phenomenology of moral and aesthetic experience and concludes with a treatment of 
Unamuno’s “tragic sense of life” – a harbinger of Bugbee’s later experiential philosophy. 
A brief, personal “Epilogue” completes the work. 
One observation that immediately strikes the reader is the religious “tenor” of the 
thesis – a tenor that will set the tone for Bugbee’s appeal to an absolute “dimension” of 
experience. The religious dimension is immediately apparent by virtue of the inclusion of 
the word “Spirit” in the title. But what is perhaps more revealing is that each of the first 
three chapters begins with a biblical epigraph, and the work concludes with a quote from 
Saint Paul: “To this effect I have not spoken ‘with enticing words of man’s wisdom, but 
in demonstration of the Spirit and of power: That your faith should not stand in the 
wisdom of men, but in the power of God.’”12 Bugbee’s salutation “Amen,” followed by 
his longhand signature, leaves the reader with a profound sense of having witnessed a 
personal revelation of some significance on the part of the author. 
Another observation is the evidence of a clear sense of self-consciousness on the 
writer’s part as to the severe limitations of “formal” academic philosophy and the vital 
need for philosophy to be developed in personal terms. Philosophy must speak directly to 
what Bugbee repeatedly refers to as “the whole man.” This unapologetic, self-
consciousness, when combined with a religious sensibility – quite remarkable for a writer 
of Bugbee’s age – reveals a form of “demonstration” that is neither deductive nor 
dialectical. The Spirit to which Bugbee calls our attention must be understood 
                                                 
11 DS: 2. See infra where Bugbee indicates “Many great philosophers have been greatly troubled by it, [but] 
each of us in turn must cope with it himself.” 
12 DS: 96. 
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evocatively as an “unfold[ing] not as wisdom but as revelation or ephiphany, a showing 
or ‘demonstration’ … that attends to the things of creation in their bounteous 
unfolding.”13 Bugbee’s “final word” in the “Prologue” offers a provocative intimation of 
things to come: 
  A final word – you will realize that my efforts, while wholly tentative and probably 
quite inadequate, represent a most serious and valuable attempt to think my way out of 
the particular situation in which I have become vitally involved. I hope to accomplish 
more than the fulfillment of certain requirements, for a good deal of my future depends 
upon what may be considered Philosophy. If it is the strictly limited pursuit – in regard to 
method – which it may possibly turn out to be, then I am afraid I will have to break the 
confines of the medium, for images and a full conscious life beckon me more than their 
purified reflection – ideas.14 
 
Consciousness as Sympathetic Engagement 
 
 Despite the wide range of interests of such thinkers as Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, 
modern philosophy has, to use a phrase of Hocking, continued to “polish the surface of 
the mirror,” resulting in a narrower and narrower preoccupation with the problem of 
knowledge. According to Bugbee, the empirico-deductive method “sets the type and the 
topic for an alarming amount of Anglo-Saxon, if not other current Philosophy as 
well….”15 The names of these quasi-scientific models of philosophical inquiry are well 
known: Logicism, Positivism, Instrumentalism, and Realism represent a few of the most 
tenacious examples. Such “rigorous” attempts fail due to the peremptory dismissal of a 
vast amount of potential evidence – “Consciousness is unique in that it cannot be 
represented in the Spatio-Temporal dimensions of Science … if for no other reason than 
that such observation fails to take account of the tremendous amount of data rendered 
inaccessible by the very nature of the case.”16 Thematic focus is essential to all levels of 
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15 Ibid.: 8. 
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inquiry, but an exclusive preoccupation with scientific method yields an extremely 
narrow focus – a focus unable to reveal that which is most important for human-beings. 
When the scientific method holds sway, reality becomes compartmentalized – those 
aspects of reality which cannot be scientifically confirmed become cognitively 
invalidated or, as the logical positivist claims, “meaningless.” At this point, Bugbee 
demonstrates a wisdom well beyond his years: “[T]he departmentalization of 
consciousness, in particular for philosophical purposes, … seems to me a grave error, for 
we don’t experience life that way….”17  
 Bugbee proposes a wider empiricism than that offered by Locke and Hume. An 
empiricism based largely upon an ocular model is inadequate to the breadth of experience 
– a breadth which extends into moral, aesthetic, and religious dimensions. In fact, Bugbee 
argues that “the more an experience transcends or interpenetrates categories in general 
the more significant it may be…. The crying need of man is a faith fostered in the[se] 
latter spheres of human nature….”18 
 Bugbee is not the first philosopher to question the limits of scientific explanation. 
The issue one must confront is how do we go about “verifying” those aspects of 
experience that transcend the merely empirical?  The clue resides in a more 
“interpenetrative” understanding of experience: 
 This, then, is the unique character of consciousness, whereby many elements are 
combined within a unified personality, and thus the Spirit represents the supreme 
embodiment of both the one and the many, an integrally logical manifold of infinitely 
diverse particulars. Such is the logic of personality, and it must furnish the basis of any 
living philosophy.19 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid.: 12. 
18 Ibid.: 12, 13. 
19 DS: 14. 
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 In other words, a logos, or structural unity, pervades reality at all levels, i.e. the 
concept, the person, the work of art, and serves as the basis of an implicating-
interpenetrating relational network. The experience of such unity cannot be felt at a 
distance – at some point we must enter into a sympathetic relationship with things. 
Recognizing the influence of Fite, Bugbee understands that philosophical reflection is 
necessarily instituted from one perspective or another. What is typically associated with 
the notion of “objectivity,” – or the “view from nowhere” – is, in fact, a condition in 
which the content of reflection is wrenched out of its rich context of discovery and 
filtered through a narrowing lens of justification. This is a mistake. When personal 
observations are cut off from their originating context – the only context which can 
“veritably vivify their significance – it seems inevitable that our efforts will culminate in 
an insecure skepticism.”20 
 Taking his bearings from Kant, Bugbee believes in the fundamental existence of 
noumenal reality, requiring a deeper understanding than that offered by scientific method. 
Echoing Fite, Bugbee recognizes that “in our personal relations, we are apt to satisfy the 
demand for validity along different lines.”21 Reality, whether in the form of a work of art 
or the presence of a person, is compelling – the receptive consciousness is confronted 
with a “ground bas[s]” of the real which “render[s] possible the understanding even of 
things in themselves to some degree and furnishes the basis for faith in noumenal 
experience.”22 
 Noumenal experience is best accessed through intuition. Intuition, for Bugbee, is 
“full-bodied,” providing a direct sense of a melding of the one with the many. Intuition is 
                                                 
20 DS: 16. See p. 25(a): “It is essential that we regard [consciousness] as a unit …. [A]ll experience has 
aspects which are fundamentally merged in any given phase of conscious time.” 
21 Ibid.: 18. 
22 Ibid.: 19. 
 234
no mere sub-faculty of our rational make-up – it is the typification of consciousness: 
“[I]ntuition thus interpreted most completely typifies consciousness as the experience of 
unity in plurality, and it is this synthetic realization of life which constitutes the soul and 
substance of Philosophy….”23  Through intuition, we sympathetically penetrate into the 
depths of experience. Entering these depths of experience is illuminative due to the 
synthetic fusion of ingredients contained therein: 
 When we place our ears close to the stream of life we do not hear a ticking of segregated 
consecutive instants but rather a constant hum, a mingling of harmonies interposed by 
epoch changes in key and imperceptible blends…. What I advocate is a sympathetic 
imaginative insight into the understanding of the agent, fortified by what can be learned 
from the more protracted and remote speculations of the observer.24  
 
Philosophy must demonstrate a more rigorous empirical orientation – inclusive of 
the entire spectrum of human experience. No longer simply the business of a professional 
elite, philosophy must speak to the vital concerns of the human. Sounding much like 
Hegel, Bugbee believes that the human personality participates in the life of Spirit: “[A]s 
if in a single act of understanding, … the subject consciousness may indeed incorporate 
the object…. [E]xperience of this sort is characteristic of human life functioning most 
comprehensively as a whole through imaginative insight, thus becoming aware of itself 
through itself….”25  
Noumenal Nature of Man: Personality as the Expression of Morality 
 It is clear from reading Bugbee’s undergraduate thesis that the spectre of 
relativism was not unique to the college campus of the 1960s, but was clearly visible in 
the 1930’s as well. As a champion of the foundational nature of experience, Bugbee must 
                                                 
23 DS: 20. Bugbee cites C.M. Joad: “This intuitive awareness of reality confers the most valuable 
experiences which the human mind, at its present level of evolutionary development, enjoys.” (C.M. Joad, 
Return to Philosophy [Dutton, 1936], p. 31.) Note that at the end of Chapter I, p. 27, Bugbee states: 
“[I]ntuition is never ultimately adequate, and in fact proof itself may be finally reduced to a series of 
telescopic intuitions more or less conclusively inviting agreement.” 
24 DS: 22. 
25 Ibid.: 26. 
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discredit relativism and, to his credit, he does so quite effectively. Again, showing a 
maturity well beyond his years, Bugbee quickly asserts that the relativist is a relativist 
about everyone’s moral experience except his own.  Concerning his own moral 
experience, the relativist is a staunch defender! Much like the scepticism that followed 
from the egocentric predicament of modern epistemology, Bugbee will argue that moral 
skepticism arises out of the impersonal stance tacitly assumed by moral theory. A return 
to the context of sympathetic engagement is required: “Moral Philosophy must start at the 
other pole, first of all with one’s own moral experience, and from a careful attempt to get 
at the meaning of this it will perhaps be possible to infer what that of others may mean.”26 
 Taking his lead from Kant, Bugbee is deeply convinced that our noumenal nature 
– our “locus of value” – is rooted in consciousness and cannot be grasped phenomenally. 
In fact, the moral experience of the other, obtained through sympathetic insight, gives us 
access to the spiritual universe of value – localized through the concrete embodiment of 
the human personality: “The individual personality is in the widest sense the expression 
of morality … certain elements of morality remain more or less constant throughout.”27 
 The notion of noumenal freedom provides an important clue for understanding the 
spiritual dimension of the human being. Determinists claim that all action is conditioned 
by law. But like his cousin the relativist, the determinist often rejects such determination 
when it comes to characterizing his own existence. In moments of impassioned action, 
we are neither relativists nor determinists – our actions are sui generis. Each one of us 
lives our life to some degree as a testimonial to what we consider to be just. Moral 
experience reveals a “maze of interlocking consciousness” exhibiting a spiritual 
                                                 
26 DS: 29. 
27 Ibid.: 29. 
 236
dimension that is oriented around my life: “[T]he individual is both generic and specific 
… one in many.”28 
 Acts of devotion provide prima facie evidence of the moral essence of our being. 
The fact that the problem of moral knowledge has persisted throughout the ages is not 
evidence of the truth of relativism but a testimonial to the universality of moral 
experience: “That the moral problem in general has remained relatively constant in the 
memory of man I will suggest is also corroborated by … every man not completely 
anesthetic to the central perplexities of life.”29 What appears to be a string of 
contradictions upon further examination reveals itself as an enduring essence. Moral 
philosophy must consist of more than a shell game – a “shuffling of words with an eye 
for their consistency. It stands for an attempt necessarily participated in by every one, by 
which some unity of purpose and integrity of character comes into being.”30 
 Much like the way in which the pure intuitions and the categories of the 
understanding give shape to the phenomenal character of experience, the “teleological 
autonomy” of the noumenal self is given shape through a unity of moral purpose. The 
variety of these attempts to “give shape” is the universal. Through the medium of 
sympathetic insight, we must see into the motives upon which we act as concrete 
individuals, finding a moral value intrinsic to noumenal experience. Here again, intuition 
provides a key to unlocking the door to the noumenal. Wanting to avoid the Kantian 
bifurcation of thought and experience – fact and value – Bugbee moves within 
consciousness much like Hegel does, attempting a reconstruction of “the most 
                                                 
28 DS: 32. 
29 Ibid.: 33. 
30 Ibid.: 36. 
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consummate and complete phenomenal intelligence that is possible….”31 By moving 
within deep folds of human experience – not merely through analytical dissection – we 
are closer to  capturing the synthetic unity and relational intensity that is appropriate for 
the noumenal – and much closer to a more adequate understanding of the universality of 
value experience. 
The Connection Between Phenomenal and Noumenal Reality: The Justification of 
Life as an Aesthetic Phenomenon 
 
 Bugbee’s philosophical project is clearly at odds with the single-vision 
characteristic of a rigid dogmatism. An appeal to the metaphorical aspects of thought and 
language is necessary in order “to free consciousness within its own medium, to prompt 
its flow through a mingling of associations, double meanings, overtones, plastic and 
dynamic contrasts, all the vivid channels of imaginations which break through the narrow 
limitations of static and barren logical procedure; in this sense ‘imagination is the true 
realm of man’s infinity’….”32 Art represents the closest approximation of phenomenal 
intelligence with noumenal reality – judgments of taste are universal, necessary and, at 
the same time, non-conceptual. Aesthetic judgments, like moral judgments, do not 
necessitate universal agreement on any given work of art, yet “aesthetic experience 
critically analyzed suggests the regulative necessity for some sort of aesthetic universality 
through the unique yet similar coerciveness of the object of aesthetic experience.”33 
When Kant spoke about the disinterestedness of the aesthetic truth, he was both right and 
wrong. Kant was correct that art is to a large extent disinterested as to moral, intellectual, 
or mimetic correctness. Yet at the same time, art bespeaks a vital interest – according to 
Bugbee, “I cannot conceive of men participating in a form of life which could be more 
                                                 
31 Ibid.: 40.  
32 Ibid.: 44. 
33 DS: 52. 
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vitally interesting than in some form of art.”34 Any appearance of aesthetic neutrality 
presents itself as a sublimated transfiguration of a prior “organic and inherent focus upon 
Aesthetic experience.”35 Contrary to any appearance of neutrality, art consists of “a 
unique and tremendously significant mode of communication rivaling pure 
conceptualization as an interpretation of Reality … for the aesthetic experience can be as 
intensely and widely synthetic as any consciousness of which man is capable.”36 The 
intensive unity and relational structure of the work of art provides the clue to a dimension 
of experience which is aesthetic – intensively unified and relationally extended. Although 
typically couched in abstract intellectualist terms, the response to an aesthetic object is 
one of our most commonplace experiences – a transformation of the commonplace. 
According to Bugbee: “I have discovered deep sensitivity and even an essential though 
embryonic aesthetic attitude among many men to whom to whom the cultivated circles of 
the select are foreign … their approach is usually through ‘natural beauty’ … all of which 
is apt to be a little vague and decidedly unreal to the typical ‘man of the study,’ or 
rocking chair philosopher.”37 
 For Bugbee, the process of engaging in aesthetic responsiveness is a constitutive 
act of the human-being. Art, much like the young Nietzsche conceives it, represents the 
highest task and truly metaphysical activity of life because the person, in its most 
defining moment, acts as an artist. According to Nietzsche: 
Art is neither performed for our betterment or education nor are we the true authors of 
this art world. On the contrary, we may assume that we are merely images and artistic 
projections … and that we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of art—
                                                 
34 DS: 53. 
35 Ibid.: 53. 
36 Ibid.: 54. 
37 DS: 57. 
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for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally 
justified….38 
 
The Tragic Sense of Life: The Experiential Constellation of Life and Thought in 
Miguel de Unamumo 
 
Bugbee was introduced to the thought of Miguel de Unamumo by Fite who 
translated de Unamuno’s novella Mist. De Unamuno spurs a deep seated desire in Bugbee 
to be true to experience – not through “a system of metaphysics or a cosmology, but 
rather a Lebensanschaung or view of life … as the synthetic manifestation of a total 
unified spiritual existence.”39 This unified view is called by de Unamuno a “tragic sense 
of life.” Embracing a tragic sense involves harboring a sense of skepticism in the 
presence of a compelling undeniable faith in noumenal reality. The persistent synergistic 
character of this conflict results in the perpetuation of a Socratic style of philosophical 
reflection “prompt[ing] attempts at expression in almost every direction of human 
activity.”40 The importance of de Unamuno, for Bugbee, extends far beyond the telling 
example of the philosophical spirit he dramatically embodied. His ultimate significance 
lies in the manner in which de Unamuno was able to give expression to “a gnawing 
restlessness … implicit within human nature itself.”41 Unamuno is an example of the 
manner in which the life of “the whole man” strives to realize a synthetic character, or 
“vital unity,” wherein aesthetic and moral values are given concrete expression within the 
wider context of noumenal reality. Unamuno contrasts an “intense vitalism” championing 
the primacy of the living with the Nietzschean conception of “Socratic” rationalism that 
is anathema to life. Much like Nietzsche’s “Alexandrian man” – blinded by the dust of 
                                                 
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (Vintage Books: 1967), p. 52.  The comparison of Nietzsche and Bugbee can only be 
taken so far, but their shared interest in Wagner (see DS, pp. 64-69) is indicative of their shared 
understanding of art in a most comprehensive sense.  
39 DS: 4. 
40 Ibid.: 70. 
41 DS: 70. 
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books and printers’ errors – modern man is also at risk of becoming both blind and dead 
through the unilateral embracing of a static, mortifying “criterion of reason.” 
For Unamuno, reason exhibits a profound lure which, if blindly followed, leads to 
“an empty and bottomless well … lead[ing] to the annihilation of consciousness in the 
deepest sense of vitality.”42 A life-saving link, or thread, is required, similar to that 
provided by Ariadne in Theseus’ battle with the minotaur, in order to escape the 
devastating implications of complete rational enclosure – a “dead view” of the world. A 
life-affirming view of the world requires a more catholic approach than what can be 
achieved through science. Unamuno is not in favor of jettisoning scientific rationality, but 
simply “awaking the soul” to its vast possibilities in the presence of a resigned 
acceptance of a “doomed universe.” The synergized unity of scepticism and hope 
constitutes the “high noon” of Unamuno’s Lebensanschaung – a set of conflicting 
antinomies, as exhibited in the battle between reason and faith, has haunted and continues 
to haunt mankind: “[L]ife itself consists in the conflict of these faculties and herein we 
must make our peace.”43 There is no shortage of examples of this struggle – however 
much they are overlooked by academic philosophy. The relativist and the determinist 
may leave their texts on the nightstand, but in their dreams they are neither a relativist nor 
a determinist. In Unamuno’s words “primum vivere, deinde philosophare” or, as the 
young Bugbee asserts, “[T]he essence of life – tautologically – is living, and not 
intellectual understanding.”44  
The scene in which this conflict between the phenomenal and the noumenal most 
passionately comes to pass concerns the problem of immortality. Humanity’s perennial 
                                                 
42 Ibid.: 74. 
43 DS: 76. 
44 Ibid.: 79. 
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concern with the immortality of the soul is reflected in the works of great art, literature 
and philosophy – significant examples include Michelangelo’s “The Creation of Adam,” 
Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, and Plato’s Phaedo. However, the deeply 
personal issue of the immortality of the soul is not the exclusive property of high-brow 
culture – it resonates in the heart and soul of each and every human alive to its 
possibilities: “[T]he problem of immortality … this noumenal realm …the realm of value 
… constitutes the matrix of the soul which man feels a vital longing to perpetuate.”45  
 It is unlikely that the impersonal philosophical treatise or academic tome could 
adequately express this inner logic of “the whole man.” Through his acquaintance with 
the life-work of Unamuno, the young Bugbee is on the way to a more radical version of 
Kant’s Copernican Revolution in which “the impulse to self-revelation [comes] from 
within … mak[ing] himself the subject of artistic exposition.”46 It is only from within this 
perspective of self-revelation, disclosing an experience of compelling, personal response, 
that “the most important function of the world of objects [can be seen as] that of a 
medium for the manifestation of value.”47 Herein lies the value of the aesthetic object as a 
material object that must be recognized as real and, at the same time, directing one’s 
attention to the universals bodied forth. Bugbee concludes this chapter with a word of 
thanks to Unamuno for awakening the young man from his dogmatic slumber, but 
perhaps more compelling is a quote from Unamuno that will serve as the mantra for 
Bugbee’s later philosophizing: “[I] believe that there is another world within our world 
and mysterious dominant forces in the depth of our spirit, those who speak the language 
                                                 
45 Ibid.: 80. 
46 Paul Bekker, Beethoven (Dutton Press, 1932): 79. Bugbee cites this text to illuminate the personality of 
Beethoven, but it is clear that he is making a wider claim as to the noumenal dimension of personality. 
47 DS: 89. 
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of the heart and many who prefer not to speak at all.”48 This serves as a prophetic vision, 
coming from a young man who would be denied tenure at Harvard years later for reason 
of lack of scholarly output.  
§ 
Graduate Studies at Berkeley: The Sense and the Conception of Being 
As I put it years ago in my doctoral thesis, reality makes its stand here and now in existing 
things.49  
 
[T]he experience with which this thesis is so largely concerned cannot be shaken….50 
 
 Following his graduation from Princeton, Bugbee traveled to the University of 
California at Berkeley to take up graduate work in Philosophy. The routine of graduate 
study was interrupted in 1942, when Bugbee was called to serve in the United States 
Navy, resulting in combat duty aboard ship in the South Pacific. Few academics today 
can relate to such a call to duty. Bugbee’s military service kept him from his graduate 
studies for four years. He returned to Berkeley, completing his Ph.D. in January of 1947 
with a dissertation entitled The Sense and Conception of Being. Two things stand out 
about this dissertation. First, unlike the sense connoted in the title, this is not a work 
inspired by the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of metaphysics. According to one reader, 
“Being, for him, is fundamentally experiential, something sensed rather than primarily 
conceptualized.51 Another observation is that there is no presence of any post- war 
sensibility, or “shock-effect,” in the work. Oftentimes, an experience of this magnitude 
takes time to recollect and to process – but what is especially telling is that his Inward 
Morning, a work “written in a continuous awareness of death” consists of several 
                                                 
48 Miguel de Unamuno, Essays and Soliloquies, trans. J.E.C. Flitch (A. Knopf, 1925), p. 182. 
49 IM: 162-163. 
50 Henry Greenwood Bugbee, Jr., The Sense and the Conception of Being, Ph.D. Dissertation, (University 
of California: Berkeley, 1947): 3. Hereafter referred to as SCB. 
51 Mooney, “Meditations on Death and the Sublime: Henry Bugbee’s In Defense of Spirit: p. 9.  
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accounts of Bugbee’s time at sea. It remains a mystery as to why these experiences of the 
recent past did not find a way into his Ph.D. dissertation, only to surface less than a 
decade later.52 
 The dissertation is signed by Jacob M. Lowenberg, Stephen C. Pepper, and 
George P. Adams. Recognizing that the Ph.D. dissertation is the work of the author and 
not the committee, this committee provides a very receptive audience for Bugbee’s 
innovative approach to philosophy – an approach existing in statu nascendi while at 
Princeton.53 The dissertation abstract provides a concise, compelling account of things to 
come: 
Th[is] dissertation attempts to work out the meaning of being, not merely as abstractly 
conceived, but as it arises, through special awareness of the presence of things in their 
definiteness…. 
  Ultimately we must be told what kind of world it is that either precludes or permits 
some fundamental, comprehensive understanding of its nature; therefore, criticism of the 
metaphysical enterprise must be viewed as a revision of it from within; one does not 
repudiate this enterprise without repudiating his position as a knower in and of the world, 
reflecting its nature in the way he does and does not know it.54 
 
The Possibility of an Empirical Metaphysics 
 
The question as to the possibility of metaphysics, empirical or otherwise, is 
perhaps the perennial philosophical question. Bugbee’s dissertation was composed at a 
                                                 
52 See Bugbee’s comments regarding his graduate studies in An Inward Morning, p. 141: “[I]t seem to me 
that I left man out of account … I entirely failed to connect the meaning of existence which I was trying to 
bespeak with the experience of acting, of commitment, of standing forth as a man…. After five years of 
graduate schooling in the mode of reflection, perhaps I am ready to revert to the experience of life with 
men at sea, as the situation defining my task.” 
53 At the risk of not seeing the tree for the forest, Bugbee’s dissertation committee – all Harvard Ph.D.’s – 
consisted of two members who were students of Royce, e.g. Adams and Lowenberg, as well as a 
metaphysical aesthetician in the grand tradition of Whitehead, e.g. Pepper, who studied under Ralph Barton 
Perry. This is a committee that was quite open to the novel approach taken by Bugbee.   
54 Henry Greenwood Bugbee, Jr., The Sense and the Conception of Being, Ph.D. Dissertation, (University 
of California: Berkeley, 1947): page unnumbered. Hereafter referred to as SCB. The influence of Werner 
Fite, in terms of the importance of the personal, reflexive nature of inquiry, is obvious: 
 
“[A]s the dissertation should make clear, little originality could be claimed either for the sense 
or the conception of being that is presented her – no more than that which might characterize the 
experience and reflection of an individual on a theme that should permeate the experience and 
thought of creatures having experience and thinking, if this thesis has its modicum of truth (SCB: 
ii).” 
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time when metaphysical inquiry resulted oftentimes in a “storm-center of controversy.” 
Bugbee recognizes that an anti-metaphysical position is a metaphysical position because 
in order to render metaphysical knowledge impossible, a conception of the world that is 
non-susceptible to metaphysical scrutiny must be explicitly conceived or, at the very 
least, implied. In short, metaphysics must be “self-substantiating” – the possibility, or 
impossibility, of metaphysics requires a metaphysic.  
Bugbee’s approach to this question, qua empirical, is developed infra-
experientially, “in the making, … follow[ing] the actual plan of discovery and disclosure 
enforced by strict adherence to the empirical method….”55 An “empirical” approach to 
metaphysics has taken a back-seat to a “rationalistic” approach because the former is 
viewed as unable to exhibit the comprehensiveness required in order to capture reality as 
a whole. Although human knowledge is manifestly incomplete, experience does provide 
a rich kernel of metaphysical insight. Experience confronts us with a plethora of things – 
in Jamesian terms a “booming, buzzing confusion.” From Bugbee’s perspective, in our 
day to day dealings with things, we encounter a world present as meaningful and 
indubitable – “all this is inviolable before any attempt at theoretical or conceptual 
reduction.”56  The key is to observe. The American novelist, Annie Dillard, once 
remarked with irony that single celled organisms interact with the world in a more direct 
way than humans, due to the absence of mediating conceptual obstructions in “lower 
functioning” organisms. Our human failure to engage in direct contact with brute fact 
causes our conceptions to “wash off,” as Bugbee liked to say, and “break down into a 
                                                 
55 SCB: 3. 
56 SCB: 16. 
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meaningless, circular verbal chase.”57 Unlike seeking recluse behind a sheer sheen of 
sense-data, a return to experience in the Bugbeean sense is a return to experience in its 
“thickness.” His vision for an empirical metaphysics is both prolific and powerful: “It 
balances a stress on the organicity of entities with an equal emphasis on their insularity. 
And it insists on viewing the world as a going concern, in which the nature of anything is 
as much a linear development as a cross-sectional state.”58 
An empirical metaphysics requires understanding reality in terms of the full reach 
of its cross-sectional and linear development. Considering the real as both “collective” 
and “distributive,” Bugbee turns to a consideration of things in their temporal 
dimensionality in order to move beyond any limitations imposed by the immediate 
present. Through a consideration of the ecstatic nature of temporally – a present, 
according to Leibniz that is “big with the future” – Bugbee argues that “we are faced with 
the conclusion that in so far as the distribution of reality is wider than any existing 
situation, reality as a whole cannot be construed … as itself a particular existential 
situation.”59 For that reason Bugbee is critical of systems of Absolute Idealism, as in 
Royce, in which the world of process becomes transfixed – a fait accompli within 
Absolute consciousness. In order for the “totality of fact” to exist, a dynamic world must 
have some how run its course. What has posed as the problem of metaphysics is not the 
result of any innate deficiency of human awareness, “it is at least the obdurate dynamicity 
of things that precludes their forming a reality that is whole in its extent….”60 Bugbee’s 
empirical approach to metaphysics  moves in a counter direction to the Lockean version 
                                                 
57 Ibid.: 17. See infra where Bugbee refers to the importance of knowers “seeing eye to eye.” This notion of 
an encounter while seeing “eye to eye” will take on personal significance in The Inward Morning. 
58 SCB: 18. 
59 Ibid.: 21. 
60 SCB: 26 
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of “something, I know not what.” Instead, Bugbee pursues a course more along the lines 
of an Aristotelian consideration of immanent first principles: 
The focus of metaphysical attention is not characterized by a direct stretching and 
extension until it blankets an all inclusive situation, but rather by an intensive analysis of 
the concrete world of our experience until those of its features which are ultimate, and so 
engaged in any possible situation are elicited into view.61 
 
 First principles are principles constitutive of the “immanent intelligibility” of 
things.  Bugbee’s attention to first principles as intensively immanent enables him to 
avoid the pitfalls of an extensive metaphysics of the whole. However, it is important to 
point out that first principles, due to the fact that they necessarily arise out of actual 
experience, remain, in an important sense indemonstrable: “their discovery [can] never be 
merely cognitive.”62 
 Bugbee presents brief categorical scheme of first principles in order to set the 
stage for his later analysis of Being. The first principles highlighted therein – 
relationality, insularity, quality, and dynamicity – provide only an anticipatory glance of 
the vision to be explicated.  Nevertheless, the focus remains steadfast in its commitment 
to empirical concreteness. Unlike Nietzsche’s claim in Twilight of the Idols that the 
concept of being represented the last gasp of an evaporating reality, Bugbee’s sense of 
being is neither arid nor dialectical: “[L]et our invocation be that we may see what we are 
talking about. But sometimes the plainest of things is the hardest to see. Thus the ultimate 
condition of any experience or knowledge may pass unnoticed, – unreflected upon, and 
without selective empirical recognition.”63  
                                                 
61 Ibid.: 28. 
62 SCB: 28. See p. 34, where, regarding indemonstrability of first principles, Bugbee indicates that our 
knowledge is descriptive: “[A]ll that cognition is essential to is their apprehension.” 
63 SCB: 51. 
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 Unlike the Aristotlelian-Scholastic conception of prime matter, Bugbee’s 
conception of a first principle is not that of a transcendental cause or ground: “Matter can 
be nothing, if it is not the definite materials experienced, which come in pieces, lumps, 
masses, portions, and parts…. Materials as known to us are known in terms of their 
concrete properties.”64 Reality is also fundamentally relational – a non-relational situation 
can only be conceived in abstracto from some relation. Insularity, qua first principle, is 
indicative of the discreteness and plurality the universe exhibits. Insularity, despite any 
appearance of separateness, is at bottom relational – insularity provides the condition that 
enables the degree of separateness or independence of an entity which, in turn, enables 
the possibility of their relatedness. A quality, on the other hand, is constitutive of a 
“center of definiteness.” Qualitative definiteness provides the basis of relatedness in so 
far as the unique structure of a thing is the result of qualities organically related in a way 
that is inherent as opposed to accidental. The principle of dynamicity causes us to 
undergo the experience of being “thrust ahead.” Despite recourse to gerunds and verbs, 
language is necessarily strained when it comes to accounting for the transitive character 
of the universe. Although reticent in his treatment of each of these principles, Bugbee 
focuses the most attention upon dynamicity: “A thing is as much a center of energy as it 
is a center of qualitative definiteness … a creative advance … hylicly singular and related 
beyond itself.65 
 Bugbee’s intent is to delineate a scheme of first principles that will facilitate his 
understanding of being as intensive. Being, qua intensive, is contrary to the notion of 
reality as an extensive whole. Echoing Aquinas’ comment that all conceptions are 
resolved in being (ens), Bugbee states: “Being is the principle of inclusion of the items of 
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reality … as a principle of inclusion it is all-inclusive, without implying that reality exists 
as a whole…. It is because this principle applies to any reality, rather than to a limited all, 
that it is all-inclusive, comprehensive in its embrace.”66  Bugbee’s treatment of being qua 
intensive is crucial to his project of establishing an empirical metaphysics. Whereas an 
extensive conception of being necessarily results in the problem of the inability of a finite 
self to grasp “the whole” empirically, an intensive view of being – by considering being 
as a “root concept”— allows an intensive wholeness that is sui generis. It is worth 
quoting Bugbee at length on this point: 
Being is undifferentiated; there are no degrees of being, no qualitative shades, no 
islands of being, no differential relational systems. Being gives to reality a 
uniformity and simplicity which is not that of singularity, a cohesiveness that is 
neither contiguity or continuity, it gives it completeness and self-containedness 
which is not systematic comprehensiveness, nor quantitative totality, and a 
perfection that is not the realization of any end. [Being] is eternal in the sense that 
it is a-temporal; it is infinite, not in the sense of indefiniteness, but in the sense 
that the categories of limitation are not germane…. Such is the ontological 
wholeness of reality. Being is absolute. The extensive wholeness of reality is 
founded on an intensive wholeness.67 
 
Much like Hegel intimated in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the world is 
intensively present whenever there is anything present at all – to the extent that 
something is presented as incomplete, a nascent sense of its completeness is revealed at 
the same time. At the risk of saying too much, an empirical, intensive metaphysics views 
the world as being pre-reflectively given all at once. The ramifications of this insight, 
will take Bugbee far into the reaches of experiential philosophy: “[T]he basis for the 
metaphysical perspective of any actual or possible situation must be at least theoretically 
accessible in any … such situation that are accessible to us.”68 A return to the lived 
                                                 
66 Ibid.: 44, 45. See also, p. 47: As a “root concept,” the principle of being is “concretely manifested 
wherever, or whenever, there is anything at all….” 
67 SCB: 45-46. Emphasis added. 
68 Ibid.: 48. 
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experience of the concrete world provides the stimulus for metaphysical speculation – 
philosophical reflection must be tied to the actual situation in which we find ourselves. 
Paul, one of the major characters in Norman MacLean’s novel A River Runs Through It, 
sounds very much like Bugbee when he says: “All there is to thinking … is seeing 
something noticeable which makes you see something you weren’t noticing which makes 
you see something that isn’t even visible.”69 Whenever there is a conscious recognition of 
presence, we stand within the presence of being – if only latently understood.  
The Direct and Immediate Apprehension of Being 
 In order to understand being intensively, we must begin with presence. Sounding 
much like Heidegger – whom Bugbee had not read at this stage in his development – he 
writes: “It is the presence of things in their definiteness which occasions the sense of 
being.”70 As the sine qua non of our awareness of things, presence is “inescapable” – but 
for that very reason, the experience of presencing per se can assume the character of a 
“monotonous undertone,” concealed by virtue of its very familiarity. How do we go 
about raising this muted undertone to a level of resounding audibility? 
 Resisting the pull of the purely practical and the lure of the material are necessary 
first steps.  As our American experience becomes characterized less by meandering 
pathways and more by speeding highways, we run the risk of becoming blind to that 
which is closest to us – “let[ting] the universe pass by, just as one can speed up getting 
from here to there to the neglect of the country lying between.”71  Our practical 
                                                 
69 Norman MacLean, A River Runs Through It (University of Chicago Press, 1976): 92. See SCB, p. 51: 
“But sometimes the plainest of things is the hardest to see.” The fact that the setting for A River Runs 
Through It is Montana – and that it is concerned with fly fishing – is interesting in terms of its potential 
relevance to Bugbee’s thought. 
70 SCB: 52. 
71 SCB: 55. For a sensitive account of this sense of relentless movement, see Joseph Grange, “The Roads of 
Maine: Pathways and Highways,” in Religious Humanism, Vol. X, No. 3, Summer, 1976: 98-99. See also 
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orientations and our material pursuits cause us to become numb and presence to become 
mute. 
 Our tendency to abstraction is another source of the loss of the primacy of 
presence.  As Whitehead was quick to point out, we live our life under the sway of 
dominant abstractions which reduce the wealth of detail associated with the particular 
under a determining rubric. However, there is no set of abstractions adequate to 
articulating the rich dimensionality of life! According to Bugbee, we must regain a 
Cusanus-like orientation where the center is everywhere and the limit is nowhere. Much 
like the orientation we associate with that of a child, any recognition of the sense of being 
requires “the transition from an egocentric to a cosmocentric point of view.”72  
 Despite the necessity of stepping back at times from our intimate involvement 
with the world – taking refuge in the pragmatic, the material, and the abstract – the 
experiences of these prior involvements are not disposed of – the are reinscribed within a 
full conception of being. Scientific investigation supplies a perfect example. Regardless 
of the methodological constraints required for scientific discovery, there remains a deep 
attachment to sheer factuality. As Bugbee explains it: 
  [T]hat curiosity exercised within the precincts of science is a special case of 
philosophical curiosity, and the wonder that must grow through engaging in the scientific 
enterprise is potent with a kind of wonder, bordering on reverence, that is philosophically 
fundamental. This is not reverence for science, but for what science is getting at, and 
steeping itself in…. It is an experience of being that is meant here, of the presence at all 
of reality in its definiteness, of the unanalyzable and utterly unaccountable actuality of 
anything whatsoever that may be discovered … or anything else discoverable.73 
 
 Yet no person is simply a scientist, an accountant or a carpenter – every practical 
orientation is “shot through” with a concern for ends that are non-utilitarian. As Aristotle 
                                                                                                                                                 
Martin Heidegger, “The Pathway,” trans. Thomas f. O’Meara, O.P. and Thomas J. Sheehan in Listening, 8, 
1973: 32-39.  
72 SCB: 59. 
73 SCB: 60-61. 
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is famous for saying, “All men by nature desire to know.” In Bugbeean terms, an 
“obdurate objectivity” provides the backdrop for any human undertaking: “Wherever a 
man gets in and takes hold of something with persistence, sensitivity, curiosity, 
receptiveness, imagination and some degree of reflectiveness, he is moving towards a 
sense of being.”74 This sense of being may come unexpectedly – like a thief in the night – 
but oftentimes our experience of being is like a continuous murmur or halo that surrounds 
the most commonplace. To hear the murmur or experience the halo, we must adjust our 
look to an oblique, or “retrospective backhand,” perspective so that the presence of the 
commonplace can slip into our purview. Presence does not withhold itself by residing 
behind a phenomenal screen – “things are manifestly on the common plane of being, they 
are in a sense universal; therefore the sense of being is a walking with simplicity and 
alertness in the presence of this universe…. [T]he silence with which the world sings … 
articulates being as well as anything else.”75 
  For Bugbee, attending to the ontological dimension of presence brings us to the 
threshold of philosophy. Philosophy is born out of the experience of presence – Why is 
there anything at all? – as well as the resulting sense of wonder that bursts upon us with 
the realization that resonates within this question.  As Aristotle indicated, wonder and 
mystery accompanies the realization “that things are as they are.”76 This is not a reason to 
embrace despair, for we are now well poised for a positive apprehension of things qua 
beings – instances of a manifest presence that is determinate in its own right. 
 
 
                                                 
74 SCB: 63. 
75 Ibid.: 67, 72.  See also p. 72: “Being is both cosmic and one-dimensional.” 
76 Metaphysics, A, 983a, 13-15. 
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The Field of Value Experience 
 Bugbee’s concept of being arises out of an initial, concrete empirical 
apprehension of things. His is a full-bodied notion of being – a conception realized within 
the order of sense perception. Bugbee’s interrogation of the realm of sense perception 
anticipates his later experiential approach: 
If it should be asked how to proceed and what to attend to if we were to encounter being, 
face to face, perhaps no better answer could be found than by attending to the stars, the 
living air, the moving waters, the earth, the stretch of forests and deserts, the wild 
creatures in their alertness and grace, the myriad things great and little to be seen and 
heard and felt and meditated upon. It cannot be taken for granted that we have seen and 
heard such things with adequate discernment upon easy and undriving acquaintance. 
Intense and practiced seeing and hearing, relentless and persistent, are as fundamental in 
the development of the sense of being, as their cognitive equivalent…. The world of the 
sense of being is vivid with the infusions of sense perception.77  
 
 Contrary to the tendency to abrogate sensation to a lower rung of the cognitive 
ladder, the sine qua non of Bugbee’s ontology is sensation. He refers to one dominant 
characteristic of sense perception as “impact.” In order to be present, something must 
present itself with a degree of force in such a way as to allow it to stand forth within the 
experiential field. Being may be constant, but “through uneven stresses the even plan of 
being [becomes] tilted and faulted to meet the eye.”78 In order to provide the justice 
which is due to the wide spectrum of ontological presencing, the traditional psychology 
of the faculties must be supplanted by a psychology of the person. For Bugbee, it is the 
person who perceives, and he or she does so using a wider array of proclivities than those 
offered by the traditional inventory of faculties. The significance of any given instance of 
impact must always be considered within the experiential constellation of concrete 
human reality. 
                                                 
77 SCB: 93. 
78 Ibid.: 95. 
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 Another dominant characteristic of sense experience is “poise.” Poise acts as a 
counter-balance to the effect of impact. The importance of poise, for Bugbee, lies in its 
ability to modulate the intensity of impact: “Impact and poise prescribe complementary 
‘moments’ of the sense of being.”79 In terms of Nietzsche’s famous distinction between 
the Dionysian and the Apollonian, the sudden impact of the Dionysian becomes 
transfigured through the perspectival stance of Apollonian poise. However, the 
detachment characteristic of Apollonian poise is not that of Socratic alienation – any 
reflection upon being must arise out of, and return to, experience. For this very reason, 
the experience of being must be viewed as a fundamental example of “value experience” 
– the balanced-intensity characteristic of poise and impact leads to an experience of being 
“as intelligible in, through, of, and for itself.”80 
 This “field” of value experience is vast, ubiquitous, and interstitial. As Aristotle 
insisted, every moment in the life of a person has a telic dimension. Value experiences 
are “consummatory” in the Deweyan sense of culminating in an intensive unity that is sui 
generis.  Value experience is a key ingredient in determining the sense of being because 
the experience of value bespeaks the reality of the world that gives rise to them. As 
Bugbee well knew as an undergraduate, purely academic issues can be debated ad 
infinitum with armchair impunity because nothing life-threatening hangs in the balance. 
But when the stress of life bears down upon us, “we come to know the world in its 
earnestness, and implicit in such experience is the immanence of reality as a demanding 
and commanding presence….”81  Through value experience, a sense of ultimate 
significance is engendered through the realization of things as solid, foundational, and 
                                                 
79 SCB: 97. 
80 SCB: 99. 
81 SCB: 103. Bugbee references the passage from scripture, “The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away.” 
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eternal. The best examples of the ultimacy of value experiences are those adverse 
experiences that strike with demanding magnitude. Adversity makes a devastating claim 
upon us through its objectivity – a fait accompli. This sense of “inexorable 
irreversibility” – when coupled with the determination to face life as it is – raises the 
specter of eternity in so far as we experience a sense of absoluteness which “though … 
relative to ourselves, the absoluteness is not, for it takes us up and absorbs us into 
itself…. [T]he sense of being is precisely this: the striking of the roots of consciousness 
into absolute ground … which is solid and foundational.”82 
The notion of being as reflected in value experience is contrary to any realistic-
mechanistic conception of reality. Yet despite its initial resistance to scientific 
explanation, value experience need not be merely quixotic. Value experience has the 
potential to reflect reality on its own terms. Aristotle’s treatment of the contemplative life 
in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics offers a compelling insight into the important 
connection between being and value experience. When Aristotle establishes 
contemplation as good in itself – worthy in the sense of aiming at nothing beyond itself – 
so that contemplation of “things noble and divine” make human being more godlike, he is 
affirming the intimate connection between metaphysical insight and value experience. 
According to Bugbee, “understanding is an end, even a supreme end, in itself, lead[ing] 
to the conclusion that the moment of understanding and the moment of value experience 
must be consummated in and through an identity of activity in so far as they represent an 
                                                 
82 Ibid.: 107, 108. For the notion of the ubiquitousness of being within value experience, Bugbee was 
influenced by the work of Curt Ducasse (See “A Defense of Ontological Liberalism,” in Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. XXI, no. 13, pp. 337-347.) For an indication of the importance of value experience in 
discerning the sense of being, see William James’s comment: “The inmost nature of the reality is congenial 
to powers which you possess (“The Sentiment of Rationality,” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays 
[Dover Publications, Inc., 1956]: 86.)” 
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end achievement.”83 The implication of this thesis is that the data that attends to value 
experience may serve as a conduit to metaphysical insight as much as strictly cognitive 
data. If being is as intensively continuous and ubiquitous as Bugbee so ardently 
maintains, an empirical approach to being must in some sense be grafted onto being 
already – it is no longer necessary to resort to rarified levels of philosophical 
understanding. 
Anticipations of the Sense of Being: The Example of Fine Art 
  Fine art provides a fertile domain for investigating the metaphysical implications 
of value experience. Reminiscent of Heidegger’s famous lecture, “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” Bugbee’s intent is to demonstrate the manner in which works of art 
articulate being. First, the work of art must demonstrate impact through its power to 
convey intensity and definiteness. The degree of impact a work of art has directly 
contributes to its presentation as an aesthetic object “being appreciable in and for itself, 
as occasioning value experience.”84 Bugbee is adamant that he is not advocating a theory 
of “art for art’s sake.” Through our human capacity to express value, we are all in some 
degree artists. Like Whitehead, who firmly believed that the constitution of experience is, 
at bottom, aesthetically motivated, Bugbee is intent upon showing “the capacity for the 
work of art to affect us with a presence that is pure and absorbing, in the image of 
being.”85 
 Our appreciative awareness of a work of art provides the key to recreating a sense 
of being. By making its claim upon us, the work of art emits a degree of aboriginal 
                                                 
83 SCB: 130. 
84 SCB: 140. 
85 Ibid.: 142. See SCB: 202 where Bugbee cites Dewey’s remark on p. 85 of Art as Experience (G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1980) that art “does not operate in the dimension of correct descriptive statement but in that 
of experience itself.”  
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compulsion that bespeaks a sense of intensity appropriate to being real. A work of art, 
through its degree of poise, is self-contained within its luminosity. Most importantly 
however, the work of art culminates in a prehensive unity such that it may be viewed as 
“hang[ing] together; its complexity and detail and the phases of its unfolding must be 
relevant to it.”86 This experience of the art object as a self-contained occurrence of vivid 
value enables its significance to be appreciated outside of its phenomenal context in 
which it initially presents itself.  This moment of appreciation, in which the work of art 
somehow steps out of its localized context, provides a key moment in Bugbee’s attempt 
to articulate the sense of being through the medium of value experience: “[By] lifting it 
as an occasion of complete significance within itself outside of the phenomenal context 
and postulating it in experience as a compacted being in its eternity… [a work of art 
exhibits] a significance of experience attained that rings with the timbre of eternity, 
though it is attained in the here and now, and not hereafter.”87  
 Bugbee’s doctoral dissertation is replete with examples from literature and music 
of the way in which works of art ecstatically convey the impact of reality by “stand[ing] 
out in high relief …assert[ing] and substantiat[ing] itself as a definite presence.”88  Being 
may be intensively continuous – albeit varying in degrees and concentrations – but when 
things stand out to meet the human eye, a sense of definiteness occurs that is being. Such 
an experience is highly personal, but not subjective: “[P]hysical things furnish us with the 
                                                 
86 Ibid.: 146. See p. 147: “The unity and the wholeness of the work of art are essential to its force.” Cf. 
Heidegger’s analyses of “earth” and “world” in the Origin of the Work of Art (1935-36) in Off the Beaten 
Track, edited and translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: 2002): 1-56. 
87 SCB: 148, 149. See p. 157 where Bugbee uses the example of Gregorian Chant “as fully reposed and 
composed, with the repose and composure bestowed in the sense of that which is absolute, and held fast in 
joint experience, reverence, and expression.” 
88 SCB: 198-199. See p. 196: The mind … seized by Moby Dick is hurled against something that will not 
yield, crack, or give way; that is the earnestness of reality. To apprehend it is to know the sense of being.” 
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language of existence…. [I]n the long run, it is each man for himself; let him take his 
evidence whenever and wherever he may find it.”89 
A Conception of Being 
 Despite his recommendation for each to follow his own way, Bugbee’s way is 
marked by a keen understanding of the Western metaphysical tradition beginning with 
Parmenides. Like Hegel, Bugbee finds the Parmenidean conception of “being” as a 
plenum, without deficiency, to be problematic – a caricature wherein pure being is 
equivalent to pure nothing: 
If the proposition that only being is means that only being exists, then the conception of 
being must be lost in the fatal attempt to postulate a simple, indeterminate ‘isness’ that 
would exclude from reality any context within which the conception of being may 
assume a positive meaning…. [B]eing must be distinguished from among other 
categories … without denying the relevance of the other categories from which it is 
distinguished.90 
 
 Contra Parmenides, Bugbee will assert the reality of the temporal wherein being 
and becoming are “woven together.” Being does have a meaning other than pure Istigkeit 
– being is capable of articulation in so far as “reality is ever so much more than merely 
being, … being is limited, not by a nothing that still must be something in order to limit 
it, but by the more than being that things are and can be.”91 Being, for Bubgee, has an 
objective reference that is more than its ontological status. 
                                                 
89 Ibid.: 201-200. 
90 SCB: 218. For Hegel’s perspective on Parmenides, see The Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller 
(Humanities Press International, Inc., 1999), p. 94: “Parmenides held fast to being and was most consistent 
in affirming at the same time that nothing absolutely is not; only being is. As thus taken,  entirely on its 
own, being is indeterminate, and therefore has no relation to an other; consequently, it seems that from this 
beginning no further progress can be made—that is, from this beginning itself—and that progress can only 
be achieved by linking it on to something extraneous, something outside it.” 
91 SCB: 215.  
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 To understand the ontological basis of objective reference, Bugbee turns to Kant. 
Much has been written about Kant’s denial of being as a “real predicate.”92 For Kant, 
there is no real difference between one hundred real and one hundred imaginary thalers – 
in this sense, perhaps, being is not a “determining predicate … a predicate which is added 
to the concept of the subject and enlarges it.”93  Kant could not articulate being 
phenomenally within the context of his categories, but Kant did offer a noumenal 
depiction of being as existing an-sich. Bugbee takes Kant’s decision to ground being 
noumenally as an indication of objective reference: 
[T]he self existence of specific determinations is not reducible to any self-existent 
determinations; self-existence is, however, a positive feature of any specific 
determination to which we may refer…. The ontological status of these determinations 
defines their nature as more than specific….94 
 
 Being, although not specifiable as a given instance of determination, it is 
conceivable as an “object of discovery” – as belonging to the ubiquity of being. We must 
be sensitive to the recalcitrant nature of being and its reluctance to simply succumb to 
definition. We must, according to Bugbee, “steadfastly bend our minds to the conception 
of being….”95 One of the great stumbling blocks of metaphysics and ontology is our 
continued dependence of the subject-predicate structure of thought and language – as 
Nietzsche said, we believe in god because of our belief in grammar!  
 The subject-predicate form of Western languages has given rise to a substance-
attribute metaphysic which assumes the forms of a substantial “something” that lies 
behind its attributes or appearance. Bugbee is clearly against this type of metaphysical 
                                                 
92 For an especially cogent account, see Oliva Blanchette, The Philosophy of Being (Catholic University of 
America Press, 2003): 111-114. According to Blanchette, “Kant failed to grasp this transcendentality as it 
regards being…. The notion of being includes the notion of thing, but transcends it insofar as it includes an 
actuality as well that is distinct from the essence of a thing.” 
93 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (Macmillan & Company, 1961): 504. 
94 SCB: 227. 
95 Ibid.: 217. 
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orientation; “[B]eing belongs as much to the what of reality as any other feature of reality 
disclosed in, for, and through experience. Being is no more a matter of inference and no 
less a matter of direct experience than the most available specific determinations, through 
the presence of what is being experienced.”96  Characterizing this view politically, 
Bugbees’s metaphysics is a “metaphysical democracy” – a democracy of the plurality of 
fact – as opposed to a “monarchy” of single-vision.  As a metaphysical democracy, his 
metaphysics is opposed to any Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of ontological 
gradations, or degrees, of being. A scaled hierarchy of degree of being is absurd and 
constitutes a crass objectivication of “being.” Degrees of value can only be articulated 
within experience. We must distinguish the sheer impact of being from any normative 
configuration within we configure being. Bugbee’s argument against the notion of 
degrees of being is informed by a close reading of the appropriate sections of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics. According to Bugbee, Aristotle simply confuses metaphysics with 
epistemology; “[E]ven if we accept [Aristotle’s] definition of degrees of truth, it must be 
observed that the degree of truth is relative to correct thinking about some state of affairs, 
and does not itself constitute any basis for postulating either ontological differentiation in 
reality….”97 Said differently, the locus of truth is in mente or in sententia – the locus of 
being is in omnibus rebus. 
 Aristotle’s notion of degree of being results in many of the same problems that 
plagued Parmenides. If being is conceived according to degrees, then some degree must 
be more essential than others. The problem is that the inessential degrees of being are 
only inessential when compared to an essential degree of being – a degree which can 
only be deemed essential when placed in contrast to the inessential. The fact that the 
                                                 
96 SCB: 232. 
97 Ibid.: 239. 
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essentiality of being can be preserved only within the context of the inessential 
necessarily establishes the inessential as essential – partaking of being. Any hierarchical 
understanding of being is fatal to the understanding of being: “[Being] obtains in the case 
of any specific determination that may be encountered, without implying [what those] 
specific determinations are….”98  
 It is such instances of “specific determination” that establish factuality as a 
primordial fact and provide a hint of the Absolute: “[H]owever finite and dependent the 
state of affairs may be to which we do appeal … the appeal to fact is nothing short of an 
appeal to something absolute….”99 Bugbee’s point is simple and profound: Yes, we do 
possess knowledge of fact and such fact confronts us in its definiteness. But with 
Descartes and Kant, knowledge has lost its “empirical compulsion” – its ontological 
force of determination. According to Bugbee, without any sense of compulsion, our 
knowledge “is simply cast adrift unless we actually moor it to its proper mooring, which 
is supplied by the metaphysical conception of being.”100 Knowledge makes contact with 
the real through a direct awareness of presence – a presence which is being. Philosophy 
must begin, not with technical terms, metaphysical abstractions or “second level” orders 
of discourse – philosophy must begin with a consideration of the things themselves: “Lest 
the simplicity of being and the abstractness of its conception be confused with vacuity or 
met with indifference, let the sense of being reaffirm its significance in human 
                                                 
98 SCB: 251. See also pp. 252-269, where Bugbee will devote a fair amount of energy to critiquing the 
Spinozistic distinction between being in-itself (esse in se) and being-in-another (esse in alio) as a 
“contextual notation” in order to establish the primacy of being as being.   
99 Ibid.: 271. 
100 SCB: 277. See infra “Yet, curiously, Kant does not press the conception of being and its implications 
sufficiently to prevent his entire [metaphysics] from assuming a downright subjectivist cast, with only the 
thing in itself as an anchor to windward to secure experience from an aimless and autonomous drift through 
an ontological vacuum.” One can only speculate how much Bugbee’s time spent at sea conditioned his use 
of nautical metaphor. 
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experience.”101 Leaping trout in Montana, a chapel bell ringing in Harvard Yard, a 
kamikaze pilot in the South Pacific – all are indices of the intensive panorama of being.102  
But was the profession of philosophy – what William James referred to as the “Ph.D. 
Octopus” – willing to embrace the earnestness of that which is simple and direct? 
§ 
Finding One’s Own Voice:  
                            The “Precarious Business” of Professional Philosophy 
 
Get down as far as possible the minute inflections of day to day thought. Get down the key ideas 
as they occur…. Write on, not over again. Let it flow…. Don’t be stopping to jam the idea down 
somebody’s throat. Give it a chance. If there can be concrete philosophy, give it a chance. Let one 
perception move instantly on another. Where they come from is to be trusted. Unless this is so, 
after all is said and done, philosophy is arbitrary and idle.103 
 
 With a freshly minted Ph.D. in hand, Bugbee entered the professoriate with a 
unique combination of skills and experiences. His emphasis – in both undergraduate and 
graduate work – upon the empirical immediacy of being, coupled with the extraordinary 
experience of his wartime service, combined to form the basis of an experiential approach 
to philosophy not seen in America since Thoreau. After a brief stint at both the University 
of Las Vegas at Reno and Stanford University, Bugbee would return to the east coast as 
an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard in 1948. While at Harvard, Bugbee 
would forge life-long friendships, with the likes of W.V. Quine, D.T. Suzuki, and Gabriel 
Marcel, but his experiential approach to philosophy, like that of Socrates, was more 
concerned with reflection than writing – philosophical logos, as Plato indicated in the 
                                                 
101 SCB: 283. 
102 I am reminded of Dewey’s quote in Experience and Nature, p. 8: “Experience denotes the planted field, 
the sowed seeds, the reaped harvests, the changes of night and day, spring and autumn, wet and dry, heat 
and cold that are observed feared and longed for…. It is “double barreled” in that it recognizes in its primal 
integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains the both in an unanalyzed 
totality.” 
103 IM: 34. The concern with finding one’s personal voice in philosophy is echoed in the work of Stanley 
Cavell – a student of Bugbee at Harvard. See Cavell’s The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Scepticism, 
Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford University Press, 1979) as an example of an intimately personal approach 
to philosophical writing. See Edward F. Mooney, “Two Testimonies in American Philosophy: Stanley 
Cavell and Henry Bugbee,” in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2003): 108-121. 
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Phaedrus, is veritably etched in one’s soul. As a result, the young Bugbee was denied 
tenure.104  A new venue was needed where his unique voice could be heard. The “big 
sky” panorama of Montana provided an open space conducive, both naturally and 
intellectually, to the arduous process of finding one’s own voice. Bugbee joined the 
faculty at the University of Montana in 1957 and would remain there until his retirement 
in 1977. 
 “Finding one’s own voice” is not simply a matter discovering an approach that 
fits one’s individual preferences – it is being receptive to that which defies categorical 
predetermination: “Fluency is the stylistic counterpart of the way present experience is 
invaded with authentic meaning. Basic meanings are not anticipated; they dawn on 
one.”105 Western philosophy has a long history of pursuing its quest for knowledge within 
what Heidegger refers to as der bestimmende Vorgriff, or “the determining pre-
conception” – a structure which determines what the results of philosophical reflection 
will be in advance. The imposition of a determining pre-conception results in a rigid 
separation between pre-philosophical and “philosophical” knowledge – the latter is 
attainable only after a significant amount of professional propaedeutic. This divisive 
schism within thinking results in a bifurcation of reality that is destructive – reality most 
often presents itself in a manner that defies the categorical configurations of technical 
understanding. As Bugbee says: 
                                                 
104 In 1958, a year after he left Harvard, Bugbee did publish The Inward Morning: A Philosophical 
Reflection in Journal Form. Although, in principle, an example of scholarly output, the fact of the matter is 
that the form and the content of the work is contrary to the narrow standards of scholarship then prevalent 
at Harvard. It is unlikely that it would have satisfied the requirements of his evaluation for tenure. It is 
important to note, however, that in the “Acknowledgements” for An Inward Morning, Bugbee offers 
nothing other than praise for the Harvard Philosophy Department as well as its individual members. 
105 IM: 34. The similarities between Bugbee’s conception of a “fluent reality” and Wallace Steven’s notion 
of a “Fluent Mundo” should be noted. For a philosophically inspired treatment of Stevens’ notion of a 
fluent reality, see J.S. Leonard and C.E. Wharton, The Fluent Mundo: Wallace Stevens and the Structure of 
Reality (University of Georgia Press, 1988) and Frank Doggett, Stevens’ Poetry of Thought (The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1966). 
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Since [my] earliest days of philosophic study, I have remained concerned with the works 
of philosophers, not in themselves, but as helps to the understanding of experience. I 
study the works of philosophers out of an interest which subordinates theory to 
understanding…. It will be ever important to me to give attention to technical philosophy 
but I will never be able to take technical philosophy as the ultimate phase of a reflective 
life.”106 
 
 One of the hallmarks of technical philosophy is its legion of distinctions – one of 
its most precious is the distinction between the universal and the particular. This 
distinction has been reworked many times within the history of philosophy, but in the 
absence of some large systematic assimilation as in Hegel, we are left for the most part 
with an isolated particular and a universal nominalistically conceived – a conceptual 
universal derived through the semantic extension of the name of a particular thing. 
Bugbee, taking his bearings from the poetry of William Carlos Williams, is opposed to 
any intellectual distinctions proffered prior to any appreciation of the “omnirelevant” 
array of meanings contained within a manifest conception of reality. Bugbee embraces 
Williams’ assimilation of John Dewey’s pronouncement that “The local is the only 
universal” because it provides prima facie evidence of the felt unity that exists between a 
sense of meaning that is concretely instantiated yet capable of resonating well-beyond 
this place.107 The fact that Bugbee confirmed this insight while drinking hot cups of 
coffee in diners is not simply an example of comic relief. It is a testimonial to the power 
of place and its ability to contextually reveal the surplus capacity that particular things 
disclose, beckoning us towards a more comprehensive understanding of just what it is 
                                                 
106 IM: 139. For two insightful, critical treatments of technical philosophy from the perspective of the 
“whole man,” see Oliva Blanchette, “Philosophy and the University,” in The Journal of General Education, 
Vol. XXIII, No. 1: 29-41 and William Earle, “The Death of Culture into Expertise,” in Public Sorrows and 
Private Pleasures (Northwestern University Press, 1976): 74-95. 
107 Bugbee obtains this Deweyan insight from Williams’ autobiography. See The Autobiography of William 
Carlos Williams (New Directions Books, 1948): 391. For an insightful study of the similarities between 
Dewey and Williams, see John Beck, Writing the Radical Center: William Carlos William, John Dewey, 
and American Cultural Politics (SUNY Press, 2001), especially Chapter 2, “Aesthetics as a Filed of 
Action.” 
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that surpasses. As Bugbee says, “Such a philosophy will not be set up like the solution of 
a puzzle, with all the pieces lying there before the eye. It will be more like the 
clarification of what we know in our bones.”108 
 Once we begin to trace the referential character displayed by particular things, we 
obtain an initial sense of the “animating base” upon which we act.  According to Bugbee, 
“[In] so far as we are sensitive to the absoluteness of our situation, we live in a dimension 
of meaning which is the depth of our experience—we live in eternity.109 Eternity is 
experientially rendered when one realizes the deep dimensionality out of which our acts 
resonate – the space within which our actions are imbued with a wider purpose. Acts like 
these may exhibit such simplicity that it is questionable whether or not this aspect of 
absolute dimensionality is actually known – a parent in the act of caring for a child or a 
sailor in the act of being alert during a night watch. In each instance, our sense of 
responsibility – being in the presence of that which we must be responsive to – makes a 
decisive claim upon us. For Bugbee, “[T]he meaning of reality is realized in true 
decision…. Cut off from the central nerve of responsible being, the themes of meditation 
fall dead.”110  
 Once our experience becomes enlivened through being-responsive, our quotidian 
sense of familiarity is replaced by experiences of wonder and intimacy similar to that 
connoted in the Greek sense of Θαυμάζειν and Πάσχειν. Reason and wonder are not 
opposed – according to Benjamin Blood, they “blush face to face.” Our capacity for 
wonder contributes to a perpetual process of reaching increasing degrees of 
                                                 
108 IM: 35. See Karsten Harries, “Descartes, Perspective, and the Angelic Eye,” in Yale French Studies, No. 
49, 1973: 40: “Reality reveals itself to us as such precisely where it reveals itself to us as surpassing all 
forms of our representation.” 
109 Ibid.: 37. 
110 IM: 10. 
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comprehension due to our ability to progressively reinscribe our vision within a larger 
space of reasons. As Aristotle noted in Book X of the Nichomachean Ethics, our capacity 
to be rational – when properly stimulated by our capacity for imaginative wonder – 
makes us more “god-like” by allowing us to participate in an ongoing process of 
increasing mental capacity: “The mind is not permitted to rest even within the narrowest 
limits it may circumscribe for itself.”111 Wonder provides a tributary-like function which 
facilitates an advent of awareness deeper than that which is traditionally attributed to 
ratiocination. This awareness is ec-static in the sense of being receptively open to the 
presence of things that no longer appear under the guise of mere ordinariness – things 
become transfigured through the intimate connection we share with them. Experience is 
of a diaphanous tissue of relations, exhibiting interstitial connections not conducive to 
being expressed in static terms. Bugbee would agree with Heidegger that we are, pre-
reflectively speaking, already Sein-in-der-Welt – Zunhandenheit is a more primordial 
form of existing than Vorhandenheit. Our experiential life fundamentally consists of a 
process of undergoing – an erleben, or a living through, more than erfahren, or act of 
traveling by. Our world does not reveal itself as Gegenstand – “standing against” us like 
an object. Experience is the durational process by which we exist intra-worldly – in and 
through our world: “Experience is permeated with meaning by invasion.”112 
 Bugbee’s conception of experience is radically different from the atomistic 
conceptions of Locke through Hume – his notion of experience is not that of neutral, 
episodic sense data registering upon some passive, film-like receptacle. Experience, for 
                                                 
111 IM: 39. Cf. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, trans. Geraets, Suchting, and Harris (Hackett, 1991), p. 82 : 
“[T]he activity of the forms of thinking, and the critique of them, [are] united within the process of 
cognition.” 
112 IM: 41. This experience of being invaded must not be conceived in ocular terms. Bugbee tells us it 
comes “from behind.” 
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Bugbee, is “a demand for marrow-bone truth.”113 Experience registers deeply within us 
through immersion: “Immersion [is] a mode of living in the present with complete 
absorption … of being comprehended and sustained in a universal situation.”114 Each of 
us, if we are fortunate, has some familiarity with an experience of this kind. Bugbee’s 
point is that this rich dimensionality of experience does not need to restrict itself to the 
esoteric and exotic – each and every moment, no matter how mundane harbors this 
potential: 
[When] one is himself absorbed in a situation, or by it … the present which is lived in 
does not seem accurately conceivable as a discrete moment in a series. The present seems 
to expand itself extensively into temporal and spatial distances. [I]t is as if one’s 
perception of everything distinct were engaged in alignment with a center from which 
one moves to greet things knowingly. There is a continuing passage from thing to thing in 
which a kind of sameness or continuity of meaning deepens, – ever confirmed and ever 
relevant. It is not by generalization that omnirelevant, universal meaning dawns. [I]nstead 
of things being fixed points of reference from which and to which attention proceeds in a 
procession of steps and stops, there is no stopping, precisely because each and every 
thing is a consummation of fluency.115 
 
 Once immersed in the continuous world of things-themselves – a realm of being 
which not filtered through the lens of theoretical raiment – commitment is felt as a matter 
of necessity. Bugbee is opposed to any abstract, meta-ethical perspective, or any type of 
“applied” ethics, which is not countenanced by any experience of immersion. This 
experience of being immersed in the juncture of being, and its ensuing sense of 
affirmative commitment, is prior to any sense of morality or immorality: “This is not to 
disqualify the giving of reasons, or the having of reasons for acting; it is only to suggest 
the comparative ‘lateness,’ and so the relative force of reasons had or given.”116 
                                                 
113 Ibid.: 42.  
114 IM: 51-52. 
115 IM: 52. 
116 Ibid.: 52. See IM: 55: Following Marcel, Bugbee will emphasize the priority of “being” over “having.” 
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 Our capacity for immersion is due to our capacity for reflection. As Plato 
indicated through his account of recollection, or ανεμνεσις, our capacity for sight is 
already there; it is a matter of turning the soul in the right direction. To the extent that we 
follow our unique endowment, philosophical recollection has a way of “overtaking us 
from behind.”117 Western thought has continually mistaken the context within which 
reflection occurs with the subsequent act within which reflection is epistemically 
justified, resulting in the neglect of what Dewey referred to as the “live creature” – the 
human being immersed in the creation of meaning. As Proust emphasized, human beings 
have an extensive reach backwards through which we have the potential recall our eternal 
nature. Using Marcel’s term, we are disponible – available or deeply susceptible to 
existing in communion with other human beings. For Bugbee, “The unconditionally 
essential may be reflectively approached by concentration in the experience of 
communion with other [humans].”118 This experience of communion was initially 
experienced while rowing crew, but was later intensely solidified during Bugbee’s 
wartime service and the various ships’ companies in which he served – especially the 
crew aboard the YMS 319. In the presence of these men, Bugbee learned first hand that 
Kant was correct – our dignity as a human being places us at a level of being that is of a 
different dimension than the phenomenal. What Kant failed to see is that this universal 
dimension of our being occurs only within the context of a concrete specificity: “[S]uch 
significance dawn[s] upon each one of us out of a life that is [ours] alone…. [E]ach man 
                                                 
117 IM: 55.  
118 IM: 61. 
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is irreplaceable rather than ‘a value of a variable for which any other rational being may 
be substituted.’”119 
 In order for existence to be justified, each person must have some awareness of 
the “unconditional basis” upon which she acts. Ethical reflection must be borne out of a 
genuine “spirit of prayer,” binding us to the unconditional – avoiding any trappings of 
arbitrariness. Once shed of such artifice, life presents itself as a gift that is not simply at 
our disposal – we need not have been born at all! The notion of life in its fundamental 
sense of a gift is not new to philosophy – it extends back at least as far as when Plato in 
the Republic when Socrates spoke of “the good,” Agathon, in terms of “the child of the 
good” and the sun as that which “gives.”120 Whitehead was correct when he said that the 
history of Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, but he could have been 
just as correct in saying that the history of Western philosophy consists of a series of 
misreadings of Plato. The legacy of “the good” is a case in point. Hypostatizing “the 
good” as a higher “form” in Platonic heaven fails to do justice to the perpetuating 
dimension that Plato hoped to convey through this notion: The good gives. This brief 
digression into Plato’s understanding of the good is offered in support of Bugbee’s 
conviction that our vocation is much less that of a knower and more that of a testifier or 
witness: “That which enables anything to be is no thing, no super-thing, no ghost of a 
thing, yet it dwells in the necessity of things.”121 Through the act of engagement, we are 
able to bridge the fictitious ontological gap posited between the particular and the 
                                                 
119 IM: 61-62. See also p. 190: “Chief Hill, like the Boatswain, achieved anonymity in the on-going life of 
the ship – defining concretely and unself-consciously the meaning of transcending oneself. I meet Saint- 
Exupéry in such men as these. Quiet, unassuming men.”  Despite his respect for Quine, Bugbee would not 
agree with his former colleague’s claim that “to be is to be bound by a variable.” 
120 See Plato, The Republic, 2 vols., ed. Paul Shorey (Harvard University Press, 1989): 6.506e, 6.509b. I am 
most grateful to Joseph Grange for this insight. See his “The Generosity of the Good,” in Review of 
Metaphysics, September 2008, Vol. LXII, No. 1: 111-121.   
121 Ibid.: 103.  
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universal. Whatever we experience, we experience de facto – but de facto experience 
exhibits a de jure dimension in which we are impacted by the non-arbitrariness that is 
expressed via the de facto: “Anything we understand in its simplicity and necessity we 
therefore understand in its universality.”122 The act of bearing witness consists of a 
gesture of respect through which the universal and particular can emerge together as co-
dimensions of experience within a locus of action. “[C]ontemplative understanding lives 
in generosity as the soul of necessary action.”123 
 This approach to philosophy is anything but that of the armchair variety. To 
practice this type of philosophical reflection one must live in an existentially continuous 
manner, like Socrates – the same man in public as in private. Bugbee’s philosophy 
requires the engagement of a person considered as a whole – beliefs and actions are a 
direct reflection of a mode of comportment with reality – being is refracted through the 
countenance of the personal. Hence, there is a strong peripatetic dimension to Bugbee’s 
thought, both literally and figuratively speaking: “[M]y philosophy took shape mainly on 
foot. It was truly peripatetic, engendered not merely while walking, but through walking 
that was essentially a meditation of the place.”124  
 This notion of “bearing witness” is essential to Bugbee’s conception of an 
experiential philosophy. A human being, when living authentically, undergoes an 
experience of “ingatheredness” – a term borrowed from Marcel.125 Bugbee views human 
being in a way quite similar to that of Heidegger as Da-Sein – a finite center of 
                                                 
122 IM: 104. 
123 IM: 220. See also, p. 153: “We can only bear witness to the necessity of what we do and through the 
action which is necessary.” 
124 IM: 139. 
125 See Marcel, Mystery of Being…. Cf. the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins notion of “inscape” as the locus 
of  uniquely personal yet universal meaning: “[W]hat I am in the habit of calling ‘inscape’ is what I above 
all aim at in poetry. Now it is the virtue of … inscape to be distinctive….” (Gerard Manley Hopkins, Poems 
and Prose [Alfred A. Knopf, 1995], 146.) 
 270
disclosedness. Qua ingathered, a person acts in the form of a thread, holding together a 
central strand of meaning whose tensile strength is both deeply personal and at the same 
time absolute. We are again reminded of Dewey’s comment: “The local is the ultimate 
universal, and as near an absolute as exists.”126 This localized juncture of experience 
extends both retentively and protentively within one seamless texture of experience – 
much like a closed electrical circuit. Our tendency towards abstract thinking enables us to 
break the circuit of this rich Lebenswelt. Bugbee’s lifework is a personal testimonial to 
the fact that “To think experientially is to partake in thought of the closed circuit of 
reality in which we live and move and have our being.”127 
 When one moves within this intimate circuit of meaning, any type of spectatorial 
stance is overcome by direct contact. The history of Western philosophy is laden with 
ocular metaphors. The result of this preoccupation with bi-polar, dualistic concepts, e.g. 
self and world, results in an ontological gap which presents itself in a way that is 
extremely difficult to overcome – one is never able to step out from behind one’s 
detached stance and engage the real. According to Bugbee, “From Hume we may learn 
well enough: Nothing is necessary that is merely looked at.”128 Hence, the importance of 
engaging in the act of bearing witness. When we experience things within the context of 
the immediacy of their direct impact, we correlatively experience our containment within 
a wider reality. One important aspect of seeing concretely is to engage things in such a 
way that allows for the complete presentation of their aesthetic vividness. Failure to do so 
results in an experience of a thin, abstract character. One is confronted with a name or a 
                                                 
126 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems in The Later Works Volume 2: 1925-1927, ed. Jo Ann 
Boydston (Southern Illinois University Press, 1988): 369. This is a slightly different version of the quote 
Williams’ cited.  
127 IM: 169. 
128 Ibid.: 116. See also p. 126: “Necessity can have no meaning … except as we act upon it.” 
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metric but not something in its own right. Bugbee refers poignantly to his encounter with 
experiential vividness during his time at war in the Pacific theatre: 
Not such as this, but this. So long as this is taken as such as … one has not yet responded 
to this. This, indeed only sinks in as we are involved with it at a level or depth 
appreciative of its mystery. I think of the suicide planes I witnessed; oh! They still call 
out to me….129 
 
The testimonial experience of bearing witness is “ingathered,” or received, in the 
imperative mood, echoing the necessity of its meaning. For Bugbee, much like 
Heraclitus, experience contains a deep yet simple logos or structural unity – thus allowing 
our experience to be permeated with traces of deeper meaning. Despite the importance of 
his academic training in developing this insight, Bugbee’s real learning came as a result 
of his life aboard ship: “Simplicity in men [and things] presupposes a basic, concrete 
appreciation of reality in its ultimate meaning; simplicity is the incarnation of that 
meaning.”130 So silent, yet so deep is the logos! 
§ 
 
Ontological Exigence: The Moving Center of Reflexive Receptivity 
 
 In order to articulate this process of the localized disclosure of the universal, 
Bugbee turns to a discussion of Marcel’s notion of ľ exigence ontologique – or the 
exigence of being.  The phrase “exigence of being” is not intended in a strictly negative 
sense of need or lack. Yes, our modern experience, dominated by materialistic and 
technological modes of thought, appears to be bereft of any experience of being. But at 
the same time, this vague sense we have of being bereft of being is in some sense tied to 
                                                 
129 IM: 225. 
130 IM: 171. (Emphasis added.) While at Stanford, Bugbee was inspired by an essay by classicist Herman 
Fränkel, “Man’s ‘Emphemeros’ Nature According to Pindar and Others,” in Transactions and Proceedings 
of the American Philological Association, Vol. 77 (1946), pp. 131-145.  See page 141: “A number of 
tragedies confine the time of action to a single revolution of the sun and make a point of the narrow 
temporal compass; not so much for technical reasons, I believe,  but rather to teach the lesson of man’s 
έφήμερος nature. A mortal is, body and soul, at the mercy of any one day.” 
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an awareness of ourselves in this bereft mode. Using Heideggerian terms, we are able to 
speak of a condition of Seinsvergessenheit only because we have not yet completely 
forgotten our forgetfullness. For Bugbee, “Ľ exigence ontologique … involves us 
essentially in a kind of movement and a kind of becoming ‘beyond ourselves.’”131 The 
experience of ľ exigence ontologique originates out of a deep sense of concern for things: 
How is it that beings “speak” to us in a decisive manner just as we begin to receive them 
in a decisively responsive manner? 
 To answer this question, Bugbee turns to Saint Augustine – someone intimately 
attuned to the deep resonances echoing within experience: 
But men can ask, so that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by 
the things that are made…. [I]t speaks to all; but they only understand, who compare its 
voice received from without, with the truth within.132 
 
 This reciprocal dynamic occurring between “without and within” within the 
reflexive act of ľ exigence ontologique requires a preliminary understanding of Marcel’s 
famous distinction between primary and secondary reflection. Primary reflection consists 
of analytical dissection – explaining things in terms of their basic structures in such a way 
that is conducive to segmentation, explanation and control.  Secondary reflection, on the 
other hand, is recueillement or recuperation – seeking the higher unities associated with 
over-all structures, organic wholes and intelligible syntheses without which physical 
being would not be recognizable. 
This recuperative extension of the human experience is not accomplished through 
an ever expansive conceptual dialectic but through consecration. By a return to the rich 
                                                 
131 Henry G. Bugbee, “Ľ Exigience Ontologique,” in The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, The Library of 
Living Philosophers Volume XVII, eds. P.E. Schilpp and L.E. Hahn (Open Court Publishing, 1984): 81. 
Hereafter referred to as OE. 
132 From Saint Augustine, Confessions, Book 10, Chapter VI cited in Henry Bugbee, “A Point of Co-
Articulation in the Life and Thought of Gabriel Marcel,” in Philosophy Today, Volume XIX, Spring 1975): 
63. Hereafter referred to as Co-Articulation.  
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depths of our own experience, we are able to recollect a sense of unity not merely 
subjective – we are, at the same time, “radically claimed and sustained in being with 
beings.”133 Much like Saint Augustine who was lead to the notion of a created world 
through his exposure to beings as dependent creatures, our experience can, in turn, 
become transfigured through the recognition of our containment within a higher order 
upon which we are receptively dependent. The presence of things in their “telling 
significance” provides the key to this experience: “[A] light dawns upon us in the light of 
which we become enlightened in our relationship with [things], and they dawn on us as 
given in that light.”134 Through our concern with things in their conditional way of 
appearing, we become unconditionally claimed through a confirming experience of the 
radical groundedness of life. Recollection, for Marcel – as surely as for Bugbee – is not 
an ocular-dependent activity. Spatial metaphors must be transcended: “Recollection is 
doubtless what is least spectacular in the soul; it does not consist of a looking at 
something; it is an inward hold, an inward reflection [serving] as the ontological basis of 
memory – that principle of effective and non-representative unity on which the possibility 
of remembrance lasts.”135 In this very intramundane sense, spirit constitutes itself through 
becoming flesh.  
Despite this criticism of attempts to map spiritual processes using spatial 
representations, the diagram below is an attempt to offer a provisional sketch of this 
process of reflexive recollection. 
                                                 
133OE: 83. Cf. Marcel comment in “On the Ontological Mystery” in Philosophy of Existence, trans. Manya 
Harari (The Citadel Press, 1963), p. 23 : “[T]he act whereby I collect myself as a unity … is also relaxation 
and abandon. Abandon to … relaxation in the presence of … yet there is no noun for these prepositions to 
govern.”  
134 Co-Articulation: 65. 
135 Ontological Mystery: 24. Note the “double meaning” of recollection as remembering and a 
reconstituting a unity. 
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self 
Realm of Spirit 
Nature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The natural world provides a rich source of ongoing stimuli, prompting the human 
being to participate in an ongoing series of interactive engagements with things.136 As the 
sketch reflects, the human being, through its affective encounter with nature, becomes 
grafted upon the dimension of spirit – a dimension that both contains and exceeds the 
limits of the natural world. Through its ability to respond reflexively to a world in which 
it directly partakes, the self is able to exceed its physical dimensions and participate in the 
wider dimension of spiritual life. We happen within this happening – spirit reveals itself 
perspectivally through finite acts of self-disclosure. This phenomenon is simultaneously 
bipolar: “It is at once referential and reflexive, reflexive and referential.”137 The 
embodied, finite mind is uniquely suited to emulate spirit through its special endowment 
of mentality – Geistigheit. As a result, finite human being is able to recollect what 
                                                 
136 For a detailed phenomenological account of this interactive process, see Samuel Todes, Body and World 
(M.I.T. Press, 2001), pp. 38-39: “Perception is of something encountered in our actual experience in the 
world. Imagination is of something entertained merely in our imagination, and not in the world…. [B]ut our 
imagination is free from obstacles. The only possible obstacle to imaginative productivity is the 
imagination itself.” 
137 Henry Bugbee, “The Philosophical Significance of the Sublime,” in Philosophy Today, Volume 11, no. 
1 (1967):  p. 58.  See also “On Starting with Love,” in Humanitas, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1966, p. 154.Objective 
inquiry also partakes of reflexive mutuality, “But the reflexivity of the concerned self is discounted, or 
suspended in its relevance with respect to the way things are being thought of….”  
Reflection 
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Leibniz referred to as a “pre-established harmony” existing between finite mind and 
infinite spirit (Geist).138 By turning inward through the avenue of finite mentality, the 
human being is able exhibit a form of “open concentration” and enter into an expansive 
reservoir of spiritual being – a dimension not delimited by space and time. The realm of 
spirit transcends the realm of the material. The Gospel According to Saint John states this 
diffusive aspect of spirit as, “The wind bloweth where it listeth.”139  
 The process whereby the self reconstitutes itself as a unity does not result in a 
condition of bounded, self-enclosure but a condition of permeability in which we 
receptively participate in the wider influx of being. Paul’s remark in 1 Corinthians 6:19 is 
most appropriate in this context: “You are not your own… Your body is a temple of the 
Holy Spirit.”  The event of presence discloses more than that which is simply refracted 
through a spatial-temporal locus – nothing can be given merely at an instant.  Presence 
bespeaks an aspect of persistence – a “spissitude,” or spiritual fourth dimension, to use a 
term coined Henry More, that somehow extends beyond the object.  As we reflexively 
trace the deep contours of experience, we can witness “a progressive ‘interiorization’ to 
the point where man becomes a cosmic possibility.”140 Human spirituality does not have 
to mean access to another world – it could very well mean a renewed sense of intimacy 
with this one! George Harrison captures this rich experience of reflexive recollection 
from a Taoist perspective in the following: 
                                                 
138 The use of the German word Geist is not intended to provide a Hegelian account of recollection. It is 
used to show the vital connection between our finite capacity for mentality (Geistigheit) and its potential to 
lead to an awareness of infinite spirit (Geist). 
139 John 3:8. For a clever way of expressing this important difference between the spiritual and material, see 
Frederick J.E. Woodbridge, The Realm of Mind: An Essay in Metaphysics (Columbia University Press, 
1926), p. 3: “The great ship responds quickly to the rudder’s bidding, and the wind bloweth where it 
listeth.” 
140 Walter J. Ong, S.J. , “Review of The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form,” 
in The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1959): 69. 
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Without going out of your door, 
You can know all things on earth 
without looking out of your window, 
you can know the ways of heaven. 
 
The farther one travels 
the less one knows 
the less one really knows. 
 
Arrive without traveling, 
See all without looking, 
Do all without doing.141 
   
§ 
 
The De Jure Dimension of Experience: The Moment of Obligation in the Case of Job 
 
A man who has learned to tread, wherever the foot falls, on rock bottom ... 
uncompromising in his demand to know the truth and to speak the truth. A  
man like that can make mistakes, but how can he go wrong?142 
 
Experience discloses spiritual values. Philosophical reflection should not result in 
a scheme of ideas but in the establishment of an orientation vis á vis the Absolute. Each 
one of us, at any given moment, irrevocably instantiates values because the self 
experiences its presence in the world as a “going concern” – existimo ergo sum is more 
basic than cogito ergo sum. According to Bugbee, “there is a definite strain of 
imperativeness in our experience”143 This dimension of unconditionality, rendered 
explicit through praxis, lends a deeply experiential dimension to ethical reflection. 
                                                 
141 George Harrison, The Inner Light (1968). Harrison adopted the lyrics from Chapter 47 of the Tao Te 
Ching. See also Wordsworth, The Prelude: The Complete Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, ed. J. 
Morely (London, 1950), p. 261: 
When from our better selves we have too long 
Been parted by the hurrying world, and droop, 
Sick of its business, of its pleasures tired, 
How gracious, how benign, is Solitude. 
142 SCB: 181. 
143 IM: 150. For a compelling account of this presence of imperativeness, see Alphonso Lingis, The 
Imperative (Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 2: “How many people are there who prize only the no-self 
and a compassion extended to cosmic dimensions! They do not find imperatives in pressing or remote 
problems addressed to their minds and in the structure of instruments and organism give over to their care, 
but hear summons addressed to their sensibility and sensuality in the desert and the ocean, the summer and 
the winter, the dawn and the night.” 
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Ethical truth is disclosed experientially through self-defining acts: “Concrete reality 
dwells in the sinew of decisive action…. We respond upon finality found in things in 
acting necessarily.”144 This act of personal response exhibits a character which is sui 
generis and ontologically definitive – an “assumption of responsibility to reality in its 
plenitude.”145 Bugbee refers to this experiential plenum as the “moment of obligation” in 
experience. 
Bugbee’s purpose is to lay bare “the controlling idea of a ground which can 
endow action with conclusive justification.”146 Holding to his distrust of ocular, spatial 
metaphors and empirco-deductive models of certainty, Bugbee recognizes that the results 
of his investigation, however foundational, may be difficult to convey: 
 This entire [project] is a fabric of words woven together to catch something of 
‘the good.’ And the method of inquiry on which we will be depending itself reflects the 
conviction that the good is essentially implicit, in that thought cannot seize upon the good 
and hold it before the mind, as it may objects of empirical knowledge.147 
 
A decisive clue to the experience of obligation lies in our potential to exhibit 
respect – to be respectful. According to Bugbee, it is our capacity for respect, rather than 
individual acts of showing respect, which is of primary importance. Our capacity for 
respect demonstrates “deep interest and absorption … from a spirit by which [we are] 
invaded from within….”148 Respect consists of a reflexive realization of our innate 
propensity for spirit – a realization prompted by an objective referent. Without an 
                                                 
144 IM: 182, 175. See Calvin O. Schrag, “The Structure of Moral Experience: A Phenomenological and 
Existential Analysis,” in Ethics, Vol. 73, No. 4 (1963), p. 258: “If the self is wrested from the 
intersubjective context of concrete moral action, then it becomes an abstracted and ‘lifeless’ self…. It 
becomes a formal determinant in a logical or epistemological scheme of things and is divested of its 
existential reality.” 
145 Ibid.: 167. 
146 Henry G. Bugbee, Jr., “The Moment of Obligation in Experience,” in The Journal of Religion, Volume 
XXXIII, No. 1, (January, 1953): 1. Hereafter referred to as MO. 
147 MO: 1. See Walter J. Ong, “Personalism in the Wilderness,” in Kenyon Review, Vol. 21 (1959), p. 301: 
“This is the reason for the little narrative inserts, they convey the concerns of Bugbee’s exploration in the 
non-abstract forms in which these concerns must be conveyed for the good reason that there is no abstract 
formulation in which to catch them…. They are high developed art forms.” 
148 Ibid.: 3. 
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objective point of reference, our respect risks being misplaced. Authentic acts of respect 
and reverence cut through any subjective trappings of self-interest that may be harbored 
by the beholder. This ability to transcend material interest potentially places respect on a 
level where we can begin to appreciate that which is good in itself. According to Bugbee, 
“Our interest is rendered disinterested.”149 
Respect is rooted in the recognition of the dignity of the human being as an 
absolute value. The “ultimate birthright” of a human being is one’s capacity to partake in 
the life of spirit. The moment of obligation in experience occurs when “a person is 
empowered to act with all [one’s] energy and resources by a spirit which can command 
our profoundest respect….”150 The fact that we often find the strength to face adversity 
with a sense of courage that far outstrips our physical capabilities is largely due to the 
fact that we harbor some awareness of “a basis in [our]selves deeper than anything we 
can muster and confer upon us by decree … that moment in which we may find 
immediate incentive and confirmation from within….”151 
Bugbee is highly critical of a “prospective” ethical stance in which one can 
stipulate in advance the conditions which would need to be fulfilled in order to act 
ethically. Ethical knowledge must be rendered experientially concrete through action – 
any genuine ethics cannot be derived deductively. The ethical subject must step out of the 
secure closure of quotidian familiarity.  When obligation is felt in a deep, experiential 
sense, one becomes informed by a state of humility, acting “from a fund of meaning 
pressing upon us from within, which [we] alone can advance to the point of creative 
                                                 
149 Ibid.: 3. See also p. 4: “[D]isinterestedness is only possible for a person whose interest is profound; the 
very opposite of superficial, or causal, or optional.” 
150 MO:5. 
151 MO: 6-7. 
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resolution in action.”152 The agent provides experiential justification for her action – not 
through any form of wishful thinking – but due to the fact that the agent, when seized 
through a process of formative influx, simply cannot escape this responsibility and act 
otherwise. Humility is not a state of self-deprecation but a response that must be 
followed: Become who thou art! Through recognizing their capacity to participate in the 
life of spirit, human beings are able to facilitate a rich process of spiritual disclosure: 
“Finitude becomes illuminated and is brought to clarity by a radiance that finite 
perceptiveness and intelligence cannot cast upon the human condition.”153 From his years 
spent at sea, Bugbee realized the importance of teamwork and craftsmanship as two 
important ways in which spirit may be brought to life. However, spirit is spirit and, as 
spirit, resists being conceived solely in material terms. Oftentimes the personages who 
embody spirit the most display the least self-consciousness as to its presence. Spirit, like 
energy, is both potential and kinetic. 
Bugbee’s reconstruction of the story of Job illustrates the manner in which an 
absolute message or “moment of obligation” can be deciphered within the course of 
everyday things and events. Oftentimes our manner of living day to day leaves us deaf 
and mute – unable to hear and to speak about the world in which we symbiotically co-
exist. In the context of this impoverished state, Bugbee offers the following reflection: 
Yet—perhaps even when so situated, some things need to be said, await being 
 discovered in a way of saying them…. Perhaps some things need to be said; and it 
 might even be as well to set out from a sustained reticence to speak…. 
 [R]eticence also seems attuned to the quiet of heaven-and-earth, the unprejudiced 
 silence of things…. [I]t is a measure that makes for reflection, and finding out 
 what we make of things, in the course of having to do with them. In a mortal 
 life.154 
 
                                                 
152Ibid.: 7-8. Emphasis added. 
153 Ibid.: 12. 
154 Henry Bugbee, A Way of Reading the Book of Job (unpublished).   
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Bugbee’s point here is to emphasize the importance of what Heidegger intended 
by the term Gelassenheit – a process of letting things speak from themselves in the sense 
of φάινεσθαι – as they fundamentally appear. Instead of trying to subject nature to the 
rack of explanation in a Baconian sense, we should instead try to engage in a kind of 
“mutual address” with things. To the extent that one struggles with nature – trying to 
bring it within the purview of a determining fore-conception – one will never achieve the 
Thoreuvian objective of hearing things speak “without metaphor.”  It is interesting to 
note that certain Native American languages have specific conditions at which time it is 
necessary to refrain from speaking – those situations in which participants perceive their 
situation to be governed by relationships which are ambiguous and unpredictable.  When 
a thing is allowed to speak without metaphor, it resonates at at several layers of 
intonation. According to Gerard Manly Hopkins, one “knows the beauty of our Lord by 
it. Its inscape is mixed of strength and grace.”155  
The story of Job has become in many ways a commonplace. Job’s mettle is tested 
in order to prove his faith. The scales of justice seem to be tipped without reason. The 
significance of Job’s response is that despite the complete absence of any material 
evidence to the contrary, he remains open to an understanding of cosmic justice as 
mysterious and resistant to the coordinates of an anthropocentic moral compass – “No 
man knows the way to it; it is not found in the land of living men.”156  Job must make 
sense of his condition of being God-forsaken in a most personal way: “It is through their 
                                                 
155 Gerard Manley Hopkins, Poems and Prose, ed. W.H. Gardner (Penguin books, 1979): 120. See also, 
infra., p. 21: “This busy working of nature wholly independent of the earth and seeming to go on in a strain 
of time not reckoned by our reckoning of days and years but simpler … was like a new witness to God….” 
156 Job 28:13. 
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interpretation, and only through the bearing they thus implicitly or explicitly exert upon 
significance, that they acquire the force of affliction.”157 
 Job’s problem – the problem of the universal experience of undeserved ill-fortune 
– is a perennial question that spurs philosophical reflection at a deeply personal level. 
Josiah Royce stated the matter this way: [Q]uite other speech is due to men and women 
when they are wakened to the higher reason of Job by the fierce anguish of our mortal 
life’s ultimate facts. They deserve either our simple silence, or, if we are ready to speak, 
the speech of people who are ready to speak, the speech of people who inquired as Job 
inquired.”158   
  The turning point in Job’s life occurs at the moment of his encounter with the 
presence of God reflected through the tempest, or whirlwind. Job experiences a revelation 
in the form of a vision. The space of readiness for this revelation has been prepared not 
through any sense of abject downtroddenness, hateful resentment, or loss of faith. Job is 
open to revelation through his capacity to engage in a fundamental mode of mutual 
address: 
Simply it is the vision of things: the things of heaven-and-earth, dramatized in their 
emergent majesty, wonder, and inviolable reserve. But seen in the mode of this, their 
being. And seen as if, for the first time, yet as belonging to a domain, in which dominion 
(not domination) reigns, forever and ever; the dominion of being itself. 159 
 
 The lesson to be learned from the story of Job is the need to transcend rational 
explanation and embrace the realization of an absolute source of things. The openness 
embraced by Job – a mode of comportment that we too can choose to embrace – is the 
key to achieving a kind of grace which has a cleansing effect, recalling us to our senses: 
                                                 
157 A Way of Reading the Book of Job. 
158 Josiah Royce, “The Problem of Job,” in The New World: A Quarterly View of Religion, Ethics and 
Theology, June 1897, Volume 6, No. 22: 267.   
159 A Way of Reading the Book of Job.  
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“Thinking dedicated to essential truth seems consummated only as it is graced … [by] an 
unanticipated precipitation of meaning.”160 Job is able to effectively achieve some type of 
stasis within the life of spirit by reinscribing the sheer immediacy of the present – an 
immediacy expressing what was there all along in advance of explicit interpretation – 
within the context higher of the unity of secondary reflection. As Job realized at the end 
of his ordeal: “I have spoken about great things which I have not understood…. I knew of 
thee only by report, but now I see with my own eyes. Therefore I melt away….”161 
Thought is a foreign medium here. What is perceived at first per speculum et in 
aenigmate is later seen “face to face” – what begins as a partial view is destined to seek a 
glimpse of the whole. T.S. Eliot in his poem, The Dry Salvages, intimates this rich 
dimension of experience through which one becomes graced by responding to the call of 
a “non-contingent destiny” which is ours to fulfill: 
We had the experience but missed the meaning, 
And approach to the meaning restores the experience 
In a different form, beyond any meaning 
We can assign to happiness. I have said before 
That the past experience revived in the meaning 
Is not the experience of one life only 
But of many generations—not forgetting 
Something that is probably quite ineffable….162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
160 IM: 170. Cf. Martin Heidegger, “Der Spiegel Interview” in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. 
Thomas J. Sheehan (Precedent Publishing, 1981), p. 57: “[P]hilosophy will be unable to effect any 
immediate change in the current state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all purely 
human reflection and endeavor. Only a god can save us. The only possibility available to us is that … we 
prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god….”  
161 Job, 42:3-6. 
162 T.S. Eliot, “The Dry Salvages,” in Four Quartets (Harcourt, Inc., 1971), p. 39. Cf. Edward F. Mooney, 
“A Lyric Philosophy of Place: Henry Bugbee’s The Inward Morning,” in Soundings, Vol. 82, No. 3-4, p. 
534: “Henry Bugbee’s view of the religious is rooted in his conviction of the splendid significance, even 
the sacredness, of moments and things that we encounter day to day.” 
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§ 
 
Recollection and Homecoming: Wilderness as Sublime 
 
There is an incessant influx of novelty into the world, and yet we tolerate incredible dullness…. 
We do not believe that a tide rises and falls behind every man which can float the British Empire 
like a chip if he should ever harbor it in his mind. 
   The life in us is like the water in a river. It may rise this year higher than any man has known it, 
and flood the parched uplands…. It was not always dry land where we dwell.163  
 
 The story of Job underscores the importance of the sublime – a category of major 
ontological significance. The sublime has a rich history. According to Longinus, 
“Sublimity is … the image of greatness of soul. [M]an’s mind often overleaps the very 
bounds of space…. [T]he Sublime lifts [us] near to the great spirit of the Deity.”164 For 
Bugbee, the sublime is noumenally constitutive of phenomenal existence – giving our life 
a sense of eternal sameness and unity amidst renewed experiences of discovery. As in the 
case of Job, the sublime abruptly obtrudes into our experience of everydayness from time 
to time. What may at first appear as a catastrophic disruption harbors the potential to 
become “the very acquiescence of spirit.”165 As Kant indicated, the sublime is present in 
those instances in which our experience conveys a sense of the infinite. To understand 
how the sublime is experientially rendered, it is necessary to briefly revisit Bugbee’s 
appropriation of ontological exigence in which ontological truth is reached infra-
experientially – one must in a sense lose oneselve in order to enter into the more 
complete reality of the self. This idea of pulling back from everyday things in the pursuit 
of the eternal is the meaning behind Socrates comment in the Phaedo that philosophy is a 
preparation for death. For Bugbee, the experience of the sublime provides a source of 
orientation resulting in a “wittingness of ourselves and things – together – in the mode of 
                                                 
163 Thoreau, Walden: 586-587. 
164 Cited in Bernard Bosanquet, The History of Aesthetic (Meridian Books, 1957): 105. 
165 The Philosophical Significance of the Sublime: 56. 
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finality.”166 This experience of finality resists articulation and must be approached 
obliquely through concrete instances of testimony and witness. Yet, despite the oracular, 
mysterious nature of what is disclosed, an experience of “karmic lawfulness” is somehow 
conveyed. Take the case of Job. When Job cries out for understanding, he does not 
receive any type of rational explanation per se. Job is addressed at length in terms of the 
things of this world and their nature as beings created by God. If Job is enlightened in 
any way, it is not by reason of having been informed of anything specific. There exists a 
compelling silence as to the question of justice anthropomorphically conceived. It is this 
very silence which creates the space for a deeper reconciliation – Job’s sense of justice is 
cosmically transfigured in the light of faith: 
 And the story seems something like this: as we take things, so we have them; and 
if we take them in faith, we have them in earnest; if wishfully — then fantastically; if 
willfully, then stubbornly; if merely objectively, with the trimmings of subjectivity — 
then emptily; and if in faith, though it be in suffering, yet we have them in earnest, and it 
is really them that we have.167 
 
This sense of being “co-articulated” with everything in earnest is our alpha and 
omega – both our birthright and our destiny. I feel a vague yet compelling sense of a need 
to reconnect with something, to become the person I am somehow meant to be. For this 
reason, the achievement of one’s destiny is much like a homecoming of sorts. Although 
the dimension of futurity is crucial here, the future can only be arrived at through a past 
wherein our mutuality with things is underwritten. Homecoming is fundamentally a 
future oriented process in which one re-arrives at our autochthonous past. For Bugbee, 
homecoming is the path through which our primordial sense of the sublime is 
experientially reenacted through a concrete relational sense he calls wilderness: 
                                                 
166 Ibid.: 57. 
167 The Philosophical Significance of the Sublime: 59. 
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“Philosophy is not a making of a home for a mind out of reality. It is more like learning 
to leave things be: restoration in the wilderness, here and now.”168  
Wilderness has become an active topic of philosophical discussion.  Current 
discussions of wilderness continue to make the mistake of viewing wilderness in terms of 
its separateness from culture and civilization – needing to be preserved for recreational, 
aesthetic or ecological value. The notion of the human being as wilderness, however, has 
a rich, if understated, history. The relation between exterior wilderness and its interior 
correlative in human consciousness is noted by Perry Miller in his famous book Errand 
into the Wilderness: “They looked in vain in history [and theology] for an explanation of 
themselves…. Thereupon, these citizens found that they had no other place to search but 
within themselves … fill[ing] it with meaning by themselves and out of themselves.”169 
Unfortunately, the space of meaning of both nature and human being has been 
determined largely through a Baconian-Cartesian pre-conception of externally related 
matter in motion. The importance of wilderness, for Bugbee, lies in responding to a call 
that comes from within as well as without – holding the key to shaping our destiny as a 
people. Spatial metaphors that depict any form of “simple-location” are inappropriate 
here. We must resist the tendency, using a phrase of Whitehead, to divide “the seamless 
coat” of experience. The reconnective integration with our wider reality provides the key 
to our homecoming: 
This, so far as I can tell, is the theme which unifies my own life. It enfolds and simplifies, 
comprehends and completes. Whenever I awaken, I awaken into it. It carries with it the 
                                                 
168 Ibid.: 155. 
169 Perry Miller, Errand into the Wilderness (Harper & Row Publishers, 1954): 15. For a comprehensive, 
philosophical study of wilderness, see Max Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the 
Age of Ecology (Yale University Press, 1991). For a more sociological account of the nature of wilderness, 
see Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (Yale University Press, 1967). 
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gift of life. And it lives in the authenticity of every authentic gift, every true blessing 
confirms it deeper; it is always with me when I come to myself.170 
 
Bugbee’s approach to wilderness is best revealed through the Thoreauvian insight 
that “in Wildness is the preservation of the world.”171 We must step back from the single 
vision of what Heidegger referred to as Bestand – the exclusive subsumption of nature to 
human enterprise. Reality, for Bugbee, is a “depthless mystery” and, qua wild, ultimately 
resists conceptualization. As Nietzsche noted with regard to the Dionysian, we project an 
artificial, illusory superstructure over the surface of the tumult, and through habituation 
and consensus, this illusion quixotically becomes fixed. This explains Bugbee’s 
propensity towards the sea as one of the primary manifestations of wilderness – the 
dynamism of the ocean provides a compelling example of the underlying fluency of 
reality itself. 
In short, we must let nature speak as it has spoken before. If wilderness is given 
the chance to speak, “it may lie closer to the whence of speaking than to the 
thematization of a speaking about.”172 The whence from which Wilderness speaks is the 
realm of eternal “foreverness” – the voice of our eternal past which spoke to Job. Given 
the commodified relationship to the natural world that currently holds sway, how can 
such an experience of wilderness on its own terms be recollected? According to Bugbee, 
“[Perhaps] the wilderness left to us is itself our vestigial hope of being instructed in such 
                                                 
170 IM: 128. See also, p. 146: “At the heart of our ‘metaphysics’ must lie the clear strain of responding to a 
call.” For a remarkable account of Heidegger’s notion of homecoming, see Robert Mugerauer, Heidegger 
and Homecoming: The Leitmotif in the Later Writings (University of Toronto Press, 2008). Like Bugbee, 
Heidegger views originary homecoming as an arrival at “the giving that gives … stepping out of 
metaphysics to the origin (p. 334.)” 
171 Henry David Thoreau, “Walking,” in Excursions, ed. Joseph J. Moldenhauer (Princeton University 
Press, 2007): 202. 
172 Henry G. Bugbee, “Wilderness in America,” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 42, 
No. 4 (1974), p. 616. 
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a vein.”173 How so?—By pointing to the “hidden bulk” of the wild that is implicated in 
our very being. Unfortunately, no metaphysical sleight of hand can successfully avert the 
most obvious fact: 
[W]e are there as on the spot with respect to the meaning of what we behold…. 
One is brought to realize one is held within the embrace of what is proffered in its being 
proffered. No behind or beyond the things themselves…. The givens of life are laid 
down. The foundations of the world are laid. Things are in place and stand firm. Beings 
stand forth on their own. They do not ask our leave. They invite mutuality.174 
 
The mutual partnership that Bugbee envisions with wilderness is not that of 
managerial oversight – it consists of a process wherein “the perceived and the perceiver 
enter into the working of the world: things in their meaning as responded to, taking 
shape.”175 The referential and the reflexive are achieved in unison. Referentially 
speaking, nature is primordially given. Reflexively speaking, the perceiver is “sponsored 
from within a depth underlying our own ability to respond.”176 This ability to respond 
from a greater source serves as our foundation for a non-egoistical version of “self-
respect” in which we are “ordained in responsible relationship with beings being given 
into our keeping in the very presencing of the world.”177  
As implied through Plato’s doctrine of recollection or άναμνéσις, we are co-
implicated with other beings. Wilderness does not reside at a distance from us either 
spatially or conceptually. Through the process of experiential immersion we have the 
                                                 
173 Ibid.: 617. 
174 Wilderness in America: 619. 
175 Wilderness in America: 619. For a case study of “land management” issues from a Bugbean perspective, 
see Scott Friskics, “Dialogue, Responsibility, and Oil and Gas Leasing on Montana’s Rocky Mountain 
Front,” in Ethics & the Environment, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003: 8- 30. “In a society driven by self-interest, greed, 
and fanatical obsession with growth and progress for their own sake … nothing requires more work than 
the ongoing struggle to respect things by leaving them be and letting them speak for themselves (p. 28).”  
176 Wilderness in America: 620. 
177 Ibid.: 620. Our relationship with nature is key to our relation ship with other human beings: “What can 
stand to the mutuality of man and nature can be affirmed in the relations between men…. And without 
respect for nature man cannot stand, not even in the mutual regard for men.”  
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potential to recognize “nature [as] with us more surely than we know….”178 Beings are 
bound through an act of ontological creation – the meaning of religio as a “binding 
together” should not be lost sight of: “The truly creative deed of man seems to be that of 
which he becomes lucid to himself as the creature of creation…. [C]reation is 
inexpugnably mysterious, and can only be understood through participation in it.”179 
Nietzsche understood the reflexive nature of creativity not as an ideal to be approximated 
but as an activity through which we are self-constituted.  Once this profound insight is 
embraced through witness and testimonial, we have the potential to become relationally 
transfigured. This form of transfiguration must be “understood” dynamistically – in 
spiritual as opposed to physical terms: “It appears as that which dawns and is in 
dawning.”180 Through a kindred relationship with things, human beings and animating 
things co-emerge because things possess a depth through the indefinite ways they tie 
together a world and the manifold ways in which they elicit engagement: “The mystery of 
each thing is the mystery of all things; and this – not generalization or the broadening of 
our scope of attention to wider and wider complexes of things, is the foundation of the 
idea of universe: the omnirelevance of the experience of something as sacred.”181 
Each concrete event of experience is pervaded by some indeterminate sense of 
partaking of a wider indeterminate reality – a Jamesian fringe. If one traverses both the 
vertical horizontal axes of experience – from a “this” to a “more than this” – one 
                                                 
178 Ibid.: 620. See Daniel W. Conway, “The Wilderness of Henry Bugbee,” in The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, p. 261: “[W]e can access wilderness from virtually any set of geographic 
coordinates, including those hyperurbanized places that some environmental purists have left for dead.” 
179 IM: 222, 223. See Henry G. Bugbee, Jr., Thoughts on Creation,” in Essays in Philosophy, eds. Members 
of The Philosophy Department of The Pennsylvania State University (Penn State University Press, 1962): 
135: “[W]e become ourselves—truly ourselves— in willing participation in creation. [W]e cannot conceive 
of creation in terms apart from our participation in it. 
180 Thoughts On Creation: 134. 
181 IM: 209. For a treatment of the importance of things vis ά vis achieving a sense of homecoming see 
David Strong, “The Possibility of a Homecoming for Us: A Reflection on The Odyssey,” in Philosophy 
Today, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1991): 325-338.  
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approximates some sense of total inclusiveness. Wilderness, in the Bugbean sense, 
“serve[s] as the mystical unifying core of a spiritual tradition … [a] nameless unifying 
principle and unquenchable source of mystery and wonder.”182  
 Through the hegemony of commodification, this dense world of associations 
surrounding things has largely been lost – what Heidegger referred to as the relational 
context of “things-ready-to-hand” has been eclipsed by “things-present- at-hand.” Our 
world is populated with antiques, mementos, and commodities. The deep connection 
between things and consciousness must be recollected referentially and reflexively. The 
task of philosophy is to begin with the momentous act of engaging in radical reflection 
upon pre-conceptual experience in its depth and breadth and then – using a phrase of 
Husserl – transparently “self-activate again:” 
 Experience must continue underground for some time before it can emerge as 
springwater, clear, pure, understood. And reflection is a trying to remember, a digging 
which is pointless if it is not digging down directly beneath where one stands, so that the 
waters of [one’s] life may re-invade the present moment and define the meaning of 
both.183 
                                                 
182 Conway, The Wilderness of Henry Bugbee: 266. 
183 IM: 140. See Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology trans. W. R Boyce- 
Gibson (Collier Books, 1962): 20. See also Henry G. Bugbee, “Loneliness, Solicitude, and the Twofold 
Way in which Concern Seems to be Claimed,” in Humanitas, Nov. 1774: “Remembrance is a work of 
solitude … a heeding of what comes to us that engages with our present on terms more sure and firm than 
terms we might assign or comprehend.” 
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Conclusion 
 
The Religious Dimension of Experience: 
Fertile Ground in the Recent American Landscape 
 
“[L]et a man fall into his divine circuits, and he is enlarged. Obedience  
  to his genius is the only liberating influence. ” 
Emerson 
 
Nicholas Rescher, in a recent study of the state of professional philosophy in 
North America, makes some rather bleak observations: 
The prominence of specialization gives a more professional and technical caste to 
contemporary American philosophizing…. [I]ts increasing specialization has impelled it 
toward the ivory tower. Turning to society at large, it must be said emphatically that 
American philosophers do not exert influence. The fact is that the condition of the 
American philosophy professoriate is still very much a matter of live white males 
teaching about dead ones.1 
 
 The accuracy of Rescher’s indictment is obvious to anyone inhabiting the 
landscape of 21st American Century philosophy. Despite the proliferation of abstractness 
and technique in philosophy today, there is a small cadre of American philosophers – 
albeit marginalized in varying degrees – that deserve to be recognized for their efforts to 
engage in a sustained investigation of experience in depth. The philosophers are John E. 
Smith, Robert O. Johann, Carl G. Vaught, John M. Anderson, and Robert C. Pollock. 
This list could have been populated differently, but this select group of five American 
philosophers – all “contemporaries” of Henry Bugbee – are particularly useful in terms of 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Rescher, “American Philosophy Today,” in Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1993): 732, 
733, 731, 718. See the “Preface,” to Essays in Philosophy (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962) for a 
compelling reaction against this current tendency: “Since philosophy has always included the exploration 
of man’s spirit, the present dissatisfaction with those views which reject the spirit expresses not a 
theological need, but rather a deep sense that philosophy itself has been mutilated by the analytical and 
empirical movements of the recent past.” The preface was the work of John M. Anderson, Henry W. 
Johnstone, Jr., and Stanley H. Rosen.  
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their ability to collectively illuminate the major themes surrounding the religious 
dimension of experience.2 
John E. Smith: A Return to Experience in Its Religious Dimensionality 
[T]he divine self can be present in experience at two points—at the point where the self believes 
it has experienced the ultimate purpose of its life … and secondly, where the self experiences its 
total reaction to life describable both by the self and others as intensive quality.3 
 
 No American philosopher has championed the need for “a return to experience” 
more than John E. Smith: “The major intellectual task of the present is the recovery of 
experience from the distortions to which it has been subjected, and the development of a 
theory of experience that will express adequately its nature and proper place in the total 
scheme of things.”4 An adequate account of experience is required in order to express its 
religious nature. Although Smith’s scholarly output has been nothing less than 
prodigious, his focus upon the religious dimension of experience serves as the mainstay 
of his research. Like the periodic table of elements which comprise all that physically 
exists, the religious dimension of experience “forms a continuous and pervasive 
background for all we think and do.”5 
                                                 
2 Regretfully, in the interest of space, I must omit the popular writer Sam Keen. Prior to embarking on a 
career in journalism, Keen was a professor of Philosophy and Theology who specialized in Marcel. His 
writings on Marcel represent some of the finest examples of Marcellian scholarship produced in America. 
See Gabriel Marcel (Cary Kingsgate Press Limited: 1966), “The Development of the Idea of Being in 
Marcel's Thought” In The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, eds. P. Schilpp and L. Hahn (Open Court 
Publishing, 1982), pp. 99-120, and “Gabriel Marcel” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 5 and 6, 
ed. P. Edwards (Macmillan Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 153-155. Keen’s “non-academic” writings are 
also replete with Marcelian themes, especially the reflexive interiorization of experience and the primacy of 
intersubjective being. See Inward Bound: Exploring the Geography of Your Emotions (Bantam Books, 
1980) and Hymns to an Unknown God: Awakening the Spirit in Everyday Life (Bantam Books, 1994).    
3 John E. Smith, “The Experiential Foundations of Religion,” in Reason and God: Encounters of 
Philosophy with Religion (Yale University Press, 1961), 183.   
4 John E. Smith, Experience and God (Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 21. 
5 John E. Smith, “The Religious Dimension of Human Life,” in Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. 
1, no. 1 (1980), p. 16. For a comprehensive listing of Smith’s publications, see Reason, Experience, and 
God: John E. Smith in Dialogue, ed. V. Colapietro (Fordham University Press, 1997): 145-158. 
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From Smith’s perspective, the theory of experience bodied forth by classical 
empiricism cannot allow for the manifestation of experience in its religious 
dimensionality. Classical empiricism formulates its “theory” of experience within a 
determining pre-conception – what experience must be in order to qualify as experience.  
Instead of focusing upon the continuous nature of experience as lived, traditional 
empiricism developed a theory of experience based upon, to use a phrase of Dewey, 
“reflected products” – criteria imposed from within the determining pre-conception and 
not from experience itself. The restriction of experience to sensation leads to the 
banishment of much of what we actually encounter. Had the classical empiricists paid 
sufficient attention to experience in its pre-reflective continuity, more emphasis would 
have been placed upon transitive relations. As James clearly recognized, the traditional 
penchant for contriving analytic distinctions within experience leads to a focus upon 
external relations – with an emphasis upon atomic fragments at the expense of the 
connective relationships existing between such “fragments.” 
 In order to recover dimensions of experience truncated by the classic conception, 
a reconception of experience is required. The most decisive piece of this reconception is 
the denial that experience consists of a “tissue of subjectivity” – immediate to the subject 
and existing in contrast to the “external world.” This “immediacy” attributed to 
experience was an attempt to terminate the “quest for certainty” by providing the 
foundation needed in order to establish a bed rock of epistemic truth. The unfortunate 
consequences of this misguided quest are solipsism or skepticism – the subject is forced 
back to the “subjective” side of the ontological gap.  
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 As Smith is quick to point out – there is no passive spectator who occupies a view 
from nowhere. All experience is mediated in some degree through the human dependence 
upon signs. As Royce made clear in The Problem of Christianity, interpretation serves as 
a necessary link between sensation and conception – experience contains meanings that 
are the result of varying degrees of determination supplied by the subject.  This break 
from the confines of the traditional theory of experience has powerful implications: 
Once the intuitive certainty of the internal is abandoned, the way is prepared for 
understanding experience as the medium for the disclosure of a reality which enjoys a 
tenure beyond the experiencing subject. A long standing bias is reversed; instead of the 
world “taking place” in “experience,” experience takes place in the world and is, 
correspondingly, of that world which is a major factor in bringing it about. 6 
 
Smith focuses upon the pervasive quality of an experience. Experience is not 
registered überhaupt – experience is felt hic et nunc. As we experience events in the 
world as sublime or sacred, that experience is “shot through” with a defining quality and 
is disclosive of an emergent reality existing in its own right. The religious dimension of 
experience is present within the context of those situations “in which man experiences 
both the concern for, and question about, the ground and goal of his being and all 
being.”7 The experience of God is not revealed ab extra through a transcendent act of 
sheer self disclosure. God appears in medias res – any experience of God is at the same 
time an experience of something else. Experience in its qualitative pervasiveness 
provides the “experiential roots” which must be traced, eventually leading us to an 
experience of God.  
                                                 
6 John E. Smith, “Experience and the Boundary Between Philosophy and Religion,” in Philosophers on 
Their Own Work (Philosophische Selbstbetractungen) eds. A. Mercier et al (Peter Lang, 1980),  p. 199. 
7 Ibid.: 201. See also John E. Smith, Religion and Empiricism (Marquette University Press, 1967), p. 60: 
“The religious dimension comes into view when we encounter in our own selves a peculiar question and 
concern, the question and concern for the quality of our life and our world taken as a whole.” 
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Experience presents a myriad of things within varying defining contexts. The 
religious dimension of experience provides the lure which causes us to seek the most 
comprehensive context within which to integrate and unify the totality of what we 
experience: both our personal being and the world within which we live as a whole. As 
Smith says: “The problem of the self-integrating power is the problem of God cast in 
experiential form.”8 Human reason, as Kant indicated at the beginning of the first 
Critique, is characterized by the fact that it is perennially faced with problems which it 
cannot ignore but which transcend its ability to answer. Smith articulates the religiosity 
that is inherent in this condition in the following way: 
We betray our own incompleteness by our drive toward a final purpose. The religious 
question … is not initially posed in the face of special occasions or revelatory events; it is 
rather a precondition of the quest for these occasions. Every fulfillment stands related to 
an expectation, and to speak as though a given fulfillment could generate its own 
expectation is either to confuse us or to put the cart before the horse…. The religion of 
special occasions is always dependent upon interpretation through experience and 
knowledge of general occasions.9  
 
A successful reconstruction of experience is necessary for achieving a degree of 
stasis or integrity within the human being. As long as the traditional conception of 
experience holds sway, epistemic constraints dictate the disclosure of actuality. These 
constraints place a heavy strain upon experience by filtering out of experiential 
dimensions which cannot be disclosed through that pre-conception. Human being 
becomes fragmented as a result of its inability to realize the full dimensionality of being. 
Smith emphasizes the importance of the Roycean notion of the self as exhibiting 
comprehensive life plan according to which he or she “means to be” – a unique person in 
a community of persons linked to the divine. A self, confronting the world, seeks some 
                                                 
8 Religion and Empiricism: 61. 
9 John E. Smith, “The Present Truth in Natural Religion,” in Reason and God: Encounters of Philosophy 
with Religion (Yale University Press, 1961): 262-263. 
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form of self-realization. Experience is “a great mass of contents resulting from the 
interplay between the self and the world in which it lives … the great matrix out of which 
all distinctions arise….”10 Experience is also a “double-barreled,” reciprocal affair – an 
interactive encounter between the experiencing self and that which exists. An appeal to 
experience capable of penetrating a total life pattern is an essential ingredient in the 
reinstatement of human being to its full experiential potential. This is a “living” 
conception of reason. As the self engages in the process of tracing greater degrees of 
comprehensive unity, the self is at the same time somehow reflexively “carried along” in 
this very same process of unifying development. Following Dewey, Smith identifies this 
project as the “recovery of philosophy.” 
Smith made an impassioned appeal for recovery in Philadelphia during his 
famous 1981 Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical 
Association entitled “The New Need for a Recovery of Philosophy.”11 A recovery of 
experience involves an appeal to experience in its full dimensionality. His appeal for a 
recovery was made out of respect for both philosophy and persons. Due to its fixation 
upon establishing itself as a Fach – or citadel of expertise and specialization – philosophy 
no longer has a relevant voice for the things that matter most – namely, the place of 
human being in the cosmic order.  Philosophy’s recent emphasis upon the need for the 
inculcation of a specialized technique has resulted in its alienation from the laity – the 
man on the street – those who are as much implicated in the philosophical endeavor as 
the professional caste! This preponderance of “Philosophy for philosophers” confirms 
                                                 
10 John E. Smith, The Experiential Foundations of Religion, p. 174. 
11 John E. Smith, “The New Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” in The Spirit of American Philosophy 
(SUNY Press, 1983): 223-242. 
 296
Dewey’s caricature of philosophy as the act of chewing a cud long since reduced to a 
woody fiber.  Smith expresses the dangers of such elitism in the following: 
[W]e do not see with geometry…. [W]e do not mean with a theory of meaning, we do not 
communicate with a theory of communication, and we do not know with epistemology. 
Whatever be the role and place of such theories, they must not be allowed to come first as 
constituting the entrance requirements for philosophical thinking, for, if they do, the 
charade of postponement will be reenacted…. Critical thinking must be about results, not 
roots.12 
 
According to Smith, the project of philosophical recovery consists of three basic 
pillars. First, philosophy must once again become rooted in what Dewey referred to as 
“problems of men” – the various forms of activity that constitute the life of a people. 
Second, philosophy must lose its identity as a conceptual prerequisite – no longer 
establishing in advance what it is that alone constitutes grist for the philosophic mill. 
Third, philosophy – as well as all reflective endeavors – must proceed dialectically on a 
larger scale, not tethered to the exclusive interest of any one dominant research program. 
Philosophy must be underway and at work, both engaging and seeking engagement. 
Like any program, a “new” recovery of philosophy requires both effort and time 
in order to realize itself. Smith is attempting to reinvigorate a discipline that has in a large 
measure lost its way in a maze of specialization. An emphasis upon technical acumen 
within a restricted domain of inquiry has led to large stretches of barren landscape in 
contemporary philosophy. According to one of his former students, Smith stands before 
us much like Jeremiah, a sign proclaiming the importance of “establishing the basic 
context for people functioning together with a common world…. Smith’s main approach 
to American philosophy is to employ it religiously to bind together (again?) our disparate, 
                                                 
12 Ibid.: 230. 
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fragmented, and alienated situation.”13 To use a phrase often employed by Smith himself, 
John E. Smith will always be remembered for the important role he played while 
“breaking a small lance” in the ongoing effort to reinstate experience to its proper place 
in our mental life. 
  Robert O. Johann (1924 - 2009): The Primacy of Intersubjective Being 
Ensconced in the stage of objectification, the self will be strong on means but weak on ends, 
proficient in science but at a loss about the sense of it all.14 
  
Like Smith, Robert O. Johann also champions a return to experience: 
If the process of objectification, which is essential to the constitution of experience, has 
actually involved a distortion of it, this will be able to be remedied—if remedied it can 
be—not by attempting to get back to a stage previous to that process itself, but in a sense 
by going beyond it. The “return” must somehow be a “reconstruction” … an effort to 
elaborate something anew. It will really be an effort to reshape experience, to give it a 
new mold, a new direction.15 
 
 Johann’s focus will be to identify the presence of intersubjective being within 
experience. The subject who undergoes an experience is not primarily a detached intellect 
or an “angelic eye.” The subject is a person who experiences. Each experience is 
qualified by some dominant quality due to the manner in which it makes an impress 
within the context of our individual life. According to Johann, the primary means by 
which a person achieves self-determination is through the act of participating in concrete 
dialogue. Persons are not disclosed merely through the abstract generality of thought – 
they are experientially constituted in actu exercito through the process of engaging in 
direct commerce with the world. We harbor an implicit experiential awareness which is 
                                                 
13 Robert C. Neville, “John E. Smith as Jeremiah,” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 22:3 
(1986: Summer): 267. According to Neville, “Smith’s students themselves represented the culture betrayed 
by philosophy…. (p. 261.) 
14 Robert O. Johann, S.J., “The Return to Experience,” in Review of Metaphysics, 17:63 (March, 1964): 
335-336. 
15 Ibid.: 332. Johann adds in a footnote that “This effort can be called a ‘return’ because, in making it, the 
self will try to model its life on the exigencies inherent in that life itself, rather than on the dictates of its 
thought about life.” 
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anterior to dualisms of any kind: “This is a pre-reflective kind of knowledge, implicit in 
all our actions, and in terms of which the world is present to us, not precisely as known, 
but as lived in and dealt with.”16 Experience becomes, reflexively speaking, an all 
inclusive whole in which the subject and object are mutually implicated in each other’s 
development. The “giveness” of matter may condition our life – it does not define it. The 
“other” is an ingredient feature within the experiential field. The self becomes activated 
through an experiential interaction with an other – the life of the self must be seen as 
including not only the self but also “the whole range of the other with which it deals as 
well as the whole range and variety of its dealings…. [B]y a sort of circumincession, each 
includes and is included by the other.”17  
Taking his bearings from Marcel, Johann emphasizes the need for the self to 
overcome the reifying effects of abstract reflection and regain its lost sense of unity 
within the “intra-personal” dimension of experience. Through a process of “indirect 
conceptualization,” a strata of intra-personal being can be revealed albeit in a rather 
oblique way: 
Ineffable in itself, “existence” can thus be described according to the way in which it is 
known. Such description does not make existence an essence. What is “objectised” is not 
existence in itself, but the context in which it is revealed … its relationship to essence.18 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid.: 323. 
17 The Return to Experience: 325, 327. See also Building the Human (Herder and Herder, 1968) where 
Johann develops the notion of what he refers to as a “reflective pragmatism” in which “the ideas and 
principles in which life to be shaped have their origin and final test in the experiential process itself…. We 
come to the truth only in and through the very process of living (p. 22.)” 
18 Robert O. Johann S.J., “Subjectivity,” in Review of Metaphysics, 12 (1958/1959): 214. See also Robert 
O. Johann S.J., “Creativity and Unbelief,” in The Presence and Absence of God, ed. C.F. Mooney S.J. 
(Fordham University Press, 1969), pp. 13-14: “But suppose the objectivizations of God are not confused 
with the divine itself … their importance not in themselves but in what they present to us. As determinate 
patters and structures, these mediations are simply relativities. Only what they look to is absolute and that, 
as absolute, is indeterminate.” 
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 Johann refers to this process of indirect conceptualization as reflective ratification 
– a reflection upon reflection. Human experience is necessarily shared experience.  The 
relationship between self and other takes place within the seamless web of experience. 
Reflective ratification is the act of “re-cognizing on the level of reflection what is already 
cognized, but only implicitly on the level of direct awareness.”19 What is implicitly 
revealed within the context of direct awareness is the prior reality of the “we” – 
an unanalyzed totality out of which we are able to lay claim to a common world. 
However, a series of relationship between oneself and another person is not sufficient for 
disclosing the breadth of the “infra-personal” field. The personal order within which I am 
implicated risks breaking down into an indefinite multitude unless it is held together by a 
wholeness that is attributable to universal fellowship: “Only the achievement of such a 
community can make our lives fully whole.”20  
 A university community is not simply an imaginary ideal – it is the extension of 
something to which we currently have access – our sense of being fragmented and 
compartmentalized takes place in the midst of a nascent awareness of “something” larger. 
We must thematically extend the range of that which we are pre-thematically aware. The 
sense of unrestricted relationality required for a genuine universal community requires a 
“source” or an aim to which all are responsively linked – a unifying focus of the entire 
interpersonal order. A source of this kind requires a degree of transcendence in order to 
effectively achieve any sense of integrated unity. Johann refers to the “transcendent 
ground and universal focus of the whole interpersonal order” as God.21  
                                                 
19 Robert O. Johann, “God and the Search for Meaning,” in God Knowable and Unknowable, ed. R. Roth, 
S.J. (Fordham University Press, 1973): 263. 
20 Robert O. Johann S.J., The Pragmatic Meaning of God (Marquette University Press, 1966): 47. 
21 Ibid.: 53. 
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The act of love provides the ultimate expression the human potential for 
intersubjective being. The beloved is not present to the lover as a detached object – the 
beloved is present as a mutual subject. The ontological source for the deep connection 
existing between lover and beloved is to be found within the interiority of consciousness: 
Since being is the absolute, unconditional value, totally enveloping everything 
that exists, it can be approached adequately only from the inside…. [I]f being is to be 
grasped in its absoluteness, it can only be by a sort of active, inner identity with itself, a 
sort of interior presence to itself. But the only experience we have in which being is 
interiorly present to itself is that of the inwardness of human consciousness; it is the 
incommunicable presence of the self to the self…. The interiority of consciousness first 
reveals to us what it truly means to exist.22 
 
 The love exhibited between the lover and the beloved is a human manifestation of 
the inward presence of being to itself – a “face to faceness” within being which is 
reflective of the absolute value of being itself. The lover’s soul is moved by the sensuous 
beauty of the beloved – causing the former to recollect, albeit faintly, the more genuine 
beauty of the eternal. The beloved is lifted out of the conditional reality of space and time 
and reestablished within the extensive field of being. In the words of Victor Hugo, 
“sacred being throbs within the beloved.”  Johann captures the ontological structure of 
love in the following: “To be loved is to encounter Being itself, eternity in time, God’s 
face among the faces of men…. Blessed is the man who recognizes it … for only he can 
know what it means to be.”23 
 Johann’s emphasis upon the ontological structure of human love, paves the way 
for an understanding of God as the ontological ground of creativity. Qua human, we have 
                                                 
22 Robert O. Johann S.J., The Meaning of Love: An Essay Towards a Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity (The 
Paulist Press, 1966): 13. See also, “Experience and Philosophy,” in Experience, Existence, and The Good: 
Essays in honor of Paul Weiss, ed. I. Lieb (Southern Illinois University Press, 1961), p. 27: “[E]xperience 
may be defined as the dynamic interrelation of self and world, grasped, not objectively, but from within, in 
so far as the self, as self, is present to both itself and the world as co-constituents of an open yet all-
inclusive whole.”  
23 Building the Human: 75-76. 
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the unique capacity to transcend the determinately actual through envisioning things in 
the light of their possibilities.  Our ability to conceive of “an openness beyond 
determinate structures is inconceivable … if it is not at the same time an openness to 
what is beyond the determinate.”24 Human being is defined by its ordination to being – 
creativity is the intelligent responsiveness to being itself: 
The world is a happening. Its sense is not something antecedent and original. It issues 
from the interplay of and endless variety of factors and forces, one of which is human 
intelligence. It is an emergent sense in whose shaping both intellect and initiative can 
have a part.25 
 
The world we encounter today is a functional and fragmented world. Our focus is 
solely upon the task at hand. A myopic concern with efficient causality has effectively 
eliminated any trace of final causality from the fabric of life. Yet there remains a 
dimension of life that simply resists reduction to the level of efficient causality – a level 
of the self which transcends all of its particular preoccupations. As the ground of all 
purposeful action, our conception of God cannot stand in need of further grounding. 
According to Johann, we must recognize God as the transcendent source of the 
comprehensive integration that is reflective of a meaningful life: 
Plural encounters can coalesce into a meaningful life, without the loss or suppression of 
their distinctive qualities, only if each is also a phase in a single continuing encounter—
only if there is One whom a person encounters in all his encounters and answers in all his 
actions. Only in the context of transcendence can the bits and pieces of man’s life be 
simply and wonderfully what they are and still add up.26 
 
Johann’s conception of God emphasizes the intrinsic presence of God within 
human being. God provides the “transcendental ground” of our humanity that is 
                                                 
24 Robert O. Johann S.J., “Creativity and Unbelief,” in The Presence and Absence of God, ed. C.F. Mooney 
S.J. (Fordham University Press, 1969): 9-10. See Johann’s treatment of “creative interaction” in The 
Pragmatic Meaning of God, pp. 4, 6: “Man’s fulfillment, therefore, is to be sought in the in the quality of 
the interactive process itself…. [H]e exists in a true sense beyond limits….” 
25 Building the Human: 32. 
26 Building the Human: 33-34. 
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implicated in all that we do. The world does not reveal itself experientially as already 
complete. Experience is the process through which we approach completeness.27 To be 
human is to be in some sense already holy – our divine nature provides us with a glimpse 
of the infinite. The human project consists of creatively integrating the welter of 
experiential data in such a way that it is turned towards unity. This unity must be 
conceived in personal terms: “[I]t is to experience ourselves as being involved with an 
initiative which transcends our own, a determining source which addresses us and 
expects an answer.”28 From a Johannian perspective, God bequeaths to us the ability to 
shape our world and to achieve self-realization in very the process of our doing so. 
Without any sense of a unifying vision around which to orient one’s life, our 
creative energy can become easily misguided, resulting in a Sartrean subjectivism of the 
worst kind – answerable only to itself. When God is eliminated as the overarching 
horizon of meaning, we are left without a ground for intelligent action – questions of 
value and the prioritization of values force themselves upon us. According to Johann: 
“[O]nly a thematization, in practice as well as theory, of the responsive and responsible 
openness of intellect to the Transcendent Other as its own ground can save the idea of 
creativity from falling into [this] trap.”29 A comprehensive ideal of human action is 
required. God provides the sense of “maximum coherence” – a source of unification 
within which to integrate the diverse multiplicity of perspective. The present “eclipse of 
God” that plagues contemporary life is not necessarily an indication that God is no longer 
                                                 
27 See The Pragmatic Meaning of God, p. 23: “A person’s life, therefore, is in a sense, the whole of reality. 
Not everything, to be sure, is contained there mente … but everything is involved facto.” 
28 Robert O. Johann, “Person, Community, and Moral Commitment,” in Person and Community: A 
Philosophical Exploration, ed. R.J. Roth S.J. (Fordham University Press, 1975), p. 170.  
29 Creativity and Unbelief: 16. 
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relevant to the question of our being human – it is simply an indication of an inadequate 
conception of God. The “God” many have proclaimed to be dead is simply not God. 
Carl G. Vaught (1939 – 2005): The Quest for Wholeness 
[W]e must not be occupied with merely theoretical problems, but must focus instead upon the 
world as a whole and upon the most pressing questions that confront the human spirit.30 
 
 The philosophy of Carl G. Vaught consists of a sustained attempt to reunify the 
fragmentation brought about by a broken world. Abstract reflection, although well suited 
for grasping the generic structures of existence, simply cannot articulate the concrete 
dimension involved when wholeness is disclosed within experience. Vaught circumvents 
the potentially dangerous consequences of becoming permanently enmeshed in abstract 
thinking by adopting a method that combines “the concreteness of story-telling with the 
clarity of reflective discourse.”31 
 Human being requires ongoing effort. We simply do not become human by 
belonging to the species homo sapiens. The “essence” of human being is something that 
must be achieved – we need to somehow reach beyond ourselves in order to lay claim to 
ourselves. In the absence of achieving any abiding sense of self-unity, we are besieged by 
a nagging feeling of fragmentation. This sense of being fragmented is not simply the 
reflection of a dichotomy between the self and that which is externally other. The 
fragmentation we experience is an interior phenomenon consisting of “an internal 
modification of our own nature.”32  
 Qua finite, the sense of wholeness we are capable of achieving is necessarily 
perspectival and not complete. Wholeness is not to be equated with a Hegelian sense of 
                                                 
30 Carl G. Vaught, The Quest for Wholeness (SUNY Press: 1982): ix. 
31 Ibid.: xi. 
32 Ibid.: 1. This claim is in no way intended to lessen the importance of community for overcoming our 
sense of fragmentation. 
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comprehensive completeness. The very best to which we can aspire is the achievement of 
a kind of “midpoint” position – a concrete situation wherein an image of eternity 
gradually unfolds within the context of a human drama. Vaught describes the three 
dimensional space in which our sense of wholeness is configured in bi-directional terms: 
“The quest for wholeness moves in two directions, pointing to the Ground from which 
we come and to the Whole toward which we develop; and within the human space in 
which it unfolds, it attempts to find the center of life in between these two dimensions.”33  
The experiential nature of this quest is depicted in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick. 
In order to combat the “damp, drizzly November in my soul,” Ishmael – the main 
character – strikes out on a vast, oceanic journey in search of the great white whale. The 
structural aspects of Ishmael’s quest for wholeness are crucial:  
[I]t is important to notice that the quest can begin anywhere; that it must begin 
somewhere in particular; and that it always begins nowhere…. The fact that the quest can 
begin anywhere makes participation possible; that it must begin somewhere makes it 
relevant to our particular condition; and because it always begins nowhere, we are given 
an initial access to eternity.34 
 
 The journey to self-discovery – like the search for the whale – proves to be 
elusive. Unlike Captain Ahab’s myopic fixation with the destruction of Moby Dick, 
Ishmael’s attempts to plumb the depths of mystery through the power of logos – he 
becomes “an image of narrative intelligibility … bind[ing] Melville’s story together in a 
way that gives us access to the mystery and power of the journey….”35 Ishmael’s logos is 
rendered from the surface of an empty coffin upon which he is kept afloat while adrift at 
                                                 
33 Quest for Wholeness: 7. Emphases added. Cf. W. Norris Clarke, “Living on the Edge: The Human 
Person as ‘Frontier Being’ and Microcosm,” International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXXVI, No.2, 
Issue No. 142 (June 1996). 
34 Quest for Wholeness: 23, 24. See also page 28: “[T]he water is not a place to live but a medium through 
which he is required to move.” 
35 Ibid.: 44. It is hardly coincidental that Ishmael is a teacher by training. 
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sea. The salvation provided by the buoying effect of the coffin – an obvious symbol of 
death – is indicative of the fact that the journey toward wholeness often requires losing 
oneself in order to save oneself. Like the act of reflection, the quest for wholeness 
contains a reflexive axis. As one insightful critic comments: “Melville’s deep diving is 
into self with the goal of discovering at the center a hidden but powerful sublime 
identitiy.”36 As Ishmael plunges into the oceanic depths of mystery, he is able to re-
collect himself by virtue of a logos that is concrete – rendered from a place that bespeaks 
the unique particularity of his salvation: “Why then here does any one step forth?—
Because one did survive the wreck.”37  Ishmael’s salvation, physically speaking, results 
from his rescue by the crew of the Rachel – a whaling vessel bearing the name of one of 
his biblical ancestors. Philosophically speaking, the conditions of Ishmael’s salvation 
remain somewhat ambiguous. The reader is left with the question of whether Ishmael’s 
salvation is merely a function of being absorbed into a new world in the form of a new 
ship and crew – “another orphan” as the text states – or is it a function of a dissolution 
into much deeper origins? Ishamel’s words in the Epilogue seem to indicate the latter: 
“[G]aining that vital centre … I floated on a soft and dirge-like main.”38 
Rich experiential insights like these gleaned from works of epic literature must be 
leveraged further with the help of philosophical reflection. Here, Plato’s treatment of 
piety in the Euthyphro is especially helpful. Whereas Euthyphro maintains that a proper 
understanding of piety requires a retrospective insight into divine origins, Socrates is 
convinced that piety involves an outward quest for unity. For Vaught, the key advance 
                                                 
36 William B. Dillingham, Melville’s Later Novel’s (University of Georgia Press, 1986): 13. 
37 Herman Melville, Moby Dick (New American Library, 1961): 536. Emphasis added. 
38 Ibid.: 536. The casket provides an [en]lightening bouncy from which to offer a culminating logos.  
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which the form of Platonic dialogue is able to achieve is “not merely existential but 
theoretical, for in discussing the nature of piety they become engaged in a reflective 
inquiry about the meaning of wholeness itself.”39   
Such is the reason why Socrates proposes the question of the meaning of piety in 
itself. We must move beyond the concrete depiction of meaning offered up in Moby Dick 
to the univocal perspective derivable from philosophical reflection. If piety is indeed 
capable of univocal definition, then knowledge of that definition bespeaks a wholeness of 
sorts on the part of the soul that is able to arrive at an approximate knowledge thereof. 
Through Socratic investigation, we will be given access to the univocal structure of piety 
itself.40 
Euthyphro stumbles repeatedly in his attempt to formulate an adequate 
conception. With the help of Socrates, he begins to develop a definition of piety which is 
no longer couched solely in the framework of divine characteristics. At this important 
juncture, the dialogue moves to a discussion of piety as part of a larger whole – as a part 
of justice. A wider context is needed in order to synthesize discordant, equivocal aspects 
within a greater whole. 
 However, the dialogic nature of reflection yields a conception of wholeness in the 
making rather than made. At the end of the dialogue, we are left in a condition of aporia. 
Euthyphro is determined to reach back to a sacred past of familial ties and divine intent in 
order to overcome a state of civic “pollution,” while Socrates’ noesis is forward looking – 
intent upon harmonizing the cosmos by overcoming equivocation through episteme. This 
condition of Platonic state of aporia need not be viewed destructively. For Vaught, 
                                                 
39 Quest for Wholeness: 95-96. 
40 See Plato, Euthyphro, trans. H.N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library, 1999): 6d-e.  
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Socrates’ suggestion to “return to the beginning” of the dialogue is crucial – leaving the 
reader with a sense of open-ended closure that is so indicative of a Plato: 
To ask, “What is piety?” and to ask the corresponding question “What is the meaning of 
wholeness?” is to face a problem that must be confronted on countless occasions…. [T]he 
unity of the dialogue is to be found in the analogies that draw the characters of the 
dialogue together. Socrates and Euthyphro are mirror images of one another….  This 
identity-in-difference is the analogical ground of unity that pervades the dialogue at the 
structural level and that constitutes the philosophical structure of the aesthetic unity to be 
found within the discussion.41 
     
  Hegel attempts to dissolve the appearance of disunity represented by this 
condition of identity-in-difference by systematically uniting all instances of opposition or 
“externality” within the concrete unity of experience. The aporia of Platonic dialogue is 
aufgehoben through analogy in the form of the all-inclusive, intelligible unity of 
consciousness. Experience, for Hegel, has a dynamic aspect – it moves. Objects become 
revealed in greater degrees of truth within consciousness: “[W]hat it previously took to 
be the in-itself … is only in-itself for consciousness.”42 Taking a gloss from T.S. Eliot, 
Hegel’s goal is to arrive at the point where we started – at an understanding of 
consciousness itself – and to know the place for the first time.  
 Despite Hegel’s appreciation of the ability of religious experience – especially 
Christianity – to transcend the moment of externality, religious experience is still inferior 
in form to philosophical experience. According to Vaught: “Th[e] transformation of 
religion into philosophy is the final conquest of radical externality, for it transposes the 
external stages of the Christian mediation into the internal moments of the process of 
philosophical reflection.”43 
                                                 
41 Quest for Wholeness: 149. 
42 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press, 1977): 54. 
43 Quest for Wholeness: 169. 
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 The Hegelian sublation of religion into philosophy comes at a price – a price that 
Vaught is not willing to pay. The dimensions of openness, otherness, and mystery must 
be preserved and not swept up within the clarity of Hegelian synthesis – absorbed within 
the systematic totality. Unlike Plato’s aporetic identity-in-difference in which irreducible 
difference is preserved, Hegel attempts to undifferentiate difference through its 
reconstructive assimilation within a higher unity. In short, mystery is de-mystified qua its 
assimilation within consciousness. For Vaught, Hegel’s propensity to assimilate 
otherness within the rational order stems from his inability to appreciate the power of 
metaphor. Despite his aversion to externality in all its various forms, Hegel held a 
dualistic view of language. Neither the ontological unity of the “speculative sentence” 
nor the external string of pictorial representations characteristic of common speech can 
provide an adequate space for wholeness. An appeal to metaphor is required – an appeal 
which is implicit in Hegel’s philosophy itself: 
For example, Hegel claims that the Phenomenology is both a pathway to Science and a 
highway of despair. And he compares the stages of the philosophical journey to the 
stations of the cross, where we encounter the metaphors of the inverted word, the master-
servant relationship and the unhappy consciousness…. In this way, art and the aesthetic 
dimension remerge as crucial elements of his system, and Hegel gives us poetic access to 
the meaning of his thought….44  
 
 In fact, Hegel’s notion of Aufhebung is rooted in a metaphoric conception of 
language. In order for the “tripartite” movement of consciousness to occur, a rigid 
opposition between two terms must be made fluid, allowing for their incorporation within 
a higher unity. This is exactly what happens in metaphoric discourse – “the ordinary 
concept of a meaning is taken up, conjoined with a different, sometimes even 
                                                 
44 Quest for Wholeness: 176. 
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contradictory meaning and held in tension with it to comprise a larger metaphorical 
unity.”45 
The whole need not consist of simply an intelligible unity – it can “explode from 
within.” An adequate conception of the whole must allow for dynamism as well as 
intelligibility. Vaught refers to this new sense of ground as the “Place of places.” Space 
provides the region in which an irreducible, concrete instantiation may occur – the taking 
of a stand in and through which the religious dimension of experience reveals itself. 
Much like the case of the identity-in-difference characteristic of Socrates and Euythphro, 
the stand that is associated with a particular place may exist in contrast to another, but the 
infinity of possible standpoints implies a unity that is not susceptible to conceptual 
inclusion.  Place provides an “ontological nexus” – a region in which unity and otherness 
are preserved at the same time.  
[T]he emergence of the concept of space as a primordial conception suggests that 
the philosophical demand for intelligibility can be satisfied without needing to transform 
the quest for wholeness into a quest for complete comprehension…. The metaphorical 
openness of the stages of experience allows them to open out toward one another, while 
the analogical otherness of these same elements allows them to be connected without 
being included in an overarching unity.46 
 
This notion of a “Place of places” provides the pervading theme of Vaught’s later 
research.47 Contrary to the direction taken by Heideggerian phenomenology in which 
space is subsumed under the ecstasis of time, place must be given its ontological due. 
According to one astute observer, “Place itself is concrete and at one with action and 
                                                 
45 Ibid.: 176. See Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Metaphorical Twist,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. XXII, no. 3, (1963), pp. 203-307 for a detailed treatment of the “clash of meaning” that 
occurs within metaphor. 
46 Quest for Wholeness: 192-193. See also “Being and God,” in Essays in Metaphysics, ed. C. Vaught 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970): pp. 213-233 where Vaught argues that “the Absolute is open-
ended in respect to final integration.” 
47 See Carl G. Vaught, Metaphor Analogy and the Place of Places: Where Religion and Philosophy Meet 
(Baylor University Press, 2004). 
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thought.”48 The “Place of places” is the locus where space, time and eternity come 
together – the point at which “I can locate and orient myself to whatever else there is.”49 
Place also bespeaks a dimension of eternity by providing a source of origination from 
which all synthetic acts arise. For Vaught, the Place of places preserves the creative 
dynamism of the whole in which identity and difference are preserved.  Much like Hegel 
referred to as black cows in the dark of night, this purview provides “not only a way of 
understanding the being of beings but as a way of glimpsing the Being of Being as 
well.”50 As the place that makes truth possible, the Place of places is no ordinary place. 
   John M. Anderson (1914 - 1999): The Recovery of the Experiential Infinite 
If philosophy has a future, its future is to make man unendingly aware that what he seeks through 
his contributing to works is richness with integrity. The integrity of the work of philosophy itself 
reflects the richness of the ultimate.51 
 
 John M. Anderson was a brilliant, unconventional philosopher who established 
Pennsylvania State University as a vital center for the study of continental philosophy in 
the 1950’s and beyond –opposing the dominant trends of analysis and positivism that 
dominated the American landscape. This was a remarkable achievement for a public, land 
grant university. Anderson received a Ph.D. from Berkley in 1939 – having written a 
thesis entitled Structure and Purpose.52 Anderson’s initial training was in mathematics – 
his earliest work consists of essays in industrial management and quality control. 
Anderson’s corpus in many ways defies categorization. He was a founding editor of the 
legendary journal Man and World, he edited a collection of documents by John C. 
                                                 
48 Edward Casey, Getting Back into Place: Towards a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World (Indiana 
University Press, 1993), p. xiii. See also Michael Mayerfield Bell, “The Ghosts of Place,” in Theory and 
Society, Vol. 26, 1997, pp. 813-836 for an interesting treatment of place as both sui generis and collective.  
49 Metaphor, Analogy, and the Place of Places: 9. 
50 Ibid.: 13. 
51 John M. Anderson, “Why Categories?” in Research in Phenomenology, Vol. VIII, 1978: 173. 
52 At Berkeley, Anderson would befriend a fellow graduate student named Henry Bugbee. 
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Calhoun, translated and introduced a series of texts by Heidegger, and co-authored a text 
on the axiomatic structure of natural deduction – but he is known most for his books 
entitled The Individual and the New World and The Realm of Art.53 Providing an 
overview of a thinker of such broad persuasion is a challenge. The theme that is perhaps 
best able to illuminate the entire constellation of Anderson’s thought is his treatment of 
the human capacity to realize the infinite. 
 Anderson’s conception of a “positive” infinity stands in contrast to what Hegel 
calls the “bad infinite” – the recurring, endless repetition of the same. To understand 
Anderson’s conception, we must return to a fragment of Anaximander: archē ton onton to 
apeiron – the originating principle of things is infinity.54 Infinity, in its originating sense, 
is the limitless (in-finis) depth out of which things appear as limited (finis). It is our 
aversion to the boundlessness of the originating infinite that causes us to take refuge in a 
series of metaphysical schemes – we seek a surrogate in the form of “a distinct and final 
grasp of things.”55 According to Anderson, we must reclaim within a contemporary 
context the original experience indicated by Anaximander – an experience eclipsed by the 
ongoing effects of experiential sedimentation. Fortunately, the Ur-gefühl indicated by 
Anaximander is realizable through various forms of human activity. Anderson’s writings 
                                                 
53 The Individual and the New World: A Study of Man’s Existence Based Upon American Life and Thought. 
(Bald Eagle Press, 1955) and The Realm of Art (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967). For a complete 
bibliography of Anderson’s publications, see Being Human in the Ultimate: Studies in the Thought of John 
M. Anderson, eds. N. Georgopoulos and M. Heim (Rodophi, 1995): 335-337. It is a little known fact that 
Anderson composed three classified books on the use of computers during World War II and he holds two 
patents – one on a vector computer and the other on a polynomial computer. See Georgopoulos and Heim, 
p. 2. 
54 See G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 105. 
The fragment is taken from Simplicus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.  
55Michael Heim, The Realization of Infinity: On the Philosophy of John M. Anderson,” in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, June 1983: 544.  
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point to the various domains of praxis which exhibit the potential to yield “the free 
becoming of the actual infinite.”56 
 Human beings possess a unique gnosis for participating in the infinite. An oblique 
type of peripheral vision is required in order to perceive the hidden background that 
animates all things as they become meaningful within a worldly context. Anderson’s 
early philosophical work focuses upon the various ways infinity became realized within 
the context of the early American pioneer experience.  The array of concrete activities 
that characterized westward expansion in 19th century America share in common the fact 
they reflect the articulation of a “New World” out of an infinite matrix: “[T]hat man, too, 
was infinite, that no aspiration or power was too great for him to conceive and dare to set 
in motion…. The Life which accepted this responsibility related the confidence 
engendered by the infinite in man to a natural locus.”57 
 The Shaker religion provides a powerful example of the phenomenon that human 
nature is derived from an infinite source. The Shaker notion that “every force has a form” 
reflects the deep conviction that the union of earth and spirit is obtained through “hand-
mindedness” – an intuition of divine presence locally instantiated through a creative 
example of simplicity.58 The overall importance of the movement of Western expansion 
lies in the way in which “primal human energies” are released – resulting in meanings 
that are generated rather than discovered in the process of choice and action: 
[I]f one appealed to experience looking for a definite and particular character of man, one 
appealed in vein…. Any person appealing to experience for information about man 
                                                 
56 Why Categories?: 165. 
57 The Individual and the New World: 97, 103. For a powerful account of the philosophical dimensions of 
this phenomenon of American explorational expansion, see John J. McDermott, “The American Angle of 
Vision,” in Cross Currents, No. 1, 1965 and No. 4, 1965.  
58 See “Force and Form: The Shaker Intuition of Simplicity,” in The Journal of Religion, Vol. 30, No. 4, 
1950. 
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would see this universal aspect of himself, and however he turned and whatever path he 
took, experience would reflect his core as a star without parallax.”59 
 
The human capacity to realize the infinite is further revealed through works of art. 
To borrow a phrase of Heidegger, the “work-being” of a work of art bespeaks a 
burgeoning resistance to form. Through the existence of what Anderson refers to as 
“horizontal form,” the formal modalities of the work of art are momentarily overcome – 
allowing for the open disclosure of a content which reveals the ultimate: 
An aesthetic occasion is an emergence, a disclosing of content evoked from an opaque 
given through a forming process within which man, as participant, happens to find 
himself…. In this moment human questions are silenced and human questing stilled. Here 
there is a fugitive disclosure which is perfection. The absoluteness which beauty 
evidences attests the ultimate bounding movement of creation itself.60 
 
Twentieth century abstract expressionism provides a compelling example of a 
genre in which works of art disclose “the revelation of content in and through form….”61 
As expressionist artists simply paint, art is able to emerge on its own terms. Ordinary 
experience, qua intellectualized, is truncated – linearized through an overemphasis upon 
formal constraints. Straight lines and geometrical surfaces simply do not allow for the 
sense of depth required in order to inspire a sense of kinesthetic immediacy on the part of 
the beholder. Within expressionist experience, the creative use of strokes, curves, and 
sweeps result in an intensity of content not achievable in form-governed works. Form 
now becomes intrinsic to content through a dynamic balance in which “the content 
revealed by form is potentially more than its presence … emerg[ing] as something giving, 
                                                 
59 The Individual and the New World: 88. See p. 173: “Man’s nature is not attained once and for all, but 
again and again, hauntingly maintained in an eternal present.” 
60 John M. Anderson, The Realm of Art (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967): 183, 169. See also 
Why Categories?, p. 171: “[P]hilosophy should stand as the name for that art which defines the special way 
in which the infinite richness may be articulated with integrity.” 
61 John M. Anderson, “Art or History?” in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 25, no. 4 (1967): 
409.  
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rather than as something given.”62 Expressionistic art thus provides a compelling example 
of the experiential realization of the infinite. The dynamic movement back and forth 
between form and content lends a sense of life to the texture of the artwork that is 
“completable but not completed.”63  
The human potential to realize infinity becomes most acute in the realm of 
politics where the collective association of human being occurs. From Anderson’s 
perspective, each realization of political structure contains an implicit principle which 
must be creatively overcome in order to realize infinity anew. The principle of dialogue is 
a key ingredient of this process of realization. Dialogue reflects a dimension of linguistic 
openness unattainable through canonical, non-dialogic approaches to language. The sense 
of closure generated through canonical speech creates an internal pressure that must be 
overcome in order to realize the infinite. According to Anderson, “It is my wish to fix the 
point at which language is absolutely essential to politics … not in its day to day 
functioning but in expressing the significance of collective action…. [O]ur language is 
necessary to present the truth of freedom.”64 
 The infinite consists of such richness that no finite distinction is final and any 
distinction made is free. Through mutually recognizing and dialogically participating 
within the public sphere, we achieve “a free becoming of difference in the ultimate, and 
                                                 
62 Art or History?: 411. See also “Sketch for a Phenomenology of the American Experience,” in 
Phenomenology in a Pluralistic Context, eds. W. McBride and C. Schrag (SUNY Press, 1983), p. 181: 
“[T]he artist is as intent upon yielding to the unknown in his action as upon forming it…. In yielding, the 
artist comes to trust the unknown emerging as given to him … in his projection of the artwork as an 
unending open receptacle for the free moments of beauty that successively culminate the joint enterprise in 
which he and the unknown participate.” 
63 Ibid.: 411. 
64 John M. Anderson, The Truth of Freedom: An Essay on Mankind (University Park, PA: The Dialogue 
Press, 1979): vii. See Anderson’s, “…Since the Time We are a Dialogue and Able to Hear from One 
Another” in Man and World, 10:2 (1977): p. 117, where he develops Heidegger’s notion that “each 
language used breaks up under the strain of its use….”  
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thus an articulation of the ultimate.”65 The articulation of the ultimate requires a horizon 
within which a process of creative unfolding can occur without repetition and without 
limit. This can only be accomplished through a quasi-Platonic type of dialogic encounter 
with revolutionary consequences: 
The articulation of the ultimate proceeds by building a net of public acts in which, in 
principle, each successive articulation disregards the net already built by focusing upon 
the ultimate emerging within the net, that is, remaining in the open region central region, 
and articulating this in a way which does not form or continue any pattern of the net so 
far produced…. The truth of freedom becom[es] in the activity of building this patternless 
path. The expression of this truth is the work of revolution.66 
  
 Nowhere is the revolutionary style of Anderson’s thought more poignantly 
expressed than in his last published work “Bespeaking the Origin of the Dialogue We 
Are.”67  Anderson’s project of reclaiming infinity required a continuous revamping of his 
mode of expression. Philosophy must abandon the Cartesian quest for clarity, 
distinctness, and systematic understanding. Philosophy must aspire ά la Nietzsche to the 
creation of alternative world interpretations which allow for the unrestricted realization of 
possibility as opposed to the accurate representation of an objective Ding-an-sich. 
 Anderson’s vision of a polity constituted by continuous acts of unending 
creativity may appear naïve according to current the quotidian standards – a strange 
mixture of romanticism and bohemianism. We must not forget, however, that Anderson 
was no stranger to scientific rigor. His philosophy serves as a testimonial to the 
limitations of analytic thinking when it comes to articulating the infinite – “that realm in 
which the myriads of nets spun from man’s ultimate nature glow in the invisible light of 
                                                 
65 Ibid.: 61. 
66 The Truth of Freedom: 70-71. 
67 See Being in the Ultimate: pp. 293-334. 
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what he is not.”68  To appreciate Anderson’s vision is to begin to realize the possibility of 
a “New World” – what Anaximander referred to as athanaton kai anolethron – “the 
radiant being of divinity.”69 
Robert C. Pollock (1901 - 1978): The Apotheosis of Human Consciousness as Spirit 
The philosopher must be sensitive to the need for experience, and while recognizing no ‘fatal 
chasms’ in experience, he should never forget that knowing cannot be taken as primary without 
cutting the cords that binds experience and nature together.70 
 
 The philosophy of Robert C. Pollock resembles a crucible – a rich metallurgic 
melding of medieval and classical American influences. The medieval axis was derived 
from his work with Étienne Gilson at The Pontifical Institute in Toronto – the 
headquarters of North American Thomism. His interest in American philosophy stems 
from his training under Alfred North Whitehead at Harvard University. During his 30 
year career at Fordham University, he attained legendary status as a lecturer. 71 It may not 
be an exaggeration to claim that the catholicity of Pollock’s erudition may have equaled 
that of Royce.  Pollock’s synthetic intellect is duly noted by John J. McDermott, one of 
his former students: 
[The]theme of experience, especially the American experience, then the focus of the 
Fordham University philosophy department was generated for the most part if not totally, 
by decades of extraordinary teaching on the part of Robert C. Pollock. . . .  Over against a 
good deal of hostility and widespread institutional disinterest, Robert Pollock waged a 
valiant struggle to upend the narrow parochialism, both speculative and academic which 
pervaded Catholic institutions before our time. [H]e taught Medieval philosophy with a 
fashion of imagination and scholarship nowhere matched in the field.72 
                                                 
68 John M. Anderson, “The Work of Revolution,” in Philosophy in Context, Vol. 5, 1976: p. 11. 
69 See Aristotle, Physics 203b12 where he cites Anaximander. I am grateful to Heim’s essay for this insight. 
70 Robert C. Pollock, “Process and Experience: Dewey and American Philosophy,” in Cross Currents, 9, 
no. 4 (1959): 357. 
71 See John J. McDermott, “Robert C. Pollock 1901 – 1978” in Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association, Vol. 52, no. 1, 1978, p. 18: “It is as a teacher of philosophy that Pollock will be 
most remembered. [H]e was without peer as a classroom lecturer.” See also McDermott’s comment in his 
“Acknowledgement” to The Writings of William James (University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. xvii: 
“Robert Pollock stands out in our time as one who embodies the majestic vision of William James.” 
72 Cited in Thomas W. Casey, “The Audiotapes of Robert C. Pollock,” in Pollockosmos.com (a website 
dedicated to the work of Robert Pollock.) Although his formal scholarly production is limited to less than a 
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 Pollock views the history of Western thought as consisting of a rich panorama of 
influences. Christian mysticism, Renaissance science, and American pragmatism each 
share in the quest for a cosmological outlook that is theophantic in nature– an “all 
embracing drama” in which divinity is revealed intra rebus naturae.  
Through the application of human understanding, greater degrees of unity are 
engendered upon the world. The world comes into greater proximity as we experientially 
embrace it. Through a fusion of self and world, consciousness makes present to itself an 
ever-increasing, vast experiendum.  Dynamic and processive, human being exists in-the-
making. We are unprecedented and not bound by any antecedent state of affairs – a star 
without parallax. The self exists as a mode of infinity, always underway in search of a 
larger “totality of presences” – a finite attempt to concretely realize the infinite. The 
human project is best viewed as an attempt to become more God-like, or universum, by 
collectively (colligere) bringing polarity into unity through the gathering power of lόgos. 
The desire for incessant growth, complete integration, and total consciousness are 
correlative activities. 
We live in the midst of an incomplete universe in which “the temporal dimension 
has come into its own, and with it, the reality of growth and development.”73 This 
conception of human experience has the potential to lead to an awareness of the cosmic 
dimension of consciousness – transporting us from a closed world to an infinite universe. 
A burgeoning historical consciousness plays a decisive role: 
                                                                                                                                                 
dozen excellent journal articles, an extensive collection of cassette recordings of his lectures are currently 
housed in the library at Marist College. To date there are over 230 recorded lectures averaging 
approximately 80 minutes in length. 
73 Robert C. Pollock, “Process and Experience,” in Cross Currents, Vol. 9, no. 4 (1959): 342. 
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[M]en now look upon history as a great flowing reality, a gigantic river of life fed by 
many tributaries, and continually gathering force and increasing in turbulence…. 
[H]istory is a real and meaningful continuum … manifesting its fluidity and plasticity, 
and diversifying itself in innumerable ways while striving after unification. In situating 
ourselves within a vast process of history ultimately embracing all mankind, we are 
achieving a new and startling transcendence over our circumscribed and limited lives in 
the present, through which we shall finally sweep away the last vestiges of 
individualism.74 
 
 The key to human self-realization lies in the recognition that human being is an 
increasingly emerging experiential organism. Any prior notion of the self qua solus ispe  
must be surpassed in order to recognize the cosmic potentiality of experience. In and 
through our finite condition, human being exists underway in the expansive pursuit of 
that which surpasses us. We are summoned by “gigantic forces … journeying to a goal of 
perfection, achieving … greater fullness of life for each individual person, accumulating 
experiences and building up reserves of power through the ever expanding … living 
organ of the individual’s action and realization.”75  
 It is important to note that Pollock is not advocating anything resembling a kind 
of historical relativism. Once history is viewed in its full ramifications, it is apparent that 
history includes a process of development that is spiritual in nature – “a progression in 
the polarization of man to transcendent truth and value.”76 A vertical conception of 
history is required in order to understand human being as a dynamic process seeking 
greater degrees of comprehension and integration: “The complete man is man with the 
universe. He cannot therefore be satisfied with merely logical coherence, for he is driven 
relentlessly beyond himself toward a concrete universality.”77 
                                                 
74 Robert C. Pollock, “History as a Matrix,” in Thought, Vol. 26 (Summer, 1951): 206. 
75 Ibid.: 209. 
76 Ibid.: 211. 
77 Ibid.: 212. 
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 The human striving for concrete universality serves as the basis of human 
freedom.78 A vertical understanding of historical development yields a conception of 
human being that, albeit finite, is opened to an infinite reality to which it is dynamically 
related. This open, vivifying relation between the finite and the infinite allows for a 
richness and fecundity unavailable within any conception of a “closed universe.” 
Historical experience occurs sub specie aeternitatis. Pollock’s discourse resounds with a 
Hegelian-like resonance: 
The Absolute penetrates man’s mind with an inner necessity and as an exigency which 
rules his thought. When we view man as, in a sense, the climax of the whole cosmic 
process … we can see in man’s awareness of the Absolute as the law of its thought a 
universal intimacy which has reached a new pitch of intensity in becoming conscious of 
itself. In short, man’s awareness of a totality which surrounds him, and its struggle  
toward concrete wholeness are vitally bound up with his sense of the Absolute which is 
truly encompassing in its very transcendence and within which he lives and moves and 
has its being.79 
 
 Pollock’s intent is to create a “significant synthesis” – combining an appeal to the 
concrete á la pragmatism with an appreciation of the absolute depths of metaphysical 
speculation. In this sense, Pollock’s philosophy is both catholic and Catholic.80 As 
consciousness develops historically – both vertically and horizontally – human being is in 
the position of becoming increasingly aware that the historic route of conscious 
development is not arbitrary. History “is not closed in on itself, but is always in a 
vivifying relation to the divine…. [O]ur history is not merely the search for an all 
inclusive order, but is rather the very process of its achievement….”81 
                                                 
78 See, Robert C. Pollock, “Freedom and History,” in Thought, Vol. 27 (1952), p. 407: “[H]uman freedom 
must be looked at within the frame of historical process.” 
79 History as a Matrix: 217. 
80 It should be noted that Pollock converted from Judaism to Catholicism while at Harvard. For an account 
of how Catholic philosophy can effectively meld with American pragmatism, see Pollock, “Catholic 
Philosophy and American Culture,” in Thought, Vol. 17, No. 1, September 1942: 445-463. 
81 Robert C. Pollock, “The Basis of a Philosophical Anthropology,” in Thought, Volume XXV, no. 97 
(June, 1950): 199-200, 201. 
 320
 In order to appreciate the cosmic potential of consciousness, it is necessary to 
jettison the notion of consciousness as bicameral – possessing distinct inner and outer 
dimensions. In fact, the “inward” and “outward” dimensions of consciousness are 
complementary and organically linked. Consciousness is increased, or deepened, as it 
engages in a “movement into the objective order … [into] more interrelationships and 
more far-reaching unities.”82 Nowhere is the bicameral dualism of consciousness 
transcended more than in the Patristic tradition where we witness the ability of human 
being to exist on two planes of consciousness simultaneously. Every contact with the 
material environment involves us in a mysterious contact with a higher world. The 
philosophy of Saint Augustine serves as a paradigmatic example in which human being is 
depicted as possessing both a deep reflexive interiority which, at the same time, provides 
an external, objective access to the immediacy of God: “Augustinian interiorism thus 
implies a remarkably organic conception of personal life; it is obviously a liberating 
objectivity … since it gives man an irresistible élan toward the fullness of reality, and the 
capacity to open himself completely to it….”83 
 Unfortunately, this pervading sense of the unity of consciousness so powerfully 
depicted by Augustine is languishing in the contemporary world – annulled by an 
emphasis upon the Cartesian conception of a detached Cogito with its distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities. One of the many benefits of reading Pollock is his 
creative reading of the early modern philosophical tradition, paying close attention its 
                                                 
82 The Basis of a Philosophical Anthropology: 202. 
83 Ibid.: 205. See Pollock’s similar characterization of Emerson in “Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803 – 1882): 
The Single Vision,” in American Classics Reconsidered: A Christian Appraisal, ed. H.C. Gardner (Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1958), p. 37: “Emerson’s affirmation of the vertical or spiritual as against the temporal or 
horizontal axis of history served a practical purpose…. Men had to be brought to a realization that a divine 
force is operative here and now….” 
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theophantic intentions. Still, the Cartesian notion of substance as “requiring nothing but 
itself in order to exist” has been effectively applied to the human self. The effect has been 
to disregard the fact that human being is situated in ever-more inclusive unities without 
which human being cannot lay legitimate claim to being human. The concrete connection 
between human being and God, according to Pollock, must be made luminous. Human 
being is an intellectual and spiritual being who exhibits a “likeness” to God. Our capax 
Dei is due to the ontological proximity we share with God as well as our decisive role in 
recollecting Divine unity by virtue of “the exigency of the absolute that rules our 
thought.”84 Despite the many functional demands placed upon us today, there exists 
ample evidence to support Pollock’s claim that human beings are most eager to break out 
of pre-determined roles and confining situations, hoping to become integrated in a wider 
context of meaning. This sense of an exigence of being, to return to a phrase of Marcel, 
bespeaks a pre-reflective awareness on the part of consciousness of a sense of spiritual 
completion. Typically, this sense of completion is experienced nascently as a dark night 
of the soul. Once this nascent awareness becomes realized in greater degrees of 
fulfillment, what a cosmos stretches out before our eyes!85  
§ 
The Future of Philosophy: A Brief Prospective 
As to the future of philosophy in America, we cannot overlook the fact that philosophy becomes a 
historical force only when it succeeds in making contact with what is of universal and of enduring 
value in the historical life of a people. If it should show itself incapable of participating in that 
process, it can have no future worth talking about, nor will it be able to tap the vast potential of 
energy that has been built up…. Whatever future remains to a nonhistorical philosophy will be 
confined to hollow classroom exercises, a purely academic philosophy which remains powerless 
to expand consciousness and contribute towards the enrichment of experience.86 
                                                 
84 The Basis of a Philosophical Anthropology: 216. 
85 See The Basis of a Philosophical Anthropology: 205. 
86 Robert C. Pollock, “The Dream and the Nightmare: The Future of Revolution,” in American Philosophy 
and the Future: Essays for a New Generation, ed. M. Novak (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968): 82-83. 
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Unfortunately, all of the philosophers treated in this section are deceased or have 
retired from academic life.  Very few up and coming philosophers have accepted the 
important mantle bequeathed by these thinkers. Despite the appearance of pluralism that 
is currently projected from within the American academy, our philosophy still wields a 
formidable abstractness. The representative work is often verbose and otiose – its lack of 
originality shrouded by an over use of jargon and footnotes. When contrasted with the 
current standard of philosophical writing, the efforts of this select group stands out by 
reason of the accessible manner in which it is written, the wealth of experiential 
dimensions to which it appeals, and the absence of any invasive formalism.  In order for 
philosophy to have even the slightest chance of resonating outside of the academy, it 
must at the very least exhibit qualities of accessibility and relevance. As Barnaby C. 
Kenney – a former president of Brown University – once remarked “The scholar does not 
lose dignity by being intelligible.”  Failure to heed this fact will result in a largely 
unacknowledged transition from the “ivory tower” to something akin to the Tower of 
London – a place suited to storing the Crown Jewels but hardly a place worthy of housing 
that which should be the intellectual property of humankind. As William James intimated 
in his satirical essay The Ph.D. Octopus, a certain baldheaded-bespectacledness has come 
to dominate philosophy. One astute American philosopher summed it up as: “[T]hose 
who need the most possess the least. Sheltered within the academic world, philosophers 
lack access to human diversity.”87 My hope is that our fate would not become that which 
Nietzsche predicted for Western humanity – a state of archival blindness stemming from 
a myopic preoccupation with dust from books and printers’ errors. E.M. Adams – a 
                                                 
87 John Lachs, “Valuational Species,” Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (1997): 297. 
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recent American philosopher acutely aware of this very problem – states the matter 
powerfully: 
We have what I have called a saber-toothed tiger civilization. In the evolutionary 
process, the saber-toothed tiger developed great tusks as effective weapons in combat, but 
perished because they obstructed its eating. We have developed a culture that is highly 
successful in advancing science and technology and producing wealth and power, but in 
doing so we have undermined and subjectivized the sectors of the culture that underwrite 
our identity…. But unlike the saber-toothed tiger, we can discover our error and correct 
our course. 88 
 
Our dream must be to reverse this course and recover those dimensions of 
experience that have become lost so as to awaken from the current nightmare. With 
dreams come responsibilities.  
                                                 
88 E.M. Adams, “Reinstating Humanistic Categories,” in Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2001): 21. 
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